France and security in the Asia–Pacific: From the end of the first Indochina conflict to today

France’s defence- and security-related activities in the Asia–Pacific are often underestimated, sometimes distorted or simply ignored. This paper surveys France’s growing presence in the Asia–Pacific from the Indochina War and efforts to resolve the Cambodian conflict, through to the country’s 21st century contributions driven by strategic engagement related to globalisation, new threats, multilateral regional cooperation and increasingly interconnected strategic zones.

Does France carry weight in the major strategic balance in the Asia–Pacific? The answer to this question is ‘No; not directly’. But if the question is whether France contributes to regional security and to the development of defence and security capabilities in a large number of countries in the Asia–Pacific, then the author believes that the answer is clearly a positive one.

Delivering ‘joined-up’ government: Achieving the integrated approach to offshore crisis management

The call to improve ‘joined-up’ government articulates a principle that is the foundation of effective and efficient public administration. Increasingly, the ability of government to achieve effects that are more than the sum of their parts will determine whether Australia influences its strategic environment or is merely captive to it. 

Offshore crisis response requires a higher level of multiagency interconnectedness than ever before. This level of interconnectedness requires the adoption of transformative approaches to recruitment, professional development, leadership and management.

The paper stresses the need for adaptable people, the importance of capturing lessons of recent experience and provides practical actions to strengthen joined-up government.

ASPI at 15

ASPI was registered as a wholly government-owned company on 22 August 2001, but it was several years earlier when Ian McLachlan, the first Defence Minister of the Howard government, saw the need to establish an institute to provide an alternate source of advice on defence and strategic policy.

The articles in this Strategic Insights paper, originally published on the ASPI Strategist website in August 2016, come from a number of individuals who deeply wanted the institute to succeed and indeed were prepared to invest their own effort to make it happen. While turning 15 is a good time to reflect on growth and early experiences, ASPI’s most productive years are still ahead of it.

From Hollywood to Bollywood? Recasting Australia’s Indo/Pacific strategic geography

Australia’s strategic geography is being revolutionised. China and India’s rising maritime power, coupled with a Eurasia-wide ‘connectivity revolution’, is drawing together two formerly disparate theatres: the Asia–Pacific and the Indian Ocean region.

This report argues against the Indo-Pacific idea and presents the case for a more regionally differentiated ‘Indo/Pacific’ alternative. The hyphen at the heart of the Indo-Pacific aggregates two distinct regional security orders that have differed widely in their historical evolution and that today present different challenges and regional order-building opportunities for Australia.

By contrast, an Indo/Pacific strategic geography explicitly differentiates the Asia–Pacific from the Indian Ocean region and calibrates Australia’s strategies for regional engagement accordingly.

The Asia–Pacific and the Indian Ocean region thus present increasingly interconnected—but still durably distinct—security orders. For this reason, Australia should pursue a regionally differentiated ‘triple track’ strategy of order-building.

Assessing the South China Sea award

The Philippines had a major, if unenforceable, win against China in the 12 July South China Sea Arbitration under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. But the implications go beyond the bilateral dispute between China and the Philippines and it carries great legal weight as an authoritative ruling by an international judicial body.

Bearing in mind that the award is legally binding only on the parties to the arbitration, there’s the question of what might this assertion mean for third countries who may opt to exercise navigational rights based on the Tribunal’s rulings on the status and maritime entitlements of features in the Spratlys.

The South China Sea award has produced a diverse range of opinions on ASPI’s blog The Strategist. This Strategic Insights assembles a selection of those articles.

Authors: Sam Bateman, Allan Behm, Anthony Bergin, Jay L Batongbacal, William Choong, Helen Clark, Malcolm Davis, Peter Jennings, Amelia Long, Donald Rothwell & Feng Zhang.

Improving on zero: Australia and India attempt strategic convergence

India no longer sees Australia as merely a strategic stooge of the US. And Australia is starting to accord India the importance India always saw as its right. Those are big changes in attitude and policy—and in the two countries’ understanding of each other’s interests.

Strategy: The Australia–India strategic relationship was in zero territory—often in negative mode—for much of the 20th century; indeed, effectively since India’s independence. In the 21st century, though, Australia and India can reach for greater strategic convergence.

People: Australia in the 21st century can have a set of relationships with India based on people as much as on economic and strategic need.

Economics and trade: As China slows economically, Australia turns to India. The negotiation of an Australia–India free trade deal—a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement—aims to match the bilateral agreements Australia reached with China, Japan and South Korea.

Improving on zero: The previous negative relationship was based on a lot of hard history (White Australia, the Cold War, alliance versus non-alignment and India’s nuclear weapons status). This time it’s different—our astigmatism and the antagonisms should not derail the opportunity, and the need, to see each other clearly and do much more together.

Why Russia is a threat to the international order

Almost a quarter of a century after the demise of the USSR, Russia is back on the world stage and in a familiar, threatening manner. There can be no doubt that Putin’s Russia is now seeking to reassert itself as a major power. It seems set on a path to confrontation with the West and is now challenging the established post-World War II security order in Europe.

This paper analyses Russia’s geopolitical ambitions, its military modernisation, the threat it poses to the international order and how the West should respond. It estimates the prospects for the Russian economy to assess how economic weakness might affect Russian behaviour. It concludes by addressing Moscow’s strategic priorities in the Asia–Pacific region and the implications of Russia’s rise for Australia.

Cyberspace and armed forces: The rationale for offensive cyber capabilities

Aserious approach to military modernisation requires countries to equip, train, and organise cyberforces for what has become an essential component of national defence and deterrence. A force without adequate cyber capabilities is more dangerous to itself than to its opponents. As nations move forward in rethinking the role and nature of their military forces, and as they study the problems of organisation, doctrine and use of cyber operations, they need to:

  • develop the full range of military cyber capabilities with both offensive and defensive application
  • create a centralised command structure for those capabilities, with clear requirements for political-level approval for action
  • embed those capabilities in doctrine and a legal framework based on international law.

Peak Japan and its implications for regional security

This paper examines Japanese security policy under Abe, identifies the constants and constraints that frame that policy, and attempts to project where Japan will go in the near-term future.

Its conclusion may unnerve many: structural constraints in the Japanese economy, self-imposed limits deriving from Japanese national identity and an increasingly beleaguered polity will narrow Japanese options.

The chief task of friends and allies of Japan, including Australia, will be to engage Tokyo and ensure that there’s a place for Japan in regional security policy.

Net worth: Australia’s regional fisheries engagement

This paper argues there’s a need for a whole-of-government approach to Australia’s external fisheries policy that recognises clear linkages between fisheries and foreign, trade, and strategic policy.

Extending and complementing current stakeholder engagement practices is the key to this approach. Regional fishery management organisations (RFMOs) and arrangements allow Australia to promote a strong approach on sustainable and responsible fishing practices and develop regional instruments to protect our fish stocks and wider regional interests.