Strategist Article Archives - Page 1163 of 1186

Reader response: Reserves, force structure and need

17 January 2013

Like so many people with very little firsthand experience of creating and using defence capability at any sophisticated level, Nic Stuart has effortlessly come up with yet another answer to the financial problems of Defence—Reserve manpower.

It was only a matter of time.

Although he does not state it directly, the only fair conclusion from how Nic structured his article is that he believes that the use of reserve manpower was successful in the past, we had too much manpower in WWII, two-year national service was all that was needed in Vietnam, the only thing that we face in the future is an invasion of the continent (and there isn’t much chance of that), and in these financially tight times, greater use of Reserve manpower would enable the RAAF to buy the JSF and the RAN to buy the future submarine. There are, to risk massive understatement, some problems with this line of logic.

What produces quality Australian soldiers, sailors, and airmen and women is not whether they are full or part time, regular or reserve, it is the quality of the recruits combined with first class equipment, quality leadership and realistic training. If a Reserve serviceman or woman does a few weeks per year of training, and so likely never reaches any real level of individual or group deployable operational capability, then you get exactly what you are paying for—not much. I wonder if Nic thinks that being capable in combat is so simple that anyone can do it with just a few weeks’ training per year. Read more

ANZUS, Article 8 – has its time come?

16 January 2013

On 5 September 1952, Richard Casey, the Minister for External Affairs, provided the Australian House of Representatives with a report on the first meeting of the ANZUS Council in Honolulu about a month earlier. The report gives an indication of the alliance’s early good health, reflecting engagement by senior policymakers, warm relationships and broad discussions. It also shows something else—the detailed consideration given to the place of Article 8 of the Treaty in the alliance’s future. Today, even among alliance cognoscenti Article 8 features scarcely at all in policy debate or the academic literature. The Article authorises the ANZUS Council

…to maintain a consultative relationship with States, Regional Organisations, Associations of States or other authorities in the Pacific Area in a position to further the purposes of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of that Area.

The single longest paragraph (by far) of the 1952 report covers the decision to focus on ANZUS as a close-knit tripartite alliance, and to put to one side the concept that ANZUS might be a vehicle for broader regional consultations. The broader concept sketched in Article 8 was to be kept under ‘continuous review’, but was deemed to be ‘premature’. The central effort was to go towards nurturing the defence and strategic relationship between the three core members of the alliance. As Casey put it in the report, ‘We felt that the first task was to concentrate on making the treaty work with its original limited membership.’ Read more

A Capability of First Resort: Australia and amphibious warfare

16 January 2013

In my previous post I discussed the broad utility of an amphibious capability and noted how its popularity has waxed and waned over the past century or so. Narrowing our gaze down to Australia, we find that since Federation these operations have even more of a vexed history.

The title of this piece is a very deliberate piece of plagiarism. ‘A Capability of First Resort’ is the name of two important pieces of writing on this topic. The first a Land Warfare Studies Centre Working Paper by Russell Parkin that traces the history of amphibious operations in Australia from 1901–2001. The second is a 2004 ASPI Strategic Insights paper by Aldo Borgu which discusses Australia’s Future Amphibious Requirements and assesses the decision to purchase the Canberra Class Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) ships. These are both important pieces of analysis that I highly recommend.

For both of these articles the notion of amphibious forces as a ‘capability of first resort’ for the ADF references a quote from General Peter Cosgrove during his time as Chief of Army and later as Chief of the ADF. Cosgrove’s observation was, as Borgu states, ‘unsurprising given the archipelagic nature of Australia’s region’. Yet what might have seem obvious to Peter Cosgrove, especially after his experience commanding INTERFET, has often not registered with other senior military officers and defence officials over the last 100 years or so. While this might seem strange given Australia’s status as an island nation with its northern approaches dominated by an extensive littoral region, it’s entirely consistent with the swings and roundabouts of Australia’s defence strategy and priorities over this period. Read more

Schisms and backtracking in embracing Myanmar

15 January 2013

The world should be thinking twice about lauding Myanmar’s nascent reforms. Recent air strikes directed at Kachin rebels in Shan state by the Myanmar government exacerbate one of the longest-standing civil wars in the country’s post-colonial history. This sharp escalation of force, condemned by the US, the UN and China, gives further credence to suspected schism between the government in Naypyidaw and operational command of the Myanmar Armed Forces (also known as Tatmadaw). There’s also increasing concern that commercial commodity interests will trump prospects for an end to conflict in the region.

With one hand, the junta have made sweeping reforms, invigorating freedom of speech and hopes for democratic rule. There are even liberal sex education publications now hitting Rangoon bookstores. However, the other hand continues to swipe violently at dissidents and rebels, leaving breaches of international law and fickle diplomacy in its wake. This could be explained by the junta’s historically erratic behaviour and its tendency to renege on deals struck with armed wings of its ethnic minorities. It might also illustrate deeper incongruence between the central leadership under President Thein Sein and tactical command amongst the military. Read more

‘Vive la France’ – the surprise French lead into Mali

15 January 2013

The conflict in Mali that has been making headlines this week has been brewing for many months now. As I pointed out back in October last year, all signs were that an Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) force would be deployed into Mali to repel Islamist fighters in the north of the country early in 2013. Much of the international community appeared highly reluctant to become actively embroiled in the fight, being happy to back a UN mission to the country but reluctant to commit troops, aircraft and vehicles to the approaching engagement.

So what has taken many by surprise has been the sudden rapidity of France’s whole-hearted engagement in the conflict, throwing their weight into Mali in a way that wasn’t expected. Why did this happen and what are the consequences for Mali?

In fact, the script has been prepared for some time for the intervention in Mali. The UN passed a resolution in October requesting West African states under the ECOWAS banner to speed up the process of providing a plan for military intervention. It seemed that there was ready-made force of 3500 ECOWAS troops available for deployment, backed by logistical support from the US and France. However, as the planning became more intense, it was felt that the Malian forces, whom ECOWAS would be supporting, would require increased training and strengthening and the ECOWAS force wouldn’t be ready for deployment until September 2013. Read more

Force Structure 102: getting the balance right?

14 January 2013

The next White Paper’s conclusions on the overall force balance will be closely studied. While whether current or future wars receive priority and the numbers of wars to be fought concurrently might be big strategic decisions, it’s the force structure decisions that will identify the big financial winners from the White Paper.

There is a wonderful myth in Australian defence planning that the correct force structure is some ideal ‘balanced’ force. It’s myth mainly because everybody has their own unique idea of the ‘right’ balance. Rather than being permanent, the balance sensibly changes overtime as people consider the emerging circumstances and decide what to focus on. Each White Paper in ways large or small rebalances the ADF. The last White Paper’s decision to build 12 submarines was one such rebalancing.

In simple terms, military forces can do many things, but there are really only three broad types of wars they can be organised for: civil wars (including counterinsurgency), conventional interstate wars and nuclear wars. The weighting of the force between the various types of war is one of the balancing criteria. Read more

Sea power, Mahan and the Western Pacific

14 January 2013

One of the things I like most about the summer break is the opportunity to catch up on some reading. This time around one of the items on my reading list was a revisit of a 1911 essay ‘The Panama canal and sea power in the Pacific‘ by the great sea American power theorist Rear Admiral A. T. Mahan.

The reason I wanted to read this particular piece again was because there’s a turn of phrase in there that has stuck with me and which seems pertinent to our deliberations about the future security structure of the Asia–Pacific region. Mahan, as was often the case, was ahead of the pack in thinking through the strategic implications of the opening of the Panama Canal—still three years away at the time of the publication of his essay.

For Mahan, there were two main implications. Firstly, that the western coast of North America would now be more readily accessible by American fleet elements based on the Atlantic coast and the Royal Navy would be thousands of miles closer to the westernmost provinces of Canada. The ability to provide greater security along that coast would mean that the population of the region could be greatly increased, and the products produced on that seaboard would be able to be reliably traded, with consequent economic gains: Read more

Reader response: Reserves, force structure and budget cuts

13 January 2013

In a recent post on force structure, Peter Layton dramatically highlighted the continuing tension between future capabilities and existing requirements. The problem is, of course, (as Andrew Davies likes to say) that there are a limited number of dollars, and each of them can only be spent once. This is a particular problem when it’s necessary to decide what equipment should be purchased. Similar considerations are also relevant when considering personnel.

It has been a long time (71 years) since Australia faced the prospect of being invaded, and this helps to go some way towards explaining the current structure of the forces.

It’s clear today that the prospect of Japanese invasion was more remote than was appreciated at the time—the Japanese discussed the possibility but the Army wasn’t at all keen on the idea. Nevertheless it was this ‘total war’ situation, together with the prospect of fighting island campaigns in the jungles of the Pacific, resulting in an enormous mobilisation. By 1943 the Army had swelled to more than a dozen divisions (11 infantry and 3 ‘armoured’); nearly 500,000 men, or more than ten times the size of today’s Army. As it turned out, there were far more people in uniform than the country could support. Additionally, manpower was needed for other vital tasks, such as growing food and supporting the general Allied war effort. That’s why, within a year, a decision was taken to significantly reduce the size of the armed forces in general and the Army in particular. Read more

ASPI suggests

13 January 2013

Happy 2013 to all our Strategist readers! Welcome back for another round of new articles and links in the security, strategy and defence world.

Mali

Mali is heating up with the deployment of French troops at the request of Mali’s interim government to help beat back Islamist rebels. If you need a quick primer, check out the timeline and factsheet put together by the American Security Project’s Ashley S. Boyle.

Non-proliferation

Michael Krepon at Arms Control Wonk blog shares his (bleak) prognosis for the year in nuclear arms reduction for Iran, Russia, India and North Korea. Earlier in the week, Tanya Ogilvie-White gave her take on dealing with North Korea’s nuclear intransigence.

Afghanistan

The tempo of drone strike operations in Afghanistan is illustrated by this Defense News item. Two a day in December was a decline on the previous rate. Meanwhile, Kate Clark at Afghanistan Analysts Network looks at different US troop configurations other than the ‘zero option’ for 2014.

Indo–Pacific

Meanwhile, Carnegie Endowment’s Ashley J. Tellis has a new paper that’s optimistic about the opportunities in the India–US strategic relations. It echoes observations by Amit Gupta on The Strategist last year who also saw room for growth in the relationship.

Whether it’s a ‘pivot’ or a ‘rebalance’, the increased American focus on the Asia-Pacific region seems to be good for business. It might be an appropriate time to have another look at US President Eisenhower’s farewell address on the military-industrial complex.

Interested in aircraft carriers of the Indo-Pacific’s Maritime Great Game? German blogger Felix Seidler has a round-up and analysis of the region’s big players over at CIMSEC blog.

Defence projects

The one-time head of DMO, Stephen Gumley, used to say that it wasn’t budget issues with defence projects that kept him awake—it was the schedules. The release just before Christmas of the Australian National Audit Office 2011–12 Major Projects Report bears out that observation:

Maintaining Major Projects on schedule, the second major dimension of project performance, remains the most significant challenge for the DMO and its industry contractors; in turn affecting when the capability is made available for operational release and deployment by the ADF.

But we shouldn’t feel too special—it seems that this is just another of the rich heritage of traditions we have inherited from the United Kingdom, whose own National Audit Office has just made essentially the same finding.

Prioritising North Korea in the UN Security Council

10 January 2013

Australia is right to use its seat on the UN Security Council to push for a tough response to North Korea’s most recent act of military provocation. Pyongyang’s successful launch of the Unha-3 rocket on 12 December 2012 has profound implications for peace and stability in our region, creating exactly the kind of high level threat that the Security Council was set up to address. Yet, in the month since the launch, the body’s only action has been to issue a statement condemning the launch and promising consultations on the issue. This came eight months after an earlier, failed rocket launch prompted the Security Council to declare that it ‘deplored’ North Korea’s behavior and was determined to ‘take action accordingly in the event of a further launch or nuclear test by that country’. It’s high time that these words were translated into action, and Australia is now well-placed to try to make that happen, starting with this week’s first substantive Security Council meetings of 2013.

Although it requires urgent action, North Korea’s missile program doesn’t pose an immediate or direct threat to Australian territory. A report in The Australian described the December launch as ‘chilling’ because, theoretically, it puts parts of Australia within reach of a North Korean nuclear-armed missile. This is misleading, to say the least, because Pyongyang hasn’t yet developed a re-entry capability or a nuclear warhead that would be small enough to fit on top of a missile, and is likely still years away from such a capability. The December launch was significant on a technological level because it demonstrated a successful separation of a three-stage rocket—an important technological step in the development of an intercontinental ballistic missile, but certainly not the final step, and arguably not the most significant one in terms of advancing North Korea’s nuclear capabilities. Read more