We saw yesterday how geography helps determine the number of submarines required for a credible deterrent capability. But that’s not the end of the story. The characteristics of the submarines themselves are also important. For example, the speed of advance is the critical factor in determining how long it will take a submarine to complete the transit to and from a patrol area. This speed is determined not only by the submarine’s own design, but also by external factors such as weather, ocean currents, the need to remain covert to achieve the mission and level of ASW surveillance/threat. Design features of the submarine, such as hull shape and the rate at which it can recharge its batteries (and their capacity) will determine how it performs in those environments. Not all designs are equal; these features are all critical attributes that need to be balanced and optimised in the design of the future submarine. My brief summary understates the challenge and complexities involved in achieving this.

The external factors will vary during the course of a transit and the mission profile will be adapted ‘on the fly’ to accommodate these variations. Typically the submarine will ‘snort’ (run its diesels to recharge the batteries) at a slow speed and for a limited time, exploiting local acoustic and environmental conditions where possible to reduce counter detection risks, before going deep to run at higher speed using power from the battery to cover the ground. To avoid snorting in a high threat/surveillance situation in the choke points enroute to the patrol area, it’s possible that an air independent propulsion system may have to be used—though that’s generally a limited resource. Read more

It’s another public holiday here in sunny Canberra, but we thought these posts from our archives would be topical to revisit.

First up, submarines: last week saw Cameron Stewart publish articles on the prospects for life extension program for the Collins class submarines. Below is what we had to say about the public statements on the program last year.

Second is a look at Tony Abbott’s view of Australia’s foreign policy in the middle of last year, from a speech he gave to to the Heritage Foundation. Read more

Today’s White Paper launch saw the two ‘lower’ options for the future submarine taken off the table. We now know that the RAN’s future boats won’t be an existing off-the-shelf design or a relatively modest derivative of them. This decision was taken on the basis of a judgement that existing designs that were available for export or licence production in Australia didn’t have the performance—especially the range and endurance—needed for operations across the Asia-Pacific theatre.

In effect, this decision has removed the two least expensive, least risky, (probably) fastest and least capable options from the potential solutions. What we’ll see is either an evolution of the Collins class or an entirely new design. Both of these options are likely to be expensive and involve significant project risk. I don’t think they’re mutually exclusive, of which more shortly.

Also announced today was that there was a viable way ahead to keep the Collins boats operational for an additional duty cycle of eight years. (That was actually a re-announcement of comments made by Defence officials at last year’s Submarine Institute of Australia conference and in the second part of the Coles Review.) That’s important because, as Mark Thomson and I found last year, the only credible ways of avoiding a collapse of Australia’s submarine capability some time next decade was to either move to rapid acquisition of an existing design or to extend the Collins life to provide the time to design and build a replacement. Read more

Andrew Davies makes some points about maritime operations which need teasing out.

The first is in relation to maritime trade and the ability to protect it. It seems to me that in making the declaration that such protection is getting more difficult because of the reducing numbers of warships and the increasing numbers of merchant ships, there is an inherent assumption that such protection has to be achieved by mechanisms such as convoy. In other words, there has been a default to what is a particular operational/tactical method rather than an attempt to consider the issue as a whole. I find it interesting how often this happens when naval/maritime questions are raised in public, perhaps much more often than is the case on land or in the air.

There can be no doubt that the protection of shipping is a complex and constantly evolving problem. But that complexity needs to be borne in mind, because it works both for and against would-be protectors. There are many techniques for the protection and control of shipping, some time-honoured and some very new. Close protection of merchant ships by warships is a tool that may well be employed in particular circumstances, but it would be wholly impractical in others. Arguably, there have been a whole host of developments, such as the much improved maritime domain awareness systems now multiplying around the world, as well as remote and very long range sensors (such as passive and low frequency sonars) which provide much greater support to what needs to be at least a theatre (and potentially global) effort, and about which all too little has been said in public. What is also clear about the protection of maritime trade as a whole, as opposed to securing specific vital supplies to particular destinations, is that it would need to be on a coalition basis. As, arguably, it always has been. Read more