Halifax International Security Forum: global leadership (part I)

The Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta and Minister of Defense Peter MacKay of Canada make opening statements at the Halifax International Security Forum on November 18, 2011 in Halifax, Nova Scotia

Recently I was fortunate to have attended the Halifax International Security Forum which is rapidly becoming one of the most significant meetings on the global strategic calendar. Conceived and now hosted by the Canadian Minister for National Defence, Peter MacKay, and Foreign Affairs magazine, the fourth Forum, has just concluded in Halifax, Nova Scotia—MacKay’s home province. Over a three day period a diverse and especially invited group of government officials, military personnel, politicians, academics, think tankers and others, worked to unpick the complexities of some of the most challenging security issues of contemporary international affairs. The panels brought together many of the most eminent people in their respective fields and if the conclusions were not always reassuring, the debate was invariably lively, wide ranging and consistently well informed.

With this year’s theme ‘What is the new normal and when will it get here?’ the meeting kicked off by exploring the contemporary geostrategic landscape and continuities with the recent past. Understandably perhaps, assessments of the key issues and trends varied among the panellists, except that we live in challenging times, where much that confronts us resonates with the past and where the tool box of the policymakers seeking to address them is often bereft of reliable instruments. With China rising and India and Brazil emerging, for example, the geopolitical tectonic plates are shifting irretrievably towards a new global order, but to what extent can we expect the new normalcy will bring peace and stability? To the extent that conclusions were possible, they tended to be unsettling. But as Australia’s High Commissioner in Ottawa, Louise Hand was able to remind the audience, the news is not all bad. In East Asia, she noted, economic growth is strong, incomes are rising and millions are being lifted from poverty in what is proving, at least so far, a sustainable way. Read more

Show me the money

A slice of pie for Defence?

In the film Jerry Maguire, Tom Cruise’s client Rod Tidwell believes that the only way a team can ever really demonstrate that they value him is to pay him more—leading to the famous ‘show me the money!’ scene. Of course it’s not strictly true that everything can be reduced to money. The moral of the movie is that love, happiness and friendship are also vital. Nevertheless, it’s the $11.2 million contract that Jerry eventually wins for Rod that makes the happy ending possible.

A recent column by Peter Layton questioned the tendency of many commentators to see Defence as being ‘all about the money’. He correctly points out that this runs close to assuming that the allocation to the three services is little more than risk management. But then Layton suggests that a ‘simple focus on money can distract from other matters that might be equally or even more important’.

No one can quibble with his argument. After all, it’s the way money’s spent or used to support a particular strategy that provides a far better measure of effectiveness than the simple quantum of funds allocated to Defence. But that doesn’t mean the bottom-line figure is irrelevant. In fact, rather the reverse. Read more

Pacific (sub)regionalism – where to next?

Richard Herr’s recent item on intra-regional relationships in the Pacific is a timely contribution to this discussion.

The past, present and future of regionalism and sub-regionalism in this part of the world are topics of endless fascination but they have significant political (including geopolitical) and economic implications as well. It’s an environment that’s both fluid and fast changing at numerous levels. At the beginning of the year, I predicted this would be an issue of significance during 2012 and so it has proved. This isn’t particularly surprising and, for what it’s worth, I predict it is going to be a ‘hot topic’ next year as well.

Here I’d like to briefly pick up on a couple of points Richard made in his piece. I think there is more to add about the Fiji situation, about sub-regionalism more generally and about the future role of the Pacific Islands Forum.

First, I think it’s worth mentioning that, while the re-entry of Fiji into the PACP ‘family’ was indeed significant, it was one in a series of steps that have been ongoing for a considerable period—in fact, since Fiji was suspended from the Forum. It’s necessary to remember that while Fiji might be coming in from the cold, it remains suspended from both the Pacific Islands Forum and the Commonwealth. However, what’s particularly fascinating here is the way Fiji has manoeuvred and positioned itself in recent years, regionally and internationally. If and when Fiji’s suspension from the Forum is lifted, it’s plausible that its significance will be more symbolic than meaningful, either politically or economically. But if Fiji does make a reappearance at the Forum, it will be from a position of political strength, having not only cemented but enhanced relationships within the region and developed new ones in a whole range of places. In addition, Fiji’s accession to the chair of the G77 grouping earlier this year provides one more plank in a carefully constructed raft of geopolitical and diplomatic strength, which will not be conceded lightly, if at all. Read more

Position Vacant: Non-proliferation and Disarmament Leader, Asia

Help wanted

During the past few weeks there have been some striking discussions in the international media about the future strategic order. One of the most interesting is an article by Ralph Cossa and David Santoro, which was originally published by the CSIS think tank and was then picked up by the Japan Times. Two short sentences half way through the piece particularly caught my eye: ‘The United States has limited power and influence to shape the major power agenda in the Asia–Pacific. The future of this agenda will be determined by decisions made in Beijing, New Delhi and Islamabad—not in Washington.’

This is probably true over the longer-term, and the implications are very significant for world order. It brings to mind William Walker’s new book, A Perpetual Menace, which raises concerns about the weakly-defined Asia-centric system of military engagement that is likely to replace the Eurocentric one. The big questions are: how will peace and stability be achieved as US preeminence wanes, and what values will underpin the new Asia-centric system?

This discussion is becoming more urgent, including in the nuclear context. A potential problem is that the existing non-proliferation regime has been largely shaped by the Eurocentric system that is currently in decline. At the heart of this regime, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) has expanded and deepened its original role, achieved almost universal membership and withstood serious challenges, primarily because its strategic and political value has been recognised by the states that have dominated the Eurocentric system (the Western powers and the Soviet Union/Russia). Of these, the US has had the most significant impact on the Treaty’s success: when it has offered pro-active support, great strides have been possible; when it has dropped the ball, as it did most dramatically during the George W. Bush years, the consequences have been serious. Read more

The incredible shrinking ANZAC alliance

New Zealand Prime Minister John Key

It’s the lot of smaller countries to fret over how seriously their interests are treated by bigger allies. It’s not surprising then that Robert Ayson worries about what New Zealand has to do to stay on Canberra’s radar screen. There’s good reason for Wellington to be concerned, because Australia’s strategic focus increasingly looks north. Limited resources for defence engagement after the 2013 White Paper will be ear-marked mostly for countries like Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, rather than New Zealand. But the chill wind from Canberra hasn’t just been blowing since the global financial crisis. What Australian governments have said about New Zealand in previous defence white papers, allows us to chart the steady diminution of the importance of the ANZAC relationship in Australian thinking. Here are all the Australian white paper comments on New Zealand since 1976, with fuller excerpts here (PDF). The key phrases read like a series of scenes from that great B-grade Hollywood movie, The Incredible Shrinking Man:

1976: ‘Defence cooperation with New Zealand is fundamental to our interests …’

1987: 'Australia and New Zealand share a defence relationship which is of basic importance to the security of both countries …’

1994: ‘ … our defence alliance with New Zealand remains important to Australia's defence policy.’

2000: ‘… our defence relationship with New Zealand shows the imprint both of our strong similarities and of the sometimes surprising differences between us.’

2009: ‘ … from a strategic point of view what matters most is that they are not a source of threat to Australia.’

The last quote bundles New Zealand with Indonesia, PNG, East Timor and the Pacific Islands: from key ally to alley cat in one generation? Read more

Four ships for the price of six?

Four ships for the price of six?

A few years ago, I estimated the per ship costs of the Air Warfare Destroyer program. The conclusion I came to, based on conservative assumptions, was that we were getting three ships for the price of four. In fact, numbers from Defence SA suggest that, if anything, this underestimated the fixed costs of the program.

It’s worth revisiting this proposition when analysing the prospect that has been floated recently of acquiring a fourth ship with the justification of keeping ASC’s skilled workforce in place so that it can build the future submarine when the time comes.

There’s a risk that this is a case of the industry tail wagging the capability dog. As I wrote here recently, and as Henry Ergas amplified, there are opportunity costs of ‘makework’ projects to both defence’s acquisition portfolio and to the wider Australian economy. And it’s telling that, at least as the story is reported, there isn’t even a pretence of this being a decision based on strategic or military judgements about the desirability of a fourth AWD. It’s always true that more capability is more capability, but the case remains to be made that Australia actually needs the extra capability that would come with a fourth ship. Read more

ASPI suggests

Here’s this week’s collection of new articles and reports in the defence, strategy and security world for your reading pleasure and some events to attend.

Articles and reports

If you’re interested in the changing nature of warfare, there are two 2012 issues of the Red Cross’ International Humanitarian Law magazine for you. The first features an article on autonomous robots and the automation of warfare (PDF) and the second includes one on state control over private military and security companies (PDF).

There’s been much coverage of China’s new passport that shows disputed areas of the South China Sea as belonging to China. But here’s an author who analyses the Chinese dotted line that appears in the passport from a legal perspective.

Now that the Global War on Terror is seemingly over, the team at Danger Room have a piece on what the end might look like.

And before we get too excited about the effects of social media on warfare, Nathan Cohen’s new RSIS paper casts doubt on its impact (PDF) during recent violence between Israel and Hamas.

Events

Canberra readers, Hugh White will be giving a public lecture at ANU’s Strategic and Defence Studies Centre on the prospects and risks of an alliance between Australia and Japan, Tuesday 11 December a 5.30pm. He’ll also be launching the accompanying Centre of Gravity policy paper at the event.

Meanwhile, Clive Williams will be speaking about the causes and implications of ‘green on blue’ attacks in Afghanistan at ANU, Tuesday 11 December at 6pm.

Finally, there’ll be two talks on China’s new leadership at ANU next week. The first is a four-member expert panel on Thursday 13 December at 2.30pm and the second is by Professor Baogang He of Deakin University on Friday 14 December at 10am.

Reader response: the legacy of RAMSI

Thank you to Shahar Hameiri for his recent post on RAMSI. No doubt we’ll be hearing and talking a lot about the impact and legacy of the mission in the coming months. Indeed in the last few days, we hear that the last of the NZ military rotations has completed its input.

Shahar’s particular viewpoint is one I find intriguing. Certainly the influence of those involved in logging on the political economy of Solomon Islands has been and continues to be significant.

In terms of the wider issue of the impact and legacy of RAMSI a number of things arise. Of most concern is the perception that the ‘institutional strengthening’ aspect of the  mission has, in effect, created a parallel government rather than assisting local stakeholders in developing and maintaining crucial processes and systems that can be embedded and sustained. It’s hard to see how this has contributed to the statebuilding project overall. Allied with this (and alluded to by Shahar) is the skewing effect on the economy (particularly in Honiara) of the influx of military and police personnel as well as expatriate advisers wanting (and paying for) services and goods (but mainly services) of various kinds. It is a matter of concern as to what the social impacts will be if and when this largely artificial economic buttress is removed.

Managing the effect of withdrawing this type of economic buttress is not an easy challenge to address in any environment. The first aspect of addressing this challenge is to acknowledge its existence and identify potential risks, particularly those relating to social conflict at an early stage where possible. Allied to this is the importance of acknowledging the wider social impacts of a long-term intervention such as RAMSI on a small yet complex society such as that of Solomon Islands. It is inevitable that the presence of this mission will leave a range of impressions on the country, especially in Honiara where it’s most visible. These impressions span a range of things both tangible and intangible. The ‘exit strategy’ for RAMSI needs to encompass a whole lot more than putting people and equipment on planes and ships. It’s not possible for an outside influence, even one as significant as RAMSI, to ‘do’ nation building for a sovereign state. However, what is to be hoped is that Operation ‘Helpem Fren’ will have indeed assisted the people of Solomon Islands to recover from a very painful period in order to move forward on a their own journey.

Tess Newton Cain specialises in developing knowledge connections in the South Pacific region. She is a research associate of the Development Policy Centre and is currently employed by the Pacific Institute of Public Policy.

Pamphlets, papers and policy

Kazimir Marevich's 'White on White', 1918.

Dear Minister

In some quarters, your promised 2013 Defence White Paper is already being ridiculed as ‘the white pamphlet’. Others take an even more pessimistic view, with Hugh White doubting that a document will be delivered at all. I really do hope that’s not the case.

The ADF is struggling to handle deep near-term budget cuts, and neither you nor the opposition is willing to say how much they plan to spend on defence in the medium or long term. What was a mess is now becoming a crisis. Coherent planning is impossible, our allies are confused, and morale is declining in the ranks. We need a new Defence White Paper and we need it soon.

The good news is that there is no reason why a credible White Paper cannot be produced. Defence has a well-documented strategy framework with literally hundreds of people working full time on intelligence assessments, strategic policy, capability plans and the like. If you can’t readily access the information you need on the costs, benefits and risks associated with options for Australia’s defence, heads should roll.

Even if your mandarins and generals have been sitting on their hands in a stupor of learned helpless for the past six months, which is doubtful, there’s still time to pull together a White Paper in the first half of next year. Here’s how to do it. Read more

Defence: is it really all about the money?

Defence: Is it really all about the money? Image courtesy of Flickr user Krug6.

There is a tendency by many commentators to see defence as just being all about money. A cut is intrinsically bad, growth naturally good. For some, the size of the defence budget is held as a real measure of the defence credentials of a government or nation. Hugh White’s latest missive is a good example of this, although I’m sure unintentionally.

At its core the focus on money is derived from considering defence as an insurance policy against the risk that bad things might happen. This was the case with the 2009 White Paper which saw that the key problem in defence planning was strategic risks. This kind of approach addresses risks through building and sustaining the necessary defence (and other national) capabilities such that these risks might be controlled to tolerable levels. This costs money. So the more money you spend, the more risks that can be handled and/or the less damage that these risks if they occur might inflict.

There are some issues with this seemingly reasonable approach when it is translated into the arcane art of budgeting. Firstly, only some risks can be addressed while most are ignored. As US Defense Secretary Bob Gates warned: ‘Nobody lives in that world…you are never going to get to zero threat. You could spend $2 trillion and you’d never get to zero threat.’ Read more