Two—the magic number

At last, defence is being paid some serious attention in the election campaign. In his campaign launch on Sunday, Mr Abbott said:

Within a decade, the budget surplus will be 1 per cent of GDP, defence spending will be 2 per cent of GDP, the private health insurance rebate will be fully restored, and each year, government will be a smaller percentage of our economy.

In contrast, the government’s stated position—as set out in its 2013 Defence White Paper—is less definitive and comes with an important caveat:

…as well, the Government is committed to increasing Defence funding towards a target of 2 per cent of GDP. This is a long-term objective that will be implemented in an economically responsible manner as and when fiscal circumstances allow.

Nonetheless, it’s possible to compare the commitments of the two sides in some detail based on some minimal assumptions. Read more

ASPI suggests

Damascus, Syria, in happier timesFollowing what was probably a chemical weapon attack in Syria last week, the White House appears to be moving closer to possible military action (and here). But while there is tremendous pressure on President Obama to act decisively, there appear to be very few good military options. Eliot Cohen writes:

The temptation here is to follow the Clinton administration’s course — a futile salvo of cruise missiles, followed by self-congratulation and an attempt to change the topic. It would not work here. A minority regime fighting for its life, as Bashar al-Assad’s is, can weather a couple of dozen big bangs. More important, no one — friends, enemies or neutrals — would be fooled. As weak as the United States now appears in the region and beyond, we would look weaker yet if we chose to act ineffectively. A bout of therapeutic bombing is an even more feckless course of action than a principled refusal to act altogether.

On the home front, ASPI will be hosting the Great Defence Debate on 29 August, in a week where Defence issues are likely to play a larger role in the Election than they have so far. If you have a question which you think should be asked, you can send it to us here. Read more

Indonesia’s new military chief

Current TNI commander, Admiral Suhartono, (left) with Lieutenant General Moeldoko (right) at the handover ceremony for Chief of Army, 23 May 2013.

On 21 August, the Indonesian House of Representatives endorsed the candidacy of General Moeldoko, Indonesia’s Army Chief, moving him a step closer to becoming commander TNI. With defence ties a key pillar of the Australia–Indonesia bilateral relationship, it’s worth knowing more about the Indonesia’s future military leader (known as ‘Panglima TNI’) and what this means for Australia.

Moeldoko finished top of his class and is generally considered to be a high-performing officer. If his first public statements can be taken to encapsulate his approach to the military, then expect an emphasis on military professionalism and soldier welfare. Moeldoko has promised to improve soldiers’ welfare by increasing their pay by 15%. He also intends to improve soldier discipline, minimise the import of foreign military equipment in order to support Indonesia’s defence industry and remain neutral during the upcoming 2014 elections. Read more

Asia Essentials: soft not hard

A view of the Bund in Shanghai.The Asia Essentials express Australia’s experiences during more than two decades of slow institutional construction in Asia since the end of the Cold War. The emerging weak system is an expression of Asian habits of ‘soft regionalism’, as opposed to the Western habits of ‘hard regionalism’ as expressed in institutions such as NATO and the European Union.

Given its preferences, Australia would always choose ‘hard regionalism’, based on legal agreement, enforceable treaties and agreed norms. The experience of the past two decades, though, is that Asia’s own multilateral security system can only emerge through the ‘soft regionalism’ of consultation and consensus inculcated by ASEAN. Read more

There’s a price to pay to be a US ally

Australian Chief of the Defence Force, General David Hurley, and U.S. Navy Commander, US Pacific Command, Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III, announce the official completion of Exercise Talisman Saber 2013 during a media conference on board USS Blue Ridge in Cairns, Queensland.

Defence and security have yet to feature in this election. But it should. As ASPI’s Davies and Thomson recently pointed out, the ADF is in a dire position, particularly in relation to the sustainment of forces over the next decade. Sustainment (spare parts, maintenance, modernisation, upgrading) is just as important as the sharp-edged fighting tools of war: ships, planes, tanks and skilled people. The situation’s worrying enough now but it just gets worse in future.

Despite the wishes of the strategically blind, it isn’t possible to effectively provide for the defence of this country at the start of the 21st century with Defence consuming only about 5% of government expenditure and 1.5% of GDP. That we’ve provided inadequately isn’t alarmist, nor is it a myth—it’s a fact recognised by both political parties, but yet to impact on the Australian consciousness. Both parties agree that Australia should be spending 2% of GDP on Defence. This means that we’re spending about 25% less on our defence than everyone agrees that we should. Think about it. Read more

Tyranny prevails: what next for Zimbabwe?

Robert Mugabe, president of Zimbabwe, attends the 12th African Union Summit Feb. 2, 2009Australia’s reaction to the conduct of the Zimbabwean election (31 July), in which President Mugabe was victorious, reportedly gaining 61% of the vote, was resolute. On 4 August, Foreign Affairs Minister Bob Carr said:

Australia has been a strong supporter of the people of Zimbabwe and we follow developments closely….Given our doubts about the results, Australia calls for a re-run of the elections based on a verified and agreed voters roll.

It’s commendable that Australia has taken a strong stance. Interestingly, Prime Minister Kevin Rudd and Deputy Opposition Leader Julie Bishop both previously participated in an election monitoring delegation to Zimbabwe. Read more

Pick a number. Now add five and double it…

Space ShuttleIn one of my earlier pieces I mentioned the cost growth experienced by the Apollo program. It’s worth digging a little deeper into that story. In a wonderful paper on cost estimation (yes, I need to get out more) for a NASA symposium*, this story is told:

Apollo is often painted as a successful program that came close to its initial 1961 [schedule] estimate for a 1967 moon landing. [The] 1958 Air Force estimate… was 1.5 billion with completion targeted in 1965. The ‘actual’ historical events went something like this. The NASA cost estimating gurus in 1961 projected an amount close to $7 Billion to do the entire program. This figure was apparently padded to $10-$12 Billion by management prior to giving that estimate to James Webb, the NASA Administrator. Mr. Webb (within hours of receiving the $10-$12 Billion figure) placed an ‘administrator’s discount’ on NASA’s ability to predict costs with due precision and by the stroke of his own pen, changed the estimate to $20 billion and submitted it to Vice President Linden B. Johnson. In the words of Robert Seamans Jr., (the Associate Administrator at the time) ‘We were aghast’! This cavalier beginning describes how Apollo’s original fiscal requirements arrived at the steps of the Capitol and was subsequently blessed by Congress.

Imagine trying to justify that process to Senate Estimates! It would be a brave official to take the line ‘Yes, senator, the best efforts of the cost estimation cell was $7 billion, but we arrived at the final figure by padding it a bit and then doubling the result, on the basis that we’ve never got it right in the past, so why should this be any different?’ Yet it turns out that Mr. Webb’s intuition based ‘pluck’ was closer to the correct answer—$25 billion—than the results from cost estimation models. (Lest this sound ‘cheap’ compared to modern aerospace endeavours, the program cost $200 billion in today’s dollars.) Read more

However it’s described, Japan’s Izumo will be its naval centrepiece

The U.S. Navy aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis (CVN-74) (left), steams alongside the British Royal Navy aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious (R 06) in the Persian Gulf on April 9, 1998. The two ships were operating in the Persian Gulf in support of Operation Southern Watch, which is the U.S. and coalition enforcement of the no-fly-zone over Southern Iraq. DoD photo by Airman Robert Baker, U.S. Navy.Benjamin Schreer offers some important qualifications to Radford’s initial remarks about the relevance of Japan’s new carrier, Izumo, both for the JMSDF and in relation to naval developments and ramifications for naval politics in Northeast Asia in general.

I think Radford overemphasised, and to some extent misrepresented, the importance of Izumo in the context of Japanese efforts to enhance naval capabilities over the last decade. But I don’t think Schreer is quite right either in his characterisation of Izumo and aircraft carriers, and by extension and the role of a variety of warships in naval operations. Izumo, by design, meets all the established criteria for being called an ‘aircraft carrier’. It doesn’t feature a well deck or other integrated weapons capabilities aimed at providing either amphibious, anti-submarine warfare (ASW), anti-surface warfare or anti-air warfare functions, except for short-ranged self-defence purposes. Just as Hyuga and Ise before it, Izumo is wholly focused on supporting naval aviation. The Japanese designation as ‘destroyer’ can be dismissed as a political choice, as should be done with the Hyuga class. It’s safe to say that in no other naval force worldwide would this term be warranted or used for such a ship.

For the time being, the Izumo only carries helicopters in support of what are primarily ASW operations in peer-to-peer warfare scenarios. But this doesn’t by any means negate the capabilities of the design. Neither, for that matter, do Japanese comments to the same effect. The ship before our eyes needs to be judged primarily on its own merits, not by what someone would like to make it out to be for the rest of the world. Read more

Cambodia’s ‘postponed’ exercises and the US pivot to Asia

REAM, Cambodia (Oct. 22, 2012) Rear Adm. Tom Carney, commander of Task Force 73, salutes Royal Cambodian naval officers at the Ream Navy Base during Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) Cambodia 2012. CARAT is a series of bilateral military exercises between the U.S. Navy and the armed forces of Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Timor Leste.

Cambodia’s recent suspension or ‘postponement’ of military exercises with the United States has in some ways come as a surprise and in another sense isn’t surprising at all. For several years Cambodia has been ‘playing the field’, seeking to capitalise on its relations with China and the US, among others, to best suit its interests. Only this time, Hun Sen may feel he has greater leeway than ever before in snubbing the Americans without worrying much about negative consequences.

Cambodia has long been a beneficiary of Chinese largesse, in part because of China’s antipathy towards Vietnam dating back to before the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979. Today, the bonds between them are closer and stronger than ever. China is Cambodia’s top foreign investor, a major donor (outstripping the United States in investment and aid several times over) and an increasingly important trading partner. In recent years, China has been assisting with training matters and provision of defence equipment but with no strings attached other than a requirement to be supportive of China in international affairs. The Chinese Foreign Minister’s visit to Cambodia on 21 August, marking the 55th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations, adds symbolism and substance to the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of Cooperation between the two countries in 2010.

China has emerged as Cambodia’s most significant military benefactor, recently signing a memorandum of understanding on military training, helping to significantly expand the Cambodian forces’ training capabilities, hosting dozens of Cambodian military students on courses in China and providing a range of significant items of military equipment including helicopters. Last year, Cambodia duly complied with China’s bidding in blocking a resolution at the ASEAN Summit which could have proven to be inimical to China’s claims over the South China Sea and its desire for dealing bilaterally rather than multilaterally with respective rival claimants. After all, China has a much stronger position over the South China Sea if it can keep the affected ASEAN countries from acting collectively and particularly from acting with the full support of a united ASEAN. Read more

Which came first? Strategic trust and maritime confidence building measures

ASPI'sconference on Maritime Conference Building Measures in the South China SeaASPI recently convened a conference on Maritime Confidence Building Measures in the South China Sea. It was attended by 62 participants from 16 countries and considered maritime confidence building measures of a military and non-military nature, as well as examining possible mechanisms for avoiding and managing incidents at sea.

In a post on the conference on the Lowy Interpreter, Rory Medcalf rightly pointed out that we need to get beyond a situation where some countries won’t institute CBMs until they’ve achieved a level of political and strategic trust that would make confidence building measures (CBMs) redundant.

This has become a ‘chicken and egg’ situation. What comes first—trust or CBMs? Some claim that the Chinese position is that CBMs aren’t possible in the South China Sea (SCS) without first building strategic trust. But others believe that when China puts forward proposals such as the ASEAN–China Maritime Cooperation Fund, it’s actually proposing CBMs. ASEAN claimants have been slow to embrace the Chinese proposals: they’re saying that some form of trust is required before there can be cooperation. This might mean some concessions by China with regard to its sovereignty claims in the SCS. Read more