Strategist Article Archives - Page 1156 of 1182

Andrew Davies and Jim Molan talk strategy: round 1

4 February 2013

Over the course of several blog posts and tweets, Jim Molan and I decided to get together in person to hash out the issue of Need and strategic planning face to face. What ensued was a spirited discussion, the end of which, to my surprise, we found ourselves in violent agreement. The debate that unfolded will likely be of interest to Strategist readers, so I’ve reproduced parts of the transcript below:

Andrew Davies: Thanks for coming along here Jim—we seemed to be butting virtual heads on the blog, but I sensed we might have been talking past each other.

Jim Molan: Yes, I think so. Our clash has a lot to do with the definition of strategy. I think you use the term differently to me. I see it as following on from the Government coming up with a policy, which might be ‘defence of Australia’ or ‘forward defence’ or ‘minimise spending’. Underneath that there’s a strategy which translates policy into the reality of a force structure. So when I use strategy, it’s in the sense of implementation of policy, not how we fight country A, B or C. Your use of strategy, I think, is different to mine. There’s a missing link in what we’re all doing. The link is between government policy, implementation of that policy through an implementation strategy and eventually capability. I think there’s something missing in the centre, which turns strategy into capability. I think that’s what you are calling strategy, but it’s what I’d call an operational plan. Does that make sense? Read more

ASPI suggests

4 February 2013

Here’s our short weekly collection of new developments, reports and events in the defence, NatSec and strategy world.

ASEAN

What are the challenges facing the new ASEAN Secretary General Le Luong Minh? Amruta Karambelkar looks at the inaugural speech of the grouping’s first Vietnamese head and what lies ahead for the region.

Submarines

For the naval wonks out there, RSIS fellow Michael Raska has a new paper (PDF) arguing for new classes of conventional submarine designs in the Asia Pacific.

India

What strategic interests does India have in the Arctic? This new Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies article looks at India’s chill factor. Read more

Who lives down in deepest darkest Canberra?

3 February 2013

A small but important creature has clearly established permanent residence in the heart of Canberra’s defence and intelligence jungle. New creatures are extremely rare in this environment so a fresh player is always significant, especially if the bureaucratic animal has the potential to evolve from herbivore to meat eater. The creature that has cemented its existence is the National Security Adviser to the Prime Minister.

A small part of the import of the National Security Strategy is what it says about the two key creatures that live in the PM’s orbit*: the long-established big beast, the Office of National Assessments, which sits at the head of the intelligence community, and its new smaller sibling, the National Security Adviser—created in 2008 to bring greater coordination and cohesion to national security policy.

In looking at the National Security Adviser position, it’s worth stressing the novel point—how unusual it is to welcome a new entity to Canberra’s defence and intelligence fold. In this, the Rudd Government’s establishment of the National Security Adviser stands beside the Howard Government’s formation of the National Security Committee of Cabinet. Both are creations and creatures of the Prime Minister and their enhancement of the leader’s power should ensure their future. Both rate as uncommon additions to a Canberra institutional structure that is little changed over 30 to 40 years. Read more

Avoiding a ‘final showdown’ with North Korea

1 February 2013

After the UN Security Council tightened existing sanctions against North Korea this month (adding four organisations and six individuals to its blacklist) the North responded by warning that it would carry out additional rocket launches and a third nuclear test. In recent days, the North has ramped up its histrionic rhetoric saying that a third nuclear test is the ‘demand of the people’ and that it has ‘no other option but to push forward towards the final showdown’.

Against this backdrop, there’s no doubt that we’re in the middle of another cycle of North Korean nuclear brinkmanship. Intelligence reports, including images of activity around the Punggye-ri nuclear test site, suggest that a third nuclear weapon test is imminent—another step in Pyongyang’s typical escalatory ladder. For instance, in April 2009 it began by conducting a rocket launch, which prompted the UNSC to tighten sanctions. This led Kim Jong-Il to retaliate by authorising a second nuclear test. It wouldn’t be surprising to see the same pattern repeated, especially in the context of the North’s current threat levels, South Korea’s successful rocket launch, and because South Korea is due to assume the UNSC presidency in February.

Looking back, North Korea’s first nuclear test was widely considered to be a failure and its second too small to be an unqualified success. But analysts now fear that a third might produce a yield of between 12–20 kilotonnes, which would indicate that North Korea has managed to resolve some or all of its technical difficulties. Read more

What does the National Security Strategy say about Indonesia?

1 February 2013

The short answer is ‘not very much’. And that’s a good thing. In the past we’ve had government and opposition policy pronouncements such as the 2009 Defence White Paper, proposed asylum seekers solutions in East Timor, American Marines rotating through our north and the proposed towing of boats back to Indonesia that have raised the eyebrows of our near neighbours. Some of the concern has been about language directly concerning Indonesia, some about a lack of consultation and some about the way we see regional security in general. This time, neither the text of the National Security Strategy nor its launch have caused much of a stir in Jakarta, at least so far.

Let’s start with the text itself. As my colleague Graeme Dobell noted last week, there’s a separate section on Indonesia (page 12) which describes the security relationship as ‘deep and productive’. What’s notable about the outline is the number of key areas where there is solid and ongoing cooperation and the concrete agreements such as the Lombok Treaty that frame that cooperation. This isn’t to say the security relationship is perfect or comprehensive, but it shows that we’ve arrived at a point where there is a strong foundation with positive future potential.

The rest of the Strategy reinforces messages from the Asian Century White Paper about Indonesia as a partner country and an important and emerging member of the international community, whether in security architecture or the G20 (pages 27, 38 respectively). Read more

Graph of the week – why (fleet) size matters

31 January 2013

Following on from last week’s graphs, I thought it would be worth looking at some of the consequences of the decline in western naval fleets. The graph below reprises last week’s data for the size of the United States Navy since 1960, but this time overlays it against the growth in the world’s commercial fleet over the same time.

Clearly the trends are in different directions—and dramatically so. In 1960 there were 45 commercial vessels in the world for every major combatant the USN could muster. Today the number is around 360. To be sure, not all of those commercial vessels are involved in activities that would bring them to the attention of the USN. The data set includes all vessels of 100 gross tons or more, and so includes many coastal and fishing vessels. But over half are cargo vessels and are responsible for carrying most of the exported goods produced around the world.

In its doctrine (PDF), the USN self identifies as an important player in securing the global maritime commons:

The creation and maintenance of security at sea is essential to mitigating threats short of war, including piracy, terrorism, weapons proliferation, drug trafficking, and other illicit activities. Countering these irregular and transnational threats protects our homeland, enhances global stability, and secures freedom of navigation for the benefit of all nations. Our maritime forces enforce domestic and international law at sea through established protocols such as the Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan (MOTR). We also join navies and coast guards around the world to police the global commons and suppress common threats. Read more

Reader response: NSS, escalation and clarification

31 January 2013

Having led the development of the National Security Strategy, we are pleased to see the lively commentary and debate which has followed its release including on The Strategist.

While it would not be appropriate for us to become active participants in that debate, we want to ensure any factual inaccuracies are corrected. Mr Jennings states that ‘the word ‘escalation’ doesn’t appear anywhere in the strategy’. It does, on page 27, as follows: ‘But miscalculation or escalation is possible in contested areas, such as in the South and East China Seas, and by countries of strategic concern, such as North Korea.’

More broadly, in relation to Mr Jennings’ statement that ‘there is no bigger judgement than that Australia has a ‘positive’ and ‘benign’ security outlook’, we believe it is important to draw readers’ attention to the important qualifiers used in relation to these words. The Prime Minister’s Foreword states that ‘our strategic outlook is largely positive’ [our emphasis]. And on page 11, the Strategy states that ‘ [strategic and economic competition] brings a degree of uncertainty and complexity to the relatively benign strategic landscape’ [again, our emphasis]. Mr Jennings implicitly acknowledges these caveats by reproducing the same extracts elsewhere in his post. He is of course entitled to his opinion that the Strategy ‘underplays the strategic risks emerging in our wider region’. We simply note that in laying out the risks and challenges Australia might face in the future, the Strategy recognises there are already clear elements of strategic competition at play in the region and that miscalculation and escalation are possible, with the potential for dangerous outcomes.

Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet

Peter Jennings responds:

I should have spotted the Strategy’s use of the term ‘escalation’; that was sloppy on my part. As PM&C notes, I quoted instances where the Statement qualified the use of terms such as ‘positive’ and ‘benign’, but I stand by my overall judgement that the statement underplays the impact of strategic risks emerging in the region.

Countering violent extremism – the ‘soft power’ approach

31 January 2013

The new National Security Strategy points to the Commonwealth’s Countering Violent Extremism Strategy as a key feature of its approach to countering terrorism, espionage and foreign interference. Community programs designed to counter violent extremism—so-called ‘soft power’ counter-terrorism programs—are being increasingly adopted by governments worldwide, including Australia. They are part of an evolving response to the threat posed by groups and individuals seeking to perpetrate or support violence in pursuit of ideological, political or religious goals.

The prevalence of ‘home-grown terrorism’—defined by the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department as ‘locally-cultivated violent extremism by individuals born, raised or currently living in Australia’—has prompted a re-design of the solely ‘hard power’ approach to counterterrorism that was the hallmark of the immediate response to the 9/11 attacks.

The threat of violent extremism is now more complex and is becoming increasingly difficult to detect, with violent extremists frequently operating in small independent groups or as ‘lone actors’. Under significant organisational pressure, Al-Qaeda inspired affiliates have used online channels such as its Yemeni affiliate AQAP’s Inspire magazine to campaign for local solo attacks. This campaign seems to be paying off for them, and has coincided with a marked increase in the number of such attacks since 2008. And the threat isn’t just from violent jihadism—the attack by Anders Behring Breivik in Norway in 2011 demonstrates the possible presence and lethality of violent extremists across the ideological spectrum (jihadist, right wing, left wing or ethno-nationalist). Read more

Why Carr needs the velvet glove more than the iron fist

30 January 2013

On my flight home from Fiji recently, I was struck by the continuing negativism of the arguments regarding Australian relations with Fiji. Rowan Callick’s commentary in the Weekend Australian is another example of a tough line on Fiji without any positive proposals. The one element of novelty in Callick’s piece, however, is the suggestion that Carr’s ‘soft’ approach toward the Government of Commodore Voreqe (‘Frank’) Bainimarama is the reason why Fiji has slipped the leash and gone feral recently. But this belies the evidence of the past six years. When has the Bainimarama Government ever been on an Australian leash or even responded positively to pressure from Canberra?

Having viewed the changing events in Fiji fairly closely in a variety of roles over the past six years, I find it difficult to see how the tactics that have failed to have any influence on the course of Fiji’s return to democracy since the December 2006 military coup will work in the 18 months before Fiji is due to go to elections. And this view has been bolstered by a week in Suva talking with a range of people that included participants in the constitutional process, current and former members of Government and academics. More of the same intransigence simply will not to produce a different outcome.

The Bainimarama Government has neither deviated from the roadmap’s timing for the return to democracy that it announced in July 2009 and nor has it altered this timetable since Bob Carr became Foreign Minister. Still, it’s a welcome development that Carr apparently has accepted this—albeit at a fairly low level—but it’s far too late to have the sort of influence that was on offer at the beginning of 2008. Read more

The NSS: a strategy within a strategy

30 January 2013

Last week’s National Security Strategy has attracted a mixed reaction, with many commentators focussing (rightly) on the vagueness of the document and the lack of any concrete spending commitments.

But the PM’s speech on launching the paper was rather more concrete. In particular, she emphasised three big changes in Australia’s strategic environment: a swing back to focusing on states rather than non-state actors, on our region rather than the world, and on diplomacy over other alternatives.

I think she’s right on each of these. The tensions between China and Japan over the Senkaku Islands, and between China and almost everyone in the South China Sea, are good examples. Both are all about states, all about our region (and particularly maritime sea lanes and freedom of passage, perhaps the most crucial security issue for Australia) and (hopefully) both can be resolved diplomatically. If not, we’re in trouble. Read more