Should the US forgo its primacy to accommodate China?

Professor Hugh White, a respected Australian academic and strategist, has long argued that as China has emerged as a great power in the Asia Pacific, it’s time for the Middle Kingdom to play a greater role in the regional order, to the extent that the United States should forgo its long-standing primacy and share its regional leadership with China. Whether the US comes to terms with this fact, White contends, has far reaching implications for the region, as the US insistence on its primacy will inevitably lead to China’s growing grievances. As a consequence, US–China strategic rivalry will intensify and regional peace and stability will suffer in the long run.

White’s argument is valid with respect to China’s impressive economic and military rise over the last three decades, which brings it greater respect and influence in regional affairs. However, whether China should enjoy a greater regional status rests not only on its growing power, but also its moral authority and regional acceptance. The region’s future peace and stability, therefore, is not determined by whether the US forgoes its primacy or not, but primarily by how China behaves to prove it deserves such a concession from the US. Read more

The Alliance is dead, long live the Alliance

President George W. Bush and Australia's Prime Minister John Howard sign the Defense Cooperation Treaty following a meeting Wednesday, Sept. 5, 2007, at the Commonwealth Parliament Offices in Sydney. White House photo by Eric Draper

Our well-worn alliance with the US ceased to exist a little while ago, at least in the way we’ve known it for several decades. The familiar parameters within which Australia operated for many years have now vanished. Today, new ones have arisen that will shape the alliance’s future. This new beginning will progressively impact Australian defence, foreign and domestic policies in many ways, some quite fundamental.

A child of the Cold War, the US–Australia alliance reflected American implementation of its containment grand strategy and Australian concerns over a revanchist Japan. When the ANZUS treaty was signed in 1951, Menzies’s foreign minister, Percy Spender considered it a disappointment compared with the NATO treaty signed only two years earlier. Under the NATO treaty, an attack on a signatory firmly committed the US to respond militarily in the threatened country’s defence. ANZUS, in contrast, only committed the US to consultations in times of crisis. Moreover, Spender was also frustrated that the US was unreceptive to the idea of Australian military personnel being involved with the American joint staff in operational defence planning. Spender considered ANZUS a base-level document that would need upgrading later, although this never eventuated. Read more

Why does Indonesia need Apache gunships?

A U.S. Army AH-64 Apache attack helicopter prepares to depart Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan, on Jan 7, 2012. The Apache conducts distributed operations, precision strikes against relocatable targets, and provides armed reconnaissance when required in day, night, obscured battlefield and adverse weather conditions U.S. Air Force photo/Tech. Sgt. Matt Hecht

The recent visit by the US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel to Indonesia was concluded with a decision to sell eight Boeing AH-64 Apache Longbow gunship helicopters worth US$500 million to the Indonesian Army (TNI-AD). The package includes pilot training, radars, and maintenance. However, arguments surrounding the purchase echo concerns about Indonesia’s decision to buy 100 Leopard 2A6 main battle tanks. The Apache gunships are primarily designed to attack other gunships, slow low-flying aircraft, or are used for ground attack and as anti-tank strikes. It simply doesn’t make sense when Secretary Hagel says that they ‘will help Indonesia respond to a range of contingencies, including counterpiracy operations and maritime awareness’. So why did Indonesia buy them?

Similar to the Leopard purchase, there seems to be a sense of ‘catch-up’ with the region in Indonesia’s Apache decision. As one analyst notes, Indonesia’s military procurement strategies seem to be emotionally driven, with a desire to keep up with neighbouring countries. But there are other reasons too.

The Army has been eyeing gunships for some time under the so-called ‘Minimum Essential Force’ (MEF). As per President Yudhoyono’s decree, the MEF is a capability upgrade program for TNI to be achieved in three stages by 2024. Moreover, Indonesia’s Defence Minister said that the TNI should have more modern capability, which it has lacked for the last 20 years. In March 2007, the Army revealed its 25 year plan to acquire around 135 helicopters to form eight squadrons. The plan started with the purchase of Mi-35 gunships in 2003 and 2008. Other than the Apache, the Army also intends to procure Eurocopter AS 550 Fennec light military helicopters. Read more

Reader response: US military action in Syria

Here’s a reader response on Syria from Jose KL Sousa Santos:

Robert Ayson’s support for possible US military action in response to the chemical attacks in Ghoula appears to be based upon an underlying assumption that the Assad regime is responsible for the attacks despite the absence of credible evidence.

That evidence may come if the UN inspectors are able to do their job and that is exactly what UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon is asking for. Time for the UN team to gather the evidence. This is not a time for emotional responses. As Ban Ki Moon pleaded, give peace a chance. The Syrian conflict has raged for over two year and a half years with the civilian death toll reaching Rwandan comparisons. The chemical attacks are without a doubt morally obscene and demand an international response. But ill-thought out military action would have substantial consequences for regional stability.  Ban Ki Moon has indicated his own red line; that the UN will not sanction military action without clear proof. This is a watershed moment for the UN and it clearly resonated with the British Parliament and public. One of the central lessons of Iraq is that if the case for war requires convincing the public sans proof, then cooler heads should prevail.

Cyber wrap

In an attack linked to pro-Syrian government supporters, the sites of The New York Times, Twitter and up to ten other sites were compromised by the Syrian Electronic Army (SEA). Using stolen log-in credentials from Australian IT company hosting the domain names of the affected sites, the SEA is said to have effectively ‘walked through the front door’ of the websites. The subsequently rerouted traffic to SEA websites and attacked Twitter’s twimg.com domain, used to store image data and styling code. The Pentagon is reportedly preparing for a wave of retaliatory cyber attacks against US targets in the event of any US action against the al-Assad government. While the SEA remains a concern in Washington, Syria’s allies in the form of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, and their state backed hackers, pose a much greater concern to officials. Read more

Biding their time: the Opposition’s defence statement

MQ-4 TritonThe Opposition’s defence policy (PDF) released yesterday was perhaps more notable for commitments it didn’t make rather than ones it did. It’s a cautious document, light on for hard timings for major decisions. But that’s no bad thing—taking the time to get decisions about complex issues right is eminently sensible. And when it did make a firm commitment with a date—the promise to increase defence spending to 2% of GDP in ten years—the outcome is both difficult to achieve and divorced from a coherent strategic framework.

It’s hard for oppositions to make defence policy as issues require detailed knowledge of costings, technical performance or intelligence that simply isn’t available to them. In part, this is an unavoidable consequence of the secrecy attached to national security matters. But it also reflects the tendency of incumbent governments, and indeed Defence itself, to withhold information from the public. Doing so creates an information asymmetry that protects the government from scrutiny and confers considerable power to Defence in advising government. Then there’s the sheer volume of information. Even incumbents have difficulty sifting through all of the open source, commercial-in-confidence and classified information. The net result is that oppositions often don’t know what they don’t know. Read more

Policy, what policy?

Australian service personnel vote while on Operation Slipper in Afghanistan.An ear-piercing alarm should ring the moment a politician pretends national security is too important for party politicking. You know they’re lying. That’s because within seconds they’ll set about violating their own injunction. Thin, grasping, avaricious fingers reach out from beneath the purity of the policy wrapping. They’re clutching around for any scrap of partisan political advantage they can use to belabour their opponents.

Before the campaign began Kevin Rudd flew to Afghanistan to thank the troops. That was terrific and appropriate. Nor should Tony Abbott be prevented from demonstrating his own personal battle-fitness by doing push-ups with the troops. These are the sorts of anodyne images you expect during election campaigns.

Last week was different. For the first three weeks of the election campaign a deafening silence had enveloped strategic issues. But then, quite suddenly, the military was all anyone wanted to talk about. A deliberate, systematic attempt was being made to use national security for partisan political advantage. Read more

There’s a feeling I get when I look to the west

A sunset on the Indian Ocean is featured in this image photographed by an Expedition 23 crew member on the International Space Station (ISS).If Tony Abbott becomes Prime Minister next week, expect Australia to devote greater attention to the Indian Ocean. Shadow Foreign Minister Julie Bishop and Shadow Defence Minister David Johnston are both from Western Australia. They’ve got a keen appreciation of the defence presence in their state and the importance of protecting offshore developments in Western Australia.

The Defence White Paper 2013 identified the Indian Ocean as a vital strategic interest for Australia. There’s been increased international focus on strategic relations between major powers in the Indian Ocean. And coupled with the Asian Century White Paper, the Government has been attaching much greater importance to Australia’s partnership with India. Read more

Asia Essentials: concert not cataclysm

High Representative Catherine Ashton travelled to Asia in November 2012 and participated in the 19th ASEAN Regional Forum taking place in Cambodia. Whilst in Cambodia, Ashton visited a number of EU-funded projects.

Europe’s 20th century offers Asia ample warning about the concert or cataclysm choice. But the solution Europe produced to deliver its own peace in the second half of the 20th century is of limited utility to Asia, a judgement succinctly expressed by the academic Roger Buckley: ‘The European model of creeping federalism is a non-starter—the letters USA are not about to stand for the United States of Asia’.

Along with economic shifts and the tide of history, Asia’s creation of itself is also about face and pride (with the hope that lots of fear will keep the hubris in check). Europe is becoming useful in defining what Asia is not becoming.

European dynamics have determined the current international system. Europe created the nation state, wrote the language of diplomacy and the rules of war, then drew the map of the world in the quest for empire. Europe’s revolutions, concerts and wars drove industrial and colonial history. Europe will continue to be a player, but perhaps not always in the main game. The Cold War looks like the last gasp of the global order as an expression of European politics. Read more

ASPI suggests

An American Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer launches a Tomahawk cruise missile in the Eastern Mediterranean.This week defence issues have been a bigger part of the election campaign than they were previously. The two big events on the calendar were Kevin Rudd’s address to the Lowy Institute and ASPI’s great debate between Mike Kelly and David Johnston. Along with the debate, The Strategist ran statements on their respective defence policy from Liberal, Labor, and the Greens yesterday—available here.

The big revelation came on Tuesday, when the Prime Minister suggested that a Labor government would look at moving the Royal Australian Navy’s basing in Sydney to Queensland and Perth, and expanding Darwin and Broome. ASPI’s Andrew Davies examined some of the challenges this suggestion poses here. The plan has drawn fire from several quarters, including Murdoch and Fairfax press, and a run-in between Kevin Rudd and NSW Premier Barry O’Farrell. Sam Bateman put the contrary view, arguing that the Navy should plan to vacate Sydney Harbour here. Read more