Reader response: getting carried away with Britain’s new carriers

HMS Ark Royal Visits HMNB Clyde for the Final Time

Harry White’s contribution on the UK carrier program highlights a number of the flaws in the UK’s current approach to its defence capabilities. But he seeks to ask the wrong first question in suggesting that it should be ‘are carriers the best way to achieve our strategic objectives for the money’?

Rather, the UK needs to go much deeper than this and seek to work out much more precisely just what its strategic objectives are. If, as proposed in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review, they are to include a capacity to intervene overseas, only then does the question of whether carriers are the appropriate basing solution for air power arise.

If (and only if) there is determined to be a requirement for an intervention capability, it’s worth looking at the very mixed experience with maintaining basing access and passage through other nations’ airspace that the UK and its partners had during operational contingencies in the 1990s, and the part that this played in the original decision to build the carriers. The need to achieve and maintain access certainly drove much of the thinking behind the 1998 SDR and was the reason for the unanimity of Defence advice (including the RAF) at the time. If the UK is to continue in the intervention game, then that issue of access very much remains on the table. And, even if access can be assured, there remains the question of the cost benefit difference between proximate, sea delivered air power (plus seaborne lift—and an island state like the UK will always need to use the sea when conducting expeditionary operations) and long distance air-to-air refuelled capability. This is a very complicated question. Read more

North Korean missile launch: the good and the bad for Australia

Salute to the Kims

In a typical destabilising move, North Korea launched a missile last Wednesday (despite having previously advised that the launch would be in late December). An unpredictable and defiant North Korea is nothing new—it’s something that we came to expect from Kim Jong-Il, and his successor appears to be no different. North Korean missile and nuclear provocations have direct security implications for neighbouring states and the United States (as a primary target of North Korean aggression). What’s less obvious is that they also indirectly impact Australia’s strategic interests.

Managing North Korea and strategies for bringing it into line has been an important election issue for political candidates in both Japan and South Korea—so this latest missile launch stands to influence the outcome of upcoming elections (16 December for Japan and 19 December for South Korea). North Korea’s latest provocation will only serve to further consolidate votes for conservative candidates; Ms Park in South Korea, and Mr Abe in Japan.

More hard-line conservative governments in Tokyo and Seoul might actually bode well for Australia’s strategic interests. Both countries are strategic partners for Australia as part of the ‘hub and spokes’ alliance arrangements with the United States. While a hostile North Korea continues to develop long-range missile capability, Tokyo and Seoul will have even greater incentive to reach out to like-minded countries like Australia to address common security threats. A stronger drive in Seoul to reinforce military ties with allies in the region stands to improve Australia–South Korea defence cooperation and maximise both country’s middle power status. Similarly, if this latest missile launch precipitates a shift in Japan’s defence policy to allow it the right to collective self-defence and to come to the aid of an ally, this shift would be a welcome development for Australia–Japanese defence cooperation. Read more

Reader response: managing submarines and managing uncertainty

Andrew Davies’ post yesterday on the second Coles report is absolutely right: the fundamental issues don’t lie with the Collins design itself but with the poor management of the complex system that determines the maintenance and manning of the submarines. Andrew is also right that if those issues can be resolved, there could be very significant efficiencies involved in extending the Collins’ life of type.

However, as Andrew also notes, there is no certainty that those issues are being resolved or will be in future. As a result, there is a risk that the extension option will simply be throwing good money after bad. The question then becomes how different possible approaches going forward compare in terms of their consequences if those problems are not fully or satisfactorily addressed.

In other words, what needs to be analysed are the risks under alternative approaches for taxpayers (both financially and in terms of our defence capability) and how those risks vary with the extent to which we can or cannot address the systemic problems Andrew (and Coles) notes. Read more

Graph of the week: Collins (un)availability

Yesterday’s release of the Coles review report into the availability of Collins Class submarines was very illuminating. As well as telling us that the Collins has some life in it yet, it shed a bit more light on past performance than had been previously unavailable in public.

In particular, after the 2008/09 reporting year, Defence stopped reporting availability data for the Collins fleet, instead rolling it into a single number for ‘major combatants’—ie submarines plus frigates. But figure 3 from the latest Coles report (PDF) and data from past Defence Annual Reports allows us to produce the following chart.

This graph updates the figure that Mark Thomson and I produced for our previous work on submarines. Historical data is in blue, estimated data in red. Perhaps it’s not too surprising that the 09/10 figures were deemed unfit for public viewing.

Graph showing Collins availability, Andrew DaviesSources: Defence Annual Reports (blue), estimates based on Coles data (red and black)

Andrew Davies is a senior analyst for defence capability at ASPI and executive editor of The Strategist.

Are social media users now legitimate targets?

Artist: Aaron Wood

There are lots of interesting dimensions in Israel and Hamas’ recent social media war. But one of the more pertinent ethical questions arising from this case is whether engaging with or contributing to a militarised social media space constitutes an act of war. If that’s the case, this might mean that those using social media in support of military operations are now legitimate targets.

According to the Geneva Convention, legitimate military targets

 … are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.

Read more

ADF–Tatmadaw relations: is Myanmar ready?

A young monk, Myanmar

The Myanmar junta have come a long way in a very short space of time. Aung San Suu Kyi has been released and has met with world leaders including US President Barack Obama, the media is incrementally liberalising with more international exposure, and people in central Myanmar regions are reporting more freedoms of expression and collective rights. Myanmar is stumbling down the path to democracy, but is heading in a favourable direction.

Nevertheless, there have been some recent incidents that raise questions about how quickly Myanmar is transitioning. A violent crackdown by police on workers and Salingyi villagers protesting outside the China/Myanmar-run Letpadaung Taung copper mine left scores of villagers and monks with burns and other injuries. Since then, President Thein Sein has appointed Aung San Suu Kyi to head a taskforce investigating the conduct of Myanmar forces during the incident and the Myanmar police force have apologised for their actions. This whirlwind of bureaucratic housekeeping has taken place before any public international or regional condemnation, media statements or official responses. ASEAN has also remained silent, preferring to report rather than comment on the incident.

It’s not yet clear what this says about developments in Myanmar’s military (known officially as Tatmadaw) and its approach to policing. Read more

Sub par management: the Coles review and the Collins Class

HMAS Collins arrives in Sydney Harbour. HMAS Collins is the first Collins Class submarine to visit Sydney for more than two years.

Before the second part of the Coles review into submarine availability had even been released, ‘sources’ were telling the press that the report should scuttle the idea of using the Collins design as a basis for the future submarine. To be sure, when the report emerged later in the morning (PDF), it had a lot to say about the availability of the Collins fleet that doesn’t reflect well on its management.

For instance, comparison against international benchmarks is very unflattering—the Collins availability is only a little more than half of the average, while maintenance overruns clock in at more than 200% of the international average. At times like this, all we can say is thank heavens for Canada.

This is nothing short of scandalous. A $10 billion investment by the Australian taxpayer—one that has come with a significant opportunity cost due to the economy-wide shortage of skilled workers, engineers and project managers—has been mismanaged to the point where the submarines have essentially been unfit for purpose. Read more

Reader response: some more thoughts on nonproliferation

Le traité de non prolifération nucléaire - The nuclear non-proliferation treaty

Many thanks for Tanya Ogilvie-White’s insightful and somewhat wistful commentary on nuclear proliferation in an increasingly complex security arrangement in Asia. She points out the dangers confronting the international security system generally, and nuclear-insecurity in particular, as transitional volatility at the systemic level begins to erode confidence in the post-Cold War equilibrium, and she does so with the right combination of urgency and anxiety. I commend her analysis, but I wish to make a couple of observations on the difficulties facing future leaders of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, emanating from the regime’s own history.

Firstly, let me recognise the broad success of nonproliferation efforts. Other than the initial P-5 nuclear states, only a handful of countries, ie Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea, are known to possess nuclear weapons, and only Iran is believed to be pursuing the capability to produce some, Tehran’s persistent protestations to the contrary notwithstanding. Many other states, despite suffering from grave insecurity of various origins and possessing the technical and financial wherewithal to address these by fashioning a nuclear deterrent, have elected not to, or have been persuaded to desist. This success of the NPT regime is commendable. Those who believe in the risks inherent in proliferation should support and strengthen the regime in their collective interest. Read more

Halifax International Security Forum (part II): contemporary trouble spots and modern warfare

Afghanistan National Army Sgts. Bashir Allahmurrad and Abdul Ahad, both assigned to 1st Kandak, 1st Brigade, 215th Corps, wait for their rifles to be cleaned and inspected before firing at Range Juarez near Forward Operating Base Geronimo, 25 May 2010.

Last week, I presented my thoughts on the leadership challenges discussed at the Halifax International Security Forum which I attended last month. While not entirely abandoning the leadership theme, the Forum also took up a couple of enduring trouble spots—Afghanistan and Iran. Both seem to be nearing something of a tipping or end point, where the outcomes of the international community’s exertions give little reason for much optimism. But, in fact, the panel on Afghanistan was not all pessimism: the increase in Afghan literacy, degrading of the Taliban, and the size and growing competence of the Afghan National Army were all seen as encouraging signs. There is a strategy in place for Afghanistan and while events will probably unfold in some unexpected ways, Afghans have a window of opportunity to seize their future. Next door, in Pakistan, however, the picture could hardly be bleaker. For many, Pakistan presents a picture not too far distant from that which once applied to Afghanistan, with broken political institutions, high levels of domestic insecurity and chronic economic breakdown. Whatever future might exist for Afghanistan, it’s difficult to avoid the conclusion that the greatest regional challenge in South Asia is the manifest instability in Pakistan. Despite the obvious need for change, there are few signs either in Pakistan itself or from the outside that anyone has any serious plans to affect the reforms desperately needed there. Consequently, the security situation seems only destined to deteriorate, notwithstanding the promise of the forthcoming elections. Read more

A way forward for peace-building in the Solomon Islands

Locals welcomed RAMSI to church service, July 2003The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) and its legacy have been the subject of debate among critical Solomon Islanders and foreign analysts. Many ordinary Solomon Islanders believe that if RAMSI leaves, crises will arise again. The question is how long RAMSI will maintain law and order in the Solomon Islands while the issues that ignited the conflict are left unaddressed. As University of Hawaii academic Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka has argued:

… foreign intervention, while useful in the short term, does not offer an easy solution to internal problems. It might create a quasi-functioning state that is able to restore order … but without addressing the underlying causes of unrest … the risk is it will create a culture of dependency.

The underlying causes of the conflict in the Solomon Islands are deep-seated traditional issues of land and compensation, and they remain important during post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building. But the process of peace-building as a pre-requisite to post-conflict reconstruction can’t advance if these issues are ignored. The danger is that the longer they remain unresolved, the more likely it is that resentment will build up. In addition, uneven development and grievances relating to powerful local perceptions of relative deprivation due to these underlying causes will remain an obstacle to sustainable peace. Read more