Strategist Article Archives - Page 1173 of 1186

Who is Xi Jinping and what will he mean for Australia?

31 October 2012

At the launch of the Australia in the Asian Century White Paper, Lowy Institute Executive Director Michael Fullilove made an interesting observation during question time about the level of attention paid in Australia to developments in the United States versus developments in China. Specifically, he commented that the Australian public is told a lot about the US Presidential candidates—right down to the marathon running time of the Republican candidate for Vice President—but, despite the imminent leadership change in Beijing, we hear very little about the incoming Chinese President.

Perhaps part of the reason for our lack of interest in the Chinese leadership change is because it’s more or less pre-ordained, whereas in the US, Romney and Obama are engaged in a dramatic race to the finish, battling it out in televised debates. (Some prefer to imagine what a heated Chinese leadership debate would like). Yet, the Chinese leadership change is a once-in-a-decade event and, considering we know comparatively little about Xi Jinping, what should we know about this man and how his term might impact Australia?

Xi Jinping has been Vice President since 2007 and, at 59 years old, is one of the youngest members of the Communist Party leadership. His father was a revolutionary war hero who went on to become Vice President. However, in 1962 his father had a falling out with Mao and was jailed during the Cultural Revolution. Xi himself was sent to do hard labour in the countryside and ended up living in a cave, sleeping on bricks, and fending off fleas. Xi openly admits to outsiders that the Cultural Revolution was ‘a failure for the nation’—unusual candour from a Chinese leader. Read more

Australia: an ASEAN perspective

30 October 2012

‘You [Australia] have found Southeast Asia, don’t lose it.’

These were the words of the highly charismatic ASEAN Secretary-General Dr Surin Pitsuwan, the key-note speaker at last Tuesday’s launch of the Southeast Asia Institute at the Australian National University. Discussing the future of ASEAN, a central theme of his talk is best reflected in the quote above: now that Australia has ‘found’ Southeast Asia, it is in our best interest to continue to focus our cooperation, support and involvement in that region.

According to Dr Surin, Australia’s ‘discovery’ and involvement in the region has been a recent phenomenon. For a long time, Southeast Asian states, and even Australians themselves, viewed Australia as something of an aberration—a European country that just happened to be located in the Asia Pacific. However, as Southeast Asia has grown and changed, it was ‘about time’ for Australia to look towards its neighbours and realise the advantages of being connected with that part of the world. This is particularly important as ASEAN has become increasingly interlinked as an economic bloc, and is attracting world attention as being centred in the ‘new growth centre of the world’. Read more

The challenges of order-building in the Indian Ocean Region

30 October 2012

Recent contributions to The Strategist have provided valuable insights on the extent and limits of India’s willingness and capacity to assert itself as a nascent great power. Implicit in these discussions lies a deeper issue, specifically the challenge of how best to secure international order in an increasingly contested Indian Ocean Region (IOR). As both the epicentre of the struggle against jihadist extremism and an increasingly critical ‘energy superhighway’ linking East and South Asia to resource hubs in the Persian Gulf, East Africa and Northwestern Australia, the IOR is rapidly growing in strategic significance. But the absence of either a ‘hub and spokes’ style alliance system or a well-developed tradition of multilateral security diplomacy comparable to equivalent structures in the Asia–Pacific significantly complicates efforts to establish a viable regional security architecture. India’s ‘rise’—however halting and incomplete—thus occurs in a radically different regional context from the densely institutionalised web of security and economic cooperation that is presently shaping China’s ascendancy in the Asia–Pacific. For this reason, when trying to make sense of the magnitude and likely consequences of India’s rise, it’s necessary to contemplate the range of possible alternative regional security orders that may co-evolve alongside a stronger and more assertive India:

1) An Indian Ocean Pax Americana: The US Navy’s re-calibration of its ‘two ocean’ orientation (from an Atlantic/Pacific to an Indo-Pacific focus) and the greater interest in the IOR evidenced in the US ‘rebalance’ towards Asia both provide some grounds for envisaging a more overt US leadership role within the local security order. Nevertheless, a combination of limited US interest and likely regional resistance to US hegemonic pretensions—not least from India—make the prospective emergence of an IOR Pax Americana a remote prospect. Undoubtedly, the US Navy will remain the principal security guarantor for regional maritime commerce, and the US will increasingly work to strengthen defence and intelligence cooperation with regional partners. But even the staunchest boosters of American primacy are unlikely to see the value or the viability of attempting to replicate in the IOR the obtrusive, costly and densely institutionalised types of security orders that have underpinned US dominance in Western Europe and East Asia since 1945. Read more

ASPI suggests

29 October 2012

With the upcoming US presidential election on 6 November, we’ve put together a special edition ‘ASPI suggests’ of reports and articles relating to US defence policy and spending.

Defence policy and spending

One of the key issues in US defence is sequestration. To help you get across the issues, here’s a good primer. Although sequestration hasn’t happened yet, Deputy Defense Secretary Ashton Carter has directed the Pentagon to ‘continue normal spending and operations’ in order to avoid the ‘harmful effects’ of spending cuts while they still can.

Turning to the third Presidential debate on foreign policy, Mitt Romney’s concerned about the US’ lack of ships. Over at Bloomberg, Gopal Ratnam has penned a piece on why that’s an imprecise measure of naval power. And whoever wins the election might have some tough decisions to make about the future of fighter aircraft development in the United States, according to no less than Aviation Week.

Next, for those graph tragics following the election itself, this New York Times graphic tracking the voting pattern of swing states is nothing if not eye catching.

Key advisers on defence and security

Both President Obama and Governor Romney have assembled teams to advise on defence and security matters. We’ve identified two important individuals who are shaping options for the next administration.

Michèle Flournoy served as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in the Department of Defense from February 2009 to February 2012. In this role, she was the most senior woman ever to have served in the Department of Defense and a close adviser to President Obama on Afghanistan and other security issues. She recently moved to the Boston Consulting and has been active in a leadership group advising Obama on second term defence and security policy options.

In this September interview at the Fletcher Forum, Flournoy sets out some of the key challenges facing a second term Obama administration. She says,

The thing that would worry me most if he were not re-elected is that there is a lot that’s been done to restore respect for America as a country that champions the rule of law in the international system. There’s a lot that’s been done to restore our reputation for working well with others, for seeking to create and strengthen alliances and bring together coalitions.

There is also some good career advice here for women thinking of working in Defence organisations.

Probably the sharpest exchange between Obama and Romney in the third presidential debate was over the numbers of ships in the US Navy. One of Romney’s lead advisers on Defence is John Leaman, who at age 38 was made Secretary of the Navy in the Reagan administration, and was the author of the then plan for a 600-ship Navy.

Here Leaman sets out his views on plans for the Navy in a Romney administration. He reveals plans to create an 11th carrier air wing, one for each aircraft carrier; to continue F/A-18 Super Hornet strike fighter production; to build up the amphibious fleet up to the Marine Corps’ requirement of 39 ships; to procure an entirely new battle-group-deployable class of frigate, along with a class of ballistic missile defence ships. These would be important developments for Australia and in all probability would impact on our own plans for Super Hornet acquisition and for BMD capability on the Air Warfare Destroyers.

Events

Australia’s Ambassador to China, HE Ms Frances Adamson will be delivering two presentations during November. Ms Adamson’s first appearance will be a Griffith University-hosted seminar on Australia’s relations with China at the Gallery of Modern Art, Brisbane on 8 November at 5.30pm. Her second is a business lunch hosted by Asialink and the Australia China Business Council at the Langham Hotel, Melbourne on 9 November at 12pm.

The Kokoda Foundation will be hosting Susan Eisenhower, American expert on nuclear energy and US–Russia relations and President of the Eisenhower Group, for a workshop called ‘Why strategy matters’. The workshop will be held on Wednesday 14 November at the Hyatt, Canberra. Registration required.

For Perth-based readers, Curtin University will be holding its 4th Annual National Security & Strategy Workshop (look out for ASPI’s very own Tobias Feakin who’ll be presenting) on Friday 9 November at the Crown, Perth. Registration required.

The Asian Century White Paper: one plan to rule them all

29 October 2012

The Australia in the Asian Century White Paper is an ambitious document, and it’s one Strategist contributors will analyse from different perspectives over the next few days. Broadly speaking, there are some important and positive aspects to the statement: it is the most comprehensive expression of Australia’s foreign policy objectives in over a decade; it focusses on a region of enormous importance to us; and it allows for a very modest growth in our diplomatic engagement with the region. But the downsides to the report are equally apparent: it is largely unfunded; the planning complexity rivals the Barry Jones ‘noodle nation’ education plan that was sunk by its own cleverness; and (as I have argued here) the narrow focus on Asia’s emerging powers is a necessary but insufficient start point for Australian strategic policy.

The chapter on ‘Building Sustainable Security in the Region’ is the only point in the White Paper that discusses the consequence of potential risks to Asian stability and growth. There is a welcome emphasis on the importance of continuing US military engagement in the region and on the essentiality of the US policy of extended deterrence to its allies. The chapter points to the growing range of defence capabilities in Asia. In China’s case, it says that this growth is ‘natural and legitimate’ and it emphasises the importance of building trust as a means to prevent potential conflict. We’ll have to wait for the 2013 Defence White Paper to see the finer detail.

The most curious inclusion in the security chapter is a reference to ballistic missile defence: Read more

Defence skills golden triangle: right people, right place and right time

28 October 2012

In a recent speech to RUSI, Raytheon boss Michael Ward outlined how the Australian Defence industry had dropped from close to 30,000 people down to about 25,000 people over the last three years. Given the government would like to see 34,000 people upwards in that space over the coming decade I would suggest that the golden triangle for a skilled defence workforce is on very shaky ground.

‘In his July 2009 speech to the Defence & Industry Conference, the then Defence Minister, John Faulkner, predicted a defence industry workforce of 34,000 by 2013,’ Ward told his audience. ‘Much has changed since then but the reality is we will soon have a defence industry workforce some 30% smaller than the Government expected.’

Since this time guidance to industry has been a mixed bag. The White Paper of the day sent many a mixed message on the strategic outlook and the hows and whys of the wider defence landscape. Financial details were slim to be filled in at the budget and we all know how that went. Just read anything on ASPI’s site or blog by Mark Thomson on the Defence budget and the complete lack of detail on future spending. Rhetoric is great but the numbers just don’t match up. Read more

UN intervention in Mali – preventing terrorism or providing a new training ground?

26 October 2012

On 12 October the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution urging African regional troops and the UN to present within 45 days a plan for military intervention in Mali, seven days later Australia won its seat on the Security Council. This highly precarious situation in Mali is one that Australian diplomats will have to understand as the consequences of poor decisions will be far reaching beyond the immediate Sahel region.

Mali is one of the poorest nations on the planet, and its citizens have undoubtedly experienced a traumatic year so far in 2012. And with the recent announcement of the plan to deploy Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) troops into northern Mali under the auspices of the UN it looks like things will become even tougher for the country before it becomes better, if in fact that happens in the long term.

First, let’s take a look at the background of this situation. With the return to Northern Mali of somewhere in the region of two to three thousand angry, highly armed, battle-hardened Tuareg fighters who had been serving under Gadaffi in the previous year’s Libyan conflict, came the beginnings of the present rebellion, beginning in January 2012. The influx of Tuareg fighters was compounded by the lack of action on behalf of the Mali government to counter the problems they were causing. The uprising by the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and the Islamist Tuareg group Ansar Dine began with the killing of many government soldiers in a series of battles, which also led to a humanitarian crises as tens of thousands of civilians fled the fighting. As the fighting intensified, the Malian military became increasingly incensed at what they perceived as a lack of political will to end the rebellion and a lack of sufficient munitions, supplies and equipment to drive it back. Thus on 21 March a military-led mutiny at these conditions culminated in the resignation of President Amadou Toumani Touré and the temporary placement of a military Captain as the nation’s leader. Read more

Will China be a responsible stakeholder in the Asian Century?

25 October 2012

Cam Hawker’s recent post about the ‘Asian Century’ moniker got me thinking about the power of words to shape our analysis and perceptions—perhaps, most dangerously, in ways of which we are never aware.

Watching the third US Presidential debate, it was easy to discern the influence of another common phrase: China as a ‘responsible stakeholder’. This term, made popular by Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick in 2005 (PDF), has become an oft-used expression. But are we aware of the extent to which it subtly influences our considerations of China? Consider the following passage from Mitt Romney during the debate and listen for the thoughts of Zoellick, an adviser to Romney:

China has an interest that’s very much like ours in one respect, and that is they want a stable world. They don’t want war. They don’t want to see protectionism…they want the economy to work and the world to be free and open. And so we can be a partner with China. We don’t have to be an adversary in any way, shape or form. We can work with them. We can collaborate with them if they’re willing to be responsible. Read more

A US–China ‘shadow condominium’?

25 October 2012

Coral Bell’s recent passing has created an unfillable void in the Australian International Relations and Strategic Studies scene. Yet Coral leaves behind a wealth of ideas generated during her illustrious career that retain substantial currency for those of us continuing to toil in her imposing scholarly shadow.

One such idea is Coral’s under-studied concept of a ‘shadow condominium’, which she conceived of during the mid-1960s. Inspired by the US–Soviet relationship of the day, it is a notion which arguably better describes the current state of strategic ties between Beijing and Washington.

Contemporary understandings of the US–China relationship have tended to swing between two opposing poles. At one end of the spectrum, pessimists such as John Mearsheimer and Aaron Friedberg point to the inevitability of strategic competition between these two preeminent powers.

At the other, optimists such as Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski and our own Hugh White have instead pointed to the possibility of a power-sharing agreement between Beijing and Washington. This idea reached the peak of its popularity during the 2008–2009 global financial crisis in the form of calls for a ‘G2’. Read more

UN Security Council – down to work

24 October 2012

In a recent post, Peter Jennings and I argued that if Australia won a seat at the global decision making peak body, the UN Security Council, we’d benefit from picking some signature issues where Australia could contribute most effectively to solutions to pressing international problems.

Our suggested to-do list included leveraging our expertise to help build the UN’s capacity to help stabilise countries at risk of failing; highlighting Timor-Leste’s continuing needs; championing global opposition to the use of Improvised Explosive Devices; promoting efforts to strengthen maritime security, such as counter-piracy (see ASPI’s latest report on this issue); and developing cooperative measures to address information security.

Now we’ve won our fifth two year term on the Council, (proving wrong those naysayers that predicted our ties with the US, and strong support for Israel would spell defeat), we’ll need to respond to a whole host of global issues. Read more