2% of GDP: it might be logical, but is it rational?

budget_signRemarkably, there’s now bipartisanship in Australian Defence. Both major parties agree that the Defence Budget should be 2% of GDP. The only difference is the timing in getting there. While some express doubts, there’s a certain logic to this position. Its rationality is less easily discerned.

Logically this declaration cuts through worries about strategy or the ADF’s role. There are some who see the Defence budget as buying insurance; the more you buy, the less you’ll lose if some predetermined event occurs. Seen this way it’s just like car insurance—spend a bit and get third party, spend more for comprehensive, spend even more and cover the windscreen, lower the excess and so on. The attraction of this risk management policy is that it avoids having to have a strategy. And devising strategies are intellectually demanding. We’re still recycling Paul Dibb’s 1987 deterrence by denial strategy—even though the Cold War has ended, China’s risen, the Arab Spring has come (and gone?) and cyber war is the new black. Read more

The big picture: Australian foreign affairs and defence

Coat of Arms at the Australian embassy in Washington DCThe defence and foreign relations debate in Australia is bedevilled by several entirely obvious flaws. In the first place, foreign affairs people very seldom mention defence while the defence people seldom emerge from technical assessments to discuss the larger and usually imprecise foreign and often global circumstances on which their planning and eventual operations must depend. Yet even a cursory reading of ancient or modern history demonstrates that the utility, not to mention the details, of defence policy always depend on the larger foreign affairs context, while the foreign affairs posture of any nation depends to a marked extent on the assessment by others of its capabilities in defence as well as in other areas, including economic stability.

As a subset of this there is a continuing dispute between those who—usually in the context of that meaningless verbal construct, of an ‘Asian Century’—give overriding priority to Australian concerns in ‘our region’ in Asia, especially Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific, and others who take a more international or global view. That discussion has all the hallmarks of an unhelpful inter-departmental dispute. It is true that the problems of the Solomons and Papua New Guinea are closer to Australia’s shores than those of Portugal or Poland. But the financial problems of Portugal have a far greater influence on the Eurozone, the decisions of the International Monetary Fund and therefore on Australia’s economic security and global standing, than the financial fate of East Timor or even Malaysia. Read more

Asia Essentials: the US military chameleon

chameleonThe Asia security system is to be constructed atop the foundations of the US hub-and-spokes of alliances in Asia—the San Francisco system, which is enjoying a burst of health and regional affection in its seventh decade.

The longevity of the US alliance system is a tribute to its ability to change colour and form according to the needs of the Asian ally. Similarly, the US military guarantee to Asia has vitality and endurance because it has a chameleon capacity—adjusting colour, weight and contours to suit different Asian partners.

Envisage the US alliance system as three layers. The top layer holds the formal alliances expressed by treaty. Below the formal layer sits the de facto or virtual alliances. And in the lowest layer sit the partial or quasi-military relationships. In this lowest level are the partnerships or relationships, but it’s no stretch to call them quasi alliances. This is the beauty of the US military chameleon, adapting as it shifts through the different layers and colours. If the champion chameleon is one that can merge while walking across a kilt, then the US military can just about do tartan. Read more

ASPI suggests

President Obama, August 2013The big story this week is still Syria, and expectation has reached a fevered pitch. The Economist writes that

…The congressional votes and the action to follow [will be] one of those episodes that will define America’s—and the West’s—place in the world. It will signal what is left after the hubris of Iraq and unfathomable complexities of Afghanistan. Amid challenges from Russia and Iran and the growing weight of China, both as an economic power and a champion of authoritarian purpose (as opposed to democratic indecision), it is also a measure of the West’s self-belief. The world is watching.

But it’s not simple for President Obama. Foreign Policy has this piece on Obama’s dilemmas in Syria, and Gideon Rachman writes in the Financial Times that:

For better or worse, Mr Obama drew such a red line over Syria… The governments of Japan, Israel and Poland – to name just a few – will all feel less secure if Congress votes against military action in Syria.

The National Interest has an analysis of whether Syria could ‘kill’ the US rebalance to Asia, and the Wall Street Journal has this look at who makes up the Syrian Opposition.  And on a more operational note, here’s a map of relevant US (and French) military assets in the region, and a potential target list in the Washington Post. Read more

Salami slicing ASEAN solidarity

No one can dispute the fact that the South China Sea has been a sea of contention in recent years. And now Malaysia has added confusion to the already torturous mix. Speaking to Bloomberg News in Brunei last month, Malaysian Defence Minister Hishammuddin Hussein said that the Chinese navy could conduct patrols off Malaysia’s coasts as long as China’s ‘intention is not to go to war’. He added that Malaysia and China had built ‘enough level of trust that we will not be moved by day-to-day politics or emotions’. On the sidelines of meetings with counterparts from ASEAN as well as the US, he said that ‘Just because you have enemies, doesn’t mean your enemies are my enemies. His comments must have raised many eyebrows across Southeast Asia, and a frisson of excitement in Beijing.

For one, Mr Hishammuddin’s phraseology is problematic. The term ‘enemy’ has been banished from the strategic lexicon since the end of Cold War bipolar competition. And one could only wonder what he meant exactly by China having ‘no intention of war’. To borrow from Clausewitz: war is the continuation of policy via other means; but there are coercive steps short of war that are highly effective policy instruments. Read more

South Korea’s developing blue water navy

USS Nimitz (CVN 68) is moored near of the ROKS Son Won-il (SS 072), a Type 214 submarine, in Busan Naval Base, Republic of Korea.A little over two weeks ago, the Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) launched its fourth 1,800 ton German Type 214 submarine in a ceremony attended by President Park Geun-hye. Featuring modern Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP) and the advanced ISUS 90 submarine combat system, the new boat of the Son Won-ill class brings up the total number of modern South Korean submarines to 13: nine 1,200 ton German Type 209 Chang Bogo class and four Son Won-ill.  And South Korea has apparently already started the design phase of a new, indigenous 3,000 tonne submarine, with the goal of having at least nine such boats in service by 2030. According to navy sources, they’ll be equipped with a vertical launch missile capability, dramatically improving South Korea’s long-range strike capabilities.

The submarine launch is indicative of South Korea’s prospective emergence over the next decade as one of the ‘world’s premier middle power navies.’ Back in 1995, then-President Kim Young-Sam approved a plan by then chief of naval operations, Admiral An Byoung-Tae, to begin the long-term development of a ‘blue water navy’, capable of extended operations within East Asia and short-term operations in the Indian Ocean and the Middle East. Read more

Syria: don’t just do something, stand there!

U.S. President Barack Obama addresses a joint session of the United States Congress.President Obama’s bizarre choice to give Congress a right to veto a strike on Syria effectively confirms lame-duck status on the rest of his Presidency. He has around 1200 days left in office, a long time for a President whose domestic agenda has been blunted by Congress and who seems unwilling to act decisively on foreign policy.

As Dana Allin and Steven Simon observe in a IISS blog post, there’s no legislative requirement for the President to take a proposal for a military strike to Congress. The Congressional War Powers resolution of 1973 asks the President to consult with Congress ‘in every possible instance’ before committing military forces, but the resolution’s focus is on large-scale deployments of troops. The reality is that Presidents have the executive authority to decide when and where America can use military force—just as Obama did in the strike on Bin Laden. It’s a major backward step for Obama to volunteer this concession to Congress and one that future Presidents will say shouldn’t be taken as a precedent to limit their executive authority. Read more

Bread and stones: Africa–Australia opportunities

A field worker at the Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research (EIAR) at Kulumsa, Ethiopia.I’ve just returned from Perth where I participated in two events. The first was a forum run jointly by the Africa Australia Research Forum at Murdoch University and the Crawford Fund (an organisation focused on international agricultural research assistance), on the theme Mining, agriculture and development: bread from stones?. The second was the tenth Africa DownUnder mining conference. I spoke on the outcomes of the recent ASPI–Brenthurst Foundation’s Aus-Africa Dialogue.

Recent comments by Peter Jennings and Russell Trood resonated with me. Both called for a broader international focus in Australia’s foreign policy. Peter commented that it was ‘misguided’ to think that our relations with major Asian countries, as highlighted in the Asian Century White Paper, constituted the total of Australia’s international interests and that it was ‘dangerous to concentrate on them at the expense of a more widely focused foreign policy’. Russell made a similar point when he said the new government should ‘examine comprehensively all of Australia’s foreign policy interests, not merely those focused on the Asia–Pacific’. Read more

US isn’t the pushy one in Asia

 The China Marine Surveillance cutter "Haijian 66" and the Japan Coast Guard cutter "Kiso" confronted each other near the Diaoyu Islands.Hugh White continues to paint a picture of the United States being the principal cause of the growing tensions in Asia by not making enough concessions, and by ‘containing’ rather than ‘ceding primacy’ to China. He claims ‘American efforts to perpetuate primacy in the face of China’s challenge will create not peace and stability but escalating rivalry and a growing risk of conflict.’ Many in the region would disagree.

I could understand this line being argued under the ‘hawkish’ Bush administration. But I can’t quite see how this line is maintained concerning a reluctant and non-combative Barack Obama. Sure, the United States has talked about a ‘pivot’ or a rebalancing, but in reality it has not amounted to much more than a return to barracks of those forces that used to be based there (in Okinawa, Guam and Hawaii) before they deployed for over a decade on operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Even then, the siren calls of the Middle East continue to beckon. So much for an Asian-centric pivot. Read more

Obama, Syria, and the use of force

President Barack Obama meets with Members of Congress to discuss Syria in the Cabinet Room of the White House, Sept. 3, 2013. (Official White House Photo by Pete Souza)

President Obama’s decision to seek Congressional approval for a limited US attack on Syria has temporarily put on hold one of the most vexing decisions of his presidency. So far, Obama has said merely that he believes the US should attack Syria—not that it will. He’s said that an attack would be limited in duration and scope, isn’t time-critical, and can be carried out at a time of US choosing. And he has stated that the purpose of an attack would be threefold—to hold the Syrian regime accountable, to deter future chemical weapons use, and to degrade Syrian chemical weapon capabilities. He has also, correctly, cast the decision as one shaped by considerations much broader than the Syrian conflict itself. Those considerations involve the strength of global prohibitions on chemical weapons use as well as US willingness to enforce its own self-determined red lines in relation to weapons of mass destruction. That last one’s an issue that plays globally for the US, not just in the Middle East.

Recently I’ve been trying to revisit a piece of work I did a few years back at ASPI, namely an exploration of Obama’s strategic thinking by an analysis of his speeches and remarks. That report, Obama in his own words, examined his view on US primacy, leadership and the use of force. As his second term is now well underway, it seemed to me timely to repeat the exercise just to see what had changed. At the big-picture level, there’s one particular difference between Obama Marks I and II. In 2009 Obama was a character of loftier ambitions—carefully reasoned ambitions, perhaps, but lofty ones. Remember his Prague speech on nuclear disarmament or his speech to the Arab world in Cairo? Obama in 2013 gives fewer of those speeches. True, the Brandenburg speech was a lecture about the dangers of complacency, and an injunction to make history rather than just study it. But at its core, it turned upon a set of objectives that were specific and limited rather than open-ended and grandiose. Read more