The Air Warfare Destroyer project – how effective is the alliance model?

Hobart class DDG (artist's impression)Of all the issues facing the new defence minister, the replacement of the Collins class submarines stands out in terms of scale, complexity and difficulty. A critical aspect of this multi-billion dollar program will be the commercial arrangements under which the boats are built. The challenge is to design a commercial framework that brings together local industry and foreign suppliers while protecting taxpayers’ interests and assuring that the Navy gets what it needs.

Fortunately, we have an experiment already underway in one of the possible options; the alliance contract being used to deliver the three-vessel $8 billion Air Warfare Destroyer (AWD) project. The new government would do well to look closely at the AWD project to see what it can learn.

The AWD Alliance involves three parties, the Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO), Raytheon Australia and the government-owned but commercially operated ASC Pty Ltd. The contracts are valued at $2.6 billion for ASC Pty Ltd and $1.7 billion for Raytheon Australia. Subcontractors to the Alliance include the US Government Foreign Military Sales program for the Aegis radar and combat system, and the Spanish shipbuilder Navantia for the design and some module fabrication. BAE Systems Australia in Williamstown, Victoria and Forgacs Engineering in Newcastle, NSW are also involved in module construction for the AWD vessels, which are being consolidated and fitted out in the ASC facility in Osborne, South Australia. Read more

Antarctica: coming in from the cold?

australian_flag_antarcticaSince the April 2013 publication of my previous post on Antarctica, two events have added further to the picture of Australia’s strategic interests in Antarctica. The first was the release of a new defence white paper and the second a policy statement from the then Opposition but which today becomes the incoming government. The former just marked time as far as Antarctica was concerned, but the latter suggests that we might see some real progress in pursuing our interests on and around the southern continent.

But first the defence white paper. Released on 3 May this year, it added two paragraphs of commentary about Antarctica:

2.76 There is no credible risk of Australia’s national interests in the Southern Ocean and the Australian Antarctic Territory being challenged in ways that might require substantial military responses over the next few decades. The Antarctic Treaty System provides for the international governance and management of Antarctica and sets aside use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes, with a particular emphasis on scientific research and environmental protection. The Antarctic Treaty’s ‘Madrid Protocol’ prohibits any activity relating to mineral resource exploitation other than scientific research, and until 2048 can only be amended by unanimous consent. Australia is a strong advocate of the Antarctic Treaty System and its goals.

2.77 There is, however, increasing international interest in Antarctica, including in Australia’s Antarctic Territory. Australia has forged operational and scientific cooperation relationships with several nations and will continue to monitor the strategic implications of international developments in the Antarctic region. To date, the Antarctic Treaty System has been well respected, but in coming decades it may come under pressure as resources become more scarce elsewhere.

Read more

Homeland security: what should the Abbott Government do?

emergency response drillThe incoming Australian Attorney-General George Brandis’ top priority is the elimination of what he views as a ‘left-wing control of the human rights debate’. And he plans to conduct a national audit of federal statutes that infringe common law rights as a first step to restoring these freedoms, when appropriate. However, Senator Brandis hasn’t said much to date about operational security issues. That’s despite the fact that matters relating to domestic intelligence, counterterrorism, cyber security, emergency management and serious and organised crime fall under the Attorney-General’s portfolio. The Attorney-General has around 60 portfolio responsibilities. About half are directly relevant to homeland security. That’s why I’ve argued that creating a Minister for Security and Resilience at Cabinet level would provide unity of command in areas related to counterterrorism, organised crime, cyber security and emergency management.

My colleague David Connery and I recently suggested that a new minister for security and resilience should have two parliamentary secretaries. Given that we’re likely to see more frequent and intense weather events, one could assist on emergency management. The other could be a parliamentary secretary for cyber security. This would allow the Attorney-General to focus on the administration of justice and strengthen the traditional role of the Attorney as the commonwealth’s first law officer (PDF). Read more

ASPI suggests

Last week’s Australian election  has raised the question of how the new Abbott government will manage our foreign and security policies. Here we have Michael Fullilove and Hugh White in the New York Times and Foreign Affairs respectively, talking about Australia’s balancing act between the US and China. The Economist has this analysis, and James Brown has a more Defence-focused look at Australia after the election here. Lastly on this topic, ASPI’s Peter Jennings has this video on the opportunities and challenges for the new government (with videos here on the same subject from Andrew Davies and Anthony Bergin):

The Syria crisis grinds onwards (for Obama as well as Syria). John Kerry made this apparently off-the-cuff remark when asked how Assad could avoid military action by the US. Russia then leapt on the proposal, leading to a week of slightly half-baked political wrangling. Highlights included this speech from Obama, described by the Economist as ‘a little confusing’, and Vladimir Putin’s oped in the New York Times. Read more

For the bookshelf: Africa’s third liberation

Africas third liberation coverIt’s now time for Africa’s third liberation, according to Greg Mills and Jeffrey Herbst in their positive and uplifting book, Africa’s Third Liberation. In their construct Africa’s first liberation was from colonial governments—in essence the struggle for decolonisation—the second from African liberation governments, who invariably became dictatorships. The third will be from poverty and unemployment. They give a roadmap of how to achieve this third liberation, employing a comparative analysis with other regions of the world: Asia, the Middle East and Central America.

The book focuses on how Africa can stimulate economic growth and utilise the immense resources of the continent to pull its populations out of poverty. A key argument is the need to end the staggering levels of unemployment, especially amongst African youth—80% in some countries—which has the potential to create further political instability. The authors encourage African governments to embrace the private sector and entrepreneurship to create an attractive environment for business. The time of basing development on foreign aid has passed. Read more

Don’t assume the PLA land force is a paper tiger

Soldiers with the People's Liberation Army at Shenyang training base in China, March 24, 2007Concerns about China’s rising military capabilities usually focus on its naval, air and anti-access/area-denial forces, downplaying its ground forces.

Some American analysts have great confidence in the ability of the US and of its regional allies to take on the PLA’s ground element. For instance, Dartmouth’s Michael Beckley says we’ve no reason to think that the Chinese ground forces would fight much better than the Iraqi army thrashed by coalitions in 1990 and 2003, on a ‘pound for pound’ basis. Maybe Beckley and others just want to avoid repeating the mistakes of earlier analysts. After all, in 1990 there was a widespread opinion that Iraq was superb at defence and would inflict serious casualties on the invading forces.

But overestimating your clout compared to a potential opponent’s isn’t the only mistake you can make. When the British Governor of Singapore heard that the Japanese were on the way in 1942, he told an army commander, ‘Well, I suppose you’ll shove the little men off’. Read more

China’s 10-dash line and cross-strait tensions

Forbidding clouds over the Taiwan StraitsJohn Blaxland recently argued on The Strategist that China is largely responsible for tensions in the Asia–Pacific. Indeed, its new ‘10-dash line’ is likely to increase the fears of its neighbours about Beijing’s expansive territorial claims. The new map is particularly worrisome for Taiwan, which has already initiated steps to counter China’s assertiveness.

Released in January this year, China’s ‘10-dash line’ declares 80% of the South China Sea Chinese. The 10 dashes are not Beijing’s only claim—there are dozens more beyond that, including the dispute with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Significantly, it also asserts Taiwan to be a part of China’s sovereign territory, which is reinforced by the new ‘10th dash’ off the east coast of Taiwan.

The new dash complicates cross-strait relations. It reiterates China’s long-standing assertion of sovereignty over Taiwan, not only subsuming China and Taiwan’s identical claims in the South China Sea, but also those regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. The identical claims are based on a 1947 Kuomintang nationalist government map containing 11 dashes. The map was adopted by the Chinese communists and adjusted when President Zhou Enlai deleted two dashes in the Gulf of Tonkin. China and Taiwan both argue that historical documents show the islands are a part of Taiwan. For the mainland, which claims that Taiwan is part of its territory, by extension Taiwan’s claims become its own. Read more

Asia Essentials: the US chameleon must adapt again

Chameleon

The security system the US has evolved in Asia has dealt with upsets, defeats, setbacks and even the dangers of victory. The US suffered a bitter draw in Korea that’s had a half-life equal to the San Francisco treaty system, and has experienced defeat in Vietnam, the loss of the Clark Field and Subic Bay in the Philippines and the loss of the Soviet Union as the obvious enemy—a cruel thing to have happen to an alliance system. Through it all, the US system endures. The creation of the new superbase on Guam is a major statement of 21st century intent. The pivot that turned into a rebalance notches up the volume of the statement.

Compared to the multilateral depth and unified command of NATO, the US alliances in Asia can change shape, form and colour from country to country. The previous column saw these alliances in three layers: formal treaty alliances on top, de facto or virtual alliances in the middle and the bottom layer consisting of quasi or partial alliances that could more politely be called relationships or partnerships. The various Asian customers have a choice of size, function, tempo and commitment in what they ask of the US military chameleon. Read more

Polarised cyber perspectives in the Asia-Pacific: what’s the ARF to do?

This post will be the first of a three-part series based on my participation in an ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), hosted jointly by the Chinese and Malaysian Governments in Beijing. The intriguing title of the workshop was ‘Measures to Enhance Cyber Security—Legal and Cultural Aspects’. I’ll come back to why that’s so interesting in my third post, as it appears that the cultural aspect of the debate has caused a great deal of heated discussion amongst state representatives. But more of that later. My first two pieces will give a flavour of the thoughts I put forward in my address to the ARF.

In my first post on The Strategist I looked at the divisions that exist between the various states that are contesting cyberspace and suggested that there was a divided road ahead in terms of how cyberspace is governed in the years to come. Broadly speaking, the Western liberal democratic states of US, Australia, Canada, UK and Western Europe are on one side of the debate, and the roughly aligned Chinese, Russians and a collection of former Soviet states are on the other. But the picture in the Asia–Pacific region isn’t as clear cut and it’s far from easy to determine exactly where nations align or compete. Read more

Abbott and Abe: allied Liberals

Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan

Just as the thumping victory by the conservative Liberal Democratic Party under Shinzo Abe in December 2011 over the ‘progressive’ Democratic Party of Japan is good for Japan–Australia relations, the thumping victory by the Liberal–National Coalition under Tony Abbott last Saturday against the Australian Labor Party led by Kevin Rudd is good for Australia–Japan relations.

Even before the new Coalition government is sworn in, there are three main reasons why such a categorical judgment is possible.

First, as stated clearly in the Coalition’s foreign policy platform (PDF), the new government will return to the successful policy settings of the Howard years that places Japan as Australia’s closest and most important partner in Asia and focusses on strengthening both the economic and strategic elements of the relationship. The attenuated Labor government under Prime Minister Rudd from 2007–10 didn’t share such a view, in word or action. Read more