ASPI suggests

As usual, we’ve rounded up this week’s useful reports and articles, as well as interesting events related to Strategist themes.

First for today is Chris Elder and Robert Ayson’s new policy primer (PDF) that looks at China’s rise and New Zealand’s interests. It’s published by the Centre for Strategic Studies (New Zealand) and Victoria University of Wellington.

Then there’s a new RUSI report that looks at Taliban perspectives on reconciliation in Afghanistan (PDF). Authored by Michael Semple, Theo Farrell, Anatol Lieven and Rudra Chaudhuri, it contains interviews with four senior Taliban interlocutors and finds that they ‘deeply regret their past association with Al-Qa’ida’ (p.3).

Closer to home, the Pacific Institute of Public Policy has released a paper that looks at the Asia-Pacific Century from a Pacific island perspective (PDF).

Update: a late addition to the list is Andrew Krepinevich, President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, whose new paper (image below) examines whether the expansion of the military competition into the cyber domain represents a major shift in the character of warfare. How do cyber attacks compare in devastation and likelihood with nuclear ones?

After that, check out Adam Elkus’ considered review of Krepinevich’s paper over at CTOvision.com.

Cyber Warfare CSBAThe Commandant of Pakistan’s Command and Staff College, Major General Sohail Ahmad Khan, is delivering a seminar on ‘Humanitarian Assistance and Development Aspects in Conflict Zones’. The event is hosted Kokoda Young Strategic Leaders’ Forum and the USI of the ACT at the Australian Defence College, Canberra, Wednesday 19 September at 6.00pm.

Lastly, there’s a CNN live panel ‘China ♥ America’ that looks at the ‘special bond’ between the United States and China. The panel, which includes James Fallows, Geoffrey Garrett, Jianying Zha and Eric Knight, will be at the Sydney Opera House, Saturday 29 September at 6.00pm.

Image courtesy of Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

Re-re-re-reforming Defence acquisition

The recent Senate committee report ‘Procurement procedures for Defence capital projects’ was naturally of great interest to us, concerned as it was with our core business. We weren’t dispassionate observers of the process either; we put in a submission and tendered some of our relevant work, and we appeared before the committee on occasion.

The Committee grappled with some of the perennial issues that surround Defence projects, and (in our view) through their recommendations put their finger squarely on the biggest challenges that face the Department:

The key recommendations deal with much needed organisational change directed at achieving the correct alignment of responsibilities and functions of relevant agencies, and providing them with the skills and resources they need to fulfil their obligations. They underscore the importance of Defence becoming a self critical, self evaluating and self correcting organisation.

In many ways, and as the Committee recognises, these observations are following a well-trodden path, behind many reviews of the acquisition, support and general management practices of the Department, including those by Kinnaird (2003), Mortimer (2008), Rizzo (2011), Cole (2011) and Black (2011). The alignment of responsibilities, functions and resources has been a common theme in those reports. The degree of contestability and rigour within the capability development process has been a subject that ASPI has visited in the past as well. Read more

Neither democracy nor defence planning

One of the things I like about Jim Molan is the relish and obvious enthusiasm with which he brandishes his lance at the many windmills that rise out of Russell Hill. However, I was dismayed by his latest contribution to The Strategist in which he proposed a way forward to address what he perceives as the inappropriate levels of defence spending by the current government. Particularly so at a time when he believes that the perceived strategic uncertainty merits a much greater contribution from the public purse.

In his words, what should determine how much Australia spends on defence should be the strategic environment. When this should be spent is the relationship between warning time and the time it takes to build defence capability. From the tenor of his contribution, the correct answer should be ‘lots’ and ‘right now’. However, I am left uneasy by two factors. First, his apparent view that the only thing to do at a time of strategic uncertainty is spend more money on defence. That to me sounds like a curative approach rather than a preventative one. One could equally argue that greater expenditure in improving our diplomatic capabilities to address the claimed uncertainties. Second, that ‘more’ equals ‘better’ or ‘more effective’. Indeed Major General Molan makes this very point when he notes that the ADF has an almost total lack of real capability, despite having lots of ‘things’. Read more

New Zealanders and the rising cost of Afghanistan

CPL Douglas GrantTwo multiple casualty incidents in one fortnight have made August the deadliest period for New Zealand’s Defence Force in Afghanistan. In those two weeks, the death toll among New Zealand’s deployed forces—in theatre for a decade—has doubled.

These incidents occurred in the increasingly difficult northeast portion of Bamiyan, the central and relatively calm province where New Zealand has maintained a Provincial Reconstruction Team since 2003. The common view is that the attackers appeared to be operating from across the border in neighbouring Baghlan Province.

Recent media commentary on these incidents increasingly asks direct questions about New Zealand’s commitment in Afghanistan. Why are we still there? What have we really accomplished? Shouldn’t we be getting out right now? Read more

On democracy and defence planning

If I go to a public hospital and it is inadequate to my needs, I have immediate feedback that there’s a policy failure. I express my dissatisfaction immediately and if there is no improvement I hold government to account politically at the next election. I’m able to fully understand the risk that the government has decided to take in relation my health if it underfunds hospitals. In the meantime, I may use my own money and buy hospital services from the private sector. The result of this is that governments have an incentive to act as the people want, and even if the government decides to underfund, the total impact on the service is always less than the total amount of funding loss because we use our own money. Health is a ‘private good’ in this sense. In this situation, the democratic system works relatively well, and we can rely on the impact of the peoples’ will on governments to influence policy. It applies to almost all other areas of government policy such as education and welfare.

Andrew Carr hopes that the Australian people will lead the government to spend an appropriate amount on defence. But whether we like it or not, as the above comparison with other government policy areas illustrates, defence in Australia at present is different. As Mark Thomson pointed out recently, it’s a ‘public good’—we can’t buy extra defence for ourselves if the government doesn’t provide what we want. This creates special government responsibility. Read more

ASPI suggests

This week, we’ve compiled a list of interesting and informative reports and articles for your reading pleasure, as well as a few events to attend.

First off the mark, the Council on Foreign Relations’ Dinah Walker has this piece on trends in US military spending. It includes (about two thirds of the way down) an interesting observation in a graph that shows that democracies account for about 85% of global military spending (see below).

Demoracies' military spending

Meanwhile, the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade has released its latest report on procurement procedures for Defence capital projects. The report is a wide-sweeping review of Defence’s management of the capability process and an assessment of troubled projects like the Tiger Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter and the Air Warfare Destroyer.

In terms of regional security, Koh Swee Lean Collin from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore, looks at Vietnam’s recent acquisition of six Kilo-class submarines (PDF) and evaluates the effects on the naval balance with China and in Southeast Asia.

On a lighter note, Andrew Exum at the Center for a New American Security reflects on the utility of social media and blogging for those who engage in policy analysis or research, and provides some solid advice for those thinking of trying it out.

Ahead of the anticipated white paper, Emeritus Professor Peter Drysdale will be speaking about Australia in the Asian Century at the Australian Institute of International Affairs’ Canberra offices, Tuesday 11 September at 5.30pm.

And you may wish to check out author and think tank fellow, Martin Jacques, deliver a presentation (and incidentally, title of his bestselling book), ‘When China Rules the World’, at the Australian National University, Canberra, Wednesday 12 September at 3.00pm.

Reader response: weapon lethality and battlefield risk

Following on from my post on the increasing lethality of weapon systems over time, I got some interesting correspondence from Strategist reader David Goyne. He provided me with some data taken from the work of the late T.N. Dupuy, who David accurately describes as ‘a US Army officer, historian, operational analysis autodidact, and a fanatical advocate for his OA (operational analysis) method based on quantified historical data and assessment’.

Relevant to the earlier post is Dupuy’s observation of a counter-intuitive trend—the increased lethality of weapon systems has been accompanied by a decline in the average daily casualty rates in major battles (see the graph below, source: redrawn from data in T.N. Dupuy, The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare).

Graph average daily battle casualty rates Read more

Remember who controls the purse strings

Duncan LewisJim Molan ends his latest post on defence policy with the cutting line ‘The only upside for us voters is that the CDF and Secretary are more than likely to tell the Minister exactly what they think the consequences of his policies are. And we will know exactly who to blame. Of course there is no indication that this Minister cares.’ I’d wager that Molan has it backwards, no Minister likes having their budgets cut. But more importantly, it’s the public that doesn’t seem to care that Defence has been cut.

While the tightening of the defence budget was announced as part of the overall 2012-13 budget changes, a look at the polls suggests no strong public reaction. Newspoll (PDF) found voters were split on whether this year’s budget was good or not (37-37). This was down on the number of voters who thought the budget would negatively affect their personal finances (41%), but it seems the issue of defence cuts does not seem to have even registered. Equally, the Federal Opposition’s initial reaction to the cuts was muted. Leaving any return to higher spending as an aspiration, the Coalition’s priority is instead to fast-track small combat ships to help turn back asylum seekers. If the Coalition’s internal polling was showing great voter anger or concern over the defence budget cuts, we could expect to see it in their policies. Their reticence to reverse or even strongly criticise the government’s cuts is therefore telling.

Why does this matter? Read more

Clash of the titans? China and the United States in Myanmar

There is an emerging consensus that the United States is challenging China’s dominance in Myanmar, with analysts reporting signals of ‘Myanmar’s shift from China’s orbit toward the West’. This apparent shift was brought into focus by the suspension of China’s Myitsone Dam mega-project in northern Myanmar’s Kachin State in September 2011, a decision described as a ‘democratic act’ by US Senator John McCain. Many have described the dam suspension and other recent events as signs that Myanmar wants to be ‘part of the new world order instead of being half-colonized by China’.

The thrust of these analyses is the vilification of Chinese involvement, in contrast to the idolisation of US engagement. That viewpoint needs some analysis. On face value, it cannot be assumed that US involvement is necessarily positive or negative. But nor is Chinese.

China’s years of diplomacy and assistance have supported and cultivated Myanmar’s development. It is unfair to the Chinese government to insinuate that Myanmar’s recent liberalisations and the increasing involvement of other foreign nations were unforeseen by the Chinese. Indeed, the Chinese have actively encouraged Myanmar to engage with the international community over the years, including supporting their ascension to ASEAN. Read more

Malaysian–Australian relations: close to the limit (part II)

Exercise Bersama Lima 2011In my last post, I outlined the development of the long-standing defence relationship between Australia and Malaysia. While there is strong history between both militaries, the difference in the ways in which they are utilised accounts for, in part, the limit to how close a defence relationship there can be. Here, I examine additional factors impacting on Australia–Malaysia cooperation.

First is the issue of defence budgets; both countries are facing the issues of limited budgets for their militaries which in turn affects their capability for future training, particularly when having to deploy assets out of country. Indeed the RMAF’s non-participation at this year’s RAAF Pitch Black exercise in Australia was due to a lack of funding. It might be expected that both militaries may have to curtail some of their activities in the future in order to accommodate the budget.

Second, further expansion of training and cooperation may largely be moot due to the existing commitments of both nations. All three services of the ADF are heavily involved with Australia’s global missions and, with the presence of the US military in Darwin, the ADF will add additional joint exercise and training activities to its schedule and thus be limited in what it can provide in regard to other bilateral military cooperation and training. In Malaysia, the Royal Malaysian Navy and RMAF face the problem that their forces are undersized for patrolling Malaysia’s extensive maritime waters and airspace and as such are heavily committed, which limits the assets and personnel available for cooperation and training with foreign forces. The Malaysian Army, given its size, could easily accommodate an increased scope of military exercises with its Australian Army counterparts in the form of company- or battalion-sized mechanised, armour or artillery exercises. But the fact that both countries have sufficient training areas for such in their respective countries means that neither army can justify the costs of shipping heavy equipment and troops overseas for an exercise, particularly in an era of budgetary restraint. Read more