This month, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security turns 15. But what has changed for women and girls in conflict over the past decade and a half?

Nearly 300 schoolgirls from Chibok Government Secondary School are still missing, joining another 2,000 women and girls who have been kidnapped by Boko Haram since 2014. And thousands of women, teenage girls and boys are still enslaved by Islamic State (IS), many as sex slaves.

According to the United Nations, sexual violence in conflict is one of the greatest moral issues of our time. It’s a moral issue we face now and it has been a moral issue for time immemorial.

Lamentations recount that ‘women have been ravished in Zion, and virgins in the towns of Judah’. Historically, rape was characterised as a private crime against a woman’s honour and not a matter of universal human rights.

During World War II, the Japanese created ‘comfort women’ and the Soviet army is thought to have raped up to two million women in Eastern Europe and Germany. Despite the fact that evidence of sexual atrocities was received by the Nuremberg tribunal, those who committed these crimes were never prosecuted for them.

On the other hand, indictments before the Tokyo tribunal did charge rape and received evidence, and the Tokyo judgement referred to rape. General Matsui was convicted of war crimes as well as crimes against humanity based in part on evidence of rape. However, none of the victims were called to testify and the issue was only given incidental attention.

In June 1996, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia issued its first indictment that dealt exclusively with sexual violence and adopted rules that made it easier for victims to give evidence. The tribunal represented a watershed moment for sexual violence in conflict and it’s now a regular aspect of the United Nations’ work.

And this year, more progress: the Government of Croatia passed a new bill to compensate victims of sexual violence, the African Union committed to a landmark framework on cooperation with the United Nations on the prevention of sexual violence, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army In Opposition committed to prevent conflict-related sexual violence and the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo signed a declaration to combat rape in war.

Yet the abuse and atrocities against women and girls in conflict continues. It’s horrifying to contemplate that in the 21st century the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war, as an orchestrated, industrialised terror tactic is still part of the terrain of conflict. To date, the focus on eliminating and prosecuting sexual violence in conflict has been on state actors.

How do we broker agreements with non-state actors who haven’t signed up to international norms, laws, conventions, protocols or rules of engagement? Those groups’ strategies are to shock, defile and denigrate all that we hold sacred and whose very tactic is to affront our morality and challenge our values.

What we are seeing with IS is a non-state actor engaging in some of the most unspeakable acts of sexual violence, where rape and sexual abuse aren’t just a by-product of war but used as a deliberate military strategy to degrade the enemy, guided by a pamphlet chillingly entitled ‘Questions and Answers on Taking Captives and Slaves’.

The UN’s Special Representative to the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Zainab Bangura, found that girls from Iraq and Syria had been stripped, sold, and in some cases, made to undergo over a dozen virginity reparation surgeries. The intense shame that accompanies these acts is too much for many women to bear, with a number later committing suicide—as suggested in this horrifying message from IS fighter Abou Jihad:

‘Yes… they are idolators, so it’s normal that they are slaves, in Mosul they are closed in a room and cry, and one of them committed suicide LOL’

How we deal with this entrenched hatred of women will challenge us for years. While the United Nations, through UNSC1325, the supporting resolutions and the Special Representative to the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, has made some progress in achieving its goals and milestones, much more needs to be done.

Today, the UNSCR1325 will undergo a high level review. And it’s vital the review takes a close, long and hard look at Item 10, which ‘Calls on all parties to armed conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, and all other forms of violence in situations of armed conflict.’

A lot has changed in the geostrategic environment in 15 years. UNSCR1325 pre-dates 9/11, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Ukraine, Sudan, the Arab Spring and the emergence of Boko Haram, IS and al-Qaeda. It pre-dates the violation and torture of women and children through rape, prostitution and sexual slavery by non-state actors. And it pre-dates the establishment of the Special Representative to the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict.

The review provides the opportunity to re-examine and recast UNSCR1325 in today’s world of violent extremism, social media and non-state actors operating outside traditional paradigms.

To gain a steely resolve to act upon, not just talk about, the institutionalised sexual violence of women and children as a central aspect of ideology and operations and a tactic of terrorism.

And to address the nub of the issue – the complex and challenging task of gender equality.

So that women are not only around the table in post-conflict and peace negotiations. But in the leadership positions to help avoid conflict in the first place.

The United Nations appears to have seized on its 70th anniversary this year to undertake a series of high-level reviews (previously noted here). Long awaited among them have been the outcomes of the High-level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations. Last week the chair, Jose Ramos-Horta, presented the final report (PDF) to the UN Secretary-General. As the most comprehensive review since the Brahimi Report in 2000, there have been high hopes for the report.

The challenges prompting the appointment of the panel to undertake the review of UN peacekeeping and special political missions in June 2014 are immense. Recent decisions of the UN Security Council—decisions Australia supported as a non-permanent member—resulted in the deployment of a controversial force intervention brigade into the DRC, a robust stabilisation operation in Mali and another new mission to the Central African Republic. Pressure for the international community to respond without delay to protect civilians has meant that peacekeeping missions are increasingly deploying into environments where hostilities are ongoing, political dialogues (if any) are fragile and blue helmets are a direct target. And many missions still lack the capabilities authorised and budgeted for as part of their mandates.

The panel report recognises efforts to prevent and mediate conflict have been vastly under-resourced. Special political missions like those deployed in Libya, Iraq and Afghanistan have a much smaller footprint than many peacekeeping operations. They have traditionally lacked a political constituency like the one that drives dialogues among troop and police contributors on peacekeeping. This has often meant that political support and investment in prevention and mediation efforts has waned until a crisis breaks out. The role of those smaller missions in brokering political dialogues has become all the more important with concerns about violent extremism and state breakdown across North Africa and the Middle East.

That awkward and institutionally ingrained distinction between peacekeeping operations (largely military and police) and special political missions (primarily civilian) in the UN system has resulted in inflexible political, financial and operational approaches in the field. The report subsequently makes several recommendations to address these deficits, with a heavy emphasis on the need for the UN to invest more in prevention activities and political dialogues.

Among the most awaited recommendations, however, are likely to be the panel’s assessments on the direction of peacekeeping operations. These included reviving old ideas on the need for a rapidly deployable capacity, two-stage mandating process and greater accountability on conduct and discipline, highlighting ongoing deficits and gaps. Addressing political concerns about the limits and reach of UN peacekeeping operations, the panel report cautioned the Security Council from authorising peace operations in environments that the UN is ill-equipped to operate in (eg counterterrorism operations), but nonetheless noted the need for personnel to be prepared for these environments. Echoing statements by UN officials, the panel not surprisingly urged countries with higher capabilities to deploy to UN peacekeeping missions.

Like Europe, Australia was a likely target audience of that latter comment. Our contributions to UN peacekeeping have substantially declined and are at their lowest in nearly decade—and this is at a time when the UN is overstretched. With just over 40 personnel deployed to operations in South Sudan, Liberia, Cyprus and the Middle East, Australia is ranked 86th from 121 peacekeeping contributors. While deployments of personnel and equipment aren’t the only measure to demonstrate support for UN peacekeeping, it’s still one of the most visible means for assessing a country’s level of commitment. Key allies such as the United States are stepping up their engagement politically. President Barack Obama will chair a high level summit on UN peacekeeping in September. You can expect Australia will be approached to make commitments.

The release of the panel report and upcoming summit in September present an opportune time for Australia to consider its political and operational interests in supporting UN peace operations. This should include a more strategic and whole-of-government approach, which identifies policy priorities, opportunities for training and capacity-building programs, and missions where the government may consider deploying personnel and assets in the future.

As the government reflects on the recommendations in the panel’s report, thought should be given to issues that Australia wishes to actively progress among the UN membership, including established priorities such as protection of civilians and policing. It should also include further consideration of niche, modest capabilities that Australia can deploy to missions that have an enabling effect, which may include strategic airlift, logistics, and counter-IED expertise.

As Foreign Minister Julie Bishop has noted, the conclusion of our two-year term on the UN Security Council has positioned Australia well to deliver support to strengthen the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping. We should utilise the momentum established with the release of this report to continue that work—and build on it.

In a recent blog I raised the broader question of ‘what next after ISIS?’ The military mission is now evolving around President Obama’s statement about disrupting, degrading and destroying ISIS. But to date, the conditions which would define political success remain unclear. While the three D’s may suffice for military planners (and even there the guidance has its limits) they don’t come close to framing the political endgame.

Without co-ordinated military and political strategies the chance of success diminish rapidly; if we are not careful the world will be left with ungoverned or—worse—ungovernable areas in the Middle East, thus perpetuating the causal factors which fuelled ISIS.

Already we are seeing key players setting conditions and pointing fingers—actions which will not only restrict the coalition’s ability to defeat ISIS but will block any hope of crafting a sustainable political solution. No better example of this exists than Turkey’s current ‘watch and wait’ approach to the battle in Kobani. In the absence of any real political strategy the future political landscape in the Middle East looks grim. Read more

It was refreshing to see some positive news emerging from the United Nations recently, with Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointing the first-ever female force commander of a UN peacekeeping mission. Major-General Kristen Lund from Norway will take up command of the UN’s peacekeeping mission in Cyprus in August. It’s a good news story for the United Nations. But the fact that this is the first senior female UN military appointment raises questions about whether the women, peace and security agenda is advancing in national defence forces, and whether countries like Australia are positioning themselves effectively to support those efforts.

The share of military positions held by women in UN peacekeeping operations has remained steady at approximately 3% in the last few years, well behind female police (approximately 10%) and civilians (29% of international staff). That’s partly explained by the UN’s reliance on member states to provide military personnel—if countries don’t have initiatives in place to support the participation, retention and promotion of women in their national defence forces, then they can’t deploy them to UN peacekeeping operations. Read more

My new ASPI paper ‘Afghanistan—transition to transformation‘ is a look at the future of Afghanistan as the ADF mission there winds down. ‘Transition’ (2001–2014) is the primarily UN-led period designed to rebuild the basic national institutions and infrastructure necessary to re-establish Afghanistan as a functional state. That’s almost over now, and ‘Transformation’ (2015–2024) is the ensuing Afghan-led and owned decade, during which the Afghans will be responsible for further developing the outcomes of transition, to create not just a functional but also stable and durable state. The aims are reasonably clear but the challenges many.

The responsibility for national security during transition rests with the UN-mandated US/NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which includes ADF elements. National security during transformation will be the responsibility of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). One of ISAF’s missions has been to develop the capability of the ANSF to enable them to take over their responsibility for national security in 2015. Read more