Women, peace and security: Addressing the gaps and strengthening implementation

This is the second year that ASPI has run a series on The Strategist to coincide with International Women’s Day examining Australia’s approach to women, peace and security (WPS). This Strategic Insights paper compiles the articles in that series across four themes: Defence’s approach to WPS, the role of parliament and civil society, lessons from abroad, and evolving approaches to WPS. Drawing on the analyses of contributors from a variety of backgrounds including government, politics, defence, academia, and civil society, the series demonstrates that issues related to women’s participation and leadership, and the inclusion of different gender perspectives, are integral to Australia’s national security.

As ASPI’s Lisa Sharland and Jacqueline Westermann write in the introduction to the paper,  WPS is ‘an important topic that’s frequently overlooked at the expense of what are often deemed ‘more pressing’ security issues by the media and security commentators’. With the Australian Government tasked to draw up a new National Action Plan on WPS in 2019, the paper provides important reflections on the progress that has been made, the remaining gaps and how Australia’s implementation on WPS could be strengthened.

Putin and North Korea: Exploring Russian interests around the peninsula

The security situation in Northeast Asia has dominated much of international reporting over the last 1.5 years, culminating in the recent historic inter-Korean summit as well as a potential Kim-Trump meeting.

This Strategic Insights paper offers an analysis of what remains an often overlooked and underestimated connection: Russia’s interests on and around the Korean Peninsula. ASPI Researcher, Jacqueline Westermann, argues that it would be fatal to underestimate the Kremlin’s interests in the region, as ‘Russia is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, a stakeholder in the region, a partner to Pyongyang and a party to the previous Six-Party Talks’.

While it isn’t a top priority for the Kremlin, Russian involvement could play a handy part in Putin’s greater strategy to expand Russia’s engagement in the world. To illustrate Moscow’s specific motivations for being involved, the analysis is based on statements given by Russian government officials during 2017, as well as insights from Russian North Korea experts.

The paper portrays the geopolitical, strategic, economic and national policy interests that are driving the Russian government’s attentiveness towards the peninsula and Northeast Asia, and provides an outlook on potential Russian involvement, as well as options for the international community on what to expect from that.

Defence Industrial Capability Plan launched

The Hon Christopher Pyne, Minister for Defence Industry, today launched the new Defence Industrial Capability plan.

The plan outlines the opportunities for Australian industry to engage with the Government and strengthen Australia’s defence capabilities through the development of native industrial capability, infrastructure and innovation. 

A video of the launch can be viewed here.

The Cost of Defence. ASPI Defence Budget Brief 2018-2019

Australia’s strategic situation is deteriorating—is it time to revisit the Defence White Paper?

Australia’s strategic situation is deteriorating. The 2016 Defence White Paper set out six drivers that shape our security environment. None has improved since the White Paper appeared, and most have worsened significantly.

The existing rules-based global order is under threat. China simply ignores it when it chooses, for example with its de facto annexation and subsequent militarisation of the South China Sea, and is embarking on creating a new regional order that it seeks to define alone. The current leadership of the US appears unable to decide whether it wants to support the existing order, ignore it, or tear it down. Meanwhile, the relative power gap between the two continues to decrease, as China’s economy and military grows.

The development of emergent technologies such as cyber, space-based capabilities, artificial intelligence and hypersonics continues apace. We’re also seeing clear Islamic State links into terrorist attacks in Southeast Asia, some involving returned fighters. All of these developments, taken together, suggest that the ADF will be confronted with an increasingly broad spectrum of threats. The question is whether Defence can be stretched even further to cover them all, or whether it should focus on addressing particular ones.

Unfortunately, the 2016 Defence White Paper doesn’t provide clear guidance on prioritisation. It might be time for the government to revisit some of the White Paper’s assumptions, either to confirm that it does set out the right path, or, as we believe it should, make some changes to the plan.

Marcus Hellyer discusses key findings with Michael Shoebridge

Funding

With $36.4 billion in funding, Defence is heading towards 2% of GDP

Against that strategic background, the 2018–19 defence budget continues to deliver the vision set out in the White Paper. In 2018–19, the government is increasing the defence budget towards its commitment of 2% of GDP by 2020–21. Based on the Defence Portfolio Budget Statements (PBS) and GDP predictions in the budget papers, we calculate that it will fall just short, at 1.98%, but that’s essentially a $400-million rounding error. And, based on forward estimates predictions, the Defence budget will grow past 2% in 2021–22.

We should note, however, that Defence’s funding, as presented in this year’s budget, falls short of the fixed funding line presented in the White Paper by around $5 billion by the end of the forward estimates. The government essentially made two funding commitments—2% of GDP and a fixed funding line—and it’s possible it could meet one without reaching the other. Nonetheless, Defence continues to enjoy real increases to its funding.

The growth continues to be centred on Defence’s capital program. While capital investment has historically been the poor cousin alongside personnel and operating funding, the three are now roughly equivalent, and by 2020–21 capital funding could exceed the others for the first time. But it will need to, if Defence is to be able to afford the future force.

Defence has used that increase to invest heavily in remediating infrastructure. And while the shipbuilding enterprise is still in its early days, many other capital investment projects are delivering capability—Air Warfare Destroyers, P-8 maritime patrol aircraft, trucks, battlefield communications and airlifters, for example. And the Air Force’s transformation into a fifth-generation force is well underway. There is no doubt we are getting a more capable ADF.

Signs of pressure

We are starting to see the first signs of cost pressure on Defence

But, as always, there are things to be concerned about.

Full-time ADF personnel numbers are programmed to grow to 59,794 this year on the way to the White Paper target of 62,000. But actual growth has been slow, and Navy (potentially the service whose future platform growth is greatest) is going backwards. Civilian numbers fall by around 2,000 due to the Australian Signals Directorate becoming a statutory agency. Overall, however, net civilian numbers remain unchanged at the White Paper level—that is, well below where they were five years ago, potentially requiring greater reliance on expensive contractors. Funding for personnel effectively flat lines at less than 1% real increase annually over the forward estimates. That seems to be inviting future cost pressures, since ADF numbers are meant to increase, and individual personnel costs have historically increased in real terms.

Also, sustainment budgets appear to be increasing faster than predicted. Between last year’s PBS and the mid-year Additional Estimates update, the sustainment budget increased by $1.5 billion, or 16.7%. And this year’s sustainment budget is around $1 billion more than predicted last year. Some of that is likely to be due to different accounting practices that Defence has adopted, but one gets the sense that perhaps the sustainment requirements of an increasingly complex force were underestimated in the White Paper and Defence is having to adjust.

That could be one reason why Defence is underachieving against its predicted capital spend. Overall, its capital spending is increasing at a healthy rate, but it is likely to fall short of the spend predicted over the 2016–17 forward estimates by about $4 billion or so. Half of that may be due to foreign exchange adjustments, so it’s not a huge shortfall in the grand scheme of things, but probably confirms, first, that it’s always hard to ramp up investment spending quickly and, second, the sustainment increase had to come from somewhere.

Investment in ICT appears to have crashed last year, falling by 72% or $644 million between the PBS and Additional Estimates. It may be that ICT projects failed to deliver, or that sustaining current legacy ICT systems sucked funds away from investment in new acquisitions. Since there’s a complete lack of public reporting on the ICT program, it’s impossible to know what happened. The lack of transparency on ICT is particularly troubling, as the Integrated Investment Program foreshadows over $10 billion in ICT projects that are central not only to Defence’s corporate information systems, but also to its war-fighting ability.

This lack of transparency extends beyond the ICT program. While the government is claiming to be approving record numbers of projects, there’s no public record of what they are, let alone information on their scope, schedule or budget. For approved projects, there’s no reporting on progress unless they’re big enough to make the Major projects report of the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO). This year, for the first time, the PBS does not even include a list of project approvals planned for the coming year. That’s unfortunate, because capital investment projects lie at the heart of the government’s White Paper plan, so both the government and Defence should do better at transparency.

Location, location

Everybody has a view on industry policy but the key question must always be, does it make sense to do it here?

The Cost of Defence looks at two issues in more detail this year. The first is the government’s defence industry policy. A few years ago, it seemed as if everybody had an opinion on which fighter planes and submarines Australia should buy. Now the discussion has moved on to whether and what we should build in Australia. At some level, this isn’t a debate that can be resolved by data alone, as it involves issues of identity and ideology. At one end of the spectrum there are the economic rationalists who argue that there’s no net national benefit in subsidising uncompetitive industries, whether they be car manufacturing or shipbuilding. While Australia has been the world’s fifth biggest arms importer over the past decade, that has enabled us to get access to the most advanced military technologies when we need them at a price we can generally afford.

At the other end there are those who argue, whether for reasons of sovereignty, jobs, or even parochialism and prestige, that we should do as much as we can here. And in between there are those who see merit in both sides; perhaps we should be doing more to keep some of the money that we send offshore to buy arms here in Australia, but not at the 30-40% premium RAND Corporation suggested we were paying for shipbuilding, particularly if it means less capability for our servicemen and women.

The government’s industry policy includes elements of all of the above, which means that at times it appears inconsistent. Its policy documents state that, ultimately, developing Australian industry and exports is about improved capability for the ADF. Yet in practice it appears to favour building in Australia regardless of the cost premium and consequent decrease in output delivered to the ADF. Ultimately, our view is that we should support Australian defence industry when the costs and risks are understood and it makes sense to do so. However, based on the ANAO’s analysis, it doesn’t appear that Defence understands the premiums involved in local builds, so it’s hard to see how robust the business cases for local builds can be.

That said, once the government has made the initial decision to build in Australia, its choice of submarines, offshore patrol vessels, and armoured vehicles appears to have been based primarily on capability. For their part, the international primes have got the message that to be competitive they need robust Australian industry plans and partnerships with local companies and universities. Centres of excellence and cooperative research undertakings have been established, so industry seems to be meeting the government’s demand it put more skin in the game.

Innovation and R&D

Increasing funding for innovation and R&D seems like a safe bet

The innovation programs announced in the White Paper appear to be getting grant money out the door and, while it’s early days, anecdotally at least we are seeing local success stories. Since the funding involved is small compared to that spent on things like shipbuilding, it makes sense to double or even triple it in order to support the government’s broader innovation agenda, to keep up with other nations’ investments in emergent technologies, and to enhance Defence’s existing capabilities, which will have to remain in service for a long time until the future force is delivered.

In terms of exports, the goal of becoming a Top 10 defence exporter seems not only overly ambitious but also distracting. Rather than focusing on exporting platforms, there’s probably more benefit to be had by leveraging our involvement in the shipbuilding and armoured vehicle projects into greater access for Australian industry into the international primes’ supply chains for projects that they’re conducting around the world, not just here. That can achieve economic benefits here long before the mirage of submarine exports is realised.

Naval Shipbuilding

Naval Shipbuilding locks in $3.5-4 billion of cash flow, every year, forever

Which brings us to the second area that we’ve examined in more detail: the affordability of the Naval Shipbuilding Plan. There’s no getting around the fact that building modern warships is expensive. There are two numbers that perhaps warrant closer consideration than the $89 billion headline figure that’s widely quoted. The first is the $20 billion that the future frigate and future submarine projects will have spent between them before they each deliver usable capability (probably around 2028 and 2032, respectively). That’s a lot of cash to have tied up while our strategic circumstances deteriorate and our current platforms age. As ASPI has suggested previously, it’s probably worth looking at what Defence can do in the meantime in the form of cost-effective ways to enhance capability sooner.

The second number is the $3.5–4 billion in annual cash flow that we estimate the shipbuilding plan will require once it’s up and running. Granted, the capital equipment budget is growing. But shipbuilding will potentially consume around 30% of it on an ongoing basis. On the one hand, this smooths out the peaks and troughs, but on the other, since it sits at that level forever, it limits the room available for other capabilities. And since continuous local build appears to now be the government’s policy, there are likely to be other builds locked in forever (protected vehicles, armoured vehicles and so on), further shrinking the funding space for other capabilities and future flexibility.

Since the Navy is essentially undergoing a transformation that will double its tonnage, sustainment costs will also increase. Submarine and frigate sustainment (currently the largest and third largest sustainment lines in Defence) are likely to triple and double, respectively. Submarines alone could cost $2 billion a year to operate, on top of $2 billion a year to build, which together will potentially require 10% of Defence’s total budget for one capability. Granted, we are still a long way away from having all the future frigates and submarines, but at a time when western navies are shrinking due to the cost of building and operating modern warships, the fact that we are moving in the other direction raises questions about affordability.

And in order to get something close to a reasonable return on that capital investment, the Naval Shipbuilding Plan locks in a two-year delivery ‘drumbeat’ for frigates and submarines. Not only does this mean that it will be a very long time before the future fleet is delivered while our strategic environment is deteriorating, but it also limits Defence’s ability to manage cash flow by slowing things down, as that will further delay delivery and affect jobs.

There are other cost pressures. The future sustainment cost of the Joint Strike Fighter is a big unknown, but if it’s anywhere close to the jump from the classic Hornet to Super Hornet (around three times as much per aircraft), it will be hard to absorb.

In short, the megaprojects, in particular shipbuilding, have the potential to crowd out other capabilities. Historically, it’s the enablers (facilities and ICT) holding everything together that suffer. But it could be that the big projects will also distort the overall force structure. There are already signs of that, and the ANAO has noted that Defence may have to increase the future submarine project’s budget by $6.7 billion, even before the first submarine is delivered. That can only come from other areas of planned expenditure, most likely other capital investment.

Information sharing

Because these things are so big, and so important, Defence needs to get better at sharing information with the public

In the light of their centrality, both to Australia’s future military capability and to the government’s defence industry policy, there need be informed understanding and public scrutiny of the future frigate and future submarine projects—the two biggest projects in Defence’s, and potentially the nation’s, history. That discussion must be supported by real data. As a minimum, the two projects should be included in the ANAO’s Major projects report, regardless of whether they have received formal second-pass approval from government.

Because the media, the public and Defence often argue past each other when discussing the cost of military equipment, we have include a chapter (Chapter 7) that illustrates how Defence costs major acquisitions and shows why the ‘sticker’ price is very different from Defence’s total project budget. Hopefully this will contribute to better discussion around what the cost of Defence and its capabilities actually is.

So to sum up, the government is broadly meeting its commitment to get the Defence budget to 2% of GDP. But the content and timing of Defence White Paper’s investment program have not been revisited, despite changes (for the worse) in the strategic environment it was intended to address. Funding pressures are already emerging, with more to come in sustainment and personnel right at the time when a large share of the investment budget is being tied up in shipbuilding.

Informed decision making and public debate on these issues is essential to navigating them in order to keep Australia secure. To support this, the government needs to demand Defence provide greater public transparency in its planning and reporting.

Download the Report

The full report is available here

Marcus Hellyer presents an overview of the report.


© The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited 2018


This publication is subject to copyright. Except as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part of it may in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, microcopying, photocopying, recording or otherwise) be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted without prior written permission. Enquires should be
addressed to the publishers.

Notwithstanding the above, Educational Institutions (including Schools, Independent Colleges, Universities, and TAFEs) are granted permission to make copies of copyrighted works strictly for educational purposes without explicit permission from ASPI and free of charge.

Published in Australia by:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Level 2, 40 Macquarie Street
Barton ACT 2600
Australia

Note on title:
The figure of $99,606,202.74 represents one three-hundred-and-sixty-fifth of the consolidated Defence appropriation (including the Australian Signals Directorate) for 2018–19. This does not include funds appropriated to the Defence Housing Authority, nor those administered by Defence for military superannuation schemes and housing support services.

More than submarines: New dimensions in the Australia–France strategic partnership

In this compendium examining the France–Australia relationship, we have brought together experts from each country to explore our shared histories and plot a course for where we might take the relationship in the future. Each section examines a different aspect of the relationship—historical, international security, defence and the South Pacific—from a French and an Australian perspective. The experts brought together in this volume cover a breadth and depth of knowledge and experience as officials, academics and practitioners.

What emerges is a rich and complex picture of two vibrant and activist countries, grappling with complex problems, but each determined to contribute to making the world safer and more just. At a time when the international order appears under threat, the willingness of our two countries to continue to commit to the global rule of law and strengthening the liberal order and respect for human rights is both heartening and vital.

It’s also clear, however, that maximising the benefits of the bilateral relationship requires a strategic plan and practical commitment to getting things done. This compendium is a contribution to enhancing the relationship so that it can truly be more than the sum of its parts and we can navigate confidently through the decades to come.

The challenge of energy resilience in Australia: Strategic options for continuity of supply

The intent of this report is to examine approaches to ensuring Australia’s energy sources are resilient.

It discusses Australia’s energy continuity needs from a complex system-of-systems perspective and details several systemic vulnerabilities that contribute to potential gaps in the resilience of our energy supply.

The report provides options for addressing the surety of energy supply, reforming energy supply through the electricity grid, addressing evolving transport energy demand, and future-proofing our communities.

Steps to fulfilling these strategic options are examined in several recommendations addressing whole-of-government and whole-of-nation gaps in energy policy.

Coordination of federal, state and local disaster management arrangements in Australia: Lessons from the UK and the US

This document discusses the gaps in Australia’s emergency management legislation and the coordination of federal, state and local disaster management arrangements in Australia.

It analyses key legislation from the UK and US jurisdictions and reveals important lessons that could be adopted in Australia.

Crowded and complex: The changing geopolitics of the South Pacific

Australia faces an increasingly crowded and complex geopolitical environment in the South Pacific. While the most important external powers in the region have traditionally been Australia, New Zealand, the US and France, a number of new powers are increasingly active, most notably China, Russia, Indonesia, Japan and India. South Pacific states, particularly Papua New Guinea and Fiji, are emerging as regional powers to constrain Australian influence. South Pacific states are also becoming more active on the international stage, further taking them outside Australia’s and their other traditional partners’ sphere of influence.

The geopolitical environment in the South Pacific has implications for Australia’s strategic interest in ensuring stability, security and cohesion in the region. If Australia is going to ensure that it’s able to respond to the complex and crowded geopolitics of the South Pacific, it needs to prioritise the region in a clear, consistent and sustained way in its foreign and strategic policy planning.

Women, peace and security: The way forward

The articles in this Strategic Insights paper, originally published on the ASPI Strategist website throughout March 2017, include analysis about what women, peace and security (WPS) means for Australia’s defence and national security. The authors of individual pieces are Elisabeth Buchan, Amanda Fielding, Jenny Lee, Brendan Nicholson, Sofia Patel, Lisa Sharland, Laura J Shepherd, Amy Sheridan, Leanne Smith and Jennifer Wittwer.

ASPI co-hosts workshop on Protection of Civilians and Accountability in New York

On 18 November 2016, the Permanent Missions of Australia and Uruguay to the United Nations, co-hosted their ninth workshop on the protection of civilians (POC) in UN peacekeeping together with the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) in New York. The workshop provided a forum for over 120 participants to share their perspectives about ongoing efforts to address accountability when implementing a mandate to protect civilians in peacekeeping operations. The theme was chosen following the recent failures by the mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) to respond to attacks on civilians in February 2016 in Malakal and July 2016 in Juba.

Workshop panelists explored issues related to performance, leadership, training and capabilities, and safety and security. This included discussion of efforts to strengthen accountability among stakeholders with responsibility for implementing POC mandates, drawing on the findings of the Secretary-General’s Independent Special Investigation into violence in Juba and UNMISS response (Special Investigation Report). Panelists also reflected on the approaches on the ground in different mission contexts and provided analysis about how recommendations provided by the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) Report could contribute to efforts to improve accountability for POC.

The discussions among workshop participants examined the concept of accountability; discussed the limits of peacekeeping and differing expectations when it came to POC; explored efforts to improve performance; highlighted the importance of leadership and responsibility among all stakeholders; and made some recommendations to strengthen accountability in an effort to ensure missions were more effective in implementing POC mandates. Several participants noted the importance of the incoming Secretary-General personally engaging on these challenges early on in his term in 2017.

The workshop report is available here.