Tag Archive for: United Kingdom

British public opinion on foreign policy: President Trump, Ukraine, China, Defence spending and AUKUS

Results snapshot

President Trump

  • Britons support an open and engaged foreign policy role for the United Kingdom. In light of the re-election of President Donald Trump, 40% believe Britain should continue to maintain its current active level of engagement in world affairs, and 23% believe it should play a larger role.
  • Just 16% of Britons support a less active United Kingdom on the world stage.
  • When asked what Britain’s response should be if the United States withdraws its financial and military support from Ukraine, 57% of Britons would endorse the UK either maintaining (35%) or increasing (22%) its contributions to Ukraine. One-fifth would prefer that the UK reduces its contributions to Ukraine.

UK–China relations

  • Just a quarter (26%) of Britons support the UK Government’s efforts to increase engagement with China in the pursuit of economic growth and stabilised diplomatic relations.
  • In comparison, 45% of Britons would either prefer to return to the more restricted level of engagement under the previous government (25%) or for the government to reduce its relations with Beijing even further (20%).
  • A large majority of Britons (69%) are concerned about the increasing degree of cooperation between Russia and China. Conservative and Labour voters share similarly high levels of concern, and Britons over 50 years of age are especially troubled about the trend of adversary alignment.

Defence and security

  • When asked whether the UK will need to spend more on defence to keep up with current and future global security challenges, a clear two-thirds (64%) of the British people agree. Twenty-nine per cent of Britons strongly agree that defence spending should increase. Just 12% disagree that the UK will need to spend more.
  • The majority of Britons believe that collaboration with allies on defence and security projects like AUKUS will help to make the UK safer (55%) and that partnerships like AUKUS focusing on developing cutting-edge technologies with Britain’s allies will help to make the UK more competitive towards countries like China (59%).
  • Britons are somewhat less persuaded that AUKUS will succeed as a deterrent against Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific, although the largest group of respondents (44%) agree that it will.

Brief survey methodology and notes

Survey design and analysis: Sophia Gaston

Field work: Opinium

Field work dates: 8–10 January 2025

Weighting: Weighted to be nationally and politically representative

Sample: 2,050 UK adults

The field work for this report was conducted by Opinium through an online survey platform, with a sample size of 2,050 UK adults aged 18 and over. This sample size is considered robust for public opinion research and aligns with industry standards. With 2,000 participants, the margin of error for reported figures is approximately ±2.3 percentage points at a 95% confidence level. Beyond this sample size, the reduction in the margin of error becomes minimal, making this size both statistically sufficient and practical for drawing meaningful conclusions with reliable representation of the UK adult population. For the full methodological statement, see Appendix 1 of this report.

Notes

  1. Given the subject matter of this survey, objective and impartial contextual information was provided at the beginning of questions. There are some questions for which fairly substantial proportions of respondents were unsure of their answers. All ‘Don’t knows’ are reported.
  2. The survey captured voters for all political parties, and non-voters; however, only the findings for the five largest parties are discussed in detail in this report, with the exception of one question (6C), in which it was necessary to examine the smaller parties as the source of a drag on the national picture. The five major parties discussed in this report are the Conservative Party, the Labour Party, the Liberal Democrats, Reform (formerly the Brexit Party and UKIP), and the Green Party.
  3. This report also presents the survey results differentiated according to how respondents’ voted in the 2016 referendum on the UK’s membership of the European Union, their residency within the UK, their age, their socio-economic status, and whether they come from White British or non-White British backgrounds. The full methodological notes are found at the end of the report.
  4. Some of the graphs present ‘NET’ results, which combine the two most positive and two most negative responses together – for example, ‘Significantly increase’ and ‘Somewhat increase’ – to provide a more accessible representation of the balance of public opinion. These are presented alongside the full breakdown of results for each question for full transparency.

Introduction

There’s no doubt that 2025 will be a consequential year in geopolitical terms, with the inauguration of President Donald Trump marking a step-change in the global role of the world’s largest economy and its primary military power. The full suite of implications for America’s allies is still emerging, and there will be opportunities for its partners to express their agency or demonstrate alignment. For a nation like the United Kingdom, whose security and strategic relationship with the United States is institutionally embedded, any pivotal shifts in American foreign policy bear profound ramifications for the UK’s international posture. The fact that such an evaluation of America’s international interests and relationships is taking place during a time in which several major conflicts – including one in Europe – continue to rage, only serves to heighten anxieties among policy-makers and citizens alike.

Public opinion on foreign policy remains an understudied and poorly understood research area in Britain, due to a long-held view that the public simply conferred responsibility for such complicated and sensitive matters to government. Certainly, many Britons don’t possess a sophisticated understanding of the intricacies of diplomatic and security policy. However, they do carry strong instincts, and, in an internationalised media age, are constantly consuming information from a range of sources and forming opinions that may diverge from government positions.

The compound effect of a turbulent decade on the international stage has made Britons more perceptive to feelings of insecurity about the state of the world, which can be transposed into their domestic outlook. At the same time, their belief in the efficacy of government to address international crises, or their support for the missions being pursued by government, isn’t guaranteed. This creates a challenging backdrop from which public consent can be sought for the kind of bold and decisive actions that may need to be considered as policy options in the coming months and years.

This study provides a snapshot of the views of British citizens at the moment at which President Donald Trump was inaugurated for a second time. It shows a nation which, overall, continues to subscribe to clear definitions of its friends and adversaries, carries a sense of responsibility to Ukraine, and greets the rise of a more assertive China with concern and scepticism. Underneath the national picture, however, the data reveals some concerning seeds of discord and divergence among certain demographic groups and political parties. The UK Government must build on the good foundations by speaking more frequently and directly to the British people about the rapidly evolving global landscape, and making the case for the values, interests, and relationships it pursues.

Sophia Gaston

March 2025

London

Lessons in leadership: Interviews with 11 of Australia’s former Defence Ministers

In a time of growing strategic uncertainty, 11 of Australia’s former defence ministers have shared valuable lessons they learned over decades running one of the toughest portfolios in government.

In this compendium, the former ministers from both sides of politics give their views on topics ranging from the complexity of dealing with a massive department, to the grief they shared with families at the funerals of slain soldiers.

The pieces are drawn from interviews with former ASPI executive director Peter Jennings and links to the original video interviews are available in the posts on The Strategist site.

Full tilt: The UK’s defence role in the Pacific: Views from The Strategist

Britain has a new prime minister, Keir Starmer, leading its first Labour government in 14 years. Key questions for us now are how Britain under Labour will approach the security partnership with Australia and whether London will remain committed to investing defence resources in the Indo-Pacific.

This report provides vital context for addressing these questions. In this series of articles, originally published in ASPI’s The Strategist this year, ASPI authors review the historical underpinnings and future course of Britain’s strategic recoupling with Australia and this region, especially the Pacific Islands, from perspectives ranging from deterrence to climate resilience.

The report makes some recommendations for how to strengthen the Australia-UK defence partnership and shape Britain’s approach to our region.

ASPI AUKUS update 2: September 2022—the one-year anniversary

Introduction

Consistent with a partnership that’s focused on the development of defence and technological capability rather than diplomatic grandstanding,1 there have been few public announcements about the progress of AUKUS. That’s an observation we made in our first AUKUS update in May,2 and one we make again in this latest update, one year on from the joint unveiling of the partnership in mid-September 2021.

Periodic press releases note meetings of the three-country joint steering groups—one of which looks at submarines and the other at advanced capabilities—but provide little hint about what was discussed.3 On Submarines, we shouldn’t expect to hear anything concrete until the 18-month consultation phase concludes in March 2022.

What’s changed, however, is that the strategic environment that gave birth to AUKUS has worsened markedly, most notably in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s escalating pressure on Taiwan and other parts of the Indo-Pacific. Those developments are making the advanced technologies AUKUS aims to foster even more relevant.

Image: iStockphoto/sameer chogade

While the political landscape across the three AUKUS partners has also changed (of the three leaders that announced AUKUS just one year ago, only one, US President Biden, remains in office), bipartisan support for AUKUS appears to be undiminished in all three capitals.

In Australia, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s Labor government has made clear its commitment to AUKUS alongside the announcement of an ambitious Defence Strategic Review (DSR). Albanese has simultaneously worked to restore good relations with France, which temporarily withdrew its ambassador and some forms of cooperation because of the loss of the Attack-class submarine contract and what it said was a lack of Australian sincerity about AUKUS.

Britain’s new Prime Minister, Liz Truss, was a staunch advocate for AUKUS as Foreign Secretary, and all the signs are that she’ll continue in that vein as Prime Minister. Truss has kept Ben Wallace, a strong supporter of AUKUS, as Defence Secretary. Truss’s government has also moved former National Security Adviser Stephen Lovegrove into a new role focused on nuclear defence industry partnerships. If that becomes a permanent position, it could add capacity to deliver AUKUS over the long term.4

This update begins by reviewing the worsening strategic context one year on from the AUKUS announcement. Next, it summarises what more we have learned about progress in the nuclear-powered submarine (SSN) program, which is at the heart of AUKUS. It then assesses how think tanks across a selection of key countries are covering AUKUS to gauge trends in the public debate. The final section of the update assesses the importance of advanced technological cooperation through AUKUS to develop capability and reinforce deterrence rapidly in the face of the strategic challenges we face. The update makes some recommendations for the best way forward.

  1. Michael Shoebridge, What is AUKUS and what is it not?, ASPI, Canberra, 8 December 2021. ↩︎
  2. Marcus Hellyer, Ben Stevens, ASPI AUKUS update 1: May 2022, ASPI, Canberra, 5 May 2022. ↩︎
  3. ‘Readout of AUKUS Joint Steering Group meetings’, The White House, 31 July 2022. ↩︎
  4. ‘Sir Tim Barrow appointed as National Security Adviser’, media release, UK Government, 7 September 2022. ↩︎

AUKUS Update #1: May 2022

On the 16th of September 2021, the leaders of Australia, the UK and the US announced the creation of a new trilateral security partnership called ‘AUKUS’—Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States.

The three national leaders stated, ‘We will foster deeper integration of security and defense-related science, technology, industrial bases, and supply chains. And in particular, we will significantly deepen cooperation on a range of security and defense capabilities.’

At a time of rapidly increasing strategic uncertainty, when it’s increasingly clear that authoritarian regimes are willing to use military power to achieve their goals, it’s important to monitor the implementation of AUKUS so that governments and the public can assess whether it’s achieving the goal of accelerating the fielding of crucial military technologies.

To track the implementation of AUKUS, ASPI will publish regular updates on progress. This is the first of those updates.

UK, Australia and ASEAN cooperation for safer seas

A case for elevating the cyber–maritime security nexus

Summary

  • A safe and secure Indo-Pacific maritime domain is vital to the UK, Australia and Southeast Asian states for their national prosperity. While there are common objectives, the three parties have different priorities, capabilities and areas of expertis.
  • There’s a long history of multilateral cooperation between Southeast Asia and Australia, among other key partners. In the post-Brexit context and in the light of the UK Government’s Indo-Pacific tilt, London would do well to harmonise its maritime engagements with allies such as Australia and align its activities with priorities of Southeast Asian partners.
  • While maritime security cooperation at sea tends to be dominated by activities, programs and operations of navies, we recommend taking a comprehensive approach to maritime security cooperation that includes partnerships with non-military actors and considers civilian-related aspects of maritime security.
  • In finding a value-added role in the crowded space of maritime security cooperation and capacity building, we suggest exploring UK–Australia–ASEAN cooperation on issues of technology, cybersecurity and maritime-based digital infrastructure. Those are transformational aspects that will define the future of maritime activities in the Indo-Pacific and affect Southeast Asia’s safety, security, livelihoods and regional economic competitiveness.
  • This scoping report recommends UK–Australia–ASEAN cooperation to elevate and further explore the cyber–maritime security nexus.

Introduction: Understanding maritime security in the Indo-Pacific

The Indo-Pacific strategic concepts promulgated by Japan (reaffirmed in 2016)1, the US (2017)2, Australia (2017)3, India (2018)4, Germany (2020)5, the Netherlands (2020)6, the EU (2021)7, France (reaffirmed in 2021)8, the UK (2021)9 and others demonstrate the region’s geostrategic significance. While the various concepts differ significantly in scope, essence and strategy, they share one commonality: the idea of connected oceans in which Southeast Asian nations sit at the heart and form the epicentre of great-power competition that has come to define the Indo-Pacific. The region has become a ‘crowded space’ as the long-term and newer actors increase various engagement initiatives.

But Southeast Asia isn’t only an arena of competition: the region—collectively and as individual economies—has agency. ASEAN nations are able to steer competitors and partners towards meeting their own priorities.10 They’ve also been able to steer the global involvement towards political–military, economic, infrastructure and environmental agenda. While their overarching interests converge, the UK, Australia and their closest allies should acknowledge there may at times be divergences in approaches, activities and underlying values compared to those of ASEAN states.

In ASEAN’s 2019 Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, the 10 member states recognised the maritime domain as the foremost area for cooperation.11 However, the exact meaning of ‘maritime security’ is far from neatly defined. Discussions on maritime security have mainly focused on law enforcement at sea, the protection of sea lines of communication (SLOCs), the adequate management of fisheries and offshore resources, and the maintenance of sovereign maritime borders. By and large, issues of maritime security tend to focus on areas of regional security, transnational crime activities, economic and resource management, the marine environment and marine safety.

The maritime agenda is shared by ASEAN and its partners in the most extensive (by membership) security-focused institution—the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which includes Australia, Canada, China, the EU, India, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Russia and the US along with the ASEAN member states (Figure 1). Table 1 summarises the main forums for maritime security cooperation in the region.

Figure 1: The ASEAN Regional Forum members’ maritime security priorities

Data source: Annual security outlook 2021, ASEAN Regional Forum, 2021, online. Clustering and categorisation by the authors.

Table 1: Key forums for maritime security cooperation

a ‘15th ASEAN Regional Forum’, ASEAN, Singapore, 24 July 2008, online. Source: Authors’ compilation.

The UK’s Indo-Pacific tilt

The UK government’s Global Britain in a competitive age: the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy presents the Indo-Pacific as a region of increasing geopolitical and economic importance over the next decade and suggests that competition will play out in ‘regional militarisation, maritime tensions and contest over the rules and norms linked to trade and technology’.12 Therefore, seeking closer engagement with states in Southeast Asia is an essential part of a strategy that seeks to position the UK as a global actor in the era of strategic competition.The UK government’s Global Britain in a competitive age: the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy presents the Indo-Pacific as a region of increasing geopolitical and economic importance over the next decade and suggests that competition will play out in ‘regional militarisation, maritime tensions and contest over the rules and norms linked to trade and technology’. Therefore, seeking closer engagement with states in Southeast Asia is an essential part of a strategy that seeks to position the UK as a global actor in the era of strategic competition.

Anchors for the UK’s renewed engagement with Southeast Asia in maritime security

The UK became ASEAN’s newest dialogue partner in 2021,13 in what was a first milestone after the announcement of the government’s ‘Indo-Pacific tilt’.14 In the context of the UK’s exit from the EU, London has been looking at the right justifications for its priorities and for ways to meaningfully distinguish itself from, as well as coordinate where possible with, the Indo-Pacific approaches that the EU, France, Germany and the Netherlands have initiated in parallel.

While the Indo-Pacific tilt is new, the UK’s presence in the region, particularly its maritime presence, is not. London maintained a limited presence in Southeast Asia after the UK’s withdrawal in the 1960s and 1970s in the form of small-scale deployments aimed at maintaining bilateral engagements with selected countries. In the past two decades, the UK has also participated in established multilateral exercises that involve ASEAN countries, such as Exercise Bersama Lima and SEACAT (Table 2 and Figure 2). Those exercises involve a large number of ASEAN states and external partners and focus on capacity building in various maritime domains. They aim to address many issues, including current concerns about regional stability and security and long-term efforts in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR). The recent deployment of HMS Tamar and Spey to the Indo-Pacific are examples of the UK’s engagement with the Pacific. It would be interesting to see if it could become a possibility for future expansion of the scope to the wider Indo-Pacific.

Table 2: Selected flagship and regular multilateral exercises involving Australia, the UK and ASEAN countries

a The exercise was established under the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA). It’s been through many iterations since the first Exercise Bersatu Lima in 1972, including multiple expansions and renamings over the years. Exercise Bersama Lima was inaugurated in 2004 and was replaced by Exercise Bersama Gold in 2021 to celebrate the FPDA’s 50th jubilee. Source: Authors’ compilation based on official information.

Figure 2: Key multilateral exercises by Australia or UK with ASEAN countries in the Indo-Pacific

Map of South East Asia, with labels pins on Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam and several pins indicating locations at sea.

This map includes naval exercises by the UK, Australia with Southeast Asian partners in the Indo-Pacific conducted since 2013. The multilateral and enduring exercises are marked in orange. The data set can further be filtered for partners involved, key exercise themes and frequency.

The UK’s new maritime security effort to engage ASEAN states has revolved around Operation Fortis which involved the CSG 21 to conduct a variety of exercises in and around Southeast Asia between June and December 2021. This included bilateral passing exercises (PASSEX) with Thailand,15 Malaysia16 and Vietnam17 navigating through the South China Sea in 2021.18

A factor in this effort is the UK’s ability to maintain sustainability and a regular at-sea presence. London’s early diplomacy and activities under the Indo-Pacific tilt still needs to be calibrated. With the new initiatives, however, London also needs to be sensitive to perceptions and even reputational risks in the region. Part of the scepticism about the UK’s role in the Indo-Pacific arises from the fact that the ‘Global Britain’ aspiration has a predominantly Euro-Atlantic focus.19 The arguments also stress the UK’s stronger reliance on the US at the expense of its interconnectedness with Europe.

Australia’s Indo-Pacific policy

As a maritime nation at the juncture of the Indian and the Pacific oceans, Australia pursues comprehensive and proactive maritime security engagement in the region. Canberra’s most recent policy expressions—the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper20 and the 2020 Defence Strategic Update21—have emphasised the importance of the maritime rules-based order and the value of cooperation with regional partners. Australia perceives the maritime domain as one of the key battlegrounds for China’s coercive practices, particularly in the South China Sea.

The Royal Australian Navy has a history of participation in maritime security exercises in the region, including multilateral exercises. Unlike the UK, Australia served as host and initiator of exercises that engaged numerous ASEAN states and other Western allies, for example Indo-Pacific Endeavour and Exercise KAKADU (see Figure 2). The exercises also had sizable scale and scope, including antisubmarine warfare and live-firing training with the intent of sharpening proficiency and interoperability. These are signs of significant commitment.

Compared with the UK, Australia has the advantage of being a residential actor in the region. Combined with an enduring track record of working with a closely knit network of regional partners across different agendas, as well as the recently annualised Australia–ASEAN summit, the engagement from Australian partners has stretched beyond official channels through civil society, research, industry and think-tank communities.

In fact, stability in the maritime domain, particularly in the South China Sea, has been a common concern for Australia and the UK. Opposition to China’s militarisation of the artificial islands, the dangerous use of coast guard and maritime militia that undermined countries’ maritime rights and freedoms were reiterated in the most recent Australia-UK Ministerial Consultations (AUKMIN) in January 2022.22 Boris Johnson’s government recognises the value of Australia’s long standing connection to Southeast Asia. In the bilateral virtual meeting in February 2022, the UK committed £25 million to strengthen regional resilience in areas including cyberspace, state threats and maritime security.23 This complements Australia’s ongoing efforts in supporting regional security and reaffirms mutual shared commitment to working with ASEAN.

Anchors for Australia to partner with the UK and Southeast Asia

Australia—ASEAN’s first dialogue partner—has had a history of engagement, including naval exercises and maritime capacity building, for decades, including invitations to Southeast Asian partners to join as observers to local and regional exercises.

In recognising the importance of regional engagement, Australia secured commitment from Southeast Asian partners to directly address threats against their territory. Australia’s engagement focus has also shifted from support to countering illegal activities at sea and providing HADR to strengthening regional maritime security and stability. This probably reflects the intensity and volatility of the Indo-Pacific waters.

Australia doesn’t have claims in the regional maritime disputes in the South China Sea, but it has vested interests in supporting the applicability of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS24) and the safety of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) for trade and passage. As co-chair of the ARF inter-sessional meeting on maritime security 2018-21, Australia has overseen a variety of confidence-building, regional support, training and workshop activities on UNCLOS that were initiated by individual ARF member states.25

In the past, Australia has lent a diplomatic voice to Southeast Asian partners, including by supporting and calling for the implementation of the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling in the case between the Philippines and China.26 Australia as a maritime nation is invested in securing the commercial interests of maritime trade,27 and the security of the maritime domain has also come to the forefront of strategic competition. This is in sync with the UK’s diplomatic support for a legal approach to the management of disputes. The UK has also supported the PCA ruling, as well as Southeast Asian nations’ note verbale to the UN in objection to China’s excessive claims.28

In Australia’s recent efforts to play a more influential role in Southeast Asia,29 the government announced a range of financial ‘packages’ that constituted the largest Australian funding for the region since assistance after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.30 Measures announced by Prime Minister Scott Morrison in November 2020 included a A$65 million investment to further support regional maritime states to develop their marine resources sustainably and to address challenges, including through enhanced training, technical advice and cooperation.31

In Southeast Asia, where postcolonial sensitivities linger, it’s important for both London and Canberra to calibrate new initiatives with adequate diplomacy and make sure the engagements are sustained for mutual benefit. This is particularly pertinent when the concept of the ‘Anglosphere’ is invoked.32 The following section highlights the complexity of Southeast Asian positions towards UK–Australian ambitions to play a stronger role in the region. Their adequate understanding is critical for sustainable and effective engagement frameworks.

Southeast Asian views of the recent UK and Australian maritime security engagement

Southeast Asian nations’ attention to the UK’s role and interests in the region was heightened after the deployment of the UK’s Carrier Strike Group 21 (CSG-21) in 2021. Although the UK’s military role in Southeast Asia isn’t new, CSG- 21’s presence in Asian waters produced a wave of reactions. During its 28-week deployment, CSG-21 visited some 40 countries and took part in more than 70 defence diplomacy activities across Europe, Middle East and Asia, which included training exercises and port visits. It was the UK’s largest operational naval deployment to Asia since the 1997 handover of Hong Kong.33

While the deployment was welcomed in some capitals, others expressed concern. Jakarta found the British naval presence worrying and perhaps contributing to further militarisation of the region. Indonesia was never fond of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) established in 1971, which involved the UK, Australia, New Zealand and its neighbours Malaysia and Singapore, but excluded Indonesia. The renewed activeness and ambitions of the UK in this domain invoked postcolonial discomfort. Indonesian strategists are concerned about an increasing ‘strategic overcrowdedness’34 caused by the renewed interest of ‘external powers’ in Southeast Asia. There is a feeling that too many naval ships exercising in the disputed waters may lead to incidents or accidents.

Hanoi, on the other hand, viewed the UK’s maritime activity positively. The Vietnamese government has applied a strategy of involving, rather than alienating, ‘external powers’. Due to power imbalances and China’s growing dominance in the South China Sea, its active militarisation activities and relentless challenge to other countries’ offshore resource rights, Vietnam has actively sought external partners’ involvement and engagement in the region. Moreover, for Hanoi, good relationships are also a function of improving trade relations. Vietnam and the UK have recently finalised a bilateral trade agreement, opening the post-Brexit British market to Vietnamese products and integrating the UK with the Asian economy.35 Singapore was also among the more welcoming Southeast Asian nations, although it stresses the need for a UK presence to be ‘principled, persistent and purposeful’.36

However, regional nations’ attention was most sharply focused by the announcement of the Australia–UK–US trilateral security partnership (AUKUS) in September 2021.

Predictably, individual countries reacted with varying degrees of concern. The dominating concern is that the new security arrangement could be a catalyst for a nuclear arms race in the region and might provoke some countries to act aggressively, especially in the South China Sea. Malaysian Prime Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob expressed that view directly to Scott Morrison, while Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry stated that it was ‘deeply concerned’ about the ‘continuing arms race and power projection in the region’.37 Both cited commitments engraved in ASEAN norms: the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in 1971 and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in 1976, to the latter of which Australia acceded to when it joined the East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2005.38 They called on Canberra to refrain from adding to regional tension. It was kept in the dark about AUKUS despite the fact that it had a ‘2 + 2’ dialogue (defence and foreign ministers’ meetings) with Australia just before the announcement.39 However, in the following months, after some efforts towards direct communications from the Australian Government, Indonesian Defence Minister Prabowo Subianto has been reported as saying that he understands and respects AUKUS.40 Cambodia was alarmed by AUKUS and the nuclear-powered submarine deal and invoked international commitments to non-proliferation.

The Philippines produced self-contradicting statements from the government. President Rodrigo Duterte labelled AUKUS as an ‘arms race’, while Secretary of Defence Delfin Lorenzana and Foreign Minister Teddy Locsin both said that Australia has every right, and capacity, to shore up its own defence.41 Thailand, a treaty ally of the US, maintained an enigmatic attitude, making no direct statements or comments on the AUKUS announcement. Singapore42 and Vietnam43 were more measured. Both agreed that each country is responsible for its own security, as long as it doesn’t contribute to a regional arms race. Both are strategically astute and are aware of the growing security concerns in the region and the region’s limited capability to respond to those challenges. So, while they comprehend the AUKUS rationale, they both emphasise the need for keeping nonproliferation commitments, as well as the need for greater transparency in communicating new security partnerships that may affect the region as a whole.

Despite disparities in their assessments of the strategic value of AUKUS, the overall Australia–ASEAN relationship is wide-ranging and didn’t seem to suffer, and, just a month after the AUKUS announcement, the elevation of the relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership was announced.44

The fact that there was no joint ASEAN statement on the issue reflects divergence of views internally. This granularity of regional interests and views is to remind London and Canberra that receptiveness to their individual as well as collective initiatives will remain varied. Given those political sensitivities, and the concern that the UK’s Indo-Pacific involvement has been too defence-focused, it would be good for London to consider areas for maritime security cooperation and capacity building that would include more civilian elements of maritime security. It is also the reason why our report recommends practical areas of cooperation—ones that prioritise collective benefit.

It is important to note that, despite Southeast Asian diplomatic narratives, there are real concerns about the fragile regional stability. China’s active militarisation in the South China Sea and gradual control of the waters put increasing pressure on the littoral states. Recent reports suggest that Beijing has fully militarised three islands with anti-ship and anti-aircraft missile systems, laser and jamming equipment and fighter jets,45 which undeniably adds to the already asymmetric balance of power in the region. In such a context, cooperation with external partners on all fronts, particularly when the resources are limited and especially in the post-Covid circumstances, should be welcomed.

And there’s no shortage of areas where Southeast Asians would be open to cooperative efforts and collaborative mechanisms. Many studies have defined the prospects and challenges around the application of international law, resolving territorial disputes, maritime deterrence, protecting offshore resources, combating unregulated fishing, piracy, transnational crime, strengthening law enforcement, and addressing the more pressing environmental crisis.46

While we agree with the severity of these issues and the need for the involvement of multiple stakeholders involvement in this report, and through the specific prism of UK-Australian-ASEAN cooperation, we suggest a focus on the nexus of maritime security and cyber and emerging technologies. This is an under-studied area but which has the potential to drastically shape the nature of maritime security in the years ahead. It is related to the safety and security of deep-sea vessels at sea and maritime commercial on-shore infrastructure as well as the monitoring of human and natural activities at, below and above sea level; the security of sea lines of communication, maritime supply chains and increasingly critical submarine communications infrastructure.

Exploring UK-AU-ASEAN maritime security cooperation: a case for cyber and technology capacity building

Our main recommendation for UK–Australia–ASEAN collaboration is to explore the newer and rapidly developing, but far less chartered areas of cybersecurity and emerging technologies and their application in the maritime security domain.

In cyber and technology issues, the UK and Australia have a demonstrated track record and expertise, experience and approaches. It’s also an area in which the UK and Australia can reasonably expect to have resources, drawn from the public and private sectors, to sustain this effort. Most of all, it’s also an area of growing interest from partners in Southeast Asia which are putting digital transformation and Industry 4.0 at the forefront of their (post-Covid) development strategies.47

At the nexus of cyber, technology and maritime security, limited qualitative data currently exists on cybersecurity in Southeast Asia or the take-up of emerging technologies in the maritime sector. Given the UK’s and Australia’s global credibility in this space, and the importance of cyber and tech for the future stability of the region, we explore four potential areas of cooperation: cybersecurity and digital transformation in the maritime industry; digital and emerging tech in the maritime domain; supply chains; and the security of submarine digital infrastructure.

Cybersecurity and the maritime industry’s digitisation transformation

The digitisation of shipping processes and the automation of oceangoing vessels, operators, insurers, certifiers, onshore facilities, and maritime safety and security agencies have surged in the past few years. IT and OT (operational technology48) systems have become critical to the functioning of ships and the safety of their crews and cargoes, and also help shipping to navigate safely and securely through troubled Indo-Pacific waters. That said, given the lifespan of industrial assets (for ocean-going vessel about 25–30 years), much offshore and onshore infrastructure operate with legacy software, which is a known ICT security risk.49

Various maritime-specific cybersecurity incidents have occurred that have resulted in the malfunctioning of critical control systems, in ships and onshore facilities; the exfiltration of sensitive data that’s monetised by criminals, including pirates; the manipulation of systems to allow for trafficking and smuggling activities to occur unnoticed; commercial and military espionage, for instance of ship designs, lading and trading routes; spoofing of navigation systems; and manipulation of identification transmissions.50

The maritime sector is known to lag other comparable industries in its level of cybersecurity maturity. ‘C-suite’ boardrooms still don’t adequately acknowledge cybersecurity as a business continuity risk.51 That isn’t unique to the maritime industry and, in fact, is unfortunately common practice across Southeast Asian industries. However, the potential consequences of cybersecurity incidents for ships, logistics or port facilities are massive and long term.

An incident in 2021, in which the MS Ever Given obstructed traffic in the Suez Canal, immediately reverberated through global supply chains and demonstrated the dependence of the world economy’s on accurate forecasting capabilities.52 There’s little room for errors or delays. The maritime domain in and around Southeast Asia is becoming of greater geopolitical and geo-economic importance, and there’s an increased likelihood that non-state and state actors will try to disrupt, manipulate or coerce actors. With the automation of navigation and the vulnerability of navigation systems, for instance to spoofing, a crisis could be easily caused.

Other examples include some shippers being complicit in manipulating their own IT systems. In 2018, a Singapore-managed oil tanker spoofed its GPS data to conceal from authorities a mid-sea transfer of petroleum to a North Korean ship, thereby circumventing UN sanctions.53 The same thing occurred with an Iranian ship in 2013 off the coast of Malaysia.54 Those tactics are also being used to disguise illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, which is an issue pertinent to maritime security for most Southeast Asian nations.

Initial efforts to boost cyber resilience by the Southeast Asian shipping industry are underway, but they’re far from concerted. In late 2021, Singapore’s Maritime and Port Authority organised a first cybersecurity exercise involving two port terminal operators and a shipping company.55 In 2021, the International Maritime Organization issued recommendations for maritime cyber risk management, mirroring standing international good practices but with compliance and enforcement remaining voluntary.56

A first stepping stone for cybersecurity capability is access to incident-response resources. In 2018, a private-sector initiative was announced by Wärtsilä Corporation and Templar Executives to establish an international maritime cyber centre of excellence, including a maritime-sector computer emergency response team, based on similar capabilities for the financial sector.57 The UK Government has supported British cybersecurity company CyberOwl to establish a footprint in the region.58 The Australian Government has been promoting business opportunities in Southeast Asia for the Australian local cybersecurity industry, too, although that effort is yet to have a specific maritime focus.59 At DEFCON, one the world’s largest annual hacking and security conferences, a Hack the Sea competition is being organised to specifically test cybersecurity in a maritime environment.60 For now, however, these efforts are just a drop in the ocean, given the magnitude of Southeast Asia’s maritime activity and the lack of an industry- and region-wide approach and apprehension of the risk.

Emerging digital technologies in the maritime domain

Digital and emerging technologies are starting to disrupt conventional business models and operations in the maritime industry. Gains in efficiency are achieved through the introduction of digital components in the shipping ecosystem, such as smart ships and e-ports.61 Next-level steps will include the introduction of partly autonomous surface ships, additional robotics and further automation of loading and offloading procedures.

Access to ‘maritime big data’, in combination with applications based on artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML), will help to inform decisions on most efficient routing, precise and reliable forecasting of scheduled arrivals, subsequent docking, off-boarding, load forwarding and reloading decisions, and risks related to maintenance and accidents.62 These emerging technologies also play a fundamental role in gathering and analysing meteorological, oceanographic and hydrographic data. They are also being applied to efforts related to responsible fishing (and combating illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing), the tracking of maritime pollution and the monitoring of maritime economic resources and biodiversity. For instance, Verumar, a programme focused on increasing situational awareness and fisheries management and supported by the UK’s Space Agency, identified nine groups of technologies that are disrupting fishing and other marine economic activities. They include space-based observation technologies, such as low-Earth orbit (LEO) satellites; global navigation satellite systems, such as GPS, Galileo, Beidou and GLONASS; sensors and Internet of Things (IoT) devices; 5G connectivity; and data infrastructure and data processing (AI/ML, analytics.)63

These opportunities for broader and deeper maritime domain awareness (MDA), both onshore and offshore, have been at the centre of ongoing ARF attention. MDA is currently perceived fairly narrowly and restricted to highly traversed routes and those maritime areas under the supervision of coastguards. Human activities, marine animal movements and climatic trends occurring farther out to sea and below the surface remain largely unknown. LEO satellites will provide greater connectivity and coverage, especially in less serviced and remote areas,64 and better AI/ML is already helping to map and forecast movements in the ocean, such as sea-level change, currents65 and pollution dispersion.66 Unfortunately, Southeast Asia is also the world’s epicentre of marine pollution, especially plastics.67

The application of those technologies can also extend to assisting maritime operators in complying with existing international and domestic security provisions, such as the UN sanctions list, and helping maritime security agencies with oversight and compliance.68

Boosting the adoption of emerging technologies in parallel with improving cybersecurity in Southeast Asia’s maritime domain will contribute to strengthening overall awareness of civil and maritime security agencies, which not only supports security operations and law enforcement efforts but also offers new opportunities for more effective forms of marine protection and sustainable maritime socio-economic development. In global technology and standards-setting debates, the UK, Australia and Southeast Asia should consider how to reflect maritime requirements in those negotiations.

The Southeast Asian maritime sector will probably be best served by applications that rely on open, interoperable and secure digital infrastructure, given the sector’s global character, the many and diverse port infrastructures in Southeast Asia operated by many multinational service providers, and the traffic density in regional waters.

In the light of increasing risks of rising political, military and economic tensions in the Indo-Pacific, maritime nations in Southeast Asia should seek multinational and multi-stakeholder partnerships to adequately consider and address the potential risks of digitalising critical economic sectors. It appears Southeast Asian partners would benefit from access to expertise and opportunities to exchange experiences with peer communities in North and Northwestern Europe as well as in Oceania.

Digital technology and maritime supply chains

The maritime sector is a critical avenue for shipping resources and components for the world’s production and deployment of ICTs, tech hardware and batteries. For instance, supplies of critical, strategic or pivotal metals extracted in Australia that need to be transported to processing facilities in Southeast Asia and China. As acknowledged by the Australian Government, ‘technology supply chains are increasingly global, interdependent and complex’ and that there’s a need for transparency as ‘some states seek to leverage supply chain vulnerabilities for strategic advantage and as a possible vector for coercion.’69

In January 2022, due to delays and disruptions in global shipping, Australia’s Lynas Rare Earths opted to charter its own vessel and secure continuity of supply to customers through a processing facility in Malaysia.70 Overall, the industry is expected to need to meet demands for faster and more accurate and predictive shipping. As in particular Southeast Asia has been riding the wave of e-commerce71 , major manufacturers will require logistics partners that can ship more smaller loadings more instantly. That requires maritime transporters to be more flexible and agile. An ‘Uberisation’72 of maritime transport is already taking shape which may involve, in due course, a greater number of shippers operating with more small- and medium-sized transporters.73

Onshore, attention is shifting to the digitisation of processes at ports. This includes the establishment of interoperable data hubs where shippers, ports, buyers and sellers can instantly exchange data and communicate across the different transport segments; effective track and trace systems; the digitisation of the paper trail that accompanies international shipping, such as customs clearances and bills of lading; and the use of blockchain technology to ensure the safety and integrity of official documents and compliance with regulations.74

Altogether, these technological applications contribute to improvements in the transparency and security of financial transactions, including through government efforts to tackle trafficking, money laundering, tax evasion, organised crime and terrorism financing.

Security of marine-based digital infrastructure

A fourth component at the intersection of maritime security and cyber and tech is the security of submarine infrastructure. This mainly refers to the fibre-optic comms cables and relay stations that have been laid on the ocean floor and now transport 95% of the world’s data (Figure 3).75

Southeast Asia is not only a choke-point for maritime trade but also for internet connectivity. With a high concentration of fibre-optic cables landing in and traversing through the region, Southeast Asia is gradually developing into a hub for hyperscale data providers in the region’s digital economy.76 At the same time, Southeast Asian nations have been tightening ICT-related regulation and have imposed requirements on technology and connectivity providers that amount to establishing sovereign borders on the internet.77

Figure 3: Submarine cable map of the Indo-Pacific

Source: ‘Submarine cable map 2021’, TeleGeographyonline.

While deliberate disruptions to physical submarine communication systems won’t be difficult to cause, especially when exact locations are known, cables are more likely to get damaged as the result of natural disasters or accidental collisions.78 The Indonesian government recognised that vulnerability when, in March 2021, the Ministry of Fisheries and Maritime Affairs tasked the Indonesian Navy’s Hydrography and Oceanography Centre to map and potentially rearrange its underwater geophysical landscape of cable and pipes to mitigate potential threats.79 For unconfirmed reasons, Chinese survey vessels have been extensively surveying contested waters in the South China Sea.80 The survey areas coincide with the locations of major internet cables that connect mainland China with the rest of the world, predominantly through Singapore.

Another important factor to consider is the increasing imbalance in demand and supply. While private and public investors are keen to expand the regional cable network, the market is dominated by only five companies that provide cable-laying and maintenance services: Nokia Alcatel (Finland, France, UK); TE-Subcom (Switzerland, US); NEC (Japan); Fujitsu (Japan); and Huawei Marine (China). Submarine communications infrastructure has become a matter of geo-economic importance, particularly in places that are contested or have a low density of connection points. Australia, Japan and the US have ramped up investments in new and redundancy cables in the Indo-Pacific in efforts to head off competing Chinese investments.

Given the inherent physical vulnerability of the cable system and its critical importance to economies across the Indo-Pacific, boosting its resilience is an important priority. This includes up-to-date domain awareness, regular and updated security and safety reviews, consideration of the expected global shortage of maintenance and repair resources and adequate redundancy. With Britain’s world-leading expertise in hydrography and as host to the International Cable Protection Committee, the UK government could facilitate and stimulate greater knowledge in the Indo-Pacific of the maritime security dimensions of (dense networks of) submarine cables and shape effective regional risk mitigation responses.

Recommended next steps for cooperation

Integrating cyber and tech considerations into maritime security engagements offers the UK, Australia and Southeast Asia ample opportunities to construct a holistic agenda that will help to underpin regional security, and ward off threats to it. Moreover, given the nature of the agenda, it doesn’t require either a permanent, or even a physical, presence in the region.

The cyber and tech area enables the three partners to start collaborating in practical efforts that are shareable and scalable, are inherently civil in nature, and don’t require full political alignments from the outset. It’s a suitable area not only for regional but also for interagency cooperation.

Three recommended areas for next steps are:

  1. Investigate the needs and interests for a Southeast Asia-focused maritime sector-focused information sharing and analysis centre (ISAC). ISACs are non-profit organisations formed by critical infrastructure owners and operators to share information between government and industry.81 The ISAC should look at potential financial, staffing and infrastructure requirements. Given the current level of cybersecurity awareness and apprehension of the industry, a maritime-sector ISAC may initially require public funding before it can operate on a not-for-profit commercially viable basis. Such a service could be explored as part of a review of the mandate of ReCAAP.
  2. Explore developing a program of work on standards and norms related to emerging technologies and their impact on the maritime sector and maritime security, for instance through the Global Partnership on AI of which the UK, Australia and Singapore are members, and with a focus on maritime domain awareness.
  3. Facilitate the establishment of (informal) maritime and tech security communities of practice on issues such as cybersecurity trends and responses, and the security of submarine cable infrastructure and risk mitigation; and between individual governments’ hydrographic offices.

A further and deeper exploration of operational objectives for these areas is required, alongside a review of potential partners and delivery mechanisms. It will be crucial to work with existing and emerging local capabilities that can be supplemented by targeted UK and Australian expertise and enablers.

Since most cyber and tech dialogues take place outside of Southeast Asia’s conventional governance forums, it’s important for the UK to ascertain its ambitions, roles and representation, ideally in close coordination with Australia.

Conclusion

In this report, we’ve considered the landscape for maritime security cooperation, with a focus on exploring opportunities for new, practical and critical areas for cooperation that equally leverage the strengths of the UK, Australia and Southeast Asian partners. We’ve looked at potential areas of common interest in the military and civilian domains and reviewed the UK’s and Australia’s own national strategies in the Indo-Pacific and their respective national assets, as perceived by Southeast Asia. We’ve also noted that maritime security capacity building is seen as a crowded domain in which many international actors are already seeking to win the hearts and minds of partners in Southeast Asia.

There is a plethora of areas where the UK, in partnership with Australia, could contribute to maritime security in Southeast Asia. We suggest a reinvigorated plurilateral cooperation among the UK, Australia and Southeast Asian countries to focus on newly emerging areas that are yet underserved with attention, resources and policies. This isn’t a one-way engagement in which Southeast Asia is merely the beneficiary or recipient of engagements or technical assistance.

We’re making the case for elevating cybersecurity and emerging tech dimensions of maritime security. Managing the advent of new technologies in Southeast Asia’s maritime operations—military, civil and commercial—and securing the confidentiality, integrity and availability of systems and networks will increasingly underpin the safety and security of the maritime domain, including the legal aspects of maritime borders. Securing the digital components of the maritime domain is of common interest to all stakeholders, which is exemplified by our joint political and economic dependence on the region’s undersea fibre-optic cable systems.

For future steps, we recommend further in-depth studies to explore key priority areas for cooperation and to grasp the diverging and converging perceptions of urgency among Southeast Asian, Australian and British maritime security community groups. Such a survey should look with granularity at capacities, interests and priorities of and among ASEAN member states. A follow-up quantitative survey would be able to demonstrate the views of larger groups of stakeholders—governments, security services and the maritime industry—across the region. This would involve a systematic study that extends beyond security dialogues, discussions and roundtables of known experts and policymakers.

An in-depth study would be able to recognise individual countries’ preferences, measure capacity gaps among them and thus precisely identify the most effective modalities of cooperation. By having an understanding of converging priorities, the UK and Australia will be able to design an engagement and capacity-building framework that’s as sustainable as possible. That way, the UK and Australia could better position themselves as preferred partners of choice in maritime security in the Indo-Pacific.

Above all, we emphasise that, regardless of the issue-specific area of maritime security cooperation, engagements by the UK and Australia and jointly with Southeast Asia need to be enduring and continuous, based on mutual understanding and built on existing practices. Those are the key foundations for a lasting and effective cooperation with mutual benefit at the core.


Acknowledgements

The authors thank Dr Collin Koh Swee Lean (RSIS), Dr Anthony Bergin (ASPI), Charles Brown (Booz Allen Hamilton) and Jocelinn Kang (ASPI) for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of the report. We also acknowledge the contributions from consultations with colleagues from Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Royal Australian Navy’s Sea Power Centre, King’s College London, and various Southeast Asian think tanks and Southeast Asian maritime and cybersecurity industry.

Other ASPI research staff have also contributed to this report.

The conclusions are the authors’ own, and represent neither the views of any government nor a consensus of the experts consulted.

About ASPI

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute was formed in 2001 as an independent, non‑partisan think tank. Its core aim is to provide the Australian Government with fresh ideas on Australia’s defence, security and strategic policy choices. ASPI is responsible for informing the public on a range of strategic issues, generating new thinking for government and harnessing strategic thinking internationally. ASPI’s sources of funding are identified in our Annual Report, online at www.aspi.org.au and in the acknowledgements section of individual publications. ASPI remains independent in the content of the research and in all editorial judgements. It is incorporated as a company, and is governed by a Council with broad membership. ASPI’s core values are collegiality, originality & innovation, quality & excellence and independence.

ASPI’s publications—including this paper—are not intended in any way to express or reflect the views of the Australian Government. The opinions and recommendations in this paper are published by ASPI to promote public debate and understanding of strategic and defence issues. They reflect the personal views of the author(s) and should not be seen as representing the formal position of ASPI on any particular issue.

Important Disclaimer

This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in relation to the subject matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering any form of professional or other advice or services. No person should rely on the contents of this publication without first obtaining advice from a qualified professional.

© The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited 2022

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First published March 2022. Cover image: Abstract low poly 3d cargo ship/vectorstock.com

Funding

Funding support for this report was provided via a grant from the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office through the UK High Commission in Canberra through a competitive grant proposal bidding process.

  1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Foreign policy: Free and open Indo-Pacific’, Japanese Government, 2022, online. ↩︎
  2. The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017, online. ↩︎
  3. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, Australian Government, 2017, online. ↩︎
  4. Ministry of External Affairs, ‘Prime Minister’s keynote address at Shangri-La Dialogue’, Indian Government, 1 June 2018, online. ↩︎
  5. Federal Foreign Office, Policy guidelines for the Indo-Pacific region, German Government, September 2020, online. ↩︎

  6. Indo-Pacific: Guidelines for strengthening Dutch and EU cooperation with partners in Asia, Netherlands Government, 2020, online. ↩︎
  7. EU Strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, European Union, 2021, online. ↩︎
  8. ‘France’s Indo-Pacific Strategy’, French Embassy, Canberra, 2021, online. ↩︎
  9. Louisa Brooke-Holland, Integrated review 2021: The defence tilt to the Indo-Pacific, UK Parliament, October, 2021, online. ↩︎
  10. Huong Le Thu, ‘Southeast Asia: Between asserting agency and muddling through’, in Ashley J Tellis, Alison Szalwinski, Michael Wills (eds), Strategic Asia 2021–2022: Navigating tumultuous times in the Indo-Pacific, National Bureau of Asian Research, 11 January 2022, online. ↩︎
  11. ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific 2019, ASEAN, 23 June 2019, online. ↩︎

What is AUKUS and what is it not?

What IS the new AUKUS partnership between the US, the UK and Australia? How does it fit with the Quad, ASEAN and other new forums like the government-tech Sydney Dialogue?

This new ASPI Insight sets out what AUKUS is—a technology accelerator that’s’ about shifting the military balance in the Indo Pacific. Just as importantly, it sets out what AUKUS it isn’t, to reset some of the discussion that has made some assumptions here. AUKUS isn’t a new alliance structure, a competitor to the Quad between Australia, India, Japan and the US, or a signal of decreased commitment to ASEAN forums by the AUKUS members.

And the Insight proposes some focus areas for implementation of this new ‘minilateral’ technology accelerator, including having  a single empowered person in each nation charged with implementation and ‘obstacle busting’. This is to break through the institutional, political and corporate permafrost that has prevented such rapid technological adoption by our militaries in recent decades. As is the case with James Miller in the US, this person should report to their national leader, not from inside the defence bureaucracies of the three nations.

On purpose and urgency, the report identifies a simple performance metric for AUKUS implementers over the next three years. On 20 January 2025, when the Australian prime minister calls whoever is the US president on that day, AUKUS has become such a successful piece of the furniture, with tangible results that have generated broad institutional, political and corporate support that, regardless of how warm or testy this leaders’ phone call is (think Turnbull-Trump in January 2016), AUKUS’s momentum continues.

Collaborative and agile. Intelligence community collaboration insights from the United Kingdom and the United States

The central aim of this report is to generate insights from the US and UK intelligence communities’ collaboration efforts. It identifies insights so that members of Australia’s national intelligence community, including the ONI, can use them to enhance the community’s collaboration and agility for the purpose of giving Australian decision-makers an insight edge over others. We acknowledge that agencies must contextualise those insights to Australia’s specific circumstances, and we’ve sought to do some of that in this report. The report isn’t intended as an academic think piece but as a guide-and goad-to actions that can advance and protect Australia’s wellbeing, prosperity and security.

This report doesn’t seek to second-guess the internal insights that it explores. Instead, it takes an external perspective, informed by experience in relevant agencies and by perspectives from intelligence-community partners and analysts in the UK and the US.

Trigger warning. The CCP’s coordinated information effort to discredit the BBC

Chinese Communist Party (CCP) diplomatic accounts, Chinese state media, pro-CCP influencers and patriotic trolls are targeting the UK public broadcaster, the BBC, in a coordinated information operation. Recent BBC reports, including the allegations of systematic sexual assault in Xinjiang’s internment camps, were among a number of triggers provoking the CCP’s propaganda apparatus to discredit the BBC, distract international attention and recapture control of the narrative.

In ASPI ICPC’s new report, Albert Zhang and Dr Jacob Wallis provide a snapshot of the CCP’s ongoing coordinated response targeting the BBC, which leveraged YouTube, Twitter and Facebook and was broadly framed around three prominent narratives:

  1. That the BBC spreads disinformation and is biased against China
  2. That the BBC’s domestic audiences think that it’s biased and not to be trusted
  3. That the BBC’s reporting on China is instigated by foreign actors and intelligence agencies.

In addition, the report analyses some of the secondary effects of this propaganda effort by exploring the mobilisation of a pro-CCP Twitter network that has previously amplified the Covid-19 disinformation content being pushed by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and whose negative online engagement with the BBC peaks on the same days as that of the party-state’s diplomats and state media. 

To contest and blunt criticism of the CCP’s systematic surveillance and control of minority ethnic groups, the party will continue to aggressively deploy its propaganda and disinformation apparatus. Domestic control remains fundamental to its political power and legitimacy, and internationally narrative control is fundamental to the pursuit of its foreign policy interests.

Tag Archive for: United Kingdom

Britain’s cut to foreign aid undermines threat prevention

Britain’s decision to cut foreign aid to fund defence spending overlooks the preventive role of foreign aid. It follows the pause and review of USAID activities and is an approach to foreign aid that Australia cannot afford to consider.

In late February, Britain said it would cut foreign aid. Prime Minister Keir Starmer said the decision was extremely difficult and painful. Foreign Secretary David Lammy described it as a hard choice. Both said it was necessary to keep Britain safe.

But foreign aid does help keep Britain safe.

Threats come in many forms. This means there are hard-headed security arguments for foreign assistance.

If another, poor country’s health system can’t deliver vaccinations or cope with a disease outbreak, your country can end up with a pandemic. If a nearby country suffers government collapse, military coup or state failure, this will affect your country economically and politically. If people affected by climate change are not assisted, you could end up dealing with a migration crisis.

Development funding is worthwhile investment. Dealing with a full-blown security crisis is far more expensive than the small amounts that help prevent it from happening.

People often assume that overseas development assistance gets a much larger slice of the budget pie than it does. For example, the 2018 Lowy Institute Poll showed that people thought that Australia spent $14 from every $100 in the budget on foreign aid when, in reality, it was about 80 cents. Now it is 68 cents.

Considering current threats, it makes perfect sense for Britain to increase defence spending. Lammy has said ‘Putin’s Russia is a threat not only to Ukraine and its neighbours, but to all of Europe, including the UK.’

But increased defence spending should not be at the expense of foreign aid: the preventive spending that guards against future threats. It is like taking money from preventive health care to fund emergency units. Britain is following the United States in a path that makes the world less safe.

This is something that Australia should not even consider.

The context is strikingly different. In the US, the target was the standalone aid agency USAID. Australia has already amalgamated AusAID into the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, meaning development programs are integrated across the entire department. Minister for International Development Pat Conroy has described it as an egg that can’t be unscrambled.

Unlike Britain, Australia’s development spending has already endured huge cuts during the Abbott years, and the vacuum this created for other actors in the Pacific is a salutary lesson not to follow Britain and cut further.

For those concerned about what aid money is being spent on, the government has a transparency portal that tells them. It lists conflict and security development projects including early warning reports, mediation services, reducing illicit arms flows, monitoring landmine and cluster munition use, strengthening cyber and critical tech resilience and reducing the threat of violent extremism.

And unlike the US and Britain, Australia simply can’t afford to vacate the field. Australia is surrounded by developing countries, and if it wants to have friends and partners in the region it must support them in the things that matter to them. The damage to Australia’s long-term interests would be incalculable. That’s what’s at stake. An adequate development budget is non-negotiable if Australia wants to have influence in its region.

Cutting aid might feel like a quick budget fix, but it will cost more in the long term as the world’s problems become expensive crises. In the British parliament, the chair of the International Development Select Committee made this point: ‘Cutting the aid budget to fund defence spending is a false economy that will only make the world less safe.’ She said she was ‘bitterly disappointed’ with a decision she sees as ‘endangering our long-term security’.

Humanitarian organisations have described the move as short-sighted, reckless and a betrayal of Britain’s national interest. Importantly, they have called out the decision as a political choice, noting that other options were possible.

Cutting aid is not a hard choice; it’s a weak choice—and a counterproductive one. People who care about Australia’s defence and security should be making this point.

Protectionism is not the way to protect workers

In both the United Kingdom and the United States, political parties on the left and the right are competing to show voters that they are on the side of working people. The question is whether prevailing approaches to protecting workers—which focus on a combination of industrial policy and restrictions on trade, investment and immigration—are actually in workers’ interest.

Protecting workers has become practically synonymous with protectionism. In recent years, voters in many countries, concerned about their economic well-being, have turned against free trade, immigration and inward foreign direct investment, and have rejected the leaders and parties who long promoted such policies.

Europe is a case in point. After the 2007-2008 global financial crisis plunged even middle-class households into economic insecurity, voters began to look beyond mainstream political parties in search of greater support and protection and were often attracted by those blaming immigration for their struggles. The COVID-19 pandemic, and the cost-of-living crisis that followed, reinforced this trend. Recent elections in Austria, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands saw surging support for anti-immigration parties.

In the US, new political parties did not emerge, but a new kind of leader did. Donald Trump won the US presidency in 2016 partly by blaming free trade (particularly with China) for decimating jobs and investment in America’s Rust Belt. While criticising free markets and capitalism used to be the preserve of the left, even The American Conservative now runs articles pillorying trade, immigration, and the free movement of capital for the ravages of deindustrialisation.

One answer to such ‘carnage’ is tariffs, which Trump eagerly introduced while in office. But Joe Biden—who defeated Trump in the 2020 election—maintained and even built upon those tariffs. Earlier this year, Biden imposed a 100 percent tariff on Chinese-made electric cars—a very high rate, though it affects a very small percentage of US imports from China. Trump promises that, if re-elected, he will implement 60-100 percent tariffs on all Chinese imports.

The protectionist message is clearly one that workers want to hear. But tariffs are unlikely to work. For starters, they lead to retaliation and distrust among trading partners, as we saw in 2018, when Trump imposed tariffs on steel and aluminium from Canada, Europe, and Mexico. They thus reduce a country’s access to overseas markets, while driving up prices. Because they disrupt supply chains providing vital components for domestic manufacturing, they might also lead to employment losses.

Those losses would not be offset by the ‘reshored’ jobs the protectionists promise, as previously offshored (low-wage) jobs are increasingly filled by machines, not workers. This is already happening in China, where ‘smart manufacturing’ is carried out in ‘dark factories’ run entirely by robots. Protecting manufacturing jobs is thus no more a solution to China’s high youth unemployment rates than reshoring such jobs is a realistic means of revitalising the Rust Belt.

But, as US President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s administration showed in the 1930s, there is a better way to protect workers: domestic labour legislation that supports unionisation. Beyond ensuring a decent standard of living for workers, such legislation in the US and the UK gave greater political voice to working people, enabling them to rise through the labour movement into politics.

That changed when traditional labour parties came to be dominated by urban liberal professionals, rather than representatives of the working class. For example, the proportion of working-class members of Parliament representing the UK’s Labour Party plummeted from nearly 30 percent in 1987 to only 10 percent in 2010.

Fortunately, policymakers in the UK and the US increasingly seem to recognise the role of domestic labour legislation in protecting workers. In the UK, the new Labour government has put forward an Employment Rights Bill, which would extend workers’ rights in areas like sick pay, flexible schedules and protection against unfair dismissal. The bill paves the way for reviving trade unions, removing restrictions on workers’ right to strike, addressing the gender pay gap and strengthening protections against sexual harassment in the workplace. Predictably, employer reactions have been mixed, and the government will now engage in extensive consultations as it works to turn the bill into legislation.

In the US, the Biden administration sought to include incentives for supporting unionisation in the Build Back Better Act, which aimed to create ‘millions of good-paying jobs’. But industry lobbyists pressed the US Congress to eliminate the bill’s proposed incentives for manufacturers to base their assembly plants in the US and to use unionised labour. Ultimately, the act’s passage came down to one vote—that of Democratic Senator Joe Manchin, who insisted that the support for unionised labour be removed.

Trade policy can also be used to protect labour—if we look beyond tariffs. The US-Mexico-Canada Agreement, which the Trump administration negotiated as a successor to NAFTA in 2018, has the strongest and farthest-reaching labour provisions of any US free trade agreement. Beyond placing labour obligations at the core of the agreement, and making them fully enforceable, the USMCA provides that countries can help workers adapt through domestic programs, such as the US Trade Adjustment Assistance programs that have been helping workers transition away from jobs lost to import competition since 1962. The USMCA proves that worker protections are compatible with international competitiveness.

Political support for protectionist trade policies is easy to explain. A growing share of working people in industrialised democracies feel—and, in fact, are—less represented and less protected than previous generations, and both Chinese factories and immigrant workers are easy targets. So, when politicians acknowledge these voters’ frustration and promise to improve their lives with tariffs and immigration controls, they are easily convinced. Ultimately, however, this approach will do little for workers—or for the political leaders who embrace it.

AI disinformation: lessons from the UK’s election

The year of elections was also feared to be the year that deepfakes would be weaponised to manipulate election results or undermine trust in democracy.

The record-breaking 2024 figure of about 4 billion voters eligible to go to the polls across more than 60 countries coincided with the full-fledged arrival and widespread uptake of multimodal generative artificial intelligence (AI), which enables almost anyone to make fake images, videos and sound.

Have these fears been realised? Our centre has analysed the incidence of AI-generated disinformation around the UK election held on July 4 and found both reasons for some reassurance, but also grounds for concern over long-terms trends eroding democracy that these threats exacerbate.

In contrast to fears of a tsunami of AI fakes targeting political candidates, the UK saw only a handful of examples of such content going viral during the campaign period.

While there’s no evidence these examples swayed any large number of votes, we did see spikes in online harassment against the people targeted by the fakes. We also observed confusion among audiences over whether the content was authentic.

These early signals point to longer term trends that would damage the democratic system itself, such as online harassment creating a ‘chilling’ effect on the willingness of political candidates to participate in future elections, and an erosion of trust in the online information space as audiences become increasingly unsure about which content is AI-generated and therefore which sources can be trusted.

Similar findings on the impact of generative AI misuse in 18 other elections since January 2023 are reported in a recent CETaS briefing paper.

There has of course been a sensible case for heightened vigilance this year. From India to the UK, and from France to the US, the outcome of many of 2024’s elections have had, or will have, enormous geopolitical implications, thus giving malicious actors strong incentives to interfere.

The capability that generative AI gives users to create highly realistic content at scale using simple keyboard prompts has enhanced the disruptive powers of sophisticated state actors. But it has also dramatically lowered the barriers to access, such that even individual members of the public can pose risks to the integrity of democratic processes – including elections.

The latter threat has been underscored by comments from Australia’s Director-General of Security (Mike Burgess) last week, when he helped announce the lifting of the country’s terrorism threat level. The basis for the increase was in part, Burgess said, that people with violent intent were ‘motivated by a diversity of grievances and personal narratives’ and were ‘interacting in ways we have not seen before’.

As a result, the risk of mis- and disinformation influencing election outcomes is much more serious.

Looking at the UK general election however, generative AI turned out to play a lesser role than traditional automated threats. For instance, several investigations into election-related content on online platforms found hallmarks of bot accounts seeking to sow division over controversial campaign issues such as immigration.

Some had possible links to Russia, and pushed pro-Kremlin narratives about the war in Ukraine. While these bot activities did include a few instances of AI-generated election material being circulated, the majority used a well-established tactic known as ‘astroturfing’, in which many automated accounts are used to increase perceived popular support for a particular policy stance or political candidate by spamming thousands of fake comments on relevant social media posts.

Alongside these bot incidents, the UK was targeted by a fake news operation with strong connections to a Russian-affiliated disinformation network called Doppelganger. Known as ‘CopyCop’, the operation involved the spreading of fictitious articles about the war in Ukraine, to confuse the UK public and reduce support for military aid. As part of CopyCop, real news stories were pasted into AI chatbots and then re-written to align them to the network’s strategic aims.

However, many had prompts left in, which betrayed obvious signs of AI editing and therefore failed to attract much engagement. That said, some of these sources were picked up by Russian media influencers and spread across their channels to tens of thousands of users. Often, the real sources of the articles were concealed in a tactic called ‘information laundering’ in an effort to trick users into assuming it originated from a credible news outlet.

While these disinformation activities can be connected to hostile foreign states, most viral misleading AI content in the UK election came from members of the public. This content included deepfakes that implicated political candidates in controversial statements that they never made. Interestingly, many users behind the content claimed they were doing it for satirical or ‘trolling’ purposes. Others may have pushed the content to increase support for their political party or because they were disillusioned with conventional political campaigns. This range of motives across different users highlights the new sources of risk and the expanded threat landscape that stem from such wide access to generative AI systems.

Taken together, the most prominent disinformation problems during the UK election did not arise from novel AI technology, but from longstanding issues tied to social media platforms – including the role of influencer accounts and recommender algorithms.

As we look ahead to the US election in November, it is vital that these platforms co-ordinate with different sectors to invest in measures to protect users.

This includes red-teaming exercises, requiring clear labels on AI-generated political adverts, and engaging with fact-checking organisations to detect malicious content before it goes viral.

And with Australia facing its own federal election in the next nine months, continued scrutiny of the risks and the malicious perpetrators – and emerging measures to combat them – is also vitally in the country’s interests.

  • This article is part of a short series The Strategist is running in the lead up to ASPI’s Sydney Dialogue on September 2 and 3. The event will cover key topics in critical, emerging and cyber technologies, including disinformation, electoral interference, artificial intelligence, hybrid warfare, clean technologies and more.

The UK risks losing its status as a leader in the fight against slavery

Australia and the United Kingdom consider themselves global leaders in the modern anti-slavery movement.

The UK was first country to pass modern slavery laws, while Australia was the second. Both have committed significant funding to anti-slavery programs and initiatives, were among the 37 countries to sign the call to action to end forced labour, modern slavery and human trafficking in 2017, and have created specific diplomatic posts to tackle slavery and human trafficking.

With recent estimates suggesting slavery has worsened over the past decade and some 50 million people are enslaved, now is the time for countries to strengthen their resolve. Recent developments in the UK, however, suggest that the opposite is occurring, and that anti-slavery protections risk being substantially weakened. These developments should be closely watched in Australia, particularly in light of the current review of Australia’s Modern Slavery Act 2018.

One key reform being considered by the Australian review is the establishment of an independent anti-slavery commissioner. This position has existed in the UK since 2015 and was filled by Dame Sara Thornton until 30 April. For the past nine months it has been vacant.

The UK position was initially advertised in December 2021, with final interviews on 14 April 2022. Two candidates were shortlisted and for most of last year, the government simply maintained that a final decision was under consideration. However, earlier this month it was announced that a new recruitment process was being commenced, further delaying this critical appointment.

This is worrying for several key reasons. The UK’s modern slavery act states that an independent anti-slavery commissioner must be appointed. By failing to do so, the British government is in breach of its own anti-slavery laws.

While the office of the commissioner continues to operate, it does so on a reduced basis and it has been made clear that until a new commissioner is appointed the remaining staff ‘will have no remit to provide views or take on or contribute to new work’. Failing to appoint someone to such a key role not only undermines the commissioner’s important work, but also sends a terrible signal to the rest of the world about the priority the UK gives this critical human rights issue.

A key function of the commissioner is to encourage good practice in the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of modern slavery offences, and the identification of modern slavery victims. Given these functions, the office is being left vacant at a critical time.

We are currently seeing increasing numbers of victims identified in the UK. There were 4,586 potential victims of modern slavery referred to the Home Office between July and September 2022, the highest number of referrals on record. This suggests it’s more important than ever to strengthen the commitment to combating modern slavery, and to embed a victim-centred approach.

The UK government is planning significant legal reforms, with a new modern slavery bill announced in the queen’s speech to parliament in May. The failure to appoint a commissioner risks limiting the scrutiny that will be applied to any such reform measures.

The stated purpose of the bill is to strengthen protection and support for victims and to increase company accountability in terms of supply chains. Reforms to strengthen the existing legal framework would be welcome. However, UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak adopted a different focus when he told parliament the reforms would ‘remove the gold-plating in our modern slavery system’. He highlighted that new provisions would reduce the ‘recovery and reflection’ period for potential victims and significantly raise the threshold that must be met for a person to be considered a victim of modern slavery. This has led to warnings from former prime minister Theresa May about the risks of diminishing protections for victims of modern slavery.

By not appointing the commissioner before these reforms are introduced, the UK government risks the perception that it is deliberately trying to reduce scrutiny and avoid criticism. Anti-Slavery International says the delays create ‘a vacuum of independent oversight at a time when it is critically needed’.

When Sunak promised to ‘remove the gold plating’ he reflected a recent shift in the UK’s language on slavery. Over the past year it has increasingly spoken about slavery as an immigration issue and alleged widespread fraud and abuse within the system set up to deal with it.

In her speech to the Conservative Party conference in October, Home Secretary Suella Braverman said she was ‘immensely proud of the UK’s global leadership in protecting genuine victims’ but that ‘the hard truth is that our modern slavery laws are being abused by people gaming the system’. These attacks on the credibility of modern slavery victims have become a recurring theme, with government ministers writing about the need to ‘limit the impact of modern slavery laws’, issuing press releases claiming that safeguards were being ‘rampantly abused’ by fake victims who were ‘clogging up’ the modern slavery system, and informing parliament that ‘our modern slavery laws are being abused by illegitimate claimants’ who are ‘taking advantage of the generosity of the British people’.

The claims that modern slavery protections are being routinely abused and the increasingly inflammatory rhetoric have both been publicly criticised by United Nations experts. In a statement on 19 December, the UN experts urged public officials ‘to refrain from inflammatory and spurious rhetoric that delegitimises survivors of slavery and human trafficking and their legal representatives’. They further criticised ‘misleading statements that exaggerate the level of fraud and abuse in the system’ and stated that ‘there is little evidence to support these claims and generalising them is dangerous and regressive’.

There has been further criticism of these claims by the UK Office for Statistics Regulation, which investigated concerns about the government’s use of data on modern slavery and reached the conclusion that the statistics relied on by the government ‘do not support the claims that people are “gaming” the modern slavery system’.

The reframing of modern slavery as an immigration issue can also be seen in its recent recategorisation within the Home Office, with formal responsibility being shifted from the minister for safeguarding to the immigration minister. Precisely the opposite has occurred in Australia, with machinery of government changes in July 2022 resulting in lead responsibility for modern slavery being shifted from the Department of Home Affairs to the Attorney-General’s Department.

Although there are important connectors linking the two, modern slavery is not primarily an immigration issue. In fact, 23% of all potential victims referred to the Home Office from 1 July to 30 September 2022 were UK nationals, with this figure rising to 44% of children who were referred. Re-framing modern slavery as an immigration issue risks ignoring these victims altogether, and could make others less likely to seek help due to fear that doing so may risk immigration detention or deportation.

The situation in the UK is concerning, both in terms of the impact that diminishing protections will have on victims and the signal it sends to the rest of the world. If we are to have any chance of eradicating modern slavery we need countries to strengthen their anti-slavery frameworks, not weaken them.

The UK developments contain important lessons for Australia. They are a timely reminder that the introduction of national laws is only the first step in building an effective modern slavery response. They also reinforce the critical importance of placing victims and survivors at the centre of modern slavery responses, and the critical role played by oversight mechanisms (such as an independent anti-slavery commissioner) in providing scrutiny and accountability.

Australia’s statutory review is a welcome opportunity to strengthen our anti-slavery framework, but the UK situation provides an important reminder that an effective response is always a work in progress and requires a constant renewal of commitment.

Why improving Vietnam–UK relations matters for the Indo-Pacific

Vietnam’s prime minister, Pham Minh Chinh, made a very successful trip to the United Kingdom in early November, putting the rapidly improving relations between the two countries into the spotlight. The visit to the COP26 climate summit took place a year after Britain and Vietnam ‘refreshed’ their 10-year-old strategic partnership with a new set of bilateral commitments. Chinh was accompanied by a large delegation, and many side meetings were held with British officials and organisations. Clearly, there is interest in further developing the bilateral relationship.

So, what are the reasons for these deepening ties and in which areas might the two governments increase their ambitions? The first question is relatively easy to answer: both Vietnam and the UK face a changed geostrategic environment. Although Vietnam’s leadership takes care to avoid overemphasising strategic issues in bilateral ties, it’s clear that a key driver of the new relationship is the intensifying geopolitical competition in the Indo-Pacific. Vietnam has opted for a ‘multidirectional’ foreign policy and is reaching out to new partners, particularly those which share an interest in pushing back against the strategic challenges that Vietnam faces.

Another factor is Brexit. Vietnam now sees the UK as a more independent actor and Britain is looking to new opportunities in the Indo-Pacific. This ‘tilt’ towards the region was announced earlier this year in the British government’s integrated review of foreign policy. The UK sees Vietnam, a country of more than 100 million people, as a partner for increased trade, investment and diplomatic cooperation. With the UK now formally a ‘dialogue partner’ of ASEAN, it needs to work more closely with the organisation’s members both individually and collectively.

That said, it’s important to remain clear-eyed about the fundamental differences between the two countries’ political systems and strategic dispositions. Neither side is likely to transform its governance or its international orientation in the short or medium term. Nonetheless, there are many areas where cooperation can be expanded and others where new ground can be broken.

There are opportunities across the spectrum of diplomatic engagement, ranging from sharing strengths in fisheries management and managing the challenges caused by rising sea levels to collaborating on defence. Vietnam’s most pressing needs are in tackling Covid-19 and its consequences, generating sustainable economic growth, and coping with the many threats posed by climate change. These are all areas in which the two sides would do well to increase their ambitions and cooperation. Likewise, the UK and Vietnam have a strong shared interest in upholding and promoting an open international order. There are already examples of diplomatic and security cooperation between the two, and these can be further enhanced.

The key word for the future of UK–Vietnam relations is, and will remain, ‘trust’. Britain should expect change to be gradual, and both sides will take time to assess developments before pursuing further steps. Therefore, the focus should be on building trust by rendering assistance in areas that ‘cost’ relatively little for large gains—Covid-19, climate policy, infrastructure development and trade— before deepening cooperation in more complex areas such as security agreements.

The vaccination rollout in Britain is going well, with three-quarters of the total population having had their first dose and nearly two-thirds having had their second. Vietnam, after initially handling the Covid-19 outbreak well, is now struggling under new waves of the virus. An exchange of information on outbreak management and the provision of additional vaccine doses clearly signal the UK’s intent to be a reliable and trustworthy partner.

Vietnam made some major commitments on combating climate change at the COP26 summit that will create new areas for cooperation on energy generation and transmission. These efforts may come too late for some communities in the Mekong Delta, however, and the UK should support Vietnam’s efforts to protect human security for communities at risk from rising sea levels. This is a relatively small thing for the UK to do that will have large benefits for the Vietnamese people and will help promote trust between the two governments.

Vietnam has a particular need for infrastructure development to support its rapidly growing but bottlenecked economy. While it’s unlikely that UK companies will be able to compete with Chinese, Japanese and South Korean contractors in big tenders, there will be niches that British businesses are well placed to capitalise on. Both governments need to publicise and incentivise businesses to take advantage of the opportunities that exist under the UK–Vietnam free trade agreement.

Though the growing relationship between the UK and Vietnam is broad and extensive, there are areas where security cooperation is desirable to both sides. In October, a British warship, HMS Richmond, conducted the Royal Navy’s first ‘passing exercise’ with a Vietnamese counterpart. Although a low-key event, it was a milestone. Maritime cooperation is likely to continue in the future, ranging from ‘softer’ issues such as hydrography, maritime domain awareness and legal training to exchanges with HMS Spey and HMS Tamar, the two British offshore patrol vessels now deployed in the region.

Britain is unlikely to become Vietnam’s premier diplomatic partner, but with recent visits by Ben Wallace and Dominic Raab, the British defence and foreign secretaries, there’s scope for the two sides to construct a loose and non-binding defence and security roadmap together. It could include a long-term but realistic goal, such as the establishment of a 2+2 or ‘extensive strategic partnership’—similar to that Vietnam has with Japan—over a five-year period.

UK–Vietnam relations are currently ‘good, healthy and stable’. Given the intensification of geopolitical competition in the Indo-Pacific, it’s important that they remain that way while developing in intensity and trust. Although the relationship between the two countries is often overlooked, the UK can play a valuable role in Vietnam’s developing multidirectional foreign policy, just as Vietnam can help facilitate Britain’s Indo-Pacific tilt.

Above all, the British government needs to avoid the perception that it is pushing Vietnam to choose between its international partners. But as they boost their cooperation, Hanoi and London would do well to coordinate even further with like-minded partners such as Australia and Japan to reduce duplication and competition, as well as to generate a network of Indo-Pacific partners with a deep commitment to upholding an open international order.

It’s AUKUS, not A(UK)US

Perhaps my ticklish British sensibilities are getting the better of me, but I’ve noticed a creeping tendency in the Australian debate to reduce the United Kingdom’s role in AUKUS to the margins of what is meant to be a tripartite arrangement among equals. Two weeks after the 16 September announcement, The Australian’s Greg Sheridan wrote: ‘It is impossible to understand why the Brits are in the mix, apart from PR.’ Stephan Frühling’s thoughtful contribution on AUKUS for The Strategist was illuminating on the US alliance dynamics, but also notable for its parenthetical ‘(and UK)’ formulation. Others have followed suit.

Now, commentary from across the pond has got in on the act, relegating the UK role to the margins. ASPI boss Peter Jennings, well known as a devotee of the Anglosphere, wrote recently on the submarine selection, ‘Australia should opt to buy into the US Virginia-class production line; we need to find a way to bring the UK into that.’ Even if that were possible, it’s not clear what it would mean practically for the UK beyond token inputs, given that the Virginia class is a mature US design based on a US combat system and US reactor.

Those focused on the cyber, artificial intelligence and quantum aspects of AUKUS tend to give more weight to the UK role, interestingly. There’s something about the submarine choice that predisposes Australian observers to see an ANZUS cookie in an AUKUS biscuit wrapper, even among the critics. Several influential commentators, some now in government, have made no secret of their longstanding preference for the Virginia class to meet Australia’s future submarine requirement.

Granted, the void of official detail for such a prominent initiative has been a license to speculate. My initial take on AUKUS underplayed the UK role, branding Australia’s future submarine capability as a ‘ward’ of the ANZUS alliance. Only later did it emerge that the spark for AUKUS was a bilateral approach from Australia’s chief of navy to his British counterpart. The Brits then played a significant behind-the-scenes role by fleshing out the AUKUS agenda into a broader strategic technology-sharing framework, enlarging it beyond the original focus on undersea warfare. The Royal Navy has literally pushed the boat out by promptly getting HMS Astute alongside for an inspection at HMAS Stirling.

My point is not that the Astute design has any inherent advantage over the Virginia, or that the non-submarine aspects to AUKUS lack substance. It is Australia’s sovereign decision to make and Australian taxpayers’ money to spend at the end of the day. If Canberra opts for a US submarine, the UK will respect that without histrionics, I suspect. But it helps to remember that Australia first approached the UK—just as it is still remembered in Tokyo that former prime minister Tony Abbott knocked on his Japanese counterpart Shinzo Abe’s door to sound him out about submarine opportunities.

There’s more to this than diplomatic nicety. The UK isn’t in AUKUS as a makeweight or annex to the ANZUS alliance, but because its interests are tied to the Indo-Pacific. An isosceles triangle is not equilateral, but it is still a triangle. The value of the UK to Australia, as the smallest of the three AUKUS partners by some margin, is that it adds subtle leverage vis-à-vis Washington, potentially bidding up Canberra’s access to strategic technology, while providing political insurance against the potential for American capriciousness in future, since even a second Trump administration may blanch before burning its two closest alliance bridges. That’s clever diplomacy on Canberra’s part, but London is not a stepping stone to Washington and should not be treated as such.

AUKUS, to be clear, is a welcome, stabilising development for regional security, as Philippines Foreign Minister Teodoro Locsin’s statement graciously and eloquently expressed. But it is an act of strategic desperation on Australia’s part, nonetheless. Desperation for submarine capability doesn’t bring out the best in Australia’s strategic personality. For sure, France’s reaction to the cancellation of the Attack-class deal has been out of all proportion, just as Japan’s disappointment in 2016 was understated. Australia must resist the impatient urge to step over anyone that gets in the way of a capability that is still the better part of two decades out of reach. Here-and-now relationships matter too.

And AUKUS represents a stripping down of Australia’s security partnerships to their bare nucleus. Like any nuclear core, it needs handling with care. Another point, specific to the UK, is that familiarity can sometimes breed contempt. Add in a dash of desperation and the resulting brew could curdle. Australia is diplomatically alive to the sensitivities AUKUS provokes in Southeast Asia, and with good reason. But AUKUS has feelings too.

Sheridan’s latest suggests that new joint AUKUS announcements are pending. That will hopefully put some meat on the arrangement’s skeleton, providing the basis for a more structured debate. He has also sharply changed his tune on the UK’s involvement, predicting that ‘whichever boat is chosen, both the US and Britain will be involved in the project and make money from it’. Perhaps it will also allow the UK to cast off its parentheses in Australia’s AUKUS debate.

Does Australia need a UK-style integrated review?

In March, the United Kingdom released its integrated review of security, defence, development and foreign policy, titled Global Britain in a competitive age. It’s quite possible that, after the next federal election, Australia’s government will want to revisit its international policy settings. Is an integrated review the way to go?

Australia has traditionally released separate planning documents for defence, foreign affairs and international aid. With the focus on closer coordination across defence, diplomacy and development, there’s a case to be made for going down the UK route. While the defence strategic update and Partnerships for recovery development policy only came out last year, the 2017 foreign policy white paper is looking dated and its lead author, Richard Maude, recently called for an update in ‘a smashed-up Covid-19 world.’

The UK review is less review and more strategy. It doesn’t trawl over the past looking for failure or spruiking success but spends the vast majority of its 100 pages looking forward. The overview clearly sets the scene, stating: ‘A defence of the status quo is no longer sufficient for the decade ahead.’

Critics who want to find fault will easily identify some bombast and overly ambitious goals. The ‘force for good’ language can grate, and there are some vague plans where problems outpace solutions, perhaps indicating a somewhat rushed process.

But this misses much of what is groundbreaking and constructive.

Commentators have described the review as strategically innovative, setting Britain up with ‘a new strategic lexicon for thinking about international affairs—one more suited to 21st-century realities’. Perhaps its greatest achievement is giving a sense of national vision: ‘It conveys that, for a country that has lost both its empire and its closest continental partner, it has finally found its place in the international system.’

As Abhijnan Rej noted in The Diplomat, the review makes a clear, unambiguous prediction about the future structure of the international system that is multipolar and Indo-Pacific-centred, with a larger role for middle powers. The review is willing to rethink orthodoxies, including the impacts of globalisation and the size and role of the state, and to position the UK to spend more and be selectively interventionist.

Particularly notable features of the review are its integrated reframing of issues such as climate change, conflict and the interconnectedness of international and domestic events. As it notes, ‘responding to state threats can no longer be viewed as a narrow “national security” or defence agenda’. And there is follow through, with climate change finance getting an £11.6 billion boost.

It is also willing to come to sharp judgement on the responses required: naming adversaries, making a big bet on building a strong ‘technological industrial complex’ and designing more joined-up government programs and funding. The emphasis on science and technology as an enabler—of economic, cyber, military and soft power—is pervasive and backed up with a slew of new agencies including an £800 million Advanced Research and Invention Agency, an Office for Artificial Intelligence, a National Cyber Security Centre and a National Cyber Force.

Unsurprisingly, there isn’t a perfect landing on everything. The Indo-Pacific tilt, much highlighted in Australian coverage, is somewhat thin, with an underwhelming list of actions. Britain sees the economic prize and the need to defend trade routes, democracy and human rights, but winning strategies are hard to discern.

The reaction in the UK has been positive. The main concerns expressed have been with prioritisation and implementation, in particular that it covered a ‘laundry list of issues’ and that many proposed actions were vague, general or unrealistic. This misses the point of what type of document it is: one that provides a vision and high-level guidance. Its conclusions in many areas were either to indicate the main lines of anticipated development or to initiate sectoral reviews. This suggests the need to be clear about the aim of the exercise so there’s no perception of overpromising and underdelivering.

The UK review meets the needs of a post-Brexit Britain trying to become a ‘global Britain’. But its approach also offers benefits for a country like Australia that must work harder to have influence in its region.

As Matt Sussex argues: ‘Attaining a more clear-eyed and holistic vision about precisely what the threat and opportunity landscape looks like—as well as the types of capabilities needed to address them—is precisely the kind of activity Australia’s strategic and security community should be engaging in.’

Australia has arguably been an outlier in its reluctance to embrace more holistic policymaking. Critics of integrated strategies argue that they can lead to an obsession with perfecting documents rather than taking practical actions. Some say they are rigid and prone to being out of date by the time they’re completed. Others express concerns about the securitisation of everything. All these outcomes are possible, but none is inevitable.

An integrated international relations strategy is not a panacea, but the process can allow policymakers to step out of constraints, re-evaluate risks and opportunities, and chart a new course. It can bolster national determination to engage with the world and shape it to our interests. It cannot miraculously create a whole-of-government, whole-of-nation culture where it’s lacking, but it can help to build one where it’s sought.

And there are now signs of change in Australia. The Office of the Pacific was established in 2019 to enhance whole-of-government coordination, and the 2020 Southeast Asia package was presented as a whole-of-government initiative. There is an appetite for more integrated approaches, as demonstrated by enthusiasm, including from ministers, for the Asia-Pacific Development, Diplomacy and Defence Dialogue.

Prime Minister Scott Morrison has said Australia needs to use ‘all elements of statecraft to shape the world we want to see’. This suggests the need to break down siloed thinking through the deliberate use of integrating tools and techniques that help us to think differently. An integrated international strategy might be just the place to start.

Why does the UK want more nuclear weapons?

In March, the United Kingdom took many nuclear policy experts by surprise with its announcement that it was increasing the cap on its nuclear stockpile from 225 to 260 warheads. This reversal of decades of reductions of the UK’s nuclear stockpile was spelled out in the government’s ‘integrated review’ of security and defence policy.

When Britain obtained the Trident D5 missile from the United States in the early 1980s, the capability exceeded UK military needs and the decision was taken not to deploy the maximum number of warheads on the missile. The Trident submarines could carry more warheads and strike more accurately than the UK believed was necessary.

The size of the UK nuclear force has been guided over the years by considerations of what constitutes a ‘minimum deterrent’. The UK has sought to put a certain number of enemy targets at risk.

Missile defences around Moscow led the UK to improve the penetrability of its former Polaris missile under the ‘Chevaline’ program in the 1970s to ensure that its warheads could pierce those defences.

The size of the UK’s deterrent has been gauged in concert with the much larger US capability. The UK and its allies have historically been concerned that the US might be reluctant to use its nuclear forces in defence of its allies and have believed it necessary to possess a ‘second centre of decision-making’ in which their own weapons could be used in a supreme national emergency.

The British government says the decision to expand its nuclear stockpile is driven by a deterioration in the strategic landscape and technological threats. Russia has been overhauling its nuclear forces since 2007 and investing in new technologies such as underwater nuclear drones and hypersonic missiles. China has been increasing its nuclear capabilities and its current hostility towards Taiwan increases the risk of a China–US confrontation.

In addition, the UK is mindful of the need to deter newly proliferating countries as well as novel threats such as cyberattacks. The UK has committed to replacing its four Trident submarines with a new generation of vessels to preserve its deterrent into the 2050s.

The surprise for some is that Russian improvements in missile defences have played a key role in the UK’s decision.

Western intelligence has been monitoring Russia’s comprehensive upgrade of its missile defences around Moscow and neighbouring areas, and it’s not the first time that anti-ballistic missile improvements around the Russian capital have influenced UK strategic thinking.

Recently declassified papers in Britain and the US demonstrate that such concerns were being expressed as far back as the early 1980s and even resulted in a spat between Margaret Thatcher’s government and Ronald Reagan’s administration, something we discuss in more depth in this article in the Journal of Strategic Studies. The main cause of those tensions was the determination of the Reagan administration to move ahead with its Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

US advocates of SDI regarded the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty as an obstacle that placed constraints on the deployment of US and Soviet missile defences. However, the British government regarded the ABM Treaty limiting the deployment of missile defences as essential to preserving strategic stability and enshrining a concept of deterrence based upon the threat of nuclear retaliation. It viewed this as the key to stability and to safeguarding the UK’s nuclear deterrent.

Britain was concerned that the possible demise of the ABM Treaty and the US deployment of space-based missile defences would lead to the Russians improving their own defensive systems with damaging consequences for Britain’s independent nuclear deterrent.

The George W. Bush administration eventually withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002. The treaty’s collapse has paved the way for advances in Russian missile defence systems as well as US anti-ballistic missile programs, creating the unease we now see in the British defence establishment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has referred to the US withdrawal from the treaty as a justification for the development of new nuclear weapons that can penetrate US missile defences. Early in 2018 Putin stated:

After the US withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty we’ve been working hard to develop new promising weaponry systems and this enabled us to make a big step forward creating new strategic arms … US global missile systems are mainly against ballistic missiles and these are the core of our nuclear deterrent. This is why Russia has been developing extremely effective systems to defeat missile defence and all our ICBMs are equipped with such systems now.

With its minimum deterrent, the UK is sensitive to the development by the Russians or Chinese of offensive or defensive nuclear systems that could undermine its strategic posture. The fears that surfaced 40 years ago are now becoming reality.

The UK has decided that increasing its offensive nuclear capabilities provides the most cost-effective way to offset the risks it faces and it’s prepared to tolerate the opprobrium of enlarging its stockpile of the most destructive weapons known to humankind.

What does the UK’s integrated review mean for the Indo-Pacific?

‘In the decade ahead, the UK will deepen our engagement in the Indo-Pacific, establishing a greater and more persistent presence than any other European country.’

Those are the words of the British government’s long-awaited integrated review, which establishes the vision and strategy for ‘global Britain’ in the 2020s.

The outcome is in some ways eye-popping; in others, it is very sensible and conventional. It marks the culmination of a process that Prime Minister Boris Johnson promised, on initiation, would become the deepest and broadest British foreign, security, development and defence review since the end of the Cold War. On that, it delivers.

The review is strategically innovative in many respects. It jettisons Britain’s support for the post–Cold War ‘rules-based international system’ and commits to generating an ‘open international order’. It champions the pursuit of national sovereignty and power—predicated on a dynamic scientific and technological base—as the overriding UK strategic objective. It seeks to reposition the UK as a stronger custodian of collective security, and it backs that up by pledging to beef up Britain’s nuclear stockpile and enhance its military presence by forward-deploying more assets, including warships, not least to the Indo-Pacific.

Although Britain upheld an Indo-Pacific presence throughout the 20th and early 21st centuries, the European continent continued to exert a greater gravitational pull. From holding back the German advance during the two world wars, Britain went on to help contain the Soviet Union. It then put out several fires in the western Balkans before leading the way with bolstering NATO’s deterrence measures on the eastern flank of the alliance, providing the most troops to the most locations in the Enhanced Forward Presence initiative.

Neither Brexit nor the integrated review will change Britain’s geography. The review is unequivocal in stating, ‘The precondition for Global Britain is the … security of the Euro-Atlantic region, where the bulk of the UK’s security focus will remain.’ It describes Russia as the most ‘acute and direct threat’ to British security. In order to help underwrite the defence of Europe, the review commits to boosting Britain’s nuclear weapons stockpile by some 40%.

But it is telling that the review contains only 15 references to the ‘Euro-Atlantic’ compared with 32 to the ‘Indo-Pacific’. It is equally telling that the integrated review has a two-page spread on the Indo-Pacific to emphasise the UK’s need to adapt to new geopolitical and geoeconomic circumstances.

The review explains the strategic significance of the Indo-Pacific:

By 2030, it’s likely that the world will have moved further towards multipolarity, with the geopolitical and economic centre of gravity moving eastward towards the Indo-Pacific … The significant impact of China’s military modernisation and growing international assertiveness within the Indo-Pacific region and beyond will pose an increasing risk to UK interests.

For these reasons, the review commits the UK to uphold a more persistent presence in the Indo-Pacific region in the years to come. It foresees deeper relationships with countries such as Japan, India, Australia and the other nations of the Five Power Defence Arrangements. And it plans for the broadening of Britain’s geopolitical footprint—based on a ‘strategic array’ of military and logistics facilities—stretching from the Persian Gulf to Southeast Asia.

Indeed, the review states that Britain’s goal is to be ‘the European partner with the broadest and most integrated presence in the Indo-Pacific—committed for the long term, with closer and deeper partnerships, bilaterally and multilaterally’. It declares that the UK will seek enhanced commercial relations with Australia, New Zealand and India, as well as with organisations such as ASEAN and the countries of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. And it emphasises Britain’s strategic wherewithal and the Royal Navy’s global reach, represented by the planned deployment of HMS Queen Elizabeth to the Indo-Pacific later this year.

Are these ambitions realistic? Time will tell. Although no longer a superpower, the UK is not without capability, and a strong government now leads it with a large majority in the House of Commons. In a speech back in 2016, Johnson also expressed his personal commitment to a broader British presence ‘east of Suez’. To support his aspirations for the country, he pushed for a £16.5 billion (A$29.6 billion) increase in defence spending last year.

Where the integrated review may fall short is on China; it treads too fine a line between engaging with and deterring the Chinese Communist Party. It nonetheless marks a significant change of tone: China is framed as a ‘systemic competitor’. In this sense, the review sets Britain up with a new strategic lexicon for thinking about international affairs—one more suited to 21st-century realities. And given the constantly increasing challenges in the Indo-Pacific, better intellectual tools are certainly needed.

Japan and UK move towards partnership to develop combat-aircraft systems

A surprising defence-technology partnership is emerging between Japan and the UK. The cooperation is mostly preliminary but not at all basic: the two countries are working together on some of the most challenging systems used in combat aircraft. And there’s good reason to think they’ll pool resources on more such programs.

For Japan, the UK is an obvious high-capability partner for technology areas in which the US will not share its knowhow. The British no doubt see Japan as an alternative to France and Germany for sharing development costs, especially in the combat-aircraft field. Here and there, we also see signs that Japan has technology that the British would regard as valuable.

This development should be welcomed by anyone who wants to see a stronger Japan, one that gets more capability from its defence budget.

On 2 February, the UK and Japanese governments made what appears to have been their first joint mention of an ambitious potential joint project that Tokyo had briefly discussed in Japanese text in 2018. Called ‘Jaguar’, it’s officially said to be a universal radio-frequency (RF) system. It would presumably be intended for the Japanese F-X and UK-led Tempest fighter programs.

Separately, Japan revealed in September that it and the UK had been working together on a powerful radar technology; we can assume this would be integral to Jaguar. The UK and Japan are also cooperating on developing an advanced version of a far-flying air-to-air missile. And Rolls-Royce has proposed cooperative development of a single engine type for the F-X and Tempest programs, which are running on somewhat parallel timescales.

All of this wouldn’t have been imaginable only a few years ago, when Japan basically didn’t cooperate with anyone in developing defence equipment. The sudden partnership with Britain has become possible because in 2014 Japan began to emerge from its military-technology shell. In that year it ended a self-imposed ban on arms exports, which had largely prevented it from joining collaborative programs.

A country can hardly cooperate in developing and making defence systems if it can’t send defence parts to the partner. So Japan has often wasted defence funds by working on technologies that friendly countries were also developing. We can now expect the Japanese defence-technology budget to stretch further.

In fact, a crack appeared in the export ban in 2013, when the government allowed Kawasaki Heavy Industries to send engine parts to Rolls-Royce for the Royal Navy. They were parts designed by Rolls-Royce, but the UK propulsion giant had stopped making them. The Royal Navy still needed them, so Japan agreed to supply—causing a few eyebrows to rise.

Before this there had been one, much larger exception to the export ban: Japan worked with the US in developing the Raytheon SM-3 Block 2A anti-ballistic-missile interceptor.

We might imagine that the US would be Japan’s preferred partner for just about any defence-technology effort—and indeed it would be, if only it were willing to share its secrets. In general, the US prefers to pay the whole cost of its most advanced work, initially keeping the resulting capability to itself and often not letting even close allies know what it’s up to.

That policy left Japan with only two strong alternatives: the UK and France. It may have preferred the UK not only because of specific technological strengths but also because of the unusually close UK military connection with the US. The choice doesn’t stop Japan from working with other countries, and indeed since 2014 it has done a little defence research with France and (in relation to marine hydrography) Australia.

The ambition of Jaguar development, which is subject to an ongoing UK–Japanese feasibility study, shows how high Tokyo is aiming in international collaboration. Jaguar would be an advanced piece of kit. Since it is described as a ‘universal’ system, it would probably be a four-in-one set-up, combining the functions of radar, passive radio-frequency detection, jamming and communications. Japan first outlined ambitions for just such an apparatus in 2004.

Traditionally, a separate system provides each of those four functions in an aircraft, though they have always had to be designed not to interfere with each other and there has been a trend towards integration, notably in the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning. Consolidating functions can reduce bulk and weight—for example, by sharing antennas—but the integrated system is necessarily complex and difficult to engineer.

A project on radar antenna design also reveals the scale of ambition in UK–Japanese work. The two countries have already been working together in this area, on a specific technology called element-level digital beam forming, or DBF. This concept has been applied to surface radars (reportedly including the Australian CEA Technologies radars on Anzac-class frigates) but not to aircraft radars, which is where Japan and the UK want to take it.

With element-level DBF, the entire face of an antenna can constantly receive signals in many directions, limited mainly by processing power. More conventional radars look in different directions sequentially or by splitting their antennas into segments; either way, they lose sensitivity. A radar that continuously receives in many directions has longer range and a better chance of picking up stealthy targets.

Japan has strong radar technology. It was the first country to field a radar with an active, electronically scanned array in a fighter: the Mitsubishi Electric J/APG-1 in the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries F-2, which entered service in 2000. Japan may also be the first to put that high-performance technology into the seeker of an air-to-air missile. For that job, it has chosen to modify the MBDA Meteor, a ramjet weapon that has been developed in a multinational program led by the UK. The British are helping with the upgrade. (They also provide test ranges far removed from Chinese electromagnetic listening gear.)

Although Rolls-Royce is one of the world’s three main aero-engine companies (the other two are American), it could probably learn a thing or two from Japan. In preparing for the F-X program, Japan has been working on identifying materials that can cope with extremely high temperatures, which would improve efficiency, and on squeezing down the diameter of a fighter engine to reduce drag.

As for other systems that could go into both the F-X and Tempest, Japan and the UK are still talking. Lockheed Martin will be Mitsubishi’s overall technological supporter for the F-X, helped by Northrop Grumman. But the program will run into the problem that the US companies can’t share all the information that Japan needs. Again, the solution may come from the other island nation that flanks Eurasia.

Tag Archive for: United Kingdom

How To Ensure AUKUS’ Success

AUKUS is a multigenerational project, and it’s time to admit that the trilateral effort between the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom to develop and share defense technology is still in its infancy. The enabling environment must be tended to before advanced capabilities can be developed and delivered. Progress has been made in this first phase, but concrete steps should be taken to realize the agreement’s potential concerning “AUKUS Pillar 2.”

The goal of AUKUS Pillar 2 is to accelerate the development and delivery of advanced military technology to the militaries of the member nations. To achieve this, it zeroes in on lowering barriers to information sharing and streamlining joint and cross-nation funding pathways while establishing reciprocal export controls. Underpinning these efforts are the continual efforts to strengthen and deepen the culture of trust among the participants. Significant work is underway already. Two new policy recommendations will add to this and help create the enabling environment required for AUKUS to truly thrive and for the successful creation of a more integrated defense industrial ecosystem.

First, independent AUKUS advisory boards should be created to improve institutional knowledge retention. Second, creating AUKUS business parks with shared labs and workspaces would foster closer collaboration between government and industry while lowering entry costs for small and medium enterprises (SMEs), who wouldn’t normally have access to classified networks and government experts. The name of the game is improving collaboration and efficiency to bolster innovation and deliver advanced capabilities.

Creating and Retaining Expertise

Given the sheer scope and complexity of AUKUS, there needs to be dedicated staff focused on implementation over the longer term. Currently, government officials within the partner nations are responsible for all aspects of AUKUS, from problem diagnosis and analysis to implementation. While these individuals are highly competent and driven to see AUKUS succeed, they often wear multiple hats and are tied to pushing official government positions. This does not enable the same freedom of inquiry and debate that an independent advisory board would provide. Additionally, ensconcing this staff exclusively within the government risks not only missing vital information from the industry but also exposing senior staff to electoral churn every few years. Even within the mid to lower levels of government, there is a culture of movement with talented individuals hopping between departments, often as a way to move up in the service. Losing expertise continuously will hamstring efforts at creating the enabling environment needed for AUKUS to succeed.

Thankfully, most of the work is done by career officials and attached military forces on orders or assignments for a few years, and they are, therefore, less exposed to political changes. This ensures some continuity and institutional knowledge retention within the organizations. However, this system can still be improved. Independent advisory boards would allow for institutional expertise to be cultivated and retained and policies pressure tested. Creating budgetary line items to fund these bodies would ensure proper staffing and resourcing of the organizations while avoiding the pitfalls of government agencies, such as bureaucratic bloat and changes due to political appointments or shifts. This should extend past the national level and take a two-tiered approach. A national body within each of the AUKUS partner nations should be complemented by a trilateral secretariat run by the heads of the national bodies.

At the national level, these advisory boards should be formed from a mix of trade and industry leaders, government officials, and military experts. The advisory board would then be ideally situated to capture lessons learned and feedback from all key stakeholders. These boards would examine the regulatory environment, proposed legislation, and obstacles to implementation within their respective country. They could give annual reports to the legislative and executive branches or the parliament. This ensures governmental oversight and would allow lawmakers to identify areas for improvement within their control.

The trilateral secretariat would be ideally placed to coordinate between the three advisory boards to identify obstacles and opportunities that cannot be solved within the national infrastructure of a single partner. Dual hatting the leaders of the national bodies as members of the secretariat would increase buy-in within the national advisory boards, improving their effectiveness and efficiency. This would also reward talented individuals within the organization and thus facilitate knowledge retention.

Aside from its engagement with the national advisory boards, the council should at least engage at the minister level across all three countries, providing briefings and soliciting inputs from the government. These engagements could take place every couple of years, limiting bureaucratic and political fatigue while maintaining momentum. Given the complexity and novelty of the endeavor, there are sure to be unforeseeable friction points and obstacles, so this coordination body would be pivotal in ensuring all partners operate from the same playbook as they are tackled.

Sharing Info by Sharing Spaces

As it stands, defense research and development is highly siloed and concentrated in the hands of a small number of “primes,” the biggest defense industrial companies, that have the institutional capacity and budget to manage the Byzantine legal requirements involved in defense manufacturing. The costs of building a classified workspace, known as a SCIF, can add up to hundreds or thousands of dollars to the cost per square foot, drastically increasing the upfront costs of competing in the classified space. Additionally, each organization manages its SCIF and pays for its employee’s clearances, which adds to the overhead.

This process becomes even more complex when dealing with geographically separated offices, and those within the AUKUS countries are no exception. Given the price and complexity of establishing even a single SCIF, many SMEs are precluded from operating in the classified space, a requirement for higher-level defense development and contracting. This limits the inflow of potentially disruptive technology into the procurement process and complicates collaborative development.

The government can dramatically lower these barriers by funding the creation of co-workspaces with certified SCIFs. Developing business parks that facilitate businesses with complementary capabilities operating in a shared area is nothing new, but applying this model to AUKUS endeavors could supercharge research and development. These AUKUS parks should be based around both classified and unclassified workspaces that companies can share, thereby maximizing utility while minimizing costs. This allows for synergistic collaborations within the industry and access to government expertise.

Governments could staff these parks with export control experts, rotate through military members to test prototypes early in development, provide feedback, and evaluate prospective projects for contracts. Leveraging their combined experience, these routine interactions among the researchers, government, and defense would propel innovation. Ideally, engaging with end users early in the process would allow minimum viable capabilities, or “problem sets” that need solutions, to be shared with the industry and minimum viable products to be developed rapidly.

Having government officials on site to continuously evaluate these developments would allow for built-in maturity paths. Rapid, responsive iteration with avenues to official contracts would supercharge the defense industry. AUKUS parks would have the additional advantage of capitalizing on economies of scale with respect to security. By centralizing these facilities, security protocols could be standardized, easier to manage, and ensure better safeguarding of critical technology from potential sabotage or theft from adversaries. Providing these services would offset the steep upfront costs associated with classified work, opening the door to SMEs that are usually excluded from competing and collaborating in the space.

Governments don’t have to construct and manage these spaces themselves. However, they could leverage the private sector to manage the construction and daily operations of the SCIFs. Within the United States, some movement exists within the private sector to establish shared and mobile SCIFs. Still, these efforts could be amplified across all three AUKUS partners to significant effect. If a public-private partnership is pursued, there could be a planned transition to fully privatized funding and operations of the business parks, further limiting government overheads in the future while enabling collaboration. This would help derisk the investments made by private industry and facilitate rapid expansion into the field.

And Now, for Something Completely Different

With AUKUS still in its initial phase of enabling environment creation, there is no better time than now to lay a foundation to ensure the greatest returns on investment. The feedback mechanisms provided by advisory councils and secretariats will be immensely valuable in refining processes and policies. AUKUS parks will facilitate greater collaboration during development and push the focus toward solution-based, minimum-viable product thinking and rapid iteration. Radical changes and thinking are what will ensure success. All three partner nations must push to create new systems and structures to create a truly integrated enabling environment.

Tag Archive for: United Kingdom

Stop the World: AUKUS, industry and public support with Sophia Gaston and Eric Chewning

In this episode of Stop the World, we bring you the final interview from our special series recorded from the sidelines of the ASPI Defence Conference ‘JoiningFORCES’. And today it’s all about AUKUS.

ASPI’s Director of The Sydney Dialogue, Dr. Alex Caples, is joined by Sophia Gaston, Head of Foreign Policy at Policy Exchange, and Eric Chewning, Executive Vice President of Strategy and Development at HII.

Alex, Sophia and Eric reflect on the progress that has been made on AUKUS, the role of industry in ensuring AUKUS succeeds, and the ongoing challenges such as workforce. The conversation also focuses on political and public support for AUKUS, which has been made even more timely by this week’s UK election, and the looming presidential and congressional elections in the United States.

Mentioned in this episode: The AUKUS goal: balancing power in the region, by Justin Bassi

Guests:

⁠Alex Caples⁠

⁠Sophia Gaston⁠

⁠Eric Chewning

Stop the World: Japan’s security, partnerships and regional strategic outlook with Narushige Michishita

In this episode of Stop the World, we bring you the penultimate episode in our special series recorded from the sidelines of the ASPI Defence Conference ‘JoiningFORCES’.

This interview is all about Japan and regional security. Dr Euan Graham, Senior ASPI Analyst speaks with Narushige Michishita, professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) in Tokyo and Japan Scholar with the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Asia Program. The conversation covers Japan’s perspective on the strategic outlook in the Indo-Pacific, the role of the US-Japan alliance and the evolution of the Australia-Japan relationship. Euan and Michishita also discuss Japan’s major investments in defence, including a promise to increase defence funding by 60 percent, and opportunities to increase regional cooperation on security, including through AUKUS.

Note: This episode was recorded on the sidelines of the conference, so please forgive the less than perfect audio quality.

Guests:

⁠Euan Graham⁠

⁠Narushige Michishita

Stop the World: Why auld acquaintance should ne’er be forgot

Australia and the United Kingdom have a lot of shared history and values, but not a lot of shared geography. For a long time, that left the strategic relationship feeling a little dusty—a friendship to be taken for granted. But the two countries’ security partnership has a sense of deepening urgency, with the creation of AUKUS, the UK’s Indo-Pacific tilt and the recent signing of a new defence and security cooperation agreement. With Russia’s war against Ukraine and Chinese regional assertiveness, Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security are increasingly seen as tied.

To unpack these developments, ASPI’s Stop the World podcast is devoting today’s episode to the Australia-UK strategic relationship.

ASPI senior analyst Alex Bristow speaks with UK High Commissioner Vicki Treadell and Alessio Patalano, professor of war and strategy in East Asia at King’s College London. And in the episode’s second session, ASPI senior analyst Euan Graham speaks with Philip Shetler-Jones, senior research fellow in Indo-Pacific security at the Royal United Services Institute.

Guests:

⁠Alex Bristow⁠

⁠Vicki Treadell⁠

⁠Alessio Patalano⁠

⁠Euan Graham⁠

⁠Philip Shetler-Jones⁠