Strategist Article Archives - Page 1171 of 1186

What’s in a word?

12 November 2012

Statements of mutual appreciation are never far from centre stage at an Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) meeting. In 2002, both sides agreed that the meeting came at a time “when the bilateral security alliance [between the United States and Australia] had never been stronger”, and this sentiment has been repeated in various ways at each of the meetings in the years since. The statements made at the sixtieth-anniversary of the ANZUS alliance commemorated at last year’s AUSMIN were particularly emotive, with both Australia and the U.S. pointing to their shared military sacrifices, democratic values, influence and interests in the Asia Pacific region, and common strategic objectives.

With the 2012 AUSMIN conference fast approaching, we decided to take a look at the language that has dominated at least the public face of AUSMIN over the past decade. From its beginnings in 1985, the annual meeting has provided an insight into the joint concerns of both Australia and the United States. As we can see from the word cloud above—constructed from the public communiques issued at the end of each meeting—the language has been dominated by ‘soft’ terms such as ‘cooperation’, ‘security’ and ‘commitment’, at the bilateral, global and regional level. Conversely, despite the rhetorical importance placed upon shared sacrifices, the two major theatres where Australian and American forces have been engaged—Iraq and Afghanistan—are relatively inconspicuous. Read more

Trunk call for AUSMIN

12 November 2012

When US officials of the calibre of Pacific Commander Admiral Samuel Locklear and Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell say they are worried about Australian defence spending, you can take it as read that they are putting views shared with their bosses, Leon Panetta and Hillary Clinton. It’s puzzling that Stephen Smith has so quickly dismissed their comments by saying [here and here] that there’s no American concern about Australian defence spending because he hasn’t heard that personally from Panetta. With AUSMIN to be held in Perth this Wednesday, Mr Smith may need to revise his talking points.

Based on recent visits to the US, I can confirm that a wide range of current and previous administration officials—and others watching the relationship—are worried about Australian policy. Americans are dismayed that there has been such a quick reversal of Australian defence spending plans from 2009 to now. They worry about Australian commentary saying we should distance ourselves from the US in order to get closer to China and are concerned that the Asian Century White Paper, with its cursory treatment of the US, is a big step in that direction. Although they may not bluntly say so, many of the Americans knowledgeable about Australia think that we are ‘off the reservation’ on strategic policy right now. Read more

The hazards of opportunism: rebalancing policy pivots in an Asian Century

11 November 2012

Last week, with the Asian Century White Paper, it was all about Australia’s relationship to Asia. This week it will be all about our security relationship with the US as the 2012 AUSMIN meets in Perth. In being about prosperity and security respectively, the two sets of relationships seem very different at first glance. But in terms of Australia’s policy approach, they are similar in reflecting a certain Australian penchant for opportunism.

The Asian Century White Paper is quite explicit in seeking to take advantage of the opportunities that Asian economic growth offers. Like an inverse JFK, ‘we ask not what we can do for Asia but rather what Asia can do for us’. The security dimension is similar. A recent analysis of our involvement in the Vietnam and Iraq wars asserts that Australia was a ‘hound dog’ that purposefully seized the opportunities these wars presented so as to deepen our relationship with the US. Others see similar dynamics in our Afghanistan involvement.

Putting to one side whether those observations are right or not, there’s nothing intrinsically wrong with such opportunism. Most nations seek to leverage off others and gain greater power by exploiting useful events and the actions of others. Opportunism may at times be astute policy, but in so doing there are some factors to consider. Read more

An Indonesia strategy for Australia

9 November 2012

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Indonesia seems to know where it’s going. At least that’s the impression that Indonesia’s Trade Minister Gita Wirjawan’s gave in his recent talk at the ANU discussing his country’s trajectory towards 2030. His speech envisions Indonesia as a future economic heavyweight and as a democracy that has consolidated its weaknesses, invested in areas like education and harnessed the full potential of its population—a large proportion of which is under 30. According to Wirjawan, if the ‘directionality’ of Indonesia’s democracy is right—and he believes it is—then for Indonesia, the sky’s the limit.

What’s striking about Wirjawan’s vision is its simple yet pragmatic formula. It begins with constructing an ambitious path for the nation. It’s followed by a systematic identification of the roadblocks and challenges, as well as their possible solutions, to set the right course. With a clear trajectory, armed with innovation and determination, the future seems eminently attainable. This is the view of a vital young country (which it effectively is).

When it comes to Australia’s strategic relations with Indonesia, Pak Wirjawan’s ideas should give us some clues about how we might set ourselves some goals for a much greater degree of engagement. We haven’t done anything like it yet; as a nation, we’re yet to articulate in a clear policy as to where Indonesia fits into our national objectives and, importantly, where we fit into theirs.

Graph(s) of the week: war, history and history wars

8 November 2012

This week’s graphs illustrate the importance of data in settling some historical debates. I was fortunate recently to have a chat with US military historian Williamson Murray. We got talking about some of his early work on air power in WWII, and he mentioned in passing the fine work on the German war economy that had been done by economic historian Adam Tooze in his 2006 book The Wages of Destruction: the making and breaking of the Nazi economy.

As it happens, I had a copy of that book on my ever growing ‘must get around to’ shelf. I should have got around to it earlier—as it happens it settles quite definitively a debate that has been going on since 1945 regarding the effectiveness of the allied bombing of Germany during WWII.

In a way, this shouldn’t really have been a debate. A 1947 study of the effects of the campaign was carried out by the United States Bombing Survey team, directed by leading US economist J. K. Galbraith. In their summary report, they made it clear that the campaign had been devastatingly effective:

[By] the beginning of 1945, before the invasion of the homeland itself, Germany was reaching a state of helplessness. Her armament production was falling irretrievably, orderliness in effort was disappearing, and total disruption and disintegration were well along. Her armies were still in the field. But with the impending collapse of the supporting economy, the indications are convincing that they would have had to cease fighting—any effective fighting—within a few months. Germany was mortally wounded.

ASPI recommends: A perpetual menace: nuclear weapons and international order

8 November 2012

William Walker’s book, A Perpetual Menace, on nuclear weapons and international order is one of the most important additions to the nuclear literature of the past decade. Its main contribution lies in its breadth of analysis, which helps define the nuclear order and chart state-led efforts to shape it from the early 1940s to the present day. By anyone’s standards this is an ambitious undertaking, requiring intellectual sophistication and an almost encyclopedic knowledge of nuclear developments over a period of more than 70 years.

Beyond the general theme of nuclear dangers, the message that comes through loudest and clearest in A Perpetual Menace is that the great powers are ultimately responsible for the successes and failures of the nuclear order. Many challenges exist, from the destabilising nuclear arms racing dynamics in the Middle East and Asia to the murky underworld of illicit nuclear trade. But it’s the nuclear weapon states (NWS) that have the greatest power to shape our nuclear future. Although the nuclear defiance of Iran and North Korea often dominates the headlines and preoccupies scholars and practitioners alike, the key point in Walker’s analysis is that these developments should not distract us from the fact that the great powers hold primary responsibility for international peace and stability. The most powerful states have a moral as well as legal and political obligation to engage in nuclear restraint, to bear a greater burden of the costs of building the institutions of effective international governance, and to generate momentum towards nuclear elimination. Until this happens, nuclear weapons will be a perpetual menace. Walker is at his most compelling when addressing this theme, especially in his critique of US nuclear policies during the Cold War and since, but also, at the end of the book, when he begins to question whether, as China and India become more powerful, they will be willing to share a greater burden of this responsibility themselves. Read more

The future of the Five Power Defence Arrangements

7 November 2012

The Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) is often overlooked as a regional security institution, and is a curious security device that embodies several paradoxes. The Arrangements’ most important roles are not discussed openly. And the most important non-regional player in the FPDA is not necessarily the one which plays the most prominent role in terms of its conventional military commitment. Moreover, while the FPDA is apparently anachronistic, in reality it continues to serve vital security roles and will do so in the future.

To expand on the first of these paradoxes: the FPDA is often characterised as a Cold War leftover that is irrelevant to the current and future security concerns of regional states. However, while the FPDA was created during the Cold War in the context of the military withdrawal by the UK from Southeast Asia in the late 1960s and early 1970s, its key roles were never Cold War specific. The five powers involved have always held diverse motives for participating in the Arrangements. However, discussion of two of the FPDA’s core rationales has always been essentially taboo.

The first of these implicit roles has been for the FPDA to act as a hedge against a resurgence of an unstable and threatening Indonesia which might endanger the security of Malaysia and Singapore, and perhaps also the wider sub-regional balance of power to the detriment of Australia, New Zealand and maybe the United Kingdom. While this has not been a realistic or immediate prospect since the FPDA was established in 1971, the ouster of Indonesia’s President Suharto in 1998 and the ensuing instability there over the following three to four years may have reminded FPDA members—particularly Malaysia and Singapore—of the origins of the Arrangements after Jakarta’s Konfrontasi of 1963–6. And while Indonesia’s trajectory in terms of domestic stability and its willingness to play a constructive role regionally and internationally has seemed encouraging under the leadership of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, there remain disquieting domestic political trends that could lead to the world’s fourth most populous country becoming a less congenial neighbour in the future. Read more

People, the capability that matters most

7 November 2012

Military organisations have a formalism for describing capability that involves a number of factors but there’s distressing tendency to focus on equipment and systems at the expense of some of the others. This focus is a useful, particularly when thinking about acquisitions. However, as the Australian Army knows, the capability that matters most is the quality of its people, which explains why it spends so much time and money on education and training.

Recently I had the privilege of speaking at the 2nd Commando Regiment’s new Captains course in Holsworthy. The topic was the educational requirements of future operations, and I felt privileged because it was good to be in the presence of young officers who were seeking ways to improve themselves and the institution they love.

As I reflected on what I would say I could not help but return to one of the points I made in my The Future of War Debate in Australia paper. There is no doubt that the Army possesses smart people, including many who hold advanced degrees similar to those that the 2 Cdo captains and I discussed. Yet I could not help myself from thinking that that was not enough. Having educated smart people is just one part of what is needed to make an effective Army. An institution that knows how to manage and get the best out of such people is the real enabling factor for creating a force that prides itself on achieving outcomes rather than outputs. Read more

Reader response: Australia’s underbelly in the Asian Century

7 November 2012

In his recent post Jacob Townsend pointed to organised crime as the dark side of Asia. He notes that the subject didn’t attract much attention in the ‘rivers of gold’ emphasis of the Australia in the Asian Century White Paper.

In a way that’s surprising: the Australia Crime Commission, established in 2003 to combat serious and organised crime, made a (classified) submission to Ken Henry’s White Paper team. The ACC explained (PDF, p.69) the relationship between serious and organised crime and the Asian region, and opportunities for improved law enforcement cooperation internationally. By virtue of making a submission, the ACC has flagged of the potential impact of organised crime on Australia’s relations with Asia.

But while focusing on Asian organised crime, let’s not forget that Australia too has its dark side. Read more

The curate’s egg view of defence capability

6 November 2012

That there are ongoing problems with Defence procurement would surprise no one, and much has been written and debated on the topic. Recently, austerity has dominated the discussion, with the focus on budget cuts, and how much investment is needed. I think it’s time to remind ourselves of the fundamental issues that have undermined defence procurement. To do that a slightly broader approach is needed.

The mistakes of the past

Australian defence is dominated by a number of core requirements. These include maintaining a technological edge over potential rivals, interoperability with the United States and delivering capability within planned budgets and timelines. Australia’s record in these areas isn’t as good as it should be. Consider the replacement of the Army’s Blackhawk and the Navy’s Sea King helicopter fleets. Arguably, the best choice would have been to acquire the latest digitised version of the Blackhawk. This would have offered the advantages of minimised retraining of aircrew and mechanics (the Navy already operates S-70 Seahawks), a uniform fleet, significant parts compatibility with existing supply chains, and full interoperability with the United States and other global Black/Seahawk fleet users such as Japan, Singapore, and South Korea. With a true Military-Off-the-Shelf (MOTS) purchase from an active production line, these aircraft would have almost certainly been delivered within budget and on time. Yet the eventual winner emerged as the untested NH-90 from Eurocopter, a project subsequently placed on the infamous ‘Projects of Concern’ list, $500 million over budget, and 18 months behind schedule. Read more