Strategist Article Archives - Page 1143 of 1187

Introducing nuance: the White Paper and great power competition

3 May 2013

The future relationship between the United States and China will significantly define Asia’s strategic future. For Australia, there’s no more important question than how Washington and Beijing will manage their relationship. So it’s great to see that the government’s new Defence White Paper (DWP) introduces a much more nuanced assessment of the emerging US–China strategic balance and its implications for Australian defence policy.

The 2009 DWP was very strong in pointing to Chinese military assertiveness as a major source of concern for Australian defence policy, but the new document states that the government ‘does not approach China as an adversary’. It also recognises Beijing’s military modernisation as a ‘natural and legitimate outcome of its economic growth’. This reflects the reality that China’s military rise doesn’t automatically mean greater instability in Asia. Read more

Defence White Paper 2013: the strategic setting

3 May 2013

A quick first read of the principal ‘strategic environment’ chapters of the new White Papers (Chapters 2, 3 and 6) gives a broad feel for the document as a whole. The overall tone of the document is consistent with the National Security Strategy, depicting a regional environment that’s simultaneously cooperative and competitive, and an Australian strategic approach that attempts to both shape and hedge.

There’s an occasional jerkiness to the document’s flow, as if more than one hand has been attempting to insert messages—not surprising in any government document that underpins future funding. That jerkiness is most evident at the start of Chapter 3. Para 3.3 contains, oddly, a long and detailed equipment list at the opening of an argument about Australian strategic interests. Paragraph 3.4 abruptly changes tack and argues that Australian strategic policy is really about shaping rather than hedging. It’s followed by two paragraphs on hedging before para 3.7 returns to the theme of shaping.

Along the way some important and astute observations emerge. Para 3.19, for example, identifies one of our key strategic goals—a non-coercive regional order. But those observations sit alongside other paragraphs which seem overly restrictive in how we might pursue that goal: para 3.47, for example, seems an ADF-centric view of how Australia might attempt to influence the unfolding regional transformation. Read more

Where’s the Beef?

3 May 2013

Back in the day, you could get a free Big Mac from McDonalds by reciting ‘…two all beef patties, special sauce, lettuce, cheese, pickles, onions on a sesame seed bun…’ in less than 5 seconds (limit one per customer per day). As a hungry teenager I made it my mission to master the art.

My summer of eating for free was a spin off of the Burger Wars of the late 1970s and 80s between the large hamburger chains in the United States. Over that period, millions of dollars was spent on television advertising by McDonalds, Burger King, Hardee’s and others to entice customers to the drive-through window. The most lasting legacy of the era has been the ‘Where’s the Beef?’ campaign from Wendy’s (which was revived in 2011). Take a moment now to watch the original advertisement and one of its follow-ups. It’s hard not to laugh even today.

I was reminded of the classic Wendy’s campaign today as I was reading the new Defence White Paper. Not because it’s entirely lacking in nourishment for the ADF—twelve Growlers is a substantial addition to the force structure. And there’s even a promise of some additional money over the next four years, not just for the Growler purchase but also to address budget pressures within Defence. My concern is for the longer term, when we’ll have to pay to maintain a mixed fleet of Super Hornets and F-35 Joint Strike Fighter while building twelve new bespoke submarines at great cost and risk, not to mention maintaining today’s troop numbers and enhancing ADF base infrastructure across the length and breadth of the country. None of this will come cheap. Read more

Australia’s 2013 Defence White Paper: shrinking the nuclear genie?

3 May 2013

The role that US nuclear weapons play in Australian strategic policy is given far less emphasis in the new Defence White Paper. While the 2009 document contained five paragraphs that directly addressed the issue of extended nuclear deterrence and extended nuclear reassurance in the Australian context, this White Paper has only one.

It’s an interesting paragraph, though, because it specifically limits Australian reliance on US nuclear weapons to circumstances in which Australia is threatened with a nuclear attack. This is a change from 2009, when US extended deterrence and security assurance was described in much broader terms as ‘the best defence against WMD proliferation’.

This paper’s reference to the ‘continuing viability of extended deterrence under the alliance’ reflects a more subtle but equally significant shift. The 2009 document spoke of the ‘stable and reliable sense of assurance’ that US nuclear weapons have provided Australia over the years, removing ‘the need for Australia to consider more significant and expensive defence options’. It also explained that the viability of extended nuclear deterrence was dependent upon ‘stable’ nuclear deterrence remaining a feature of the international system. These references to ‘stable nuclear deterrence’ in the broader international context have gone, replaced with a much more precisely worded, Australia-specific exposition of the role of nuclear deterrence. Read more

What’s in a name change? Cyber in the Defence White Paper

3 May 2013

The 2013 Defence White Paper marks a distinct progression in how cyber issues are dealt with by the Australian Government. Evident is an attempt to de-militarise the issue through a change in the language used, and the emphasis on a whole-of-government approach. But words are one thing, and the proof will be in the results they deliver. There’ll be a great deal of work ahead to ensure cooperation between departments, create productive mechanisms for the private sector to play their part and provide sufficient finance to produce results.

The 2013 National Security Strategy, which was intended to underpin Australia’s thinking on how it views the strategic outlook for the nation, places cyber at the heart of its security concerns, making ‘integrated cyber policy and operations’ one of its key five year priorities. This has strongly flavoured the 2013 Defence White Paper, most notably by bringing about a change in the titles of the Defence Signals Directorate and the Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation. Quite simply, both organisations have had ‘Defence’ removed and replaced with ‘Australian’. DSD always had to wear two hats, one which was as an element of defence capability (including intelligence support to the forces as well as offensive capability), and the other as a national agency that provides technical support to a wide range of government constituents (primarily in a defensive cyber security capability). The name change change seems a small one, but it’s intended to demonstrate a change in organisational mindset, from a defence led approach to a recognition of cyber as a whole-of-government approach. Read more

Future submarines

3 May 2013

Today’s White Paper launch saw the two ‘lower’ options for the future submarine taken off the table. We now know that the RAN’s future boats won’t be an existing off-the-shelf design or a relatively modest derivative of them. This decision was taken on the basis of a judgement that existing designs that were available for export or licence production in Australia didn’t have the performance—especially the range and endurance—needed for operations across the Asia-Pacific theatre.

In effect, this decision has removed the two least expensive, least risky, (probably) fastest and least capable options from the potential solutions. What we’ll see is either an evolution of the Collins class or an entirely new design. Both of these options are likely to be expensive and involve significant project risk. I don’t think they’re mutually exclusive, of which more shortly.

Also announced today was that there was a viable way ahead to keep the Collins boats operational for an additional duty cycle of eight years. (That was actually a re-announcement of comments made by Defence officials at last year’s Submarine Institute of Australia conference and in the second part of the Coles Review.) That’s important because, as Mark Thomson and I found last year, the only credible ways of avoiding a collapse of Australia’s submarine capability some time next decade was to either move to rapid acquisition of an existing design or to extend the Collins life to provide the time to design and build a replacement. Read more

Just being a ‘good local cop’ isn’t easy

3 May 2013

Today’s Defence White Paper confirms an increasing focus on the security, stability and cohesion of Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste and the South Pacific states.

Minister Smith signalled Government’s intent to ‘bring our own immediate neighborhood back into sharp focus’ by appearing at yesterday’s inaugural South Pacific Defence Ministers meeting in Tonga.

A decade after the invasion of Iraq, the ten year-anniversary of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) in July will mark a less contentious but equally significant juncture in Australian strategic policy. Smith has indicated Government’s keen to avoid further ‘commitments to distant land-based operations’. Instead, we want to focus on closer enmeshment with South East Asian defence partners and helping to promote security in the South Pacific—especially the nearby, relatively large, populous and sometimes volatile states of Melanesia. Read more

12 more Super Hornets

3 May 2013

The decision to buy 12 more Super Hornets (in this case EA-18G ‘Growler’ electronic warfare models) which was announced today essentially consolidates the initial decision made in 2006 by the Howard Government. And it’s been made for much the same reason—the schedule slippages we’ve seen in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program have meant that the RAAF was facing a decade of reliance on increasingly aged ‘classic’ Hornets. I wrote on The Strategist in October last year that ‘logic of the situation is increasingly pointing to a further Super-hornet buy’. Simply put, buying more Super Hornets retires much of the risk associated with relying on 1980s jets to form the bulk of our air combat capability. And buying Growlers off the production line rather than taking half of the existing 24 off line for conversion means that the RAAF will have their most capable aircraft continuously available.

The downside to this decision is that the RAAF will be operating a mixed fleet of Super Hornets and F-35s for the entire 2020s, with the operating cost hit of two sets of fixed costs. That will be offset to some extent by a reduced buy of F-35s—now 72 rather than the 100 that had been pencilled in. The overall capability in the late 2020s will probably be less than might have been the case had we persevered with the full transition to the F-35, but the capability between now and the mid 2020s will be higher. And future governments can always revisit the air combat fleet size and composition if circumstances demand it.

Andrew Davies is senior analyst for defence capability at ASPI and executive editor of The Strategist. Image courtesy of Department of Defence.

Correction: An earlier version of this article incorrectly designated the Growler aircraft EF-18G.

Cutting our cloth – part III: a force structure for straitened times

2 May 2013

The 2013 Defence White Paper will be launched tomorrow. There’s always a chance that it’ll take a more austere approach to force structuring, but all the indications are that it will stick to the guns of the previous one, while failing to adequately explain how the proposed force structure will be funded. If so, it will merely put off the hard decisions to another day.

In my previous two posts in this series I explained how an extended period of lean defence budgets would inevitably lead to a serious decline in defence capability over time, unless accompanied by adjustments in strategy and tough decisions on force structure. One of my premises is that Australia’s budget situation won’t return to the halcyon days of 2000–2008. Mark Thomson will say much more about this in his budget brief later in the month, but serious economists are talking about a structural deficit which will take ‘a substantial level of financial discipline’ on the behalf of future governments to deal with.

In the absence of a substantial external shock, Defence shouldn’t hold its breath waiting for more money. Like it or not, we need to find ways to provide defence capability and capacity with spending levels not too different from today’s. I think that’s doable, but acknowledge in advance that the levels of risk we’ll have to accept will rise—the good news being that they are currently very low and aren’t likely to substantially increase. Read more

Women in war: what we don’t know

2 May 2013

Over the last couple of years I’ve watched with interest how the ‘gender and Defence’ debates have unfolded in the Australian media. Debates about the inclusion of women in front line combat, physical standards for women in various occupational roles, and highly publicised ‘sex scandals’ have incited a range of political, professional and emotional reactions, and focused attention in a limited way on how gender roles are seen in the military today.

As an academic who has spent the last four years conducting an in-depth study of the health and wellbeing of Australia’s female veterans, I think debates about removing the restrictions from women’s participation in front line combat in particular have rendered invisible the considerable involvement Australian women have had in war and their exposure to trauma.

Women have served, and are currently serving, in situations very comparable to front line combat in all but name and classification. I listened to story after story from women who had deployed to Vietnam, Rwanda, East Timor, Iraq, Afghanistan, and many other operations. When I compared their experiences to the public discourse that argues the pros and cons of allowing women to serve at the ‘pointy end’ of war, it occurred to me that the debate implicitly, and often explicitly, suggested women’s experiences to date had been rather benign. Read more