The year of elections was also feared to be the year that deepfakes would be weaponised to manipulate election results or undermine trust in democracy.

The record-breaking 2024 figure of about 4 billion voters eligible to go to the polls across more than 60 countries coincided with the full-fledged arrival and widespread uptake of multimodal generative artificial intelligence (AI), which enables almost anyone to make fake images, videos and sound.

Have these fears been realised? Our centre has analysed the incidence of AI-generated disinformation around the UK election held on July 4 and found both reasons for some reassurance, but also grounds for concern over long-terms trends eroding democracy that these threats exacerbate.

In contrast to fears of a tsunami of AI fakes targeting political candidates, the UK saw only a handful of examples of such content going viral during the campaign period.

While there’s no evidence these examples swayed any large number of votes, we did see spikes in online harassment against the people targeted by the fakes. We also observed confusion among audiences over whether the content was authentic.

These early signals point to longer term trends that would damage the democratic system itself, such as online harassment creating a ‘chilling’ effect on the willingness of political candidates to participate in future elections, and an erosion of trust in the online information space as audiences become increasingly unsure about which content is AI-generated and therefore which sources can be trusted.

Similar findings on the impact of generative AI misuse in 18 other elections since January 2023 are reported in a recent CETaS briefing paper.

There has of course been a sensible case for heightened vigilance this year. From India to the UK, and from France to the US, the outcome of many of 2024’s elections have had, or will have, enormous geopolitical implications, thus giving malicious actors strong incentives to interfere.

The capability that generative AI gives users to create highly realistic content at scale using simple keyboard prompts has enhanced the disruptive powers of sophisticated state actors. But it has also dramatically lowered the barriers to access, such that even individual members of the public can pose risks to the integrity of democratic processes – including elections.

The latter threat has been underscored by comments from Australia’s Director-General of Security (Mike Burgess) last week, when he helped announce the lifting of the country’s terrorism threat level. The basis for the increase was in part, Burgess said, that people with violent intent were ‘motivated by a diversity of grievances and personal narratives’ and were ‘interacting in ways we have not seen before’.

As a result, the risk of mis- and disinformation influencing election outcomes is much more serious.

Looking at the UK general election however, generative AI turned out to play a lesser role than traditional automated threats. For instance, several investigations into election-related content on online platforms found hallmarks of bot accounts seeking to sow division over controversial campaign issues such as immigration.

Some had possible links to Russia, and pushed pro-Kremlin narratives about the war in Ukraine. While these bot activities did include a few instances of AI-generated election material being circulated, the majority used a well-established tactic known as ‘astroturfing’, in which many automated accounts are used to increase perceived popular support for a particular policy stance or political candidate by spamming thousands of fake comments on relevant social media posts.

Alongside these bot incidents, the UK was targeted by a fake news operation with strong connections to a Russian-affiliated disinformation network called Doppelganger. Known as ‘CopyCop’, the operation involved the spreading of fictitious articles about the war in Ukraine, to confuse the UK public and reduce support for military aid. As part of CopyCop, real news stories were pasted into AI chatbots and then re-written to align them to the network’s strategic aims.

However, many had prompts left in, which betrayed obvious signs of AI editing and therefore failed to attract much engagement. That said, some of these sources were picked up by Russian media influencers and spread across their channels to tens of thousands of users. Often, the real sources of the articles were concealed in a tactic called ‘information laundering’ in an effort to trick users into assuming it originated from a credible news outlet.

While these disinformation activities can be connected to hostile foreign states, most viral misleading AI content in the UK election came from members of the public. This content included deepfakes that implicated political candidates in controversial statements that they never made. Interestingly, many users behind the content claimed they were doing it for satirical or ‘trolling’ purposes. Others may have pushed the content to increase support for their political party or because they were disillusioned with conventional political campaigns. This range of motives across different users highlights the new sources of risk and the expanded threat landscape that stem from such wide access to generative AI systems.

Taken together, the most prominent disinformation problems during the UK election did not arise from novel AI technology, but from longstanding issues tied to social media platforms – including the role of influencer accounts and recommender algorithms.

As we look ahead to the US election in November, it is vital that these platforms co-ordinate with different sectors to invest in measures to protect users.

This includes red-teaming exercises, requiring clear labels on AI-generated political adverts, and engaging with fact-checking organisations to detect malicious content before it goes viral.

And with Australia facing its own federal election in the next nine months, continued scrutiny of the risks and the malicious perpetrators – and emerging measures to combat them – is also vitally in the country’s interests.

• This article is part of a short series The Strategist is running in the lead up to ASPI’s Sydney Dialogue on September 2 and 3. The event will cover key topics in critical, emerging and cyber technologies, including disinformation, electoral interference, artificial intelligence, hybrid warfare, clean technologies and more.

Vietnam’s prime minister, Pham Minh Chinh, made a very successful trip to the United Kingdom in early November, putting the rapidly improving relations between the two countries into the spotlight. The visit to the COP26 climate summit took place a year after Britain and Vietnam ‘refreshed’ their 10-year-old strategic partnership with a new set of bilateral commitments. Chinh was accompanied by a large delegation, and many side meetings were held with British officials and organisations. Clearly, there is interest in further developing the bilateral relationship.

So, what are the reasons for these deepening ties and in which areas might the two governments increase their ambitions? The first question is relatively easy to answer: both Vietnam and the UK face a changed geostrategic environment. Although Vietnam’s leadership takes care to avoid overemphasising strategic issues in bilateral ties, it’s clear that a key driver of the new relationship is the intensifying geopolitical competition in the Indo-Pacific. Vietnam has opted for a ‘multidirectional’ foreign policy and is reaching out to new partners, particularly those which share an interest in pushing back against the strategic challenges that Vietnam faces.

Another factor is Brexit. Vietnam now sees the UK as a more independent actor and Britain is looking to new opportunities in the Indo-Pacific. This ‘tilt’ towards the region was announced earlier this year in the British government’s integrated review of foreign policy. The UK sees Vietnam, a country of more than 100 million people, as a partner for increased trade, investment and diplomatic cooperation. With the UK now formally a ‘dialogue partner’ of ASEAN, it needs to work more closely with the organisation’s members both individually and collectively.

That said, it’s important to remain clear-eyed about the fundamental differences between the two countries’ political systems and strategic dispositions. Neither side is likely to transform its governance or its international orientation in the short or medium term. Nonetheless, there are many areas where cooperation can be expanded and others where new ground can be broken.

There are opportunities across the spectrum of diplomatic engagement, ranging from sharing strengths in fisheries management and managing the challenges caused by rising sea levels to collaborating on defence. Vietnam’s most pressing needs are in tackling Covid-19 and its consequences, generating sustainable economic growth, and coping with the many threats posed by climate change. These are all areas in which the two sides would do well to increase their ambitions and cooperation. Likewise, the UK and Vietnam have a strong shared interest in upholding and promoting an open international order. There are already examples of diplomatic and security cooperation between the two, and these can be further enhanced.

The key word for the future of UK–Vietnam relations is, and will remain, ‘trust’. Britain should expect change to be gradual, and both sides will take time to assess developments before pursuing further steps. Therefore, the focus should be on building trust by rendering assistance in areas that ‘cost’ relatively little for large gains—Covid-19, climate policy, infrastructure development and trade— before deepening cooperation in more complex areas such as security agreements.

The vaccination rollout in Britain is going well, with three-quarters of the total population having had their first dose and nearly two-thirds having had their second. Vietnam, after initially handling the Covid-19 outbreak well, is now struggling under new waves of the virus. An exchange of information on outbreak management and the provision of additional vaccine doses clearly signal the UK’s intent to be a reliable and trustworthy partner.

Vietnam made some major commitments on combating climate change at the COP26 summit that will create new areas for cooperation on energy generation and transmission. These efforts may come too late for some communities in the Mekong Delta, however, and the UK should support Vietnam’s efforts to protect human security for communities at risk from rising sea levels. This is a relatively small thing for the UK to do that will have large benefits for the Vietnamese people and will help promote trust between the two governments.

Vietnam has a particular need for infrastructure development to support its rapidly growing but bottlenecked economy. While it’s unlikely that UK companies will be able to compete with Chinese, Japanese and South Korean contractors in big tenders, there will be niches that British businesses are well placed to capitalise on. Both governments need to publicise and incentivise businesses to take advantage of the opportunities that exist under the UK–Vietnam free trade agreement.

Though the growing relationship between the UK and Vietnam is broad and extensive, there are areas where security cooperation is desirable to both sides. In October, a British warship, HMS Richmond, conducted the Royal Navy’s first ‘passing exercise’ with a Vietnamese counterpart. Although a low-key event, it was a milestone. Maritime cooperation is likely to continue in the future, ranging from ‘softer’ issues such as hydrography, maritime domain awareness and legal training to exchanges with HMS Spey and HMS Tamar, the two British offshore patrol vessels now deployed in the region.

Britain is unlikely to become Vietnam’s premier diplomatic partner, but with recent visits by Ben Wallace and Dominic Raab, the British defence and foreign secretaries, there’s scope for the two sides to construct a loose and non-binding defence and security roadmap together. It could include a long-term but realistic goal, such as the establishment of a 2+2 or ‘extensive strategic partnership’—similar to that Vietnam has with Japan—over a five-year period.

UK–Vietnam relations are currently ‘good, healthy and stable’. Given the intensification of geopolitical competition in the Indo-Pacific, it’s important that they remain that way while developing in intensity and trust. Although the relationship between the two countries is often overlooked, the UK can play a valuable role in Vietnam’s developing multidirectional foreign policy, just as Vietnam can help facilitate Britain’s Indo-Pacific tilt.

Above all, the British government needs to avoid the perception that it is pushing Vietnam to choose between its international partners. But as they boost their cooperation, Hanoi and London would do well to coordinate even further with like-minded partners such as Australia and Japan to reduce duplication and competition, as well as to generate a network of Indo-Pacific partners with a deep commitment to upholding an open international order.

In March, the United Kingdom released its integrated review of security, defence, development and foreign policy, titled Global Britain in a competitive age. It’s quite possible that, after the next federal election, Australia’s government will want to revisit its international policy settings. Is an integrated review the way to go?

Australia has traditionally released separate planning documents for defence, foreign affairs and international aid. With the focus on closer coordination across defence, diplomacy and development, there’s a case to be made for going down the UK route. While the defence strategic update and Partnerships for recovery development policy only came out last year, the 2017 foreign policy white paper is looking dated and its lead author, Richard Maude, recently called for an update in ‘a smashed-up Covid-19 world.’

The UK review is less review and more strategy. It doesn’t trawl over the past looking for failure or spruiking success but spends the vast majority of its 100 pages looking forward. The overview clearly sets the scene, stating: ‘A defence of the status quo is no longer sufficient for the decade ahead.’

Critics who want to find fault will easily identify some bombast and overly ambitious goals. The ‘force for good’ language can grate, and there are some vague plans where problems outpace solutions, perhaps indicating a somewhat rushed process.

But this misses much of what is groundbreaking and constructive.

Commentators have described the review as strategically innovative, setting Britain up with ‘a new strategic lexicon for thinking about international affairs—one more suited to 21st-century realities’. Perhaps its greatest achievement is giving a sense of national vision: ‘It conveys that, for a country that has lost both its empire and its closest continental partner, it has finally found its place in the international system.’

As Abhijnan Rej noted in The Diplomat, the review makes a clear, unambiguous prediction about the future structure of the international system that is multipolar and Indo-Pacific-centred, with a larger role for middle powers. The review is willing to rethink orthodoxies, including the impacts of globalisation and the size and role of the state, and to position the UK to spend more and be selectively interventionist.

Particularly notable features of the review are its integrated reframing of issues such as climate change, conflict and the interconnectedness of international and domestic events. As it notes, ‘responding to state threats can no longer be viewed as a narrow “national security” or defence agenda’. And there is follow through, with climate change finance getting an £11.6 billion boost.

It is also willing to come to sharp judgement on the responses required: naming adversaries, making a big bet on building a strong ‘technological industrial complex’ and designing more joined-up government programs and funding. The emphasis on science and technology as an enabler—of economic, cyber, military and soft power—is pervasive and backed up with a slew of new agencies including an £800 million Advanced Research and Invention Agency, an Office for Artificial Intelligence, a National Cyber Security Centre and a National Cyber Force.

Unsurprisingly, there isn’t a perfect landing on everything. The Indo-Pacific tilt, much highlighted in Australian coverage, is somewhat thin, with an underwhelming list of actions. Britain sees the economic prize and the need to defend trade routes, democracy and human rights, but winning strategies are hard to discern.

The reaction in the UK has been positive. The main concerns expressed have been with prioritisation and implementation, in particular that it covered a ‘laundry list of issues’ and that many proposed actions were vague, general or unrealistic. This misses the point of what type of document it is: one that provides a vision and high-level guidance. Its conclusions in many areas were either to indicate the main lines of anticipated development or to initiate sectoral reviews. This suggests the need to be clear about the aim of the exercise so there’s no perception of overpromising and underdelivering.

The UK review meets the needs of a post-Brexit Britain trying to become a ‘global Britain’. But its approach also offers benefits for a country like Australia that must work harder to have influence in its region.

As Matt Sussex argues: ‘Attaining a more clear-eyed and holistic vision about precisely what the threat and opportunity landscape looks like—as well as the types of capabilities needed to address them—is precisely the kind of activity Australia’s strategic and security community should be engaging in.’

Australia has arguably been an outlier in its reluctance to embrace more holistic policymaking. Critics of integrated strategies argue that they can lead to an obsession with perfecting documents rather than taking practical actions. Some say they are rigid and prone to being out of date by the time they’re completed. Others express concerns about the securitisation of everything. All these outcomes are possible, but none is inevitable.

An integrated international relations strategy is not a panacea, but the process can allow policymakers to step out of constraints, re-evaluate risks and opportunities, and chart a new course. It can bolster national determination to engage with the world and shape it to our interests. It cannot miraculously create a whole-of-government, whole-of-nation culture where it’s lacking, but it can help to build one where it’s sought.

And there are now signs of change in Australia. The Office of the Pacific was established in 2019 to enhance whole-of-government coordination, and the 2020 Southeast Asia package was presented as a whole-of-government initiative. There is an appetite for more integrated approaches, as demonstrated by enthusiasm, including from ministers, for the Asia-Pacific Development, Diplomacy and Defence Dialogue.

Prime Minister Scott Morrison has said Australia needs to use ‘all elements of statecraft to shape the world we want to see’. This suggests the need to break down siloed thinking through the deliberate use of integrating tools and techniques that help us to think differently. An integrated international strategy might be just the place to start.

‘In the decade ahead, the UK will deepen our engagement in the Indo-Pacific, establishing a greater and more persistent presence than any other European country.’

Those are the words of the British government’s long-awaited integrated review, which establishes the vision and strategy for ‘global Britain’ in the 2020s.

The outcome is in some ways eye-popping; in others, it is very sensible and conventional. It marks the culmination of a process that Prime Minister Boris Johnson promised, on initiation, would become the deepest and broadest British foreign, security, development and defence review since the end of the Cold War. On that, it delivers.

The review is strategically innovative in many respects. It jettisons Britain’s support for the post–Cold War ‘rules-based international system’ and commits to generating an ‘open international order’. It champions the pursuit of national sovereignty and power—predicated on a dynamic scientific and technological base—as the overriding UK strategic objective. It seeks to reposition the UK as a stronger custodian of collective security, and it backs that up by pledging to beef up Britain’s nuclear stockpile and enhance its military presence by forward-deploying more assets, including warships, not least to the Indo-Pacific.

Although Britain upheld an Indo-Pacific presence throughout the 20th and early 21st centuries, the European continent continued to exert a greater gravitational pull. From holding back the German advance during the two world wars, Britain went on to help contain the Soviet Union. It then put out several fires in the western Balkans before leading the way with bolstering NATO’s deterrence measures on the eastern flank of the alliance, providing the most troops to the most locations in the Enhanced Forward Presence initiative.

Neither Brexit nor the integrated review will change Britain’s geography. The review is unequivocal in stating, ‘The precondition for Global Britain is the … security of the Euro-Atlantic region, where the bulk of the UK’s security focus will remain.’ It describes Russia as the most ‘acute and direct threat’ to British security. In order to help underwrite the defence of Europe, the review commits to boosting Britain’s nuclear weapons stockpile by some 40%.

But it is telling that the review contains only 15 references to the ‘Euro-Atlantic’ compared with 32 to the ‘Indo-Pacific’. It is equally telling that the integrated review has a two-page spread on the Indo-Pacific to emphasise the UK’s need to adapt to new geopolitical and geoeconomic circumstances.

The review explains the strategic significance of the Indo-Pacific:

By 2030, it’s likely that the world will have moved further towards multipolarity, with the geopolitical and economic centre of gravity moving eastward towards the Indo-Pacific … The significant impact of China’s military modernisation and growing international assertiveness within the Indo-Pacific region and beyond will pose an increasing risk to UK interests.

For these reasons, the review commits the UK to uphold a more persistent presence in the Indo-Pacific region in the years to come. It foresees deeper relationships with countries such as Japan, India, Australia and the other nations of the Five Power Defence Arrangements. And it plans for the broadening of Britain’s geopolitical footprint—based on a ‘strategic array’ of military and logistics facilities—stretching from the Persian Gulf to Southeast Asia.

Indeed, the review states that Britain’s goal is to be ‘the European partner with the broadest and most integrated presence in the Indo-Pacific—committed for the long term, with closer and deeper partnerships, bilaterally and multilaterally’. It declares that the UK will seek enhanced commercial relations with Australia, New Zealand and India, as well as with organisations such as ASEAN and the countries of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. And it emphasises Britain’s strategic wherewithal and the Royal Navy’s global reach, represented by the planned deployment of HMS Queen Elizabeth to the Indo-Pacific later this year.

Are these ambitions realistic? Time will tell. Although no longer a superpower, the UK is not without capability, and a strong government now leads it with a large majority in the House of Commons. In a speech back in 2016, Johnson also expressed his personal commitment to a broader British presence ‘east of Suez’. To support his aspirations for the country, he pushed for a £16.5 billion (A$29.6 billion) increase in defence spending last year.

Where the integrated review may fall short is on China; it treads too fine a line between engaging with and deterring the Chinese Communist Party. It nonetheless marks a significant change of tone: China is framed as a ‘systemic competitor’. In this sense, the review sets Britain up with a new strategic lexicon for thinking about international affairs—one more suited to 21st-century realities. And given the constantly increasing challenges in the Indo-Pacific, better intellectual tools are certainly needed.

When is a war crime not a war crime? When it is committed by a British soldier more than five years ago—or at least that will be the case if the UK parliament passes the Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill. The bill has been voted through to the next stage in the House of Commons by a worrying 331 votes to 77.

The government has framed the bill as protecting British heroes in the armed forces against activist lawyers and suggested that criticising it amounts to denigrating the armed forces. That approach has been largely successful in silencing opposition to the bill.

But in recent months, ex-armed forces chiefs and senior legal figures (including the judge advocate general) have spoken out against the proposed legislation, saying that it damages Britain’s reputation as a defender of the international rule of law, papers over the inadequacies of the current system of war crime prosecution, and undermines morale and discipline in the armed forces.

If passed, the bill will create a presumption against prosecuting members of the UK’s armed forces accused of committing war crimes—including inhumane treatment, torture and murder—outside of a narrow, and arbitrary, five-year window. The attorney general will need to grant consent before any prosecution can proceed.

These measures combine to provide a ‘triple lock’ shielding alleged perpetrators from accountability under the UK’s legal system. According to the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture, Nils Melzer, this will ‘consolidate the impression of a deliberate policy of impunity’ and further erode ‘the UK’s traditional commitment to fundamental norms of international humanitarian law and human rights law’.

The bill imposes a limitation period on war crimes, which, in itself, is contrary to customary international law. The effect of this provision is that actions that fall under the umbrella term of ‘war crimes’ (only sexual assault is excluded) will be decriminalised in the UK.

Of most concern is the crime of torture, against which an absolute prohibition is firmly enshrined in international law. Not only is this a serious breach of the UN Convention Against Torture and the Geneva Conventions and their additional protocols, but it is also inconsistent with the UK’s own laws regarding the prosecution of serious crimes.

The UK, much like other common-law countries such as Australia and Canada, doesn’t impose a statute of limitations on indictable offences such as murder, torture and serious assault. Imposing one standard on the actions of British soldiers overseas and another for the rest of the population is contrary to one of the most fundamental principles of the rule of law: equality before the law.

The UK’s involvement in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan ended in 2009 and 2014, respectively, meaning that this bill will grant impunity for anyone accused of war crimes in these conflicts. One commentator has drawn a connection between the reversal of the UK government’s decision to exclude torture (originally drafted as an exception to the proposed law alongside sexual assault) and the continued allegations that the British army used illegal interrogation techniques in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Proponents of the bill say it will stop ‘vexatious’ legal claims being made against British soldiers. While false or unsubstantiated accusations certainly must be addressed in any legal institution, creating a blanket limitation that also blocks prosecutions into legitimate and serious allegations is not the solution.

Vexatious claims happen, yet until now they have been dealt with in the UK’s legal system. If the UK government was sincere in its desire to address these problems, it would recognise that it already has the tools to do so. Instead, the government’s introduction of this bill fits a broader pattern of impunity for and denial of legitimate allegations.

In taking this path, the government has failed to acknowledge that if British soldiers accused of committing war crimes are effectively granted impunity in the UK, they will be more vulnerable to being prosecuted through the International Criminal Court.

The principle of complementarity grants the ICC jurisdiction only where a state proves to be ‘unwilling or unable’ to genuinely investigate and prosecute offences alleged to have been committed by its citizens. This is not a far-fetched prospect; ‘hardly any’ British soldiers, and no senior military or political figures, have been convicted, or even prosecuted, despite compelling evidence of crimes being committed in Afghanistan and Iraq.

In the UK, several investigations and inquiries have been closed at the preliminary stages because the allegations were deemed to be of low to medium severity. However, alternative legal analysis argues that the assessments of severity were inconsistent with international standards in that they considered only the level of physical harm rather than taking a holistic view of the actions to determine if they constituted inhumane treatment.

The UK’s Overseas Operations Bill, as well as the Trump administration’s sanctions against the ICC, are serious blows to the international fight against impunity.

In Australia, New South Wales Supreme Court judge Paul Brereton has spent four years investigating claims that Australian special forces breached the laws of armed conflict while on operations in Afghanistan between 2005 and 2016.

Defence Minister Linda Reynolds said recently that the investigation is nearing its conclusion and warned that Australians would be dismayed by its findings.

When the report is released, the world will be watching how Australia responds.