Strategist Article Archives - Page 1130 of 1186

Australia–Indonesia relations: approach with caution

1 July 2013

With all the talk in the past few days about the possibility of Australia and Indonesia coming into conflict—be it diplomatic or otherwise—it’s worth understanding some of the pressure points in the relationship. At the top of the list, at least from Jakarta’s perspective, would be the events of late 1999. Following a self-determination ballot in August 1999, the security situation in East Timor worsened and—after a period of active diplomacy and coercive efforts supported by the US—Indonesia consented to the deployment of an Australian-led, UN-authorised peacekeeping force (known as INTERFET).

Aside from the obvious reasons, this case study deserves close scrutiny because a certain mythology (and oversimplification) has crept into the narrative over the years. In the latest issue of the Security Challenges journal, I present a new take on the events of 1999. As part of my research for this article, I interviewed the six Ministers then serving in the National Security Committee of Cabinet, as well as nine others who were intimately involved in Australian policy-making. One key lesson from the events of 1999 is that Australia will—in all but the most extenuating circumstances—prioritise the Jakarta–Canberra relationship above almost all other concerns.

While some see the violence of September 1999 as a catastrophe Australia could—and should—have prevented, I instead suggest that Australia’s ability to influence this outcome was limited. The events of 1999 should be considered, to some degree, independently of events in 1998. In January 1999 the Indonesian President, B.J. Habibie, announced that East Timor’s status would be resolved through an act of self-determination. Though Australia had advocated Indonesian policy action on the issue of East Timor, this decision was completely unanticipated and generated acute policy challenges for Australia. As such, Habibie’s announcement caught Australia by surprise and precipitated a period of reactive policy-making. Read more

Not really more assertive: Japan’s defence policy

30 June 2013

The notion that Japan’s defence policy is becoming increasingly assertive in the face of a rising China is gaining traction in Western media and some elite circles. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe promotes the ‘normalisation’ of Japan’s foreign and security policy, including a change of the pacifist constitution and exercising the right of collective self-defence. For the first time in 11 years, Japan’s defence budget increased in 2013. As well, the Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) has intensified joint exercises with the US; most recently simulating retaking an occupied offshore island during Dawn Blitz 2013, a major US-led amphibious exercise off the coast of Southern California. Finally, at the end of this year the government will adopt new National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG). Analysts speculated that the new guidelines might bring Japan closer to even developing a ‘pre-emptive strike’ capability, particularly after Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera publicly claimed that Japan had ‘the right to develop the ability to make a pre-emptive strike against an imminent attack’.

Undoubtedly, Tokyo is deeply worried about China’s strategic trajectory and PLA Navy activities around the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and within Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). ASPI’s recent ‘1.5 track dialogue’ with Japanese think-tank analysts and officials in Tokyo (conducted in cooperation with the Japan Institute for International Affairs) confirmed the strong focus on China’s ‘anti-access/ area-denial’ threat and a desire on the Japanese behalf for a more proactive defence policy, including participation in the emerging US ‘AirSea Battle’ concept and adopting a ‘offensive defence’ posture (without specifying what that meant).

But it’s important to keep things in perspective. In fact, what’s happening in Tokyo’s current defence policy is more the result of a long-term development, rather than sweeping changes. And it’s not clear that the money’s there for a growing wish list of military capabilities. Read more

Welcome aboard, Minister

28 June 2013

With the news that we’re about to get another new Defence Minister, we thought we’d provide our thoughts on what the executive summary of an incoming brief should look like. We’re tempted to copy the approach of the Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy and print ‘Don’t Panic’ in large friendly letters on it. We’d also suggest that the incoming Minister probably shouldn’t dwell too much on how frequently in the past 15 years this has been a valedictory posting for long-time politicians…

Minister, welcome.

First, a few salient facts. The Australian Defence organisation is an extraordinarily complicated enterprise. Its military operational activities range from routine daily in-base administrative work through to sophisticated foreign intelligence collection and high-intensity combat. The Defence Materiel Organisation manages projects and equipment costing well over $100 billion. The Defence Capability Plan contains more than 100 projects, some of which will probably still be running in the 2030s. Defence’s total workforce numbers around 100,000, with staff located in countries around the globe, including some inhospitable and dangerous locations.

For all of those reasons, Defence will never be the easiest portfolio to manage. You can reasonably expect some tough times, and a crisis might be just around the corner. Some of the problems of Defence are deep and seemingly perennial, and a series of well-researched reform programs dating back decades have only partially ameliorated them. And at the moment there’s also a significant problem in the funding plans for future force structuring. Read more

ASPI suggests

28 June 2013

We’ll kick off this week with a collection of 230 websites and blogs for terrorism research, compiled by the journal, Perspectives on Terrorism. (Thanks Andrew Z)

Also, the Lowy Institute has released their Annual Poll 2013 and for strategy buffs, there are several points of note. On the US alliance, 82% of Australian respondents thought it was important, while 61% say they are in favour of US military forces based in Australia. On regional relations, Australians are lukewarm about their closest regional partner with Indonesia rating 53° on the thermometer scale.

Unmanned platforms such as the Global Hawk high altitude surveillance drone or the Predators and Reapers flying operations in Afghanistan and beyond have been much in the news in recent years. Less well-known is that China isn’t being left behind in the UAV business. China has just exhibited a predator-like aircraft at an international air show. A report prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission argues that this is just the latest result of a concerted effort to bring China’s UAV industry up to a globally competitive standard.

President Obama’s ‘red line’ of the use of chemical weapons in Syria has been the subject of analysis by many commentators. Less well scrutinised is the possibility that existing stocks of chemical weapons currently under the control of the Assad regime have the potential to fall into the hands of rebels, and thence to al Qaeda.

On a less serious note, it seems that the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter has PR issues way beyond criticism from the aviation press or Washington agencies. Even Hollywood doesn’t seem to like it. (Thanks Justin)

Lastly, two new reports from NBR. In the first, Scott W. Harold proposes a strategy for improving US–China military relations across a range of functional areas. In the second, William J. Grimes studies Japan’s economic reforms and the implications for regional and global economies of ‘Abenomics’.

Events

Canberra: It’s Asia Pacific Week next week at the ANU. There’s a number of events including Q&Asia, a variation of the popular ABC TV show, on Thursday 4 July, 10.45am – 1pm. For more information on the public events, see here.

Also on Thursday 4 July, Dr Michael Wesley will be speaking on ‘Asia’s jostling powers and Australia’s future security’, hosted by RUSI ACT at the Australian Defence College, Weston Creek at 6pm.

Sydney: AIIA NSW is hosting a talk by Professor Kerry Brown called ‘The networked leadership: China’s fifth generation’ at Glover Cottages on Tuesday 2 July at 6pm.

Image courtesy of Flickr user Diablo Azul.

Has Indonesia welcomed the US pivot?

27 June 2013

It’s no secret that in the early days of the US pivot’s announcement, there was a split between Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa’s initial caution about US troop presence in Darwin and the President’s more measured response. With more of the pivot revealed since late 2011, it’s worth looking at how Indonesia’s reaction towards it has crystallised—not just towards the military dimension of the pivot but also other elements relating to multilateral engagement, economics and trade, and democracy.

Indonesia continues to be uncertain about what the military elements of the pivot mean for its security. In one sense, there are more opportunities for defence cooperation with both the US and Australia, including military education exchange programs and joint exercises. However, there still remains some hesitation about the presence of Marines close to Indonesia’s shores. As noted by Vice Presidential advisor Dewi Fortuna Anwar, historical suspicions about US interference in Indonesia continue to cast the deployment to Darwin in a negative light.

Yet the more pressing strategic point for Indonesia is the effect of the military rebalance on China. If it was to result in strategic escalation between the US and China and a destabilisation of the region, that wouldn’t be in Indonesia’s interest. Indonesia isn’t a claimant to territories in the South China Sea, although there’s an overlap between the Indonesian claims for the EEZ around the Natuna Islands and China’s maritime claims. As a result, it’s watching with interest the outcomes of China’s interactions with other ASEAN states. As Columbia University’s Ann Marie Murphy pointed out at last week’s ANU–CSIS Jakarta–Weatherhead East Asia Institute conference in Jakarta, ‘Intersections of Power, Politics and Conflict in Asia’, the Philippines effectively lost the Scarborough Shoal after its confrontation with China in December. While the Philippines had hoped the US would come to its aid under the Mutual Defense Treaty, a deal was brokered instead that resulted in Philippines Navy withdrawing but China occupying the area. Indonesia has fewer options to invoke US assistance than the Philippines, and with a navy in dire need of an upgrade, it’s in its interests to keep military confrontations in the region to a minimum. Read more

Investing in the future: international scientific collaboration

27 June 2013

The weight of global investment in science and technology is shifting. Strong R&D growth in countries like China, India, South Korea, Singapore and Malaysia means Asia is fast catching up to the traditional scientific centres of Europe, North America and Japan. This is a pivotal period.

Nowhere is this more evident than China. According to former Chinese President Hu Jintao, ‘China has set the goal to become an innovation-driven economy by 2020′. The Chinese are backing their rhetoric with action, with real growth in R&D spending exceeding 18% per annum since 2000.

Scientific research is now a truly global enterprise. The General Electric 2011 Global Innovation Barometer forecasts that 40% of global innovation over the next decade will be driven by collaboration across national and institutional boundaries. This is because research is conducted most efficiently when ideas, data, facilities, equipment, talent and risks are shared on a competitive basis. Despite that, the Government has made decisions in recent years to retreat from strategic collaborative engagement. Read more

‘Lifting not looting’ in Australia–Africa relations

27 June 2013

Australia is fast recognising the opportunities that the African continent represents, with about 200 Australian companies currently operating throughout the continent. Australian business and investment is worth more than $50 billion and diplomatic ties are now established with all African states and organisations. Australia–Africa relations are at a level that has never previously been reached and political co-operation between Australia and African states and organisations is now a tangible reality.

It’s important that Australia’s engagement with African countries be about establishing relations of mutual benefit. There’s a need to move beyond relations based predominately on the relationship of aid-donor and aid-recipient. Historically Australia hasn’t had significant relations with African countries or organisations, but the history of interaction between African states and other western states is one of oppression, extreme violence and the looting of natural resources. The tragic collusion between African political elites and western and non-western partners and beneficiaries has led to the enrichment of a few to the detriment of the many. The ‘many’ are left to live in severely impoverished situations within resource rich states. Although this pattern of exploitation has continued unabated throughout much of the African continent, Australia is entering relations with African states and organisations at a time when democracy and political stability and security in Africa is steadily increasing. Read more

Constraints on protecting Syrians

26 June 2013

Although the situation in Syria and the actions of Bashar al-Assad long ago passed any criteria by which a humanitarian crisis may be defined, a mix of factors has prevented any international moves that would bring about a decisive change in the country’s tragic circumstances.

The United Nations-backed doctrine of a responsibility to protect, the third leg of which enshrines the point ‘If a State is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the international community must be prepared to take collective action to protect populations, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations’ seems unlikely to have any effect on the Syrian situation. Implementing the doctrine of ‘responsibility to protect’ was always going to be governed by what big powers saw as being in their strategic and possibly in their short-term interests. Syria will long remain a classical case to study.

The overriding concern of those countries that could alter the balance of forces within the country by supplying major weapons to the forces opposing Syria’s President is that those weapons might find their way into the hands of al-Qaeda or other terrorist groups. It would be hard to deny this is a possibility. Read more

Canada and the limits of maritime diplomacy

26 June 2013

Canada has begun to play a more visible role at the Shangri-La Dialogue, and this year’s summit was no exception. Defence Minister Peter MacKay even very publicly broached the issue of participating in the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus). In some ways, Canada’s request is understandable. Regular, high-level participation at Shangri-La is often seen as necessary for joining ADMM-Plus. As Peter Jennings noted in his recent Strategist post on Canada in the Asia–Pacific, this request was also politely rejected, a reminder that what might be necessary is not necessarily sufficient.

Part of this rejection arose from Canada’s often fleeting attention to the Asia–Pacific region itself. A good case in point is Prime Minister Brian Mulroney’s North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue, quickly shelved after only a few short years and raising well-placed concerns about Canada’s staying power (PDF). One can also add Canada’s equally brief funding for the track-two South China Sea Dialogue in the 1990s. Read more

Asian gazing (10): deal or no deal in the South China Sea

25 June 2013

As the curtain comes down on this series of posts surveying the Asian strategic landscape, the final scene sets us up a lot more drama to come. Southeast Asia’s great fear is that it faces much more of the same pain in the future as it has had for the last five years from China over the South China Sea. ASEAN would love to get the offer Beijing is making Washington of a new strategic relationship. But in view for ASEAN, unfortunately, is the same-old-same-old, applied with renewed vigour by the new leadership team in China.

Indeed, if the legal challenge the Philippines is mounting to China’s territorial claims goes well for Manila, ASEAN might face an even more excruciating version of what it has suffered in the past couple of years. In that case the recent status quo might look more like a plateau of pain that’s about to be surpassed by even more pain. Read more