On 29 August, ASPI will host ‘the Great Defence Debate’ in Canberra between Mike Kelly, the Minister for Defence Materiel—who has been named by Kevin Rudd as Defence Minister should Labor be re-elected—and the Opposition Defence spokesman, David Johnston. Defence hasn’t rated highly as a public issue in an election campaign more obsessed with selfies than self-reliance. In one sense, that points to a reassuringly high level of bipartisanship on defence, which is no bad thing for policy continuity. Being deep in the comfort zone doesn’t push the envelope for critical thinking, but for at least a golden sixty minutes after lunch on the 29th, the Great Defence Debate will open the door on some substance. Here’s hoping.

Four key questions come to mind as the essential points on which our prospective ministers must be tested. As the debate won’t be held under exam conditions, I have no problem sharing these posers in advance with ASPI’s readership. Your time starts now.

First, the money question:

Gentlemen, both government and opposition say they want defence spending to return to two per cent of gross domestic product. How exactly do you intend to bring that about, and when?

Read more

Crispin Rovere and Kalman Robertson have responded to my earlier comments on their ‘low-yield nuclear weapon treaty’ proposal, but I’m not convinced by their argument. They claim that low-yield weapons ‘are a unique class of non-strategic nuclear weapon (NSNW) that carry special risks which greatly outweigh any marginal benefit’ and go on to suggest that ‘prohibiting the development and retention of nuclear weapons with yields below 5 kilotons therefore strengthens security overall.’ But from whose strategic vantage point do they make these claims? Viewed from Washington, Paris or London, you could argue that a perceived absence of an overwhelming threat, together with clamorous calls for nuclear abolition, makes consideration of a low-yield NSNW ban a logical step towards a world of ‘global zero’. The wisdom of rushing to achieve that ultimate end-state can be strongly challenged: advocates of abolition consistently don’t address the hard reality that states have nuclear weapons for valid strategic purposes—most prominently deterrence—and eliminating low-yield NSNWs increases risks for some states that deterrence will fail.

Nuclear deterrence isn’t about bluffing. A credible nuclear deterrent demands both the ability and willingness to undertake war fighting if vital national interests are challenged. It also demands a clear requirement to communicate such a posture to any adversary. This was the basis for the success of nuclear deterrence throughout the Cold War, and remains so today. During the Cold War, NATO willingness to threaten a limited use of tactical nuclear weapons provided a nuclear ‘firebreak’ in which both sides could choose to step back from the brink. Intra-war deterrence was not a myth. However, the alternative of immediately ‘nuking Moscow’ in response to conventional attacks along the inner-German border would have rushed both sides needlessly into a series of strategic exchanges. This could have only resulted in mutually assured destruction (MAD). Read more