Marine protected areas across the Southern Ocean?

Guest editor Anthony Bergin

East Antarctic map for MPAAt their annual Meeting in 2012, the 25 members of the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) failed to come to agreement on the declaration of any specific Marine Protected Areas (MPAs). This was despite several years of discussions and clear commitments to the establishment of a representative system of MPAs within the Convention Area by 2012, the adoption of a small MPA providing protection to the South Orkney Islands southern shelf in 2009, and an agreement in 2011 of Conservation Measure 91-04 providing a general framework for the establishment of CCAMLR MPAs. States are happy to commit to protecting the continent (and reap the benefits of looking proactive) but seem to lack the willpower to follow through.

CCAMLR considered three proposals for MPAs at this meeting: the Ross Sea region MPA proposed jointly by NZ and USA; the East Antarctic Representative System of MPAs proposed jointly by Australia, France and the EU; and the Antarctic Peninsula Ice Shelves (put forward by the EU). Read more

Australia–Indonesia relations: all marriages need effort

Group shot of the ASPI-Defence 1.5 track dialogue with Indonesia (photo credit: Luke Wilson, ASPI)The Australia–Indonesia relationship is headed in a broadly positive direction, with the potential for defence and security cooperation to grow. But people-to-people and economic links are surprisingly limited and more needs to be done to build ballast into a relationship often at risk due to misperceptions. These are our personal conclusions after ASPI’s inaugural ‘Australia–Indonesia Next Generation Defence & Security Forum’ in Sydney, 14 to 16 May. With the support of the Department of Defence, we brought together 20 Australian and Indonesian participants from the military, academia, government departments and think tanks for two days of 1.5 track discussion on pressing defence and strategic issues. To encourage frankness, the meeting was held under the Chatham House Rule, so we won’t attribute comments to individuals, rather we’ll offer our own impressions of the meeting.

There were several key themes that emerged from the presentations and discussion. For one, maps made an appearance in several instances—a salient reminder that geography is one of the key forces that necessitates greater Indonesia–Australia cooperation. Some presenters used maps to articulate an Indonesian perspective of our strategic environment and its security challenges. In one case, the visual representation of Indonesia’s archipelagic sea-lanes and their vulnerability to foreign vessels highlighted Indonesia’s need for greater investment in naval capabilities as well as for maritime cooperation.

Several speakers also looked at future prospects for the bilateral relationship. One speaker asked, ‘What should the relationship feel like in 20 years?’, the implication being that national sentiment and the degree of ‘warmth’ each country felt for the other would set the course towards stronger strategic ties down the track. For example, interoperability between our militaries (and even officers serving in each other’s battalions) was proposed as a desirable end. Yet several participants challenged this idea, on the grounds that interoperability entails greater compatibility between our systems than is commonly understood and greater congruence between our respective strategic cultures was still needed. Read more

What’s an Australian defence industry for? Part I

Oberon class HMAS Oxley sits in Fitzroy Dock at Cockatoo Island dockyard, in an Intermediate docking, 1970.The Queensland government has recently appointed a defence envoy to bolster defence industries in the state. In this it joins other states and the federal government in actively adopting defence industry sector strategies. But for strategies to be effective, they must be built on a clear understanding of the objectives sought. There are several different objectives that a defence industry strategy could be potentially optimised for. At the fundamental level this raises the question of what an Australian defence industry is for.

Where you stand on this issue may depend greatly on where you sit. In this post we’ll look at the federal level, leaving the state and company levels for later. The federal level comprises both the government as a political entity and below this the departmental levels, particularly Defence, Finance and Treasury.

At the political level there’s currently a focus on defence industry providing jobs—but not just any jobs, or indeed simply more jobs. Instead, the focus is on creating meaningful, well-skilled jobs in the manufacturing industry, as the current interest in naval shipbuilding attests to. This is by no means an unworthy objective; philosophically, contemporary liberal thinking stresses improving the life of individuals—what else does a society exist for? Read more

ASPI suggests

The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) helicopter destroyer JS Kurama (DDH 144) performs maneuvers during training as part of the integrated maritime exercise Koa Kai, November 2011.Michael O’Hanlon from Brookings has some ideas on how the US might spend its defence dollars given current fiscal constraints in his book Healing the Wounded Giant, including cutting ground forces, buying half of the planned 2,500 F-35s, and suggesting the Navy can get by with as low as 260 ships, rather than the planned 286. O’Hanlon and David Petraeus have an op-ed along the same lines as well.

On a related topic, here is an article on how to keep the US–China relationship from running off the rails.

In Japan, Prime Minister Abe is having some success the second time around:

Mr Abe’s dramatic rata-tat-tat of policy shifts has excited and enthused [the Japanese people]. His approval ratings, like the stockmarket, are booming.

His plans also appear to involve the first ever amendments to the 1947 constitution, including acknowledging Japan’s right to standing army, navy, and air force.

On the other side of the Indo-Pacific, the Lowy Institute has released its 2013 India poll. It tells us, among other things, that apparently 83% of Indians consider China a threat, and we in Australia are India’s fourth favourite country, behind the US, Singapore, and Japan.

And earlier this month the International Crisis Group has released a report on stability in Timor-Leste:

Timor-Leste deserves praise for the success with which it has implemented pragmatic policies designed to bring rapid stability following the 2006 crisis. Promoting confidence at home and abroad is important for transforming any post-conflict economy. But it likely has a very limited window of opportunity during which to make investments – both political and financial – that might mitigate the still real risks of an eventual return to conflict.

We have also had a couple of short responses from our readers:

Neil James notes in response to this piece on basing at the Cocos (Keeling) Islands, that as well as there being limited space, limitations in the supply of fresh water and the lack of a deep-water harbour to accommodate larger ships will also preclude the establishment of large or permanent bases.

And in response to Peter Jennings thoughts on pay parking for the ADF (and others in the Parliamentary Triangle), a bemused member of the ADF notes that: we should “Spare a thought for some in JOC that drive 140km round trips to Bungendore each day… Did you know DFAT are offering a fuel allowance to their people to actually get someone to volunteer to work out there?”

And last but not least, we also suggest you check out our jobs page. There are three positions going at the moment; a cyber security analyst, events and publications assistant, and an administration officer.

Image courtesy of Flickr user U.S. Pacific Fleet.

The order of Fiji’s New Order

Soldiers from Fiji serve as the guard unit of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI). 6/Feb/2009.The political settlement that Fiji’s New Order regime is preparing to impose on its subdued society and decimated polity is a lousy outcome after 13 years of struggle and schism. Yet Australia, New Zealand and the rest of the South Pacific have little option but to persist in engaging with the regime as it bolts in place the narrow terms for next year’s election. The decision to engage is why Canberra is prepared to put up with the current bout of silliness from Suva over issuing a visa for the new Australian High Commissioner.

A flawed and limited election in 2014 will be better than no election at all. Granted, it’s clear that the election will seek to enshrine the people and the interests of Fiji’s New Order. That outcome, however, was always in view. For Australia and the region, seeking accommodation with the regime is a sad acknowledgement that Fiji has been unable to save itself. In the contest between power and principle, power has triumphed.

The relatively tough line Canberra has taken towards the Supremo and his regime since Bainimarama’s second successful coup in 2006 was based on two ideas. One was that with a bit of bashing and barracking, the military would go back to barracks. The other thought – both lofty and practical – was the commitment to a set of democratic understandings that have wide support and proven utility in the South Pacific. Read more

Decoding China’s rising influence in the South Pacific

What’s China up to in our near neighbourhood? That’s an important question at a time when Australia has just declared that we’ll structure the ADF around just two of our Principal Tasks (PDF), the second of which is to promote stability and security in the South Pacific and Timor-Leste.

In this context, Jenny-Hayward Jones’ new Lowy paper, Big Enough for All of Us: Geo-Strategic Competition in the Pacific Islands, provides some welcome nuance on what China’s growing presence and economic clout may mean (and not mean) for regional countries’ interests and ours.

Although analysts have questioned the strength of the ‘causal link between the strategic theology of the initial chapters of the White Paper and the wish list of equipment projects further in’, Australia’s renewed security focus on the near neighbourhood is real. While the South Pacific contains less than 10 million of ‘the half billion souls that live between us and China’, the real estate and inhabitants of the region are important for reasons I’ve explained elsewhere. Read more

Reader response: Defence White Paper—between the lines

Mark Thompson writes:

Imagine how the White Paper would have read if it had begun with the recognition—brutal yet surely accurate—that our security ultimately depends on the geopolitical balance in our part of the world rather than on our ability to defend the continent against attack.

Unfortunately, that “brutal” recognition is more of a theoretical assumption derived from the attitudes of large states rather than a universal reality for all states. Australia’s security is not ‘ultimately’ dependent upon the geopolitical balance of Asia. Just as the evolving changes during the Cold War between the US and USSR had no substantial impact on Australia’s day to day environment, neither will a (much more geographically restricted) balancing act in northeast Asia affect us. Certainly the balancers may get it wrong with occasional clashes but, save a WW3 type scenario, Australia’s security does not “ultimately depend” upon the degree or even existence of ‘balance’ 10’000km to our north. Read more

Four principles of Australian defence policy

LCPL Dustin Hoppe from Melbourne’s 4th/19th Prince of Wales Light Horse Regiment stands at Rest on Arms as a member of the Catafalque Party during the Dawn Service in Honiara, Solomon Islands.I’m an old Defence-of-Australia hand, so I’ll offer a perspective which looks at the 2013 Defence White Paper through that prism, and then draw some conclusions.

There are four overall principles that have characterised Defence of Australia policies. The first is the self-reliant Defence of Australia. The new White Paper leaves no equivocation on this point.  Paragraph 3.35 says ‘The highest priority ADF task is to deter or defeat armed attacks on Australia without having to rely on the combat or combat support forces of another country’. The next paragraph elaborates:  ‘Australia’s defence policy is founded on the principle of self-reliance in deterring or defeating armed attack on Australia, within the context of our Alliance with the United States and our cooperation with regional partners’. What’s new here is the reference to the region in the final phrase.

The second policy principle is that there are limits to Australia’s military resources and influence. There are few direct references to this (perhaps it’s taken as self-evident) but there’s little doubt that it’s a central factor.  Paragraph 3.2 reads to the effect that the Government’s responses to security threats and opportunities will have to acknowledge ‘the limits of our capability and reach’. The next sentence is in some ways more telling:  ‘Choices must therefore be made to guide the allocation of finite resources to deal with challenges that are most likely or most dangerous, and where our response can be most effective’. This theme of choice, and by implication difficult choice, recurs throughout the document:  see for example paragraph 7.9. Read more

Self-reliance and the DWP13

President Barack Obama tours the Australian War Memorial with Governor-General Quentin Bryce, War Memorial Chairman Peter Cosgrove, and Prime Minister Julia Gillard in Canberra, Australia, Nov.17, 2011.Thankfully, Minister Smith has delivered the sort of Defence White Paper you hope for when you really don’t need a White Paper and there isn’t enough money to pay for the current plans, let alone any further promises. Nevertheless, the 2013 White Paper has at least attempted to repair the damage caused to our relationship with China by the Rudd hedging excursion in the 2009 paper. The Chinese must be getting confused by now.

On a positive note, the paper encouragingly hints at Defence acknowledging that it’s part of the broader Australian national security community and it finally introduces some clarity into the submarine question. However, the Air Force must be dreading the prospect of a mixed fleet of combat aircraft—and just when does the number of Super Hornets being purchased start to discount the number of JSF we intend to buy? The paper also makes positive moves towards real policies for cyber and space and finally recognises the importance of Indonesia as a partner in Australia’s security.

The paper’s conservative nature should be seen as a win for the realists in the Department of Defence over the narrow strategic view and spin-obsessed approach of the politicians. Well done to the CDF and the Secretary, who must have had a real battle on their hands to get this result. But the battle isn’t over. Now the Department has to continue the struggle to restore the defence budget to a figure in excess of 2% of GDP before some of the damage that’s already been done to defence capability becomes irreversible. Sadly recent comments from the Federal Opposition provide no hope that they will ride to the rescue. Read more

Collins IP: Australia and Sweden bury the hatchet

Swedish and Australian flagsThe Australian and Swedish Defence Ministers produced a joint communique today on the subject of intellectual property rights for submarine design and technology. That mightn’t sound like a ‘tear down the front page’ story, but it’s actually very significant—the management of Swedish firm Kockum’s IP has been a vexed issue in the past, and at one stage represented a rather large spanner in the remediation works on the Collins class submarines.

In fact, things got very untidy indeed between the Commonwealth and Kockums, ending up in the Federal Court over a number of issues in the early 2000s. In 1998–99 cracking problems were discovered in the Collins’ propellers, and the Commonwealth shipped two to the United States for analysis and advice. Propeller configuration is one of the ‘crown jewels’ of submarine design, and Kockums took court action in 2001 when another was to be shipped, resulting in the unedifying spectacle of the ship carrying the propeller being held off the US coast while the court action was resolved.

The Court found in favour of the Commonwealth, but a substantial ground for the decision was that the harm to Kockum’s position had already been done by the earlier shipments—hardly the basis for a trust-based relationship between the parties involved. (The story is told in Chapter 26 of ‘Steel, Spies and Spin‘.) Read more