Serious and organised crime: more than the sum of its parts?

72 litres of liquid methamphetamine was found suspended in shampoo

The Minister for Home Affairs released the Australian Crime Commission’s (ACC) latest update to its Organised Crime in Australia (PDF) series recently. This report is important and has implications for every Australian. The media needs to publicise it. And, most importantly, some deep thinking—which leads to action—is needed.

Such deep thinking is warranted because the report—which is consistent with other recent Australian Government publications, including the 2013 National Security Strategy—describes serious and organised crime as a threat to national security. If the motive of avoiding the direct personal impact of crime isn’t enough to encourage ordinary Australians to take notice, then the prospect of a government using the instruments of national security against this threat should.

Regular readers of this blog will be aware of the implications of calling some actor or vector a ‘threat to national security’. Those less familiar with national security might want to think back to the early 2000s, when global terrorism emerged as a major threat. In their collective and individual responses, governments changed laws, and adopted different decision-making processes that involved a significant degree of secrecy and minimal debate. More money was allocated to national security agencies with a mandate to fight terrorism, and governments used the threat to justify the need to use military force on a number of occasions. And as part of these military actions, practices such as rendition, enhanced interrogation and targeted killings via uninhabited aerial vehicles were sanctioned as both necessary and proportionate. Read more

Prohibiting low-yield nuclear weapons is a step in the right direction

Malcolm Davis raises some important issues regarding our proposal for a treaty restricting low-yield nuclear weapons. We’re word limited on our response, so we strongly recommend the longer discussion paper for subject-matter experts as it examines comprehensively all of the issues that Dr Davis quite rightly raised.

There are of course a number of views put forward by Davis that we’d associate ourselves with; such as the role of traditional nuclear deterrence, and the need to pursue tools in addition to arms control for reducing nuclear risk (he referred to tactical ballistic missile defence systems for instance).

And yet, the scepticisms expressed with respect to the proposed treaty appear to reflect a misunderstanding of the relationship that exists between this proposed arms control measure and overall military strategy. Read more

The ship that dare not speak its name

ATLANTIC OCEAN (Oct. 3, 2011) An F-35B Lightning II makes the first vertical landing on a flight deck at sea aboard the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp (LHD 1). The F-35B is the Marine Corps Joint Strike Force variant of the Joint Strike Fighter and is designed for short takeoff and vertical landing on Navy amphibious ships. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Seaman Natasha R. Chalk/Released)

Aircraft carriers have a habit of denying what they really are. In the 1970s, Britain’s new Invincible class carriers were officially christened ‘Through Deck Cruisers’, to reassure the nation’s bookkeepers that its Navy really had surrendered grandiose pretentions. America’s 40,000 ton Wasp-class flat tops are ‘Amphibious Assault Ships’, despite being instantly recognisable as aircraft carriers, and operating squadrons of US Marine AV-8B Harrier fast jets.

Now Japan has joined the international warship-euphemism stakes with the impressively misleading construction: ‘Flat Top Destroyer.’ Launched last Wednesday, this 27,000 ton (full load) capital ship, Izumo sports a full-length, 248 metre flight deck, an all-round visibility flight control island, and a hull that has been subtly sponsoned out to a 38m beam at flight-deck level.

To put this non-carrier into perspective, the new Izumo is almost exactly the same size, shape and displacement as the Royal Navy’s old HMS Hermes: the flag ship of the task force that recaptured the Falklands. At the height of that conflict, Hermes operated 26 Harrier jump jets and 10 Sea King helicopters. By contrast, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force asserts that Izumo–the largest addition to the post-war Japanese fleet–will accommodate just 16 helicopters. Read more

Young people today…

President Barack Obama meets ADF personnel at the conclusion of his visit to RAAF Base Darwin.

A provocative piece by American journalist Eddie Walsh is currently doing the rounds, making some bold claims about how Australians under 40 view the US–Australia alliance.

Based on meetings with ‘dozens’ of Canberra diplomats, think tankers, academics and military officers, Walsh claims that the under 40s could either not see any value or were ambivalent about the US–Australia strategic relationship. He contends that many see Australia becoming a ‘lapdog’ of the United States, constrained as a consequence in our ability to deal with China.

Here at the ANU’s Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, we’re fortunate to interact with a large number of students under the age of 40. They too are comprised of a mix of public servants, think tankers and military officers. Yet Walsh’s findings seem to contrast quite sharply with what we hear from them on a daily basis.

To test our hunch, we ran a short anonymous survey amongst graduate students in our Strategic Studies program, posing the same questions that Walsh asked of his interviewees. The results contrast sharply with his claims; contrary to his findings, 96% of the students we surveyed believed that the US–Australia alliance is of value to Australia, while 68% of respondents disagreed with the proposition that Australia is becoming a lapdog of the United States. Read more

Thirteen years and counting—the delivery of the 2000 defence white paper

F/A-18F Super Hornet aircraft

Thirteen years on from the release of the 2000 defence white paper (D2000), we’re still waiting for some of the major ADF capabilities it announced to be realised. Given the time it takes to deliver a major defence project, that’s not entirely surprising. And it wouldn’t be a problem if the planning around future ADF capabilities had taken the time into account. But, as my new ASPI paper shows, D2000 systematically underestimated project schedules, and the resulting cost to the ADF’s capability and to the taxpayer has been considerable.

D2000 was unusual among recent DWPs in giving an expected date for the delivery of many of its capability promises. The 15 quoted delivery times given ranged from four to 15 years, with an average of seven years. The reality was very different. Even being generous and assuming that Initial Operating Capability (IOC) corresponds to successful delivery, the actual average is almost 13 years—amounting to a schedule overrun that averages a little over five years. The table below (click to enlarge) summarises the results to date (further delays to the remaining projects are possible).

Read more

Julia Gillard’s foreign policy – part 3

President Barack Obama holds a joint press conference with Prime Minister Julia Gillard of Australia at Parliament House in Canberra, Australia, Nov. 16, 2011. Julia Gillard’s approach to foreign policy must be set beside that of Kevin Rudd. Indeed, Gillard’s place in history will be inextricably intertwined with Rudd on almost every level. The vote on September 7 will do much to define the final judgement on the terms of an internal party rivalry that was as toxic as anything Canberra has seen in generations—with as many acts as those played out by Howard and Peacock and with all the intense bitterness of Hawke and Keating.

Initially, Gillard as leader spoke with Rudd’s voice, especially as he was her Foreign Minister. Gradually over her term Gillard put down her own markers, such as the Asian Century White Paper. Indeed, one of the reasons Gillard created the White Paper was because it didn’t evoke the rhythms of Ruddism.

Rudd’s performance was much stronger on multilateral issues, while Gillard’s ability was more at the bilateral level. The foreign affairs efforts of Rudd Mk I were considerable, but the missteps were also notable for a leader who came to the top job with so much foreign policy experience. Rudd’s effort to make the G20 the preeminent international economic body was his finest achievement; his determination to bid for a seat on the UN Security Council ended in triumph, although it was Gillard who carried the torch across the line. Read more

Soft power, strategy and policymaking

Coca-cola: a global brand

Soft power is back in vogue. The Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs, Julie Bishop, stressed in the debate with Bob Carr at the Lowy Institute on Tuesday night that Australia needs to focus more on soft power—a point she’s made consistently. Closer to ASPI, Benjamin Reilly recently applied the concept of soft power to Australia’s Southern Hemisphere relationships. And the canny Fulbright Commission and AIIA, sensing a chance, have a conference on it in Canberra soon.

While a useful concept, soft power is rarely discussed at the strategic level as a policy instrument. Instead the focus is generally on the means of soft power (examples here and here), not how it works, its limitations or how policymakers could use it. It’s worth thinking in terms of what soft power is, how it works and, most importantly, what it can do for us.

Joseph Nye initially coined the expression soft power simply as the opposite of hard power—ie military forces and economic might. In his model, Soft Power works through attraction while hard power works through coercion. The currently fashionable term ‘smart’ power simply describes using both hard and soft power to address a problem—which is, of course, what grand strategies do. In broad terms, soft power involves influencing others’ background perceptions of a country’s international image. Read more

ASPI suggests

The Australian War Memorial launched a new exhibition on August 6, called Afghanistan the Australian Story, which presents the experiences of servicemen and women who deployed to Afghanistan and the Middle East Area of Operations.

T.X. Hammes has a new article in The National Interest, ‘Sorry, AirSea Battle Is No Strategy’ in which he argues that war with China won’t be won by deep strikes. Distant, defensive deterrence and blockades suit us better.

Are the economic benefits of military primacy all they’re cracked up to be? Dan Drezner has a new journal article that challenges whether military preponderance has paid off for the US.

There was a foreign policy battle of minds between the Foreign Minister Bob Carr and his Opposition counterpart Julie Bishop, hosted by the Lowy Institute on Wednesday. For a summary of the main points and key features, check out related blog posts here or listen to the recording here.

There are some new Centre of Gravity papers, published by the ANU’s Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, including one by C. Raja Mohan on recent China–India border disputes and their security implications for Australia, a second by Robert O’Neill on the ADF in a post-Afghanistan era, and a third by Admiral Dennis C. Blair on how Australia and the US should respond to China’s recent assertiveness (PDF). Read more

Closing embassy doors in Yemen – why is the West so worried?

Al-Mazraq, Yemen Oct. 9, 2009. A boy waits in line for food at the Mazraq refugee camp in Hajjah province. The displaced persons at Mazraq camp have fled the ongoing fighting in the Sa'ada province of northern Yemen.Last weekend’s headlines were filled with what was being described as the most serious terrorism threat to Western targets in some years. As a consequence, the US closed 20 of its embassies in Middle Eastern and African cities for the rest of the week. The UK embassy in the Yemeni capital Sana’a has been closed and all staff flown home, while the French and German embassies there have also closed.

Apparently, the closures took place after intercepted communications between two senior al-Qaeda leaders, including Ayman al-Zawahiri, indicated a re-invigorated terrorist campaign involving Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The Yemeni authorities reported that they’d disrupted plans to blow up oil pipelines and take control of key cities in the country, including ports in the south which distribute a majority of Yemen’s oil exports. Read more

Food…or war?

Rice terrace in Nagasaki Prefecture, JapanDrill deeply into most of the conflicts and civil wars of the past thirty years and you will find, underneath all the political, ideological, ethnic and religious divisions, people fighting over access to food, land and water.

These resources are essential to our survival—and our children’s. This simple fact is, and always has been, a primary casus belli: the emotional spark that fires the tinder of mutual antagonism between two or more competing groups or even nations. It was present in Dafur, the Rwandan genocide, the Balkans, the Horn of Africa and many other trouble spots around the globe. It triggered regime changes in Egypt and Tunisia (as well as in Russia and France, a century or two ago). Read more