ASPI recommends: Stirring from beyond the borders? American military assistance and defense reform in Indonesia

BEKASI, Indonesia (Aug. 14, 2009) A U.S. Navy Seabee, assigned to Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (NMCB) 40, says farewell to his counterpart from the Indonesian Marine Corps after the dedication of an engineering civic action program at Pusaka Rakyat primary school as part of Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) Indonesia 2009. The Seabees and Indonesian Marines worked closely together for nearly a month on the project. CARAT is a series of bilateral exercises held annually in Southeast Asia to strengthen relationships and enhance the operational readiness of the participating forces. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Seth Clarke/Released)As I mentioned in last week’s ‘ASPI suggests’, there’s a useful paper from CSIS Jakarta researcher Evan Laksmana that looks at the history of US military assistance to the Indonesian armed forces (TNI) and the effect this has had on Indonesia’s ongoing defence reform process. The state of Indonesia’s military reform is of key interest to Australia, as we steadily expand defence cooperation and increasingly look to Indonesia as a key state in our Asian Century White Paper strategy. Knowing what components of US military assistance work, which don’t (and why) will help inform our military engagement under the Defence Cooperation Program.

In dealings with post-dictatorship Indonesia, the US and Australia will naturally seek to aid the defence reform process, which includes facilitating the observance of new norms and governance, as well as helping with force modernisation. While these are sound goals in broad terms, it’s not immediately obvious how foreign military assistance can be translated into defence reform and the building of democratic civil-military relations.

The academic literature doesn’t shed much light on this topic, which is why Laksmana’s paper is a valuable contribution. It examines the historical and ideological development of US military assistance, the history of US military engagement with Indonesia (from the Cold War to today), and the implications and future challenges for Indonesia’s defence reform. He chronicles the shift in US foreign military assistance from a Cold War mentality to one aimed at promoting professionalism, democratic ideals and human rights. Read more

Graph of the week: why the US Air Force needs the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

This week’s graph is a case of a picture that is worth $200 billion. Produced by the US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in 2009, it shows the number of tactical aircraft procured by the US Air Force (USAF) every year since 1975, and the average age of aircraft in the inventory.

From 1978 to 1991, when production of the F-15 and F-16 ‘teen series’ strike fighters and the A-10 attack aircraft were in full swing, the annual buy averaged well over 100 aircraft. In terms of maintenance of overall fleet size and modernity, that was about ‘break even’. As the graph shows (click to enlarge), the average age of aircraft in the fleet hovered around 11 years throughout that period.

But from 1992 onwards, as production of the 1970s designs ramped down, the average age of the fleet began a steady upwards climb, reaching 20 years a few years ago. The delivery of 187 F-22s between 2002 and 2009 had essentially no impact on that trend. (Incidentally, the RAAF’s 71 1980s vintage Hornets and 24 brand new Super Hornets produce about the same average age).

US aircraft purchases, 1975-2010

Source: Congressional Budget Office Alternatives for Modernizing U.S. Fighter Forces (PDF), May 2009. Read more

Submarines: the silent service needs to make some noise

HMAS Dechaineux navigates on the surface in the North Australian Exercise Area after successfully completing an Anti Submarine Warfare Exercise with HMAS Warramunga.

As Andrew Davies noted here recently, the debate at the 2012 Submarine Institute of Australia (SIA) wasn’t over whether submarines should be built in Australia—that’s a forgone conclusion.

Speeches from both sides of politics (both Parliamentary Secretary Feeney  and Defence Materiel Minister Jason Clare from the government side) and Shadow Defence Minister David Johnston made it very clear that the politicians are on board the move. DMO CEO Warren King, in speaking at the event dinner, was also enthusiastic about the program and the abilities of Australian industry to get the job done. Though none of them were willing to be the face and voice of the program, the right words were indeed there.

The decision to build 12 submarines in the 2009 White Paper came as a shock to many, even at the highest levels. Until Kevin Rudd’s RSL speech in Townsville, the number was firmly at six boats; six new boats to replace the six old boats. This magical doubling of the fleet (regardless of the actual boat chosen) has no strategic thinking behind it.

The doctrinal justification behind such a fleet doesn’t exist. And believe me, I’ve looked. And looked. And asked uncomfortable questions. Repeatedly. And the business case behind the announcement was even thinner. As we all know, thanks to Mark Thomson, the financial underpinning of the 2009 White Paper was laughable. Read more

Graph(s) of the week: some (qualified) good news on Collins

In our Mind the gap paper earlier this year, Mark Thomson and I made the comment that a successful program to extend the life of the Collins class submarines would give the future submarine program a fighting chance of avoiding a capability gap in the second half of the 2020s.

At last week’s Submarine Institute of Australia 2012 conference, we heard for the first time in public from Defence officials who have been involved in the Submarine Life Evaluation Program (SLEP) which has been looking at the feasibility and mechanics of keeping the Collins class going. The news was generally good—there are no identified ‘show stoppers’ in such a program. And there seems to be a realistic opportunity to do a much-needed technology refresh of the submarine systems, and to fix the propulsion system issues that have plagued the fleet. Moreover, it’s thought that the additional duty cycle for the boats might be ten years rather than the eight of the first two.

If that happens, the availability of submarines might look something like the graph below (with the same somewhat idealised assumptions about the maintenance throughput of the Collins boats as in our earlier paper). A ten year extension of the Collins fleet life would give a reasonable amount of breathing space for the replacement program to deliver the first couple of new boats and trial them. That won’t be easy—we’ll have to manage the substantial industrial and fleet management overheads of having two different Collins configurations at the same time as developing and building the next generation boat. But provided that can be done, and barring a failure of the follow-on build to deliver a functional product, the capability gap we warned of would effectively disappear.

Submarines available

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ASPI suggests

Welcome back for the second round-up of news and articles in the defence and strategy world, coming to you from Jakarta.

Being in Indonesia, I’ve been naturally thinking a lot about reform of the Indonesian military and Australian military engagement. Evan Laksmana’s 2011 paper on American military assistance and defence reform in Indonesia identifies how limits in the design of military-military engagement can seriously hinder long-lasting reform. And there are lessons here for Australia.

This week’s capability piece is an essay from a serving USAF officer who argues that the service’s focus on high-tech stealthy aircraft (PDF) is the wrong path.

Social media is becoming an inextricable part of modern warfare. It’s also now part of a developing area of intelligence analysis called Dynamic Twitter Network Analysis which uses data from Twitter and other social media outlets to gauge public opinion in zones of insecurity and instability. And as the conflict continues between Israel and Hamas, both on the ground and (bizarrely) in the Twitterverse, here’s an Atlantic article that looks at whether this is a violation of Twitter’s terms of use.

This New York Times article on the demographics of the US electorate contains some statistics on the views of Americans on the relative merits of capitalism and socialism which might be surprising—although they mirror the Lowy Institute’s findings that ‘just 60% of Australians say democracy is preferable to any other kind of government, and only 39% of 18 to 29 year olds’.

While in the US, the Washington Post takes a look at the lifestyle of four star generals.

Journal roundup

From the people who brought you Infinity Journal, a free peer-reviewed online journal on strategy, here’s the new issue of the Journal of Military Operations. You’ll need to sign up to view their articles but if the quality is anything like Infinity, it will be well worth the effort.

Sticking with a journal theme, the Australian Defence Force Journal has released its latest issue (PDF), including an article from Strategist contributor Albert Palazzo as well as pieces on Japanese subs for Australia, ANZUS, Australian influence in the South Pacific and UAVs.

The new issue of the Kokoda Foundation’s Security Challenges has articles on ballistic missile defence and China’s multilateral engagement so get your hands on a hard copy unless you can wait until it’s available online. Previous issues are available online and contain articles by most of the well-known names in Australian strategy discussions.

Natalie Sambhi is an analyst at ASPI and editor of The Strategist.

Where in the world?

Dark globe. Photo credit: Luke Wilson (ASPI)

During a recent Telstra-ASPI luncheon speech, Robert D. Kaplan took the audience on a tour of the ‘hot spots’ of insecurity around the globe. The crux of Kaplan’s presentation (and his new book The Revenge of Geography) is that in the globalised world of tweets, ‘likes’ and viral video, analysts have forgotten the enduring impact of geography, and the indelible effects it has had (and continues to have) on national and international security.

While this approach is useful to explain the development of the nation-state, with its linkage to geographical and territorial identity, today there is a range of non-state actors and transnational groups, whose motivations and actions aren’t as deterministic, and whose existence and structure are more virtual than linked to any discrete geography. To get a handle on these players, it’s perhaps necessary to broaden the notion of geography.

For example, an understanding of Yemen’s history, the role that its mountainous geography has played in its development (or lack thereof) and the challenges that this presents to the capacity of a central government to maintain any semblance of order would clearly make for a more sophisticated response from Western analysts and policymakers to cooperation with local bodies on the threat posed by al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula. Together, a good grasp of the physical and human geographies of the area provide a firm foundation for the investigation of transnational terrorism, why it has emerged from there and its intrinsic characteristics. Indeed, seeking to gain such an understanding without a foundation in these matters seems deeply problematic and perhaps reminiscent of some of the recent failures of counterterrorism policy. Read more

Thinking unconventionally about gas

Image courtesy of Flickr user hitthatswitch.

The shale gas revolution might be upon us. Interest in shale gas has grown sharply due to the success of American producers, with the fuel now providing the U.S. with a third of its natural gas needs. Shale gas has put America in a position where it will soon be self-sufficient in gas and potentially a net exporter.

In October this year a milestone was achieved in terms of our path towards joining the ranks of global shale gas producers. Santos announced Australia’s first commercial production of gas from a shale well, and is talking big about the potential of trillions of cubic feet of gas trapped in deep shale formations in Australia’s Cooper Basin, which straddles Queensland and South Australia.

It’s got the pollies excited too. The South Australian Premier, Jay Weatherill, said at the on-site opening ceremony of the shale well that:

Natural gas from unconventional sources has been regarded as something that would happen in the future but today’s opening demonstrates that the future is happening today. This is the first step in the next wave of Cooper Basin development that will lead to natural gas from unconventional sources being increasingly used in households across SA and Eastern Australia more generally.

But it’s not without controversy. Gas is stimulated to flow from the low permeability shale rocks by injecting fluid consisting of water, sand and chemicals under high pressure into the shale reservoir to open up natural fractures and to create new ones in a process known as hydraulic fracturing, or ‘fracking’. If the debate here on the development on shale gas follows that in the US and Europe, then it’s likely that industry will be pro-shale gas, environmental groups will be concerned about the impacts of fracking and cautious of claims of a reduced environmental impact relative to coal seam gas (that occurs at much shallower depth close to surface aquifers and in areas used for farming), and politicians will focus on regulation.

The Australian Government Energy White Paper released this month presents a sensible appraisal of the important role of gas generally in Australia’s energy future, and signals government is aware that shale gas is an important resource that needs to better understand in the Australian context. Read more

Obama’s second term: international challenges

Image courtesy of The White House.

Beyond domestic concerns, which I wrote about last week, the second term Obama administration has to address a number of challenging international issues. High on the list of serious problems is Iran’s continuing effort to achieve a nuclear weapon.

During the campaign, President Obama made it absolutely clear that he would not accept a nuclear armed Iran. In this, he was supported by Governor Romney. The sanctions that have been imposed by the West upon Iran do appear to be biting hard. As well, the Iranian currency has dropped alarmingly in value, given the international isolation of Tehran. Senior American policy makers believe that the Iranians may be about to come to the table to negotiate.

Should Iran be prepared to negotiate seriously, the US and its allies will need to be focused on a comprehensive solution to reduce tensions in the Middle East. This will be occurring at a time when Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, approaches retirement and the next occupant of this critical role, possibly Senator John Kerry (Democrat, Massachusetts) will have big shoes to fill. Mrs Clinton has been the standout performer in the Obama Cabinet. Read more

Reader response: of course we have a choice

Cam Hawker asserted here recently that if conflict broke out between the United States and China, Australia would automatically be at war since we host US Joint Facilities on Australian soil. Cam is right to raise the issues of abandonment and entrapment in Australia’s alliance relationship, and it is important for decision-makers in both Canberra and Washington to hold clear understandings of Australia’s strategic choices in a possible future crisis. To this end I applaud Cam for forcefully arguing such a provocative line.

Yet, leaving aside the unassailable fact that declarations of war on behalf of Australia may not be made by other countries, Cam’s arguments remain false for several reasons.

First, America does not have the capacity to conduct offensive operations against an adversary from the Joint Facilities. There are no Okinawa-style super bases here and hence few local Chinese targets. The mere fact that Joint Facilities exist in Australia is immaterial—as of late 2011, 92 countries permanently host more than 10 US service personnel, with 13 countries having more than 1,000 (and prior to the Marine rotations through Darwin, Australia was not among these).

Second, the Joint Facilities are not targets for China. After the Joint Facilities were first established, the Office of National Assessments judged that it would increase the probability of a nuclear attack on Australia in the event of a general nuclear war between the US and the Soviet Union. At the same time, however, it was believed the Joint Facilities would strengthen America’s nuclear deterrent, thereby reducing the risk of nuclear conflict overall. Unlike the Soviet Union, however, China does not have thousands of excess ICBMs targeting every conceivable American facility across the globe. Instead, China preserves a minimum-deterrence second strike capability, for retaliation against US mainland cities. Read more

Doing the right thing is the right thing to do

Leon E. Panetta takes the oath of office as the 23rd U.S. Secretary of Defense during a ceremony at the Pentagon July 1, 2011. Image courtesy of Flickr user US Department of Defense Current Photos.

There’s an old maxim in military affairs: ‘lose moral authority, lose the war’! It’s most often quoted in the context of the conduct of armed forces towards third parties, most notably the civil population living within a theatre of operations. Occasionally, the maxim applies to one’s enemies, who may be spurred to fight on against those they consider to be a morally debased opponent. For example, fighters based in the tribal areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan have been incensed by the use of unmanned drones, which they consider to be the coward’s weapon of choice.

However, there’s a further context in which the maxim applies—in relation to the quality of leadership displayed within one’s own ranks. One might suppose that it is with this in mind that US Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, has asked the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dempsey, to review the quality and character of ethical instruction made available to senior officers—a task given added urgency in the wake of scandal surrounding the recent resignation of David Petraeus as Director of the CIA. Read more