Strategist Article Archives - Page 1168 of 1186

ASPI recommends: Australia 1942: in the shadow of war

2 December 2012

When I’m lecturing on strategic policy or Australian force structure issues, I often make a comment about the ‘defence of Australia’ (DOA) doctrine along those lines of ‘of course, the defence of Australia has been of academic interest except for six months in 1942’. It’s a rhetorical device intended to convey the idea that DOA really isn’t very relevant to a contemporary discussion of Australia’s future defence plans.

But, as any mathematician would remind me, a single counter example is enough to completely undo a hypothesis. In 1942, war really did come to Australia’s shores and the ‘air sea approaches’ were used by Japanese ships, aircraft and submarines. The purpose of this book, edited by ANU’s Peter Dean with contributions from a number of historians, is to put those events into context.

Like two volumes of essays on military history that precede this one, there’s a bit of a ‘Mythbusters’ feel to it in places. There are several chapters that examine Japan’s aims towards Australia, including one (the most valuable one in my view) from Japanese scholar Hiroyuki Shindo. He argues convincingly that that the Japanese Army was dragged kicking and screaming by the Navy into the South Pacific, when its own priorities were China and Manchuria. His conclusion is clear; the resources for an invasion weren’t going to be made available and isolation of Australia, rather than conquest, was the Japanese intention.

In this light, the pivotal battle along the Kokoda trail is put into its proper context. It denied the Japanese a base in Port Moresby from which it could strike allied bases in Queensland and interdict allied shipping and allowed the allies to use it for their own air and naval campaigns, rather than ‘saving Australia from invasion’. This conclusion might raise the ire of some, but the story of the struggles of the land forces involved actually loses nothing by being accurately placed in the overall story of the Pacific campaign. Read more

Feeding the nuclear watch dog

30 November 2012

Earlier this month, Myanmar announced that it will sign the Additional Protocol to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements—a bold step for a country that has long been suspected of having nuclear weapons aspirations. If the government follows through on this pledge, it will make it much easier for the IAEA, often referred to in the media as the UN’s ‘nuclear watch dog’, to investigate these suspicions and either confirm them or lay them to rest. This is because the Additional Protocol allows the IAEA to conduct more thorough safeguards inspections of a country’s nuclear facilities—it gives the watch dog more scope to sniff out dodgy activities (PDF).

Since the Additional Protocol was introduced in September 1997, 139 states have signed it, and 119 have brought it into force (PDF). This is an important albeit partial victory for international nuclear governance, demonstrating a commitment among more and more states to higher standards of nuclear transparency. The ultimate goal of the Additional Protocol is to build confidence that states are complying with their nonproliferation obligations, which in turn helps to prevent further nuclear proliferation and to promote conditions that are more conducive to nuclear disarmament. Viewed in these terms, it’s easy to see why the IAEA is regarded as an international agency of major strategic significance. Read more

Suva comes in from the cold – but Canberra feels the chill

29 November 2012

A special meeting in Port Moresby on Wednesday has ended Fiji’s exclusion from the deliberations of the Pacific group of the European Union’s ACP (Asia Caribbean Pacific) association.

That mightn’t sound like the biggest news story around, but it was front-page news in Suva. It scarcely rated a mention in Australian newspapers but it was bad news for Canberra, whatever the government might try to make of our neighbours’ action.

The Pacific Island states agreed to shift the secretariat functions on trade negotiations for the Pacific ACP group from the Pacific Islands Forum to Papua New Guinea. The decision weakens both the Pacific Islands Forum and the influence that Canberra has long enjoyed through it. Since early 2009, Australia and New Zealand have used their influence in the Forum to extend Fiji’s exclusion from important regional affairs like the Pacific ACP meetings, manoeuvring to deem Fiji’s suspension from the Forum to include joint activities with the Forum, even where the corresponding body had imposed no such sanctions on Fiji.

We need to be careful to avoid looking like the South Pacific is an afterthought to Australia’s broader strategy. While Canberra continues to talk of the ‘Asian Century’, the Pacific Islanders are certain that it is an ‘Asia–Pacific Century’. Read more

ASPI suggests: welcome to the Iron Dome

29 November 2012

Welcome back for another instalment of new reports, articles and events in the defence, strategy and security world.

Articles

Iron Dome has been seen as a successful missile defence system during recent violence between Israel and Hamas. But according to the Wall Street Journal, it actually took many years of lobbying (and, by the developer’s admission, sidestepping bureaucracy) to get Israeli and eventual US support for the project.

For the defence economists out there, James Hasik has an interesting post on his own blog on the economics of the Iron Dome. Did Israel get value for money?

Meanwhile, Robert Farley explains on The Diplomat why the Iron Dome won’t work in Asia, and Avnish Patel over at RUSI looks at the benefits of partnership between defence industry to develop missile defence systems.

Turning now to cyber matters, Land Warfare Studies Centre’s Clint Arizmendi has a new Blogs of War post on the blurred line between ‘hacktivism’ and terrorism.

Events

Professor Richard Rigby will speaking on China’s new leadership and what it means for the world at AIIA offices in Canberra on Monday 3 December at 5.30pm.

Brisbane-based readers, Australia’s Ambassador to Iraq, Lyndall Sachs, will be talking about diplomacy at the frontline at the University of Queensland, Wednesday 5 December at 6pm (canapés from 5.15pm).

Adelaide-based readers, Dr Pamela Schulz, lecturer at the Magill Campus in the School of Communication, International Studies and Languages, will deliver a presentation on perceptions of Defence in traditional and social media on Monday 3 December.

Image: Nehemia Gershuni-Aylho.

What the Kiwis want from trans-Tasman defence relations

28 November 2012

It’s hard to get folks excited about the Australian–New Zealand defence relationship. It’s uncontroversial because we’re already close partners in a fairly low octane South Pacific neighbourhood, where we’re expected to work together. And it’s often overshadowed by links with bigger and more distant players. Chief among these is Australia’s long-standing and very close relationship with the United States. Stephen Smith and Jonathan Coleman may have met in the same city (Perth) and the same month (November) for their annual Australian–New Zealand Defence Ministerial consultations as the biennial AUSMIN talks which had earlier involved Smith, Leon Panetta, Bob Carr and Hillary Clinton. But you would have to be from Mars to expect the media interest to be anywhere near equal.

If I was an Australian defence planner—a tough job in today’s austere times—I’d still be looking to the US relationship to have a larger impact on the future shape of the ADF. But for defence policymakers here in New Zealand, the same formula doesn’t apply. That’s not to deny that our defence relationship with the United States has come on in leaps and bounds over the last couple of years. There are even hints on an informal ANZUS triangle coming onto the scene—the Smith/Coleman communiqué indicated that New Zealand forces will observe the 2013 US–Australian Talisman Sabre exercise ‘with the aim of full participation from 2015 onwards.’

But it would take a minor revolution for New Zealand’s burgeoning relationship with the US to steal first place in Wellington’s calculations from defence links with Australia. And because the Australia–NZ relationship matters a whole lot on one side of the Tasman and rather less on the other (militarily, as well as economically and politically), New Zealand has work to do to stay on Canberra’s radar screen. That could get harder as Australia pays more attention to its links with significant Asian powers, including Indonesia, and possibly Japan and India, as the region’s geopolitical shifts become more evident. And as Australia looks more to its north and west, and especially out to the Indian Ocean, it might not see much of New Zealand. Read more

Canada, the Asian Century and the Indo-Pacific

28 November 2012

Australia and Canada, I have argued elsewhere, are Strategic Cousins with more in common than most people realise. The Eurocentric Mercator projection leaves the impression that Canada is far removed from Asia. But in reality it is as close to Northeast Asia as is Australia (see map below). Yet Canada has been strangely missing in Australian discussions about the Asian Century White Paper and on recent deliberations on how to define the Indo-Pacific (PDF).

Part of the reason is that the conservative government of Stephen Harper has long focused more on economic ties with the United States and security ties across the Atlantic through NATO. But that has been changing and the momentum has been growing in recent months for Canada to undertake its own pivot to Asia.

One sign emerged with the Canadian Council of Chief Executives which hosted a ‘Canada in the Pacific Century’ conference in September this year. The conference brought together leading lights from Canadian business, government, academia, and other key groups to discuss Asia’s rise and the implications for Canada. What emerged was a stark realisation that Canada’s future, like that of many other countries, has become increasingly tied to developments across the Pacific Ocean.

As a result, the Harper Government has come to realise that Canada needs to develop a larger Asian profile. A flurry of recent activity has come to be referred to as ‘Panda diplomacy’. Canada’s Foreign Minister, John Baird, recently pointed out the need for Canada to diversify its markets. China is now Canada’s second largest trade partner after the United States. Baird points out that Harper has visited China, Thailand and Japan recently, while he has visited Burma/Myanmar. Some are seeing this as possibly being a watershed moment for Canada. These visits have focussed mostly on trade. Read more

Reader response: strategic airpower and the importance of the enemy’s character

28 November 2012

In response to Nic Stuart’s recent post on strategic airpower, Strategist reader Sven Ortmann brought to our attention his thoughts on the topic. He suggests that the application of air power should be tailored to the nature of the adversary government. In effect, it’s a form of applied psychology:

The purpose of air power is to contribute to the military’s success in peacetime and wartime. Both times it’s in the end all about the will of a foreign power: To deter aggression or to force it into accepting our idea of a post-war peace.

The principal ability of air power to deliver such contributions hasn’t been questioned for generations, at least not in the case of large and wealthy countries. The best strategy and the limits of air power’s contributions on the other hand are subject to renewed discussion during most major violent conflicts with Western participation.

The evidence for limits and quality especially of different strategic air war strategies appears to be contradictory. Didn’t win air power the 1999 Kosovo War and didn’t it fail utterly over North Vietnam despite much greater loss of lives and property? Air power’s ability to win wars without substantial naval or ground manoeuvres appears to be inconsistent—but that’s a superficial observation.

This text attempts to resolve the apparent contradictions by paying much attention to the nature of the opposing forces’ leadership. It does also attempt to support decision-makers in identifying the most promising approach on a case-to-case basis. Furthermore, it’s about truly strategic air warfare; its core is how to persuade the opposing government, not how to crash a war economy…

You can read the rest of his post on his own blog, Defence and Freedom, here.

Submarine building as corporate welfare

27 November 2012

I read Katherine Ziesing’s recent piece on The Strategist, with interest. Unfortunately, as a[n economic] ‘dry’ approaching Thatcher-esque levels, I must disagree with some of her points.

My big concerns with the Future Submarine project stem from the backward decision-making process. Rather than objectively examining the evidence and making a decision, the process seems to be designed to reach a particular, pre-determined conclusion—that building a largely bespoke submarine in Adelaide is the only viable solution.

On what evidence did the government base its decision to build 12 diesel submarines in Adelaide given that there seems to be nothing more than a vague outline of the submarine’s required capabilities and expected missions? And why exclude even a basic consideration of nuclear submarines when the 2009 White Paper describes a submarine that is, as Katherine explains, ‘a nuclear one in capability respects’? Read more

Taking stock of RAMSI

27 November 2012

The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI)—an extensive (and expensive) Australian-led state-building intervention under the auspices of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)—has been operating in Solomon Islands since July 2003. It’s about to undergo a significant transition in its structure. As such, it’s an appropriate time to take stock of the mission’s achievements and failings to date, and perhaps more importantly, evaluate Solomon Islands’ prospects in a post-RAMSI future.

In October, RAMSI’s Special Coordinator Nicholas Coppel revealed plans for the transition—the most significant since the mission’s inception. Coppel announced that from 1 July 2013 RAMSI would become a compact police capacity-building operation. Its military contingent will be sent home and its governance programs will be integrated into the bilateral development assistance programs of participating countries, mainly Australia and New Zealand.

Crucially, Coppel claimed that these changes were warranted because of the progress made by Solomon Islands since RAMSI’s deployment. This is consistent with RAMSI’s ‘exit strategy’, as defined in the 2009 partnership framework (PDF) signed between the Solomon Islands government, RAMSI and the PIF. In the agreement, RAMSI’s exit is not focused on a date, but is conditioned upon the attainment of particular performance benchmarks, set out in the document.

RAMSI is often viewed by international and domestic observers as one of the most successful state-building interventions. For example, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s influential Development Assistance Committee described its security system reform approach as ‘good practice’ (PDF). Read more

The declining USAF tactical fighter fleet: should we care?

26 November 2012

Andrew Davies’ graph of the week about the elderly USAF tactical fighter fleet raises several issues. But before that it is worthwhile looking at the big US Defense budget picture below. The two big peaks are the Reagan defence build-up and Global War on Terror (GWOT) 2001–2014. Most of the current USAF fighter fleet was acquired in the Reagan years leading to, as Andrew noted, a fleet that is steadily aging.

The graph suggests that it’s unlikely that the USAF will again build a Reagan-era size fighter force. Reagan cut taxes and increased spending. This led to bigger deficits, which in turn led to raising taxes and cutting spending in the elder Bush’s presidency and the Clinton years. This worked, the US Federal budget went into surplus. But today, with the ‘fiscal cliff’ looming, it seems that the US is once again moving towards raising taxes and cutting spending. As the graph indicates, the Obama administration plans to constrain defence spending over the next five years. US defense spending will still be roughly half the world total, but a big Reaganesque increase looks unlikely.

There’s no joy for the USAF in all this and the USAF fighter fleet will just continue to shrink and grow old. There are those who think that the size of the Cold War fleet is still appropriate. But most wars since the Berlin War fell (excepting the 1991 Desert Storm campaign) have used relatively few USAF fighters, as vital to mission success as they were. The Precision Guided Munition (PGM) revolution now means that fewer aircraft can do the work of the larger iron bomb fighter fleets of the Reagan era. Read more