Tag Archive for: United States of America

Lessons in leadership: interviews with 11 of Australia’s former Defence Ministers

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In a time of growing strategic uncertainty, 11 of Australia’s former defence ministers have shared valuable lessons they learned over decades running one of the toughest portfolios in government.

In this compendium, the former ministers from both sides of politics give their views on topics ranging from the complexity of dealing with a massive department, to the grief they shared with families at the funerals of slain soldiers.

The pieces are drawn from interviews with former ASPI executive director Peter Jennings and links to the original video interviews are available in the posts on The Strategist site.

The future of intelligence analysis: US-Australia project on AI and human machine teaming

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Dr Alex Caples is Director of The Sydney Dialogue, ASPI’s annual summit for critical, emerging and cyber technologies.

Previously, she was Director of Cyber, Technology and Security at ASPI.

Alex is a former diplomat and national security official whose career spans over 20 years’ in Defence, the Office of National Intelligence, the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and the Department of Foreign Affairs, including postings to Canada and Afghanistan.

Between 2019-2023, Alex was an Associate Director, Operations Advisory and Director, Policy Evaluation and Public Impact at professional services firm KPMG, supporting Commonwealth and State Governments on policy and program design and implementation.

Prior to this, Alex held various senior policy advisor roles in the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet’s National Security Division, including Director of Law Enforcement and Border Security, Director Cyber Security Policy and Director Crisis Management. In this capacity Alex provided advice to Government on a wide range of security legislation, policy and operations, including critical infrastructure security, foreign interference, cyberspace, telecommunications security, digital identity management, intelligence and border security.

During 2011-2012, Alex was a Senior Analyst for Transnational Issues at the Office of National Intelligence, where she provided senior executives and Ministers with all-source analysis on people smuggling, regional law enforcement and transnational crime.

Alex is an Australian Defence Force Academy Graduate. She holds a PhD in International Relations from Monash University (2007).

When China knocks at the door of New Caledonia

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China’s covert foreign interference activities in the Pacific are a very important, and yet under-researched, topic. This report uses New Caledonia as the case study to examine China’s hidden front, 隐蔽战线, throughout the wider Pacific.

Successive months of violence and unrest in New Caledonia in 2024, have heightened regional and international awareness of the uncertain future of the territory, and the role of China in that future. The unrest erupted after France pushed through legislation extending voting rights in the territory.

The CCP has engaged in a range of foreign interference activities in New Caledonia over many decades, targeting political and economic elites, and attempting to utilise the ethnic Chinese diaspora and PRC companies as tools of CCP interests. Local elites have at times actively courted China’s assistance, willingly working with CCP front organisations.

Assessing the extent of China’s foreign interference in New Caledonia is a legitimate and necessary inquiry. The debate about China’s interests, intentions and activities in the territory has lacked concrete, publicly available evidence until now. This study aims to help fill that lacuna. The report draws on open-source data collection and analysis in Chinese, French and English. It was also informed by interviews and discussions that took place during my visits to New Caledonia and France in 2018, 2019, 2022 and 2023, as well as conversations in New Zealand.

My research shows that the French Government and New Caledonian authorities are working to manage risks in the China – New Caledonia relationship. Moreover, civil society, the New Caledonian media, many politicians, and Kanak traditional leadership have also had a role in restraining the extent of the CCP’s foreign interference activities in New Caledonia. Few Pacific Island peoples would welcome a relationship of dependency with China or having the Pacific become part of a China-centred order.

The report concludes by recommending that New Caledonia be included in all regional security discussions as an equal partner. New Caledonia needs to rebalance its economy and it needs help with the rebuild from the riots. Supportive partner states should work with France and New Caledonia to facilitate this.

Ice panda: navigating China’s hybrid Antarctic agenda

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Antarctica is often overlooked in strategic discussions, but its role in geopolitical competition deserves attention.

This report assesses the continents importance to Australian security, China’s hybrid Antarctic activity, and the need for Australia to develop a balancing strategy capable of bolstering the Antarctic Treaty and ‘pushing back’ against growing Chinese power in Antarctica.

Antarctica offers significant strategic advantages for the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Although Beijing’s actions in Antarctica may not overtly violate the Antarctic Treaty (AT), they effectively undermine its principles and, by extension, Australia’s strategic interests. Currently, the PRC is adeptly navigating the AT System to challenge the status quo without explicitly breaching the treaty.

China’s domestic policies, which merge civil and military sectors, appear to contravene the spirit of the AT’s military prohibitions, even if they have not yet resulted in direct military activity on the continent. This evolving dynamic underscores the pressing need for Australia to safeguard the existing Antarctic status quo.

With robust Australian foreign and security prioritization, the AT can counter Beijing’s growing ambitions, which may directly impact Australian interests. We must protect and uphold the principles of the AT.

With diverse domestic and international priorities, Australia must not neglect Antarctica, as Beijing continues to exploit the strategic gap left by our limited focus. Australia, with its rich history and commitment to Antarctica, must assert its role as an Antarctic claimant and clarify that China’s presence is contingent on Australian and other claimants’ cooperation. It’s time for Australia to lead in Antarctica and protect our strategic interests.

Deterrence, escalation and strategic stability: rebuilding Australia’s muscle memory

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To build an effective deterrence strategy, Australia needs urgently to improve its skills and understanding of deterrence, and raise the topic’s profile in our public and policy discussions. Despite having previously been a global thought leader on nuclear weapons and deterrence half a century ago, Australia today doesn’t have a strong grasp of the basics of modern deterrence.

Knowledge of and literacy in deterrence are vital for adapting and applying such concepts to meet today’s extraordinarily complex, multidomain and multidimensional requirements. A lack of understanding of deterrence can critically undermine the ability to get strategy and policy right. The implications for Australia’s national interests are urgent and serious. The limited debate in Australia about what good deterrence strategy looks like and its key components can’t be advanced without better understanding of key terms and ideas that are fundamental to deterrence theory and practice.

There are, of course, obvious limits to what Australia can achieve alone. Our ability to integrate and combine our military capabilities with those of the US and other critical partners is fundamental to our ability to achieve our security objectives, but some of our partners are working more closely together on building deterrence strategies. We have some catching up to do.

This report explains what deterrence is and why it matters. It looks at Australian deterrence policy in practice and at deterrence efforts by some of our partners and allies and it highlights a number of gaps in Australia’s strategic and deterrence planning.

The report makes a series of policy recommendations for government, and especially for the Department of Defence, to rebuild Australia’s position as a thought leader on deterrence.

Reclaiming leadership: Australia and the global critical minerals race

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Climate policy, geopolitics and market forces are coalescing to deliver Australia a global leadership opportunity in critical minerals. To grasp that opportunity, Australia needs both to utilise its domestic mineral endowment and its mining knowledge and technology and to leverage the global footprint of Australian companies to help build a global supply chain network.

How Australia responds will not only determine economic benefits to the nation but will also affect the world’s ability to achieve minerals security and the sustainability required for the global energy transition and inclusive economic growth.

The global energy transition and other high-technology applications have increased demand for critical minerals, particularly in countries that have strong complex manufacturing industries. At the same time, the concentration of production of many critical minerals, the dominance of China in supply chains and its actions to restrict supply and influence markets, are disrupting both minerals production and availability.

In response, developed nations have formulated critical minerals strategies and entered into bilateral and multilateral agreements, involving supplier nations and customer nations, to build alternative supply chains that are more diverse, secure and sustainable. Australia has committed in multiple agreements to work with like-minded nations to achieve this.

This report is intended to provide the government with a road map to ‘step up’ to (re)activate Australia’s global mineral leadership.

Deterring an attack on Taiwan: policy options for India and other non-belligerent states

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India has a vital role to play in deterring China from unifying Taiwan by military force, a new Australian Strategic Policy Institute report finds, highlighting New Delhi’s significant economic, diplomatic, legal and strategic narrative levers.

The report looks beyond traditional thinking on military preparations to dissuade Beijing from taking the island by force and offers six ways for India, with its great strategic and economic weight, to “help shape Beijing’s calculus away from the use of force”.

The author writes that the use of such long-term measures is vital to New Delhi’s own interests, as the economic and regional security impacts of a major war would be devastating for India itself.  India and other “non-belligerent states” could apply a range of measures to persuade Beijing that the time is not right for a military attack. The aim would be to convince Beijing that “its ducks aren’t quite in a row… so that it defers military action to some uncertain point in the future”.

The report states that China remains deterrable. While it is determined to assume control of the island as a paramount strategic priority, it knows a military invasion would be enormously costly and uncertain.

National resilience: lessons for Australian policy from international experience

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The strategic circumstances that Australia contemplates over the coming decades present multiple, cascading and concurrent crises. Ensuring a safe and secure Australia, able to withstand the inevitable shocks that we’ll face into the future, will require a more comprehensive approach to strategy than we’ve adopted over the past seven decades. We can’t rely on the sureties of the past. The institutions, policies and architectures that have supported the nation to manage such crises in our history are no longer fit for purpose.

The report highlights lessons drawn from international responses to crisis, to assist policymakers build better responses to the interdependent and hyperconnected challenges that nations face. The report brings together the disciplines of disaster management, defence strategy and national security to examine what an integrated national approach to resilience looks like, and how national resilience thinking can help Australia build more effective and more efficient responses to crisis and change.

The report concludes that now is the time to commence action to deliver a national resilience framework for Australia. Collective, collaborative action, enabled by governments, built on the capability and capacity of Australian industry and the community, and aimed at the goal of a resilient Australia, can ensure that we’re well placed to face the future with confidence.

Building whole-of-nation statecraft: how Australia can better leverage subnational diplomacy in the US alliance

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Australia and the US are both federations of states in which power is shared constitutionally between the national and subnational levels of government. However, traditionally, one domain that hasn’t been considered a shared power, but rather the constitutionally enshrined responsibility of the national governments, has been international affairs (in the US Constitution through Article I, Section 10 and other clauses and in the Australian Constitution through section 51 (xxix), known as the external affairs power). For this reason, foreign-policy and national-security decision-makers in Washington DC and Canberra have rightly seen themselves as the prime actors in the policymaking that develops and strengthens the US–Australia alliance and all global relationships, with limited power held by subnational governments.

However, in our globalised and digital world, constitutional power no longer means that subnational governments have only narrow roles and influence on the international stage. While national governments will continue having primary responsibility for setting foreign policy, subnational governments have offices overseas, sign agreements with foreign governments, and regularly send diplomatic delegations abroad. Recent events, including the Covid-19 pandemic, have highlighted subnational governments’ decisive role in shaping, supporting, adapting to and implementing national and international policy. The pandemic, including post-pandemic trade promotion, demonstrated that the relationships between layers of governments in both federations are essential to national security, resilience, economic prosperity and social cohesion.

Subnational governments have vital roles to play in helping to maximise national capability, increase trust in democratic institutions, mitigate security threats and build broader and deeper relationships abroad. At the subnational level in Washington and Canberra, people-to-people, cultural and economic links create the deep connective tissue that maintains relationships, including those vital to the US-Australia alliance, no matter the politics of the day. But that subnational interaction must be consistent with national defence and foreign policy.

Australia’s federal system should help facilitate international engagement and incentivise positive engagement while ensuring that the necessary legislative and policy levers exist to require the subnational layer to conduct essential due diligence that prioritises the national interest. In this report, the authors make a series of policy recommendations that will support the development of such a framework.

US land power in the Indo-Pacific: opportunities for the Australian army

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The US Army is undergoing its most consequential period of transformation since the end of the Cold War. The re-emergence of great power competition and a deteriorating strategic environment is forcing the US Army to rethink not just its approach to land warfare but also its future role alongside the US Marine Corps in key regions around the globe. In the Indo-Pacific, this doctrinal and structural transformation is informing a new approach to joint exercises and ‘no gaps’ defence collaboration to deter Chinese aggression. These developments hold important insights for key US allies and partners, including Australia and Japan.

Australia’s new unifying strategic approach to national defence and the high degree of convergence this has with US defence strategy offers a timely window of opportunity for the Australian Army to explore the combined use of land power in a heighten threat environment. This work should be mutually reinforcing and constitute part of Australia’s approach to managing risk and threats and balancing its contributions to deterrence.

This report aims to provide the Australian defence establishment and military leaders with well-considered options for engaging the US on matters of mutual interest. The report provides an overview of the US Army’s changing force posture and approach to land warfare, followed by a brief analysis of its evolving role as an essential enabler of joint force operations in a maritime environment. The report then explores the US Army’s ‘campaigning’ activities in the region and its efforts to increase allied and partner capacity for high-end military contingencies in all domains. Finally, the report highlights opportunities for the Australian Army to enhance interoperability with US land forces in a deepening US-Australia alliance.

Tag Archive for: United States of America

US and Australian Women and Space Event with AWDC

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On the evening of November 14th, ASPI DC and Australian Women in DC (AWDC) were thrilled to host a lively event on US and Australian Women and Space: New Frontiers for Business and Government.

At a time when most everyone in DC, and beyond, is consuming a diet of election outcomes and political appointments, it was great to step back and discuss the importance of space as a domain for innovation and development in defense, science, and communications.

A big thank you to Paula Trimble, US Space Force Space Development Agency; Jeremy Hallett, Space Industry Association of Australia; and Lisa Wood, BAE Systems, Inc. for generously sharing their time, expertise, and advice on what makes a great mentor and exciting career. Thanks also to our moderator Nerida King of ASPI DC and AWDC who drew these connections together.

Some key takeaways that resonated with our audience as they chatted over Australian wine and seasonal food:

  • The US must collaborate with its allies and partners on space. It is impossible for any one company or business to keep up with technological change required.
  • Space development is integral on the world stage—from responding to global challenges like great power competition, communications failures, climate change and natural disasters—down to the personal level, like navigating oneself with GPS.
  • President-elect Trump’s role in establishing the US Space Force in 2019 and close connection with Space X entrepreneur Elon Musk ensures the sector will continue to attract interest in the US.

Thanks to everyone who joined and made it such a successful (and topical) event!

Manila Conference

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On 25 June, ASPI DC and East-West Center coordinated and moderated a “United States-Australia and Southeast Asia Workshop” in Manila, Philippines.  
Seven leading experts on Southeast Asia engaged in invigorating discussions on Southeast Asia and the United States-Australia alliance, foreign policy, and security in the region.

This workshop is a part of a greater project with the East-West Center under the Research Innovation & Collaboration Exchange (RICE) initiative, focused on the Southeast Asian Perspectives of the United States-Australia alliance. Stay tuned for more on this project!

Investor Series Roundtable

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On 30 May, ASPI DC hosted a productive roundtable discussion on the 2024 Australian Defense Integrated Investment Program (IIP). The event brought together perspectives from both the private and public sectors, aiming to gather critical feedback from the investment community to ensure effective implementation of the program.

The discussion focused on several key areas, including investments in AUKUS Pillar 2 technologies, the Advanced Strategic Capabilities Accelerator (ASCA), infrastructure development, human capital flow, and incentives for Australian companies.

By engaging directly with the investment community, ASPI DC aims to refine and enhance the strategies within the IIP, ensuring the program’s effectiveness and alignment with investor expectations and market realities.

AUKUS as an Avenue for Tech Diplomacy

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On 7 May, ASPI DC’s program lead for Defense Industrial Base, Trade, Technology, and Innovation, Bronte Munro, led a conversation on AUKUS and tech diplomacy with Partner and Chair of The Asia Group’s Australia Practice, the Hon. Arthur Sinodinos AO, Partner and Lead of the Europe and Eurasia practice at Denton’s Global Advisor’s, Albright Stonebridge Group, Ambassador (ret.) Philip T. Reeker, and Minister Defence (Director USA) at the British Embassy in Washington DC, Mark Newton.

The conversation, which took place at the Special Competitive Studies Project (SCSP) AI Expo for National Competitiveness and alongside the Ash Carter Exchange, focused on AUKUS as an avenue for tech diplomacy. Tech diplomacy is the practice of collaborating across sectors and across countries to shape the role of technology in our lives and in our world. It is where the fields of business, technology and foreign policy intersect to effectively shape how technology is used.

Panellists highlighted how the industry- government collaboration that AUKUS requires offers not only a robust means for likeminded partners to accelerate innovation in emerging technologies to counter China’s technological advancements, but to ensure unified leadership in standards setting and best practice.

They also underscored the importance of understanding that securing high-tech involves not only being the leaders in its development, but in its commercialisation and the establishment of the rules and norms that govern its use cases. Tech diplomacy is key to building an ecosystem that supports commercialisation, builds trust in technology and protects national security interests. Critically, it requires collaboration between likeminded partners, such as Australia, the US and the UK.

ASPI’s Bec Shrimpton testifies before the USCC

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On 21 March, ASPI’s Director of Defence Strategy and National Security, Rebecca Shrimpton, testified for the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission’s (USCC) hearing on ‘China’s Evolving Counter Intervention Capabilities and Implications for the United States and Indo-Pacific Allies and Partner’.

The testimony examined the challenges posed by China’s rise and the impact on Australia and the Indo-Pacific region. It also reiterated the need for Western strategists to develop a better understanding of Chinese strategic thinking to effectively counter China. During the testimony, Ms Shrimpton highlighted the concept of “active defence”, which she argued demonstrated that China’s national security strategy extends to pre-emptive offensive operations including the grey zone phase.

With this understanding in mind, the testimony explored China’s military modernisation with respect to its naval, air and space forces. Through PLA activities such as the creation of forward bases in the South China Sea and provision of policing capabilities to Pacific Island countries, China has significantly increased its footprint within the Indo-Pacific region. Outside of the military domain, China has also used political interference and economic coercion to increase its influence in Australia.

As made clear in the 2023 Australian Defence Strategic Review and the 2020 Defence Strategic Update, the challenges posed by China in the Indo-Pacific region show that Australia no longer has ten years, or necessarily any, strategic warning time in the event of a major power conflict. In this context, Ms Shrimpton recommended Australia boost its integrated deterrence and increase burden sharing with its ally, the United States. The importance of cooperating with likeminded partners through minilateral formats such as AUKUS, the Australia-US-Japan trilateral and the Quad was also explored.

The full transcript can be accessed here.

SXSW ASPI Panel at Australia House

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ASPI DC was delighted to host Australia’s Ambassador to the United States, His Excellency the Hon Dr Kevin Rudd AC, along with former US Ambassador to Australia John Berry and representatives from Australian and American industry, for a roundtable discussion at South by Southwest in Austin on 12 March.

The conversation, hosted in partnership with the American Australian Association, focused on mobilising private sector capital for AUKUS and national security more broadly.

In additional programming, ASPI DC Analyst Bronte Munro and Director Adam Leslie hosted a panel on Doing Business in the National Security Domain with Cia Kouparitsas of With You With Me; Heather Richman of the AUKUS Defense Investor Network and Naweed Tahmas of Aeon Industries.

The event led solicited a productive dialogue on the tech industry as the new defense industrial base, AUKUS and skilled workforce development and investment in dual use technology.

17 April elections in the Solomon Islands ASPI DC Senior Analyst Greg Brown story

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Voice of America quoted ASPI DC Senior Analyst Greg Brown in a 22 February story regarding American and Chinese interests in the 17 April elections in the Solomon Islands. The report featuring Dr. Brown replayed on VOA Asia Weekly on 29 February.

Bronte Munro and Greg Brown quoted in Radio Free Asia article on Prime Ministers Albanese’s State visit with President Biden, and following visit to China

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Australian  Prime Minister Anthony Albanese met with US President Joe Biden in Washington on Wednesday before visiting China. The outside world is paying attention to what impact this will have on the trilateral relations between the United States, China and Australia. When Albanese met with Biden, what did the leaders of the two countries focus on?

On October 22, Australian Prime Minister Albanese arrived in Washington and held a bilateral meeting with US President Biden on the 25th. During the talks, the leaders of the two countries discussed possible cooperation on biotechnology, high-end batteries, quantum computer computing, cybersecurity, space, artificial intelligence, climate change and other issues.

On the afternoon of the 25th, Biden stated at a joint press conference that in earlier talks, the leaders of the two countries discussed how to maintain maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region through military cooperation: “The alliance between the United States and Australia is to maintain maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region. As an anchor of global peace and stability, we (the United States and Australia) work with India and Japan in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) to ensure freedom, openness, prosperity, and security in the Indo-Pacific region. Through trilateral security between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States Partnership (AUKUS), we are also investing in our shared security across generations.”

Biden said: “When we negotiated the trilateral security partnership, Xi Jinping asked me if the purpose of the United States was to contain China? I said no, we just want to ensure that the waterways are open, and you cannot arbitrarily change the regulations related to the waterways. , such as what are the international airspace and international waters, which is why we established the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. Xi Jinping does not like this alliance, but the focus of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue is to maintain stability in the Taiwan Strait, the Indian Ocean, and the Indo-Pacific region as a whole. “

Biden also warned against the dangerous navigation of Chinese coast guard ships in the South China Sea at the press conference: “In the past week, Chinese ships have sailed dangerously and illegally in the South China Sea with the intention of interfering with the Philippines’ routine replenishment within its exclusive economic zone. Action. I want to make it clear that the United States’ defense commitment to the Philippines is unbreakable and that any attack on Philippine aircraft, ships, or troops will trigger the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty.”

Scholar: U.S. and Australian leaders are committed to eliminating the threat of China in the scarce metals supply chain

Regarding the meeting between Biden and Albanese, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) analyst Bronte Munro told our reporter that the leaders of the two countries should have focused on maintaining the supply chain of scarce metals: “Building resilient and competitive supply chains, freeing them from coercion, and proposing an alternative to China’s market monopoly is a daunting challenge that will require the cooperation and cooperation of leaders at the highest levels of government. Talks. The United States cannot do without Australia on this matter, but Australia needs more capital and foreign investment to be able to mine critical minerals.”

Greg Brown, a senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, also said that Biden and Albanese should have exchanged views on the specific promotion of the trilateral security partnership: “Privately, I think the two leaders shared raised concerns about the rapid deterioration of global security, but the two sides also specified what help they each needed. Australia is currently frustrated by the slow speed of technology transfer in the trilateral security partnership. Under the trilateral security partnership, the two countries are working together To build submarines, the United States and Australia both hope that each other will provide assistance in manpower and infrastructure problems encountered. At the same time, both leaders hope that the United States will include Australia in the list of suppliers of critical minerals – a move that will allow Australian companies accept U.S. funding, but the decision requires approval by the U.S. Congress.”

Albanese accepts China’s invitation to visit China: continued exchanges are in the interests of all countries

Meanwhile, on Sunday, Albanese announced that he would embark on a four-day trip to China on November 4. During this trip, he will visit Shanghai and Beijing and hold talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping. At the joint press conference on the 25th, Albanese also explained his trip to China. He said that there is still a strategic competition between China and Australia.

Albanese said: “My principle is to cooperate where you can, disagree where necessary, and interact with China in the interests of the country. I think continued dialogue is in the interest of Australia, China, and the world.” interests, so I responded to China’s invitation to visit China. … I think it is also a good thing that many high-level US officials have interacted with the Chinese government recently, because dialogue can promote understanding and reduce tensions.”

On the eve of Albanese’s visit to China, the Australian Prime Minister first visited Washington. What does the outside world pay attention to such an itinerary?

In this regard, Brown believed that Albanese visited the United States first because he wanted to reach a consensus with the United States before meeting with Xi Jinping: “Before talking to opponents, it is a wise decision to meet with major allies. Albanese’s visit to Washington is It’s a signal that despite Australia’s reliance on trade with China, the U.S.-Australia alliance still comes first.”

Munro also expressed similar views on this: “Albanese’s visit to the United States publicly demonstrated the importance and commitment of bilateral relations between the United States and Australia. It also demonstrated to Beijing the strategic unity of the United States and Australia in facing China. .The purpose of the Australia-UK-US trilateral security partnership is to deter China’s coercion and aggression in the Indo-Pacific region, which will establish a key framework for Australia’s interactions with Xi Jinping.”

Scholar: China tries to win over Australia to remain neutral in US-China competition

In addition, last Saturday, the Chinese government just announced that it agreed to review the import tariffs imposed on Australian wine. This tariff was implemented in 2020 and severely hit the sales of Australian wine because the then Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison called for an investigation into the origins of the new coronavirus, sparking dissatisfaction with the Beijing authorities and economic retaliation.

It is generally believed that Albanese will visit China in the near future, which shows that China-Australia relations have stopped falling and rebounded in the near future. In addition to the opportunity for the Chinese authorities to cancel wine tariffs, the Chinese government also recently released a man who had been imprisoned for more than three years. Australian journalist Cheng Lei.

In an interview with this station, Yu Maochun, director of the China Center of the Hudson Institute, a think tank in Washington, D.C., believed that China has recently released many goodwill signals to Australia in order to win over Australia to maintain a neutral position in the competition between the United States and China: ” Because Australia is a very important member of the Five Eyes alliance and is very wary of China in terms of international defense, and military exchanges between the United States and Australia are increasing day by day, it wants to provoke a substantive alliance relationship with the United States.”

Yu Maochun analyzed that when Albanese and Xi Jinping meet, the leaders of the two countries should focus on economic topics: “It (the Albanese government) has closer exchanges with countries such as the United States, NATO, and Japan on defense and security affairs. And the AUKUS (Australia-UK-US Trilateral Security Partnership) plan is also proceeding as scheduled. However, Australia also realizes that its dependence on the Chinese market is still relatively critical. The Australian Prime Minister’s visit to China and Xi Jinping may want to talk about stabilizing bilateral relations, especially The goal is to stabilize bilateral economic relations, and the normal trade between Australia and China cannot be affected just because the Australian government has taken some defense actions and deepened relations with the United States.”

Munro also analyzed: “Trade will be the top issue on Albanese’s agenda, and resolving China’s export controls on Australian commodities such as wine, lobster and beef, and restoring barley trade will be his focus.”

AUKUS Trilateral Initiative

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On the 20th and 21st of March, ASPI DC convened with the Center for New American Studies (CNAS) and the Centre for Grand Strategy at Kings College London (KCL) its second trilateral AUKUS Initiative. This Track 1.5 event brought together high-ranking officials and industry representation from across the United States, Australian and UK governments to discuss the AUKUS announcement, and was concluded with a dinner attended by Australian Ambassador to the United States, Kevin Rudd, who gave a speech.

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How will the midterms affect US foreign policy and Australia’s strategic interests?

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On 8 November, Americans will vote in midterm congressional elections to determine all 435 voting seats in the House of Representatives and one-third of the 100 seats in the Senate. Despite the political theatre, Australians should take heart.

Recent discussions between ASPI DC and congressional committee staff members serving both Democratics and Republicans in both the House and Senate suggest that the looming presidential election in 2024 and the likely focus of congressional committee hearings on topics far from the Indo-Pacific region—such as funding for the war in Ukraine and the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021—appear all-engrossing.

But in a new ASPI report we found that next week’s midterms should not negatively affect the Australia–US alliance and the core interests that underpin its success.

While a foreign policy mandate or change in general direction is unlikely to occur, the possible shuffle of congressional committee leadership may facilitate or curb the passage and implementation of policies that address Australian concerns. Canberra should therefore be highly attuned to the changes in the structure and membership of committees, which are the bodies that have a significant influence on the formation of US foreign policy.

Currently, the Democratic Party holds the majority in the House and, with the tie-breaking vote of the vice president, holds an effective majority in the Senate. President Joe Biden’s newly released national security strategy and national defence strategy demonstrate bipartisan consensus and continuity with the previous administration on threats posed in the Indo-Pacific region. The Congress has shown the same commitment through broad consensus to support and work with key allies such as Australia on these issues.

There are three possible outcomes of the midterm elections: the status quo is maintained, with a marginal Democrat hold in both the Senate and the House; a split Congress emerges where the Senate is held by one party and the House by the other; or the Republicans take both the Senate and the House.

A status quo outcome is least likely, but if this scenario comes to pass and the Democrats retain control of both chambers, Congress may empower the Biden administration to introduce policies and laws with less consultation or cooperation with the Republicans. It may also see reduced Republican willingness to offer bipartisanship in the lead-up to the 2024 presidential election. The Republican Party would probably seek to blame a Democrat-led Congress and White House for any domestic troubles, such as an economic downturn or energy shortages. That domestic disruption could spill into foreign affairs if, for example, US domestic politics is seen as outweighing US resourcing of Ukraine in its war with Russia.

In the second scenario, in which one party has the numbers in the House and the other has the numbers in the Senate, the Biden administration won’t be able to push through controversial legislation by sheer weight of numbers. However, a Republican win in either chamber (but not both chambers) and committees that change accordingly could stall legislation and lead to congressional gridlock as each side tries to advance its own agenda in the lead-up to 2024.

A split Congress will likely view foreign policy legislation and oversight activity through a lens of domestic politics and partisanship. In this scenario, we expect to see partisanship between the two chambers and within the individual committees, which may lead to reduced agreement. Precedent indicates that there’s likely to be more cooperation in committees that are working directly and collaboratively on foreign policy than in the broader theatre of the chambers. That could change quickly if, for example, resourcing Ukraine in the war in Europe loses popularity domestically.

An agreement such as AUKUS depends on it being both a domestic and a foreign policy priority. Congress will continue to strongly support AUKUS. However, new policies for the second pillar of AUKUS’s work program (advanced capabilities such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing and hypersonics) may become harder to develop due to overlap between domestic and foreign policy. Domestic battles may also rank above foreign policy considerations.

Support for ongoing US prioritisation of the Indo-Pacific will remain bipartisan. However, there may be more political debate on the level of simultaneous US resourcing to counter Russia’s war in the Euro-Atlantic and China’s aggression in the Indo-Pacific. That will depend in part on the partisan and personal predilections of committee and subcommittee chairs.

In the third possibility, which is looking more likely as the midterms near, a Republican Congress, emboldened by an electoral win, would have incentives to challenge the Biden administration. The Republicans would be in a stronger position to introduce and attempt to pass legislation. It’s highly probable that Republican oversight would hinder the administration’s making of political appointments, including US ambassadors. The appointment process is already hindered by committee rules, but Republican oversight would further stymie hearings.

Republican political clout may not necessarily reduce bipartisan cooperation and compromise on foreign and defence policy more broadly—at least not before the presidential election campaign gets underway in mid-2023. There is an overall strong consensus to make foreign policy work, and there would likely be a six-month window of opportunity for cooperation, provided neither branch of government puts forward policies unacceptable to the other.

Awareness of this closing window for cooperation ahead of the presidential campaign season could even increase compromise and bipartisanship over that period. Notably, the Biden administration has overcome these challenges by successfully reaching across the aisle on foreign policy issues (for example, with the recent passage of the ‘CHIPS and Science Act’).

Polls suggests the Republicans will win a majority in the House and could also control the Senate, with the economy and cost of living as the dominant election issues. If that happens, both parties will focus on domestic political needs, requiring Australia to work even harder to keep attention on our priorities. That would mean regularly highlighting Indo-Pacific issues for distracted American lawmakers who, besides their focus on China, will be occupied with the war in Ukraine.

Canberra will also need to encourage presidential and vice-presidential attendance at Indo-Pacific meetings and push for early congressional visits to Australia and the region from members of the new foreign affairs, defence and armed services committees.

In the less likely event that the Democrats hold both chambers, the Biden administration would have more room to move on foreign policy.

Whatever the outcome, it’s in the US’s interest to prioritise the Indo-Pacific even as it manages challenges at home and in Europe. The kind of intimate relationship that Australia needs with the US to strengthen its security and sovereignty requires Australian politicians and policymakers—as well as key civil society and industry actors—to continue putting in time and resources and not rely on an expectation that this critical alliance will manage itself.

Tag Archive for: United States of America

Australia needs a one-of-a-kind strategy to prepare for a second Trump presidency

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The Presidential debate last week was tough viewing. In the aftermath of President Joe Biden’s faltering performance, and the Supreme Court’s favourable ruling on Donald Trump’s immunity claim, Australia needs to supercharge its planning, because the odds of a second Trump presidency have seemingly shortened.
Australia, like many countries, has been preparing for a possible second Trump administration. Ambassador Kevin Rudd’s Twitter account provides insights into how hard he and our embassy in Washington are working. But as we get closer to the election, there needs to be an approach that goes well beyond the embassy and traditional diplomacy.
Australia needs a laser-focused strategy that is ambitious, well-resourced and co-ordinated across all arms of government.
Our ability to navigate another Trump presidency depends on the creation and implementation of a one-of-a-kind strategic plan that considers every risk, predicts curve balls, and foreshadows decisions that affect us. This is difficult, but not impossible.
During the first Trump presidency, there was some conservative commonality between the ruling parties in both countries, which won’t be the case this time—noting Australia is set to have its own election within the next 11 months. This adds an extra dimension to the complexities that would need to be managed.
Scenarios should be workshopped and tested, including with well-connected people from business and civil society. Options should be developed that would help deter policy directions that are not in Australia’s interests or those of our broader region. No doubt a lot of work is already going into future-proofing AUKUS, for example—a job that will have to ramp up significantly if Trump is re-elected. Trump might change direction on the partnership. He could decide to stay committed to just one of the two pillars, or seek to renegotiate the terms of the arrangement.
In addition to defence issues, Australia’s strategy will also need to cover economic security, trade and industrial policy, societal impacts, international affairs and security.
The strategy must also have an offensive element and prepare Australia to capitalise on opportunities, including by making plans to support partners and allies during times of great difficulty, or worse, crisis. Australia fared well during the first Trump presidency and, along with partners such as Japan and India, has lessons it can share that could strengthen our partners’ hands.
What follows are six priorities the Australian Government should pursue immediately.