Feeling edgy: Japan’s new defence white paper

he Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force helicopter destroyer JS Kurama (DDH-144) leads ships during a rehearsal for the 2009 fleet review.The Japanese government released its annual Defense White Paper (DWP) on Tuesday. In comparison with last year’s version it displays a harsher attitude towards China, indicating that Japan’s defence policy could shift further in coming years. Some shifts are already underway, such as increasing the Self-Defense Force’s (SDF) amphibious capability to defend its offshore islands in the face of China’s increased maritime assertiveness.

Japan’s 2013 assessment of its strategic environment is pessimistic. While the previous version ‘observed’ security developments such as China’s ongoing military modernisation, the 2013 DWP starts by stating that ‘Japan’s security environment is encompassed by…destabilizing factors, some of which are becoming increasingly tangible, acute and serious.’ Unlike last year, the document also contains a subchapter on the ‘Security Environment in the Vicinity of Japan’; demonstrating Japan’s growing concerns about direct threats to its national territory and integrity. Apart from North Korea’s and (to a lesser extent) Russia’s strategic behaviour, the chapter is particularly strong on China as a security threat. It notes that ‘in the waters and airspace around Japan, [China] has engaged in dangerous acts that could give rise to a contingency situation, such as Chinese vessel’s direction of its fire-control radar at a JMSDF destroyer.’ It goes on to argue that ‘[c]oupled with the lack of transparency in its military and security affairs these moves are a matter of concern for Japan.’ Read more

The US–Australian joint facilities and the invention of General Knowledge

Bob Hawke with US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in the Anzus Corridor in the Pentagon, June 1983.In a Ministerial Statement late last month, Defence Minister Stephen Smith outlined and explained the Australian government’s principles of ‘Full Knowledge and Concurrence’ in relation to American defence activities in Australia. This statement merits greater attention than it has received, not least because it’s an important contribution to making our defence activities with the US more transparent. But I want to take issue with some of the claims in the statement, particularly the claim that Full Knowledge and Concurrence didn’t exist in relation to the joint facilities before the prime ministership of Bob Hawke in the 1980s. And I want to cast Hawke’s contribution to the whole issue of the joint facilities in a different light.

Let me begin by briefly summarising how Smith defined his key principles:

Full Knowledge equates to Australia having a full and detailed understanding of any capability or activity with a presence on Australian territory or making use of Australian assets.

Concurrence means Australia approves the presence of a capability or function in Australia in support of its mutually agreed goals. Concurrence does not mean that Australia approves every activity or tasking undertaken. Read more

Alliances: three cheers for the Anglosphere

A game of cricket by Norwich Cathedral Almost inevitably, I find myself disagreeing with another column by Hugh White, this time in The Age newspaper of 9 July, in which he damns the foreign policy of the Gillard government, condemns the poverty of Tony Abbott’s thought on the issue and praises the perspicacity of Kevin Rudd, because he ‘understands’ the effect of strategic change in Asia.  That’s a target rich environment, but I’ll limit my rebuttal to just one aspect of Hugh’s piece: his casual dismissal of the Anglosphere:

[Abbott’s] deepest commitment is to the ‘Anglosphere’—the agreeable idea that the world should continue to be run from Washington and London, by people just like us.  In Washington last year he went so far as to say that ‘few Australians would regard America as a foreign country’.  This is a very strange thing for a national leader to say.  Indeed for sheer sentimental silliness it ranks with Gillard’s words to Congress: ‘America can do anything’.

A more cursory dismissal of a core Australian strategic interest would be hard to find, although it has to be said that the Anglosphere is one of those international institutions about which it’s cool to sneer. So old fashioned. So, well, English.  How can this relic of an old order have a place in the Asian Century? The short answer is because the Anglosphere demonstrates itself time and time again to be the engine of global order and the essential enforcer of international stability, even at a time of sweeping strategic change. Read more

Defence and money: how to manage in an era of austerity?

HMAS Dechaineux leads HMAS Waller and HMAS Sheean in formation.

Money it would seem really is the root of all evil, or at least the lack of it! Many defence commentators would agree with George Bernard Shaw in that judgement. The problem for Australian defence—and for most similar defence forces—is that not only is there never enough but the tenor of the times seems to suggest a continuing shortage. Just last week the Governor of the Reserve Bank, Glenn Stevens, was warning once again that future Australian governments needed to be fiscally prudent and avoid ‘budget splurges’. These aren’t happy times for those for whom the scale of a budget is considered directly related to strategic success.

There’s no getting around hard facts. The Defence budget isn’t as big as it was planned to be several years ago, and this translates into insufficient cash to buy all the new capabilities planned several years ago. With less money you have to buy less, at least in a quantity sense. Read more

ASPI suggests: special edition

A F/A-18F Superhornet taxis in after the simulated strike on RAAF Base Williamtown.

The latest issue of the Kokoda Foundation’s Security Challenges journal is a special edition that collects contributions on ‘The Defence White Paper 2013’. ASPI is well represented, and the abstracts of our papers are reprinted below.

Peter Jennings: The Politics of Defence White Papers

This article analyses the political context of Defence White Papers from 1976 to 2013. Political competition between the major Australian political parties is an inevitable and indeed essential backdrop to policy development. Only by understanding the dynamics of that competition is it possible to understand how governments make key defence policy decisions around strategy, force structure and defence spending. Competition for authority within parties also informs how Prime Ministers use White Papers as a means to cement their own power. A key challenge for governments is the need to look credible as custodians of Australian national security in the perceptions of voters. If one party is unable to demonstrate clear superiority over the other in its management of defence, a secondary aim is to try to remove defence as a point of political difference by claiming bipartisanship on key aspects of policy. Read more

Law and society in Africa

President Barack Obama meets with Chief Justice Papa Oumar Sakho and regional judicial leaders at La Cour Suprême in Dakar, Senegal, June 27, 2013. (Official White House Photo by Pete Souza)

Obama’s first stop in Africa was Senegal. While there, he met with several key members of the judiciary from across Africa (pictured above), at which the discussions centered on law in Africa. Obama told the assembled jurists;

… what makes for a strong democracy includes a strong judiciary — one that’s independent from politics; one that operates transparently so that citizens can have confidence that the process is free from undue influences; accountability — because even judges are not above the law.

There’s broad agreement on the need for the ‘rule of law’ to be upheld in African states and of the need to adhere firmly to the ‘separation of powers’. However, what’s often ignored is the nature of law in many African states, which is often markedly different to that found in western legal systems. A characteristic of law in many African states is its plurality—it’s simply inaccurate in some cases to speak of a singular dominate system of law that’s followed and uniformly accepted by all citizens within a state. Read more

Of Kevin, Julia and Tony: maddies, straights and fixers

Lieutenant Commander Shane Doolin, Commanding Officer of Aware Two explains the equipment on the bridge to the Hon Tony Abbott MP and Mrs Natasha Griggs MP prior to departure from HMAS Coonawarra basin on board HMAS Glenelg.

To paraphrase Julia Gillard in her farewell press conference, the three categories of ‘maddy’, ‘straight’ and ‘fixer’ do not explain everything about political leaders, but nor do they explain nothing.

As the previous column said, we’re indebted to the British politician Tony Benn for getting an immense amount of truth into one dazzling sentence: ‘All political leaders, irrespective of party, political system, country or period in history, come in one of three categories—straight men, fixers and maddies.’ This model helps us reach towards the truth Walter Lippmann uttered long ago: the supreme qualification for high office is temperament, not intellect. Accepting Lippmann’s assessment, the question becomes what we can know of a leader’s temperament and how that will drive his or her judgement and performance? Read more

Do we need an Indo-Pacific treaty?

Indonesian FM Natalegawa at the conference ‘Intersections of Power, Politics and Conflict in Asia’ in June

Indonesian Foreign Minister Natalegawa has recently articulated his proposal for an Indo-Pacific Treaty at no less than three different conferences (including ‘Intersections of Power, Politics and Conflict in Asia’ in Jakarta in June) and it bears careful reading because it contains ambitious ideas.

To summarise his proposal, Natalegawa sees the Indo-Pacific region as beset by a deficit of ‘strategic trust’, unresolved territorial claims, and rapid transformation of regional states and the relationships between them. The potential for these factors to cause instability and conflict requires the region to develop a new paradigm, an Indo-Pacific wide treaty of friendship and cooperation, to encourage the idea of common security and promote confidence and the resolution of disputes by peaceful means. At present, Natalegawa has only provided the broad concepts behind the treaty but a precursor question is whether a treaty is really necessary? Read more

Africa on our horizon

President Barack Obama reviews an Honor Guard following his arrival at the Presidential Palace in Dakar, Senegal, June 27, 2013. (Official White House Photo by Pete Souza)

Last week, President Obama completed a whirlwind official visit to west, southern and eastern Africa, stopping in Senegal, South Africa and Tanzania, important democratic US partners.

The President announced a number of new initiatives designed to strengthen US–African relations, particularly in economic and development areas, including Trade Africa and Power Africa—the latter of which Sabrina Smith wrote about here last week. Trade Africa is intended to boost trade with and within Africa, starting with the East African Community and the negotiation of a regional investment treaty. This is coupled with the President’s desire to finalise a new trade and investment agreement with the Economic Community of West African States. Also on the trade agenda was the African Growth and Opportunity Act, which expires in 2015 and which the President emphasised in each country of the tour that he would like to see renewed and improved.

Along with these new initiatives, the President announced the establishment of the Washington Fellowship for Young African Leaders, a major expansion of the Young African Leaders Initiative launched in 2010. Beginning in 2014, the fellowship will bring 500 young leaders to US universities and colleges each year to receive training and mentoring in business entrepreneurship, civic leadership and public administration. Read more

Japan: the salamander stirs

MV-22 Osprey

In mid-June, as Presidents Xi and Obama strived to build bonhomie in the arid desert east of Los Angeles, a US–Japanese armada was purposefully massing off the coast, preparing for a simulated invasion of southern California. The contrast between the Sunnyland summit and Dawn Blitz, an amphibious exercise principally involving the US and Japan, with participation from Canada and New Zealand, was both coincidental and surreal. Yet the point wasn’t lost on the Chinese authorities who demanded, in vain, that the exercise be cancelled.

Participating in Dawn Blitz for the first time, Japan sent three warships, including two amphibious ships with 250 Ground Self Defence Force (GSDF) personnel embarked, including a helicopter detachment of two Apache gunships and two Chinooks. Five Air Self Defence Force (ASDF) staff officers also took part, making this an unprecedented combined arms exercise for the SDF. In another precedent, US Marine tilt-rotor Ospreys landed on the deck of Japan’s helicopter destroyer Hyuga. From a standing start, two years ago, Japan’s defence establishment has moved with unaccustomed speed to the threshold of an operational joint-service amphibious capability. This is consistent with the ‘dynamic defence’ concept outlined in 2010, which reorients the SDF’s posture to defend Japan’s south-western approaches against the growing threat felt from China. Read more