Tag Archive for: South Korea

Australia and South Korea: Leveraging the strategic potential of cooperation in critical technologies

Executive summary

Cooperation between Australia and the Republic of Korea (hereafter South Korea or the ROK) in a range of critical technology areas has grown rapidly in recent years. Underpinned by the Australia – South Korea Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Cyber and Critical Technology Cooperation signed in 2021, collaboration is currently centred around emerging technologies, including next-generation telecommunications, artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum computing. Such technologies are deemed to be critical due to their potential to enhance or threaten societies, economies and national security. Most are dual- or multi-use and have applications in a wide range of sectors.1

Intensifying geostrategic competition is threatening stability and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region. Particularly alarming is competition in the technological domain. ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker, a large data-driven project that now covers 64 critical technologies and focuses on high-impact research, reveals a stunning shift in research ‘technology leadership’ over the past two decades. Where the United States (US) led in 60 of the 64 technologies in the five years between 2003 and 2007, the US’s lead has decreased to seven technologies in the most recent five years (2019–2023). Instead, China now leads in 57 of those technologies.

Within the Indo-Pacific region, some countries have responded to those shifts in technology leadership through the introduction of policies aimed at building ‘technological sovereignty’. The restriction of high-risk vendors from critical infrastructure, the creation of sovereign industrial bases and supply-chain diversification are examples of this approach. But a sovereign approach doesn’t mean protectionism. Rather, many countries, including Australia and South Korea, are collaborating with like-minded regional partners to further their respective national interests and support regional resilience through a series of minilateral frameworks.

The Australia – South Korea technological relationship already benefits from strong foundations, but it’s increasingly important that both partners turn promise into reality. It would be beneficial for Australia and South Korea to leverage their respective strengths and ensure that collaboration evolves in a strategic manner. Both countries are leaders in research and development (R&D) related to science and technology (S&T) and are actively involved in international partnerships for standards-setting relating to AI and other technologies. Furthermore, both countries possess complementary industry sectors, as demonstrated through Australia’s critical-minerals development and existing space-launch capabilities on one hand, and South Korea’s domestic capacity for advanced manufacturing on the other.

This report examines four stages common to technological life cycles — (1) R&D and innovation; (2) building blocks for manufacturing; (3) testing and application; and (4) standards and norms. For each, we examine a specific critical technology of interest. Those four life-cycle areas and respective technologies—spanning biotechnologies-related R&D, manufacturing electric-battery materials, satellite launches and AI standards-setting—were chosen as each is a technology of focus for both countries. Furthermore, collaboration through these specific technological stages enables Australia and South Korea to leverage their existing strengths in a complementary manner (see Figure 1). Supporting the analysis of these four stages of the technological life cycle and selected critical technologies is data from ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker and the Composite Science and Technology Innovation Index (COSTII) jointly released by South Korea’s Ministry of Science and ICT (MSIT) and the Korea Institute of Science & Technology Evaluation and Planning (KISTEP).

Informed by that examination, this report identifies a set of recommendations for strengthening cooperation that is relevant for different stakeholders, including government and industry.

Policy recommendations

Biotechnologies

Australia and South Korea can enhance knowledge-sharing in biotechnologies-related R&D through people-to-people exchanges. Links should be formalised through an MoU between relevant institutions—such as Australia’s Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) and the Korea Research Institute of Bioscience and Biotechnology. An MoU could be used to implement initiatives such as a virtual mentoring program and long-term in-person exchanges (preferably at least 12 months in duration). Such exchanges would support immersive in-country interaction, enabling the transfer of specialised R&D expertise. Australian researchers could share knowledge about advances in early-stage clinical trials processes, while South Korean researchers could contribute insights into synthetic biology and AI tools in drug-discovery clinical-trial methodologies. Financial support from Australia’s National Health and Medical Research Council could facilitate the exchanges.2 There remains a need to address visa constraints impeding the free flow of researchers between both countries. While this report focuses on R&D, we suggest that there’s equal value in considering cooperation in the manufacturing stages of the biotechnologies value chain.

Recommendation 1: Formalise links between Australia’s and South Korea’s key biotechnologies R&D institutions by facilitating long-term people-to-people exchanges aimed at transferring specialised expertise. This includes in areas such as clinical trials, synthetic biology and AI integration in biotechnologies.

Electric batteries

Australian companies should consider the production of battery materials, including lithium hydroxide and precursor cathode active materials (pCAM), through joint ventures with South Korean battery manufacturers. Such ventures would benefit from jointly funded and owned facilities geographically close to requisite critical minerals. Since spodumene is needed for lithium hydroxide and nickel, cobalt and manganese are required for pCAM, Western Australia provides the ideal location for those facilities. Furthermore, BHP’s recent suspension of its Western Australian nickel operations provides an ideal opportunity for a South Korean battery company to purchase those operations— securing nickel sulphate supplies necessary for pCAM manufacturing.3 There’s also the potential for South Korea to invest in cathode active manufacturing (CAM) manufacturing in Australia by taking advantage of the co-location of mining and pCAM operations.

The provision of loans with relatively low interest rates from South Korean Government–owned banks,4 as well as tax credits and energy incentives provided by the Australian Government, would assist in offsetting the relatively high operational costs (including for labour and materials) associated with establishing joint battery-material plants in Australia instead of South Korea.5 Environmental regulations will need careful consideration in assessing such proposals, such as those covering the disposal of by-products. In the case of sodium sulphate, that by-product can be used in fertilisers and even recycled for future use in battery-material manufacturing.6

Recommendation 2: Consider the establishment of facilities in Australia under joint venture arrangements between Australian and South Korean companies to enable expanded production of battery materials (including lithium hydroxide and pCAM).

Space and satellite technologies

Australia and South Korea should establish a government-to-government agreement that would facilitate the launch of South Korean satellites from northern and southern locations in Australia. This would be similar to the Australia–US Technologies Safeguard Agreement. The agreement would increase the ease with which companies from both countries can pursue joint launches by streamlining launch permit application processes, export controls, taxation requirements and environmental regulations. The agreement can establish a robust framework for joint operations and continued R&D in space and satellite technologies while ensuring that both countries protect associated sensitive technologies. Any such agreement should prioritise consultations with community stakeholders to further inclusive decision-making focused on addressing the social and environmental impacts of space launches.7 Engaging with Indigenous landowners to ensure the protection of cultural heritage, sacred sites and traditional land stewardship is particularly key.8

Recommendation 3: Establish a government-to-government agreement similar to the Australia–US Technologies Safeguard Agreement to bolster the ease with which Australian and South Korean companies can conduct joint satellite launches on Australian soil.

Artificial intelligence technologies

Closer collaboration between Standards Australia and the Korea Standards Association in establishing international AI standards will be beneficial. The established positive record of Australian and South Korean stakeholders in relation to international norms and standards relating to critical technologies, and comparative regional strengths, provide a means to ensure that international AI standards continue to evolve in a way that fosters interoperability, innovation, transparency, diversity and security-by-design. One recommended body through which Australian and South Korean stakeholders could coordinate their respective approaches is the international, industry-led multistakeholder joint subcommittee (SC) created by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) known as the ISO/IEC Joint Technical Committee 1 Subcommittee 42 on AI (ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 42).

Recommendation 4: Coordinate the approach of Standards Australia and the Korea Standards Association in establishing international AI standards in international technology standards bodies, for example, through ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 42.

Full Report

For the full report, please download here.

  1. J Wong Leung, S Robin, D Cave, ASPI’s two-decade Critical Technology Tracker, ASPI, Canberra, 28 August 2024, online. ↩︎
  2. Austrade, ‘Australia: A go-to destination for clinical trials’. ↩︎
  3. ‘Western Australian Nickel to temporarily suspend operations’, BHP, 11 July 2024, online. ↩︎
  4. Government-owned banks in South Korea are currently funding a similar joint venture in the form of the POSCO – Pilbara Minerals lithium hydroxide facility in South Korea. For more information, see A Orlando, ‘POSCO Pilbara Lithium Solution executes US$460 million loan agreement to help fund chemical facility in South Korea’, Mining.com.au, 27 February 2023, online. ↩︎
  5. In particular, the high cost of a joint lithium hydroxide plant in Australia rather than South Korea was the primary reason for the joint POSCO – Pilbara Minerals plant to be built in Gwangyang, South Korea. For more information, see P Kerr, ‘Lithium processing is 40pc cheaper in South Korea, says POSCO’, Australian Financial Review, 22 May 2023, online. ↩︎
  6. M Stevens, ‘Cathode manufacturing: solutions for sodium sulphate’, Worley, 29 May 2024, online. ↩︎
  7. ‘Koonibba Test Range launches large commercial rocket’, Asia–Pacific Defence Reporter (APDR), 6 May 2024, online; J Hamilton, A Costigan, ‘Koonibba looks to the future as a rocket launch site, but one elder is concerned about the impact on sacred sites’, ABC News, 11 May 2024, online. ↩︎
  8. M Garrick, ‘Equatorial Launch Australia lodges plans for expansion to 300 hectares for Arnhem Space Centre’, ABC News, 8 November 2023, online. ↩︎

Tag Archive for: South Korea

Strengthening Australia’s space cooperation with South Korea

The time is ripe for Australia and South Korea to strengthen cooperation in space, through embarking on joint projects and initiatives that offer practical outcomes for both countries. This is the finding of a new ASPI report by an ASPI visiting fellow from South Korea’s Defence Acquisition Projects Agency (DAPA), Sangsoon Lee, on the opportunities ahead for Australia and South Korea in terms of space cooperation.

Lee’s paper makes clear that there are opportunities to boost space cooperation and development to mutually benefit both states in areas such as national security, economic growth and resource management.

The paper argues that the first area of collaboration should be in joint research and development into small satellite technologies. These are satellites under 100kg, which, if developed collaboratively, could build domestic manufacturing skills and infrastructure in this important technology area. The paper notes that constellations of small satellites are more effective in strengthening resilience in the face of growing counterspace threats. Lee provides the example of South Korea requiring small satellites to enhance surveillance and reconnaissance of North Korea, and he notes that Australia also has a requirement for Earth observation satellites to support civil and defence needs.

A constellation of small satellites, jointly developed by Australia and South Korea, could thus benefit both countries. Although the current Australian government cancelled the National Space Mission for Earth Observation (NSMEO) project in June 2023, the requirement that it was to meet—for space-based Earth observation and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance— remains in place. By jointly developing such satellites, the paper argues, the Australia and South Korea could gain benefits not only from enhancing sovereign space capability but also through developing rapid technological innovation cycles.

Building on from collaboration on small satellites, the paper then suggests collaboration in the critical area of positioning, navigation and timing (PNT). This could be achieved by establishing suitable ground stations in Australia to support and enhance South Korea’s planned Korean Position System (KPS) and the Korean Augmentation Satellite System (KASS). Australia is optimally located for ground stations, as Japan has recognised in an agreement for this country to host the Japanese Quasi-Zenith Satellite System. Furthermore, by hosting these ground facilities, such collaboration would complement Australia’s existing Southern Positioning Augmentation Network (SouthPAN), which is also used by New Zealand. The overall outcome would be to enhance the accuracy, diversity and resilience of PNT services open to both states.

By far the most significant aspect of South Korean and Australian space cooperation could be space launch. Through streamlining procedures and regulatory arrangements such as launch permits export licenses and payment of export-import taxies, cross-border movement and launch of commercial rockets could become more efficient. To this end, the paper recommends that South Korea and Australia should negotiate an agreement to build and operate a permanent space launch site that takes full advantage of Australia’s proximity to the equator and distance from potential threats.

Rockets launched close to the equator for easterly orbits gain the starting advantage of the Earth’s rotational velocity, so the launch cost per kilogram is lower than for launches from higher latitudes. For those orbits and also for orbits that cross the poles, launches from Australia do not endanger people by flying over heavily populated territory. South Korea lacks proximity to the equator, and its rockets must dodge the territory of neighbours.

Lee’s paper notes that some cooperation is already underway in regard to launch. South Korean defence company Hanwha Group is exploring use of Australian launch services through a partnership with Gilmour Space, which intends to launch its Eris 1 rocket from Bowen, Queensland. Korean firm Innospace has signed an agreement with Equatorial Launch Australia for launch services from that company’s proposed Cape York space port.

In addition to streamlining regulatory arrangements for easier collaboration, Lee’s paper argues that a dedicated South Korean launch site, established by Seoul, could then benefit local economies.

Finally, the paper argues that there should be increased collaboration in space situational awareness and space traffic management as part of broader cooperation in space security. This makes inherent sense given the reality that space, as an operational domain in its own right, is highly contested and likely to become a warfighting domain in a crisis. Boosting cooperation on space situational awareness is a key step towards collaborating on deterrence through resilience, which other aspects of cooperation, such as small satellite development and responsive launch also contribute to.

Lee’s paper concludes with a recommendation for a space dialogue that brings together government, the private sector and civil society. This can help build collaboration and see a regular sharing of perspectives on both practical collaboration and policy development. Outcomes could include a government-to-government agreement on space launch cooperation and there could be a technology working group to support cooperation in areas such as small satellite development and PNT.

That would provide a foundation for more ambitious cooperation, with Lee’s paper considering ‘moonshot’ projects such as a lunar rover to be jointly developed and made by South Korea and Australia. Others could be a collaborative mission to a resource-rich asteroid and or research on technologies such as space manufacturing, resource utilisation and space logistics.

Australia and South Korea are both new space powers, so it makes sense for them to work together to make faster progress in using the space domain to their mutual benefit. Sangsoon Lee’s analysis is excellent and thought provoking. It represents a good contribution to any future discussion between South Korea and Australia on strengthening space cooperation.

Strengthening South Korea’s national security by adopting the cloud

To improve its national security, South Korea must improve its ICT infrastructure. Knowing this, the government has begun to move towards cloud computing.

The public and private sectors are now taking a holistic national-security approach that includes the country’s military capability and cybersecurity. Success in this approach will require an improved competitive edge across emerging technologies to project and defend national power.

Cloud-based ICT infrastructure provides scalable computing capacity by managing vast quantities of data and adapting to varying workloads. From a defence perspective, flexible computing capacity enables rapid scaling during different mission phases.

Beyond modernising internal ICT infrastructure and military readiness, increasing South Korea’s cloud uptake could improve the country’s military interoperability with regional partners by facilitating real-time sharing of data at lower levels of classification and sensitivity.

Such information sharing is particularly important considering the international growth of South Korea’s defence industrial base, which includes Hanwha’s facility in Australia and Korea Aerospace Industries’ ongoing support to the Philippine Air Force to enhance its air combat capabilities. Furthermore, if South Korea participates in specific AUKUS Pillar 2 projects, a common federated cloud-based platform could foster secure information-sharing, advancing collaborative development of advanced technological capabilities.

The South Korean government has introduced initiatives and policies to catch up on cloud adoption, including the 2015 Act on the Development of Cloud Computing and Protection of its Users, the 2022 Digital Strategy and a series of plans in 2024. But to improve cloud uptake in line with these policies and strengthen national security, the South Korean government must overcome several barriers.

The first of these barriers relates to the Cloud Security Assurance Program, a certification that cloud service providers (CSPs) must receive before working with South Korean government agencies. Despite a reformation in 2022, the certification process remains complex and lengthy. Australia’s Certified Cloud Services List program faced similar criticism for its complexity, and was terminated in June 2020 following an independent review by the Australian Signals Directorate.

ASD’s review into Australia’s cloud services list outlined a need for greater industry engagement, for example through co-designed cloud security guidelines and the establishment of industry consultative mechanisms. In South Korea, regulatory reform processes—sparked by uptake challenges in the public sector—must engage CSPs to better meet provider needs.

This will require a careful balancing act. Although international CSPs can now serve government agencies, their ability to support public systems managing sensitive or private data—labelled as mid-risk and high-risk tier segments—is limited. Conversely, domestic CSPs have argued that the entry of international CSPs into the government market threatens their survival.

While market competition is healthy, the concerns of domestic CSPs mustn’t be understated—the government plays an important role in the success of domestic tech companies, such as Samsung and Naver, which are now points of national pride.

To meet the commercial interests of both international and domestic CSPs, international-domestic collaborations must continue to be brokered in South Korea. One recent example is between KT Corporation and Microsoft Corporation, which involves the development of a sovereign cloud solution to drive cloud and AI innovation in the public sector and regulated industries.

The second barrier to cloud uptake is the country’s relatively low level of necessary expertise. Cloud-specific skills are required for organisations to assess the benefits of implementing cloud services. Despite the country’s technologically advanced status, a 2021 OECD report stated that less than 15 percent of South Korean small and medium enterprises provided general ICT education to employees.

The third barrier, also linked to inadequate cloud expertise, is perceived security concerns. South Korean enterprises are conscious of the risks that cyberattacks pose, such as those that North Korea’s Lazarus group has been conducting since 2009.

Many leading CSPs offer cyber protections through mitigation as well as response and recovery at scale, which would become particularly important in major combat operations near the Korean Peninsula, such in the South China Sea. However, organisations with limited cloud expertise often stick to existing systems due to misconceptions around cloud security and the perceived burden of data protection under the shared responsibility model.

To overcome these final two barriers, ICT professionals must upskill. Beyond government-led initiatives, such as a 2021 plan to nurture a talent pool of 10,000 cloud-trained professionals, CSPs are taking the lead. For example, Amazon Web Services Korea offers free cloud-computing education to South Korean jobseekers.

South Korea’s slow adoption of cloud computing presents a gap in its national security and technological competitiveness. The government has recognised cloud infrastructure as essential to strengthening national power and interoperability with allies and partners—ultimately supporting defence, economic growth and emerging technologies. This has pushed South Korea to develop uptake strategies, but regulatory hurdles, low digital literacy and security concerns are persistent challenges. Encouraging collaboration between CSPs and improving digital literacy will only become more important as cloud technology becomes central to South Korean security.

South Korea must move beyond partisan division to tackle security threats

South Korea’s internal political instability leaves it vulnerable to rising security threats including North Korea’s military alliance with Russia, China’s growing regional influence and the United States’ unpredictability under President Donald Trump. South Korea needs a firm and cohesive security strategy that aligns with the US and Japan. Otherwise, it may suffer irreparable damage.

North Korea’s nuclear advancements pose the most immediate threat. In January, Pyongyang launched what it claimed to be a hypersonic missile, which flew 1000km across Japan’s exclusive economic zone. During Joe Biden’s term as US president, South Korea increased military and intelligence cooperation with the US and Japan to enhance extended deterrence. Military information sharing, the US-South Korea Nuclear Consultative Group and the deployment of US submarines have all been important responses to North Korea’s growing arsenal.

However, uncertainty has grown since former South Korean president Yoon Suk-yeol—an advocate of the Korea-US-Japan trilateral mechanism—was impeached. The return of Trump’s transactional approach to international partnerships has worsened this unease. Should US leadership withdraw, South Korea and Japan must take the lead together to maintain regional security. South Korea’s strong army and THAAD missile defence, combined with Japan’s formidable navy and Aegis destroyer fleet, can strengthen collective security in East Asia amid intensifying tension.

The challenge comes from South Korea’s sharp partisan divide. Critics argue that Yoon’s efforts to normalise relations with Japan have compromised historical justice and compensation for victims of Japanese colonialism. The opposition uses historical grievances to mobilise anti-Japanese sentiment against the conservatives.

They also believe that stronger military ties with Japan will raise tensions with China and obstruct peacemaking with Pyongyang. This argument was prominent in the initial impeachment resolution, which attacked Yoon for being too pro-Japan and antagonising North Korea, China and Russia.

North Korea has long used these divides to destabilise South Korea’s relationship with Japan and undermine their efforts to counter Pyongyang’s operations. During the Japan-South Korea trade dispute, North Korean intelligence directed its espionage ring in Seoul to intensify anti-Japanese sentiment by organising protests and social media campaigns. If South Korea’s partisan division continues to strain its relationship with Japan, it will only embolden North Korea’s nuclear expansion and alliance with Moscow.

This division has also impaired South Korea’s military apparatus. Ex-defense minister Kim Yong-hyun was convicted for his part in the martial law crisis, leaving a leadership void in national defence. The opposition subsequently demanded an independent investigation of military operations, such as broadcasting propaganda over loudspeakers near the North Korean border. They accused the military of treason, suggesting that these operations were designed to provoke Pyongyang and start a war. These controversies are undermining public trust and demoralising the military, which is exactly what North Korea wants.

To restore stability, South Korea needs to rebuild its decision-making body. The parliament must reach a consensus on appointing a new minister of national defense. It’s essential that this new minister be a civilian to ensure the political neutrality of the armed forces and prevent groupthink in decision-making. Strengthening civilian control will ensure the military is not misused as a political tool to violate democratic principles. Furthermore, empty military command posts—left vacant after widespread convictions—need to be filled as soon as possible to restore order and confidence within the military.

Military readiness and deterrence through cohesive and predictable policy must take precedence over political bickering. South Korea must a develop a long-term security strategy—one that isn’t rewritten with each new government. Security must be viewed independently from domestic politics, and both the ruling and the opposition parties must set aside factional rivalries for national interest.

The opposition in particular needs to accept that working with Japan isn’t a choice—it’s a matter of survival, especially if US leadership diminishes. On this basis, the state council should build a broad consensus on security policy before the next administration takes office.

As regional threats grow, South Korea cannot afford to be stuck in internal divisions. South Korea’s survival depends on moving beyond partisan division and coming together to face the challenges ahead.

In trade, nothing can replace the US consumer. Still, Asian countries look to each other

How will the US assault on trade affect geopolitical relations within Asia? Will nations turn to China and seek protection by trading with each other?

The happy snaps a week ago of the trade ministers of China, Japan and South Korea shaking each other’s hands over progress on a trilateral trade pact suggested that possibility.

The three, from nations with deep historic antipathy towards each other, said an agreement would create ‘a predicable trade and investment environment’, and they promised to speed negotiations.

There had been no discernible progress on the proposed trilateral deal since negotiations were launched in 2012. That this was the first ministerial meeting since 2019 points to the challenge ahead.

Asian nations have been active—some would say hyper-active—in pursuit of trade deals. The Asian Development Bank counts 77 preferential trade agreements among the nations of the Asia-Pacific region (including Australia) and a further 109 agreements signed with nations outside the region. Its research shows the agreements provide little help to export volumes.

About 56 percent of Asia-Pacific trade is within the region, which is only slightly less than the internal trade of the European Union. However, the intra-regional trade share has shown no growth since 2005 and has in fact slipped since 2020, despite the spread of trade deals.

Asian nations hit by US tariffs will certainly seek sales elsewhere. However, the first link in the supply chains that bind together enterprises across the region remains China’s subsidised manufacturers while the prize market remains the ravenous appetite of the US consumer.

There have been big changes in Asian trade patterns over the past decade. China has become more self-sufficient, particularly since 2018, when Donald Trump launched his first round of tariffs.

China’s President Xi Jinping responded in 2020 with his Dual Circulation Strategy, under which China would remain open to world markets but would seek economic self-reliance and import substitution in strategic sectors.

An analysis by Hinrich Foundation shows the success of this import-substitution drive. For every $100 of GDP growth over the past decade, China has had to import only $12.50 of goods and services, whereas in the decade to 2013, it needed $21.50 of imports for every $100 of GDP growth.

China’s imports are increasingly concentrated among a handful of countries, led by Russia, Vietnam, Brazil and Australia. Hinrich estimates that countries representing less than 10 percent of the global economy have supplied two thirds of China’s import growth over the last decade.

China sought, in particular, to become less dependent on the United States as both a market and as a supplier. The US share of China’s exports fell from 20 percent in 2018 to 12 percent last year, while the US share of China’s imports dropped from 8 percent to 6 percent.

While China’s direct trade with the US has fallen, its trade with Southeast Asia has increased. China’s share of Southeast Asian exports rose from 12 percent to 16 percent over the past decade, while its share of the region’s imports went from 16 percent to 24 percent.

Rather than exporting finished goods to the US, China is selling components to such countries as Vietnam, Cambodia and Malaysia, which then sell finished goods to the US.

The US has provided most of the growth for Southeast Asian exporters, with its share of their sales rising from 9 percent to 15 percent over the past decade.

There has been no growth in the US share of Southeast Asian imports, which has held steady at around 6 percent for most of the past 20 years.

The US has also become much more self-sufficient over the past decade as a result of the surge in its oil and gas production following the development of fracking technology.

However, US imports of manufactured goods have continued to rise. Estimates by Council on Foreign Relations fellow Brad Setser show the US trade deficit in manufactured goods has almost doubled since the 2008 global financial crisis to about 1.3 percent of global GDP.

In the same time, China’s manufacturing surplus has almost tripled to 1.7 percent of global GDP. Other Asian countries have become intermediaries in the flow of manufactured goods from China to the US but have not replaced it.

There is no other market like the US consumer. US household spending in 2023 reached $19 trillion, double the level of the European Union and almost three times that of China.

The huge imposts on US imports from China, Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand and Indonesia will increase the cost and slow the flow of goods to US consumers, but there are no obvious markets to replace them.

Whether the tariffs act as the catalyst for the reindustrialisation of the US—an objective of both Republicans and Democrats—remains to be seen.

The 16th Madeleine Award: truths and totems in tumultuous times

Amid tumultuous times, it’s the annual moment to lift the curtain, up the lights and open the envelopes for the 16th Madeleine Award for symbol, stunt, prop, gesture or jest.

The Madeleine is a silly-season special, served at year’s start with a soupcon of seriousness, seeking sense in sayings, signs and symbols.

The award is inspired by the late Madeleine Albright, the US ambassador to the United Nations (1993 to 1997) and US secretary of state (1997 to 2001), who sent diplomatic messages via her lapel brooches. Now displayed at America’s diplomacy museum, those lapel pins expressed ‘hopes, determination, impatience, warnings or warm feelings’.

For Albright, it wasn’t ‘read my lips’ but ‘read my pins’. Her favourite mistake was taunting Vladimir Putin over Russia’s military brutality by wearing three monkey brooches, representing Putin’s stance of ‘See no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil’. Putin went ape. Sometimes the message is just too sharp, Albright reflected, judging ‘I’d gone too far’.

With no monkeying about, we turn to the minor Madeleines. The first is the OOPS! Award for blooper and blunder. This slip-up star is almost always won by a politician. The prize’s nickname is ‘The Boris’, in honour of Boris Johnson who provides the OOPS! axiom: ‘There are no disasters, only opportunities. And, indeed, opportunities for fresh disasters.’

The Boris winner is South Korea’s President Yoon Suk Yeol, for imposing martial law. Yoon’s power grab—the first use of martial law in 44 years—was a gamble that crashed in six hours. The president declared emergency rule at 10:30 pm on 3 December, only to lift it at 4:30 am on 4 December after the members of the National Assembly rushed to vote to overturn the decree. By 14 December, the assembly had impeached the president, and he faces the possibility of a separate charge of treason. For conjuring up a disaster that destroyed his leadership, Yoon becomes a worthy member of the Order of the OOPS!

Next is the ‘Diana prize’, marking ‘the utility and force of photographs’. The trophy is named for Diana, princess of Wales, a noblewoman who understood that you’re nix without pix: ‘As Diana used to say, the picture is what counts,’ former British prime minister Tony Blair wrote.

The Diana goes to the photo of Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese being welcomed to Papua New Guinea with headdress and garb. The picture by the ABC’s Melissa Clarke is a winner, not least, because it overturns the don’t-look-silly-rule of the political minder class: never let your boss wear a strange hat or unusual costume. Context beats the minder rule. Albanese was on his way to walk the Kokoda Track with PNG’s prime minister. The image shows a cheerful leader paying homage to PNG as well as to the military legend of Kokoda.

While giving the Diana to Albo in PNG headdress, the judges point to one of the greatest ever news pix, the July photograph of a bloodied Donald Trump with his raised fist and an American flag in the background, after he’d been wounded in an assassination attempt. The photo by Associated Press photojournalist Evan Vucci is in the same class as that of the US Marines raising the American flag on Iwo Jima in World War II. Journalists use the word ‘iconic’ too often, but Vucci’s image reaches that rare grade. The only defences for not gonging Vucci’s magnificent work is that the Diana tends toward light, not shade, and Trump was last year’s Diana winner, for his scowling police mugshot after being indicted on racketeering charges.

Now to the George Orwell prize for double think. In Orwell’s novel Nineteen Eighty-Four, Winston Smith labours in the Ministry of Truth, rewriting the past so history meets the shifting needs of the Party. In that spirit, the Orwell goes to Russia for creating a modern Ministry in RuWiki, to counter Wikipedia. In the RuWiki rendering of Vladimir Putin’s truth, Russian atrocities in Ukraine are merely ‘Western disinformation’.

As Foreign Policy commented: ‘RuWiki is an isolated digital ecosystem that has created an alternate reality. In this version, Holodomor, the man-made famine under Stalin’s rule that killed up to 8 million Ukrainians by some estimates, never happened.’ RuWiki lives the slogans Orwell describes carved into the concrete facade of the Ministry of Truth: ‘War is peace. Freedom is slavery. Ignorance is strength.’

We stay in Russia for the Madeleine Award itself. Finding hope in Putin’s Russia is the mark of an award that arcs towards optimism, channelling a great Albright line: ‘I am an optimist who worries a lot.’

In that spirit, the 16th Madeleine goes to an inspiring Russian politician, Alexei Navalny, killed in jail by the regime on 16 February 2024, at the age of 47. A fine obituary judgement of the opposition leader is that Navalny didn’t just defy Putin, he showed up his depravity, exposing the fear and greed at the heart of Russia’s regime.

Putin’s first attempt to murder Navalny was in 2020, when the lawyer was poisoned by nerve agent. Navalny survived and recovered in Germany. Then, he bravely returned to Russia, knowing exactly what he would face—a rigged trial and exile to the modern gulags. At the close of his trial, Navalny blasted the court with a favourite movie line: ‘Tell me, where does power lie? I believe that power lies in the truth.’

Alexei Navalny was a proud Russian nationalist who used his own life to symbolise what Russia should be. More than gesture, this was sacrifice expressed as greatness.

After a rocky year in Northeast Asia, prepare for another

2024 proved to be an unexpectedly dynamic year for Northeast Asia, and we must be ready for an equally unsteady 2025. Changes in political leadership, evolving ententes and uncertain policy trajectories may all contribute to confrontation, or they could open policy windows to de-escalation and cooperation. Both risk and opportunity await in the new year, and it will be up to policymakers to recognise them and take deliberate steps towards desired outcomes.

To prepare for the new year, it is essential to set the scene for the current political-military situation among the major Northeast Asian players: Russia, China, North Korea, South Korea and Japan. This builds a foundation for tackling the regional issues that await.

Immediate attention will fall to Russia, whose war of aggression against Ukraine has gained from participation by North Korean soldiers. Although both Pyongyang and the Kremlin disavow formal North Korean involvement, its personnel and materiel support reflects deepening ties, that were formalised in what they called the ‘Treaty of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’ signed during Vladimir Putin’s visit to the North Korean capital in June. An outstanding question heading into the new year is what North Korean soldiers will be bringing back from the Ukrainian front lines, be it tactics, techniques, and procedures; Russian equipment and technology; or all of the above.

Another lingering question is how deepening Russo-North Korean ties will affect each country’s relationship with China. North Korea has demonstrated its capacity for deftly playing the Kremlin and Beijing off one another, and while China still maintains substantial economic leverage over the North Koreans, financial and resource support from Russia shifts the power dynamics.

China has also expanded outreach and contact with other governments since the last meeting of the National People’s Congress in March, including resumption of the Military Maritime Consultation Agreement mechanism meetings with the United States, a trilateral summit with South Korea and Japan in Busan, and a stated ‘turnaround’ in relations with Australia in 2024. While Russia seems unfazed by this outreach, its impact on Sino-North Korean relations bears observation.

Meanwhile, North Korea began the year with its most important policy declaration since its announcement in 1993 that it was withdrawing from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. The government said in January that it was abandoning its decades-old unification policy with South Korea and, for the first time in its history, would recognise two sovereign states on the Korean peninsula. Steps to implement this policy soon followed, including dismantlement of inter-Korean related organisations and infrastructure. It also made substantial efforts to harden the boundary between the two Koreas with fences, walls and landmines.

Tensions on the Korean Peninsula were low throughout 2024. While Pyongyang employed tactics such as propaganda broadcasting and delivering trash into South Korea with balloons, it took measures to mitigate risk of runaway escalation. This was evident in early October when North Korea notified the US-led United Nations Command before dismantling roads and railways in the northern half of the demilitarised zone, as well as by its muted response to South Korea’s unexpected political turmoil in December. The forthcoming end-of-year Workers’ Party of Korea meeting will offer insight into its policy priorities for 2025, including possible signals to foreign governments—particularly the incoming US administration. Given its policy trajectory since abandoning unification with the South, North Korea may seek to normalise its status as a separate sovereign state in the coming year.

Elsewhere on the Korean peninsula, South Korea will enter 2025 in political disarray. Yoon Suk Yeol’s short-lived declaration of martial law led to his swift impeachment. While this demonstrated the strength of South Korea’s democratic institutions, the saga is not yet over. There is still a constitutional process to determine Yoon’s fate, which could take up to six months, including for deliberations in the country’s constitutional court. If it confirms Yoon’s removal, final resolution of the crisis with a general election may take a further two months.

While the exact date is unknown, observers should expect a new presidential administration in South Korea in 2025. Assuming the transition happens, a shift in power from the country’s conservatives to its progressives will be all but certain. As it stands, the current conservative platform, which champions South Korea’s role as a ‘global pivotal state’ and embraces multilateral security ties, will likely give way to a platform that returns the government’s focus to rekindling engagement with North Korea. While those two lines of effort are not mutually exclusive, past progressive administrations in South Korea have treated them as such, leading many observers to wonder what may come of the country’s outreach to NATO, its increased joint training with foreign partners such as Australia, and its improving relations with Japan.

In Japan, meanwhile, the Liberal Democratic Party will enter the new year as a minority government for the first time in decades. Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru won his spot atop the government by a narrow margin in a surprise victory over intraparty opponents, further complicating the political landscape. Ishiba’s administration must navigate fraught political waters when attempting to pass legislation in the parliament, and the prime minister must do the same to build consensus within his own party.

Political discord and uncertainty tend to reinforce Japan’s foreign and security policy trajectory. In other words, formulation and implementation of those policies falls back to the historically strong bureaucracy that continues to move forward under the standing legislation and guidance. While this offers some stability, it presents challenges for championing new initiatives or adjusting to rapidly evolving situations. This may make it difficult for the Japanese government to respond to the changes that come with new US and South Korean presidential administrations or to any sudden shifts in Russian, Chinese or North Korean behaviour.

These conditions demand an agile approach to security decision-making in 2025. A new trilateral alliance forming between Russia, China and North Korea is not a foregone conclusion. Once-in-a-generation political conditions in South Korea and Japan should be given particular consideration by states looking to engage and respond to security issues. Those hoping for success must be ready to anticipate, assess and adjust to tackle the challenges that await in the new year.

Tech cooperation between Australia and South Korea will bolster regional stability

Greater alignment between Australia and South Korea in critical technologies would produce significant strategic benefit to both countries and the Indo-Pacific. Overlapping and complex regional challenges, such as climate change, economic shocks and pandemics, underscore the need for international cooperation in critical technologies

Although these technologies have a range of beneficial social, economic and security outcomes, they are increasingly being deployed by regional adversaries for malign purposes, including espionage, cyberattacks and spreading disinformation. This is particularly alarming for many countries in the region amid intensified geostrategic competition.

The latest data from ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker highlights challenges posed by technological advancements by emphasising the shift in technology leadership from the US to China over the past two decades. The tracker shows that China is now the leading country for high-impact research on critical technologies.

Enhanced collaboration between likeminded Indo-Pacific partners can counter China’s edge in technological research. ASPI’s new report recommends coordination and cooperation between Australia and South Korea in critical technologies, as the two regional powers have complementary technologies and are committed to upholding the US-led rules-based order.

In this report, we examine bilateral technological collaboration through the framework of four stages common to technological life cycles (innovation, research and development; building blocks for manufacturing; testing and application; standards and norms) and four corresponding critical technologies of joint strategic interest to both Australia and South Korea (biotechnologies, electric batteries, satellites and artificial intelligence).

Using this framework, we provide policy recommendations for Australian and South Korean government, research and industry stakeholders. We outline how they can build cooperation in the areas of biotechnology-related research and development, battery materials manufacturing, satellite launches and artificial intelligence (AI) standards-setting.

First, long-term exchanges between key R&D institutions will facilitate knowledge-sharing in the field of biotechnologies, a field relevant to both countries’ goals to become regional clinical trial hubs. We suggest that the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation and the Korea Research Institute of Bioscience and Biotechnology lead this initiative.

Second, due to Australia’s abundance of critical minerals and South Korea’s desire to elevate its capacity to manufacture electric batteries, battery material manufacturers from both countries should collaborate in the joint production of such battery materials as lithium hydroxide and precursor cathode active materials. Although the POSCO-Pilbara Minerals plant is an existing example of a joint factory operating South Korea, we highlight the strategic benefit of building future factories on Australian soil to take advantage of a secure supply of critical minerals.

Third, a streamlined government-to-government agreement will help South Korean companies to take advantage of Australia’s geography for joint satellite launches. This could emulate an agreement between Australia and the US for joint satellite launches. It would make it easier for both Australia and South Korea to collate satellite data for civilian and defence purposes.

Finally, Australian and South Korean stakeholders involved in international standards-setting bodies should align their approaches to ensure that the development and implementation of AI technologies is consistent with both countries’ respective interests. ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 42, a joint subcommittee on AI standards shared by the International Organization for Standardization and the International Electrotechnical Commission, is one recommended mechanism for coordinating the approaches of key Australian and South Korean stakeholders in AI standards.

The current political situation in South Korea may sow doubt in the mind of regional counterparts about its domestic stability and suitability as a partner. However, the quick overturning of martial law showed the robustness of South Korea’s democratic institutions. There may be short-term challenges to bolstering bilateral technological initiatives as the domestic situation continues to evolve, but the long-term trajectory for technological cooperation remains optimistic.

Aside from the economic, innovation and technology pillar of the bilateral Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and the Memorandum of Understanding on Cyber and Critical Technology Cooperation, the two countries are also active in furthering multilateral dialogue relating to critical technologies. Particularly, each country is internationally engaged in for a including the 3rd Generational Partnership Project, International Electrotechnical Commission and Minerals Security Partnership.

Technological cooperation between Australia and South Korea has can be leveraged to address regional challenges. This report serves as a starting point for furthering this cooperation. To ensure that the Indo-Pacific remains safe, secure and stable in the coming decades, now is the time for industry, research and government stakeholders in Australia and South Korea to jointly adopt a much greater and meaningful strategic role in regional technological collaboration.

From the bookshelf: ‘Engaging North Korea’

North Korea is again in the global spotlight. By providing first munitions and now troops to support Russia, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has expanded the scope of the Ukraine conflict while driving its relations with the West to a new low. And, by aligning with Russia, sidelining long-time patron China and abandoning its goal of unification with South Korea, North Korea has escalated tensions in Northeast Asia.

The last time the hermit kingdom was this visible was in June 2018, when its leader, Kim Jong Un, met US president Donald Trump at a summit held in Singapore amid cautious optimism that North Korea might gradually open up to the West. But in a follow-up summit in Hanoi in 2019, the gaping differences between the two parties became clear and negotiations collapsed.

The Biden administration adopted a wait-and-see policy, paying little attention to North Korea. Most foreign missions in Pyongyang closed during the Covid-19 pandemic and have not reopened.

In 2022, however, Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine dealt the North Korea a fresh hand. With rapidly depleting military resources, Moscow turned to Pyongyang, which in 2023 began exporting artillery shells and weapons to Russia, in return receiving much-needed food, raw materials and weapons parts.

In January this year, Pyongyang relinquished its constitutional commitment to Korean unification and said it would consider the South to be its principal enemy. To underline the shift, in October North Korea blew up parts of two roads connecting it to the South. Munitions exports to Russia have accelerated, and now Pyongyang has sent troops to fight for Russia in Ukraine.

In Engaging North Korea, 12 international experts put their heads together to review experience in relations with North Korea and provide pointers on how to deal with it in the future. The contributors include leading Korea experts from Japan, Singapore, South Korea, the US and Vietnam, a director of humanitarian aid and a Swedish diplomatic envoy. The two last-mentioned have hands-on experience working inside North Korea.

The authors start from the widely divergent interests behind the six-party talks, which sought to address North Korea’s nuclear program and broke down in 2009. The United States, Japan and South Korea want denuclearization, North Korea wants to keep its nuclear capabilities and have economic sanctions lifted, while China and North Korea have a special relationship based on inter-party cooperation. Japan must also deal with the domestically sensitive issue of citizens abducted by North Korean agents. The sixth party in the talks was Russia.

Singaporean and Vietnamese viewpoints are also discussed in the book, as either country may be called on to facilitate future negotiations. Should the North Korea ever consider opening its economy, Vietnam might serve as a model. With the world focusing on geopolitics, the authors remind us of North Korea’s deep humanitarian crisis. Given the range of interlinked issues, the book highlights the need to deal with North Kora comprehensively rather than piecemeal.

A fascinating chapter reviews the special role played by Sweden in keeping the door to North Korea ajar, though sometimes only minimally. It was the first Western country to recognise North Korea, in 1973. In 1975 it set up an embassy that it has kept open, although since the Covid-19 outbreak staffed entirely with North Korean nationals.

In the early 1990s, after a change of government, Stockholm was about to shut its embassy when the US asked it to represent it as a diplomatic protecting power—a representative. Washington lacked official relations with Pyongyang and wanted Sweden to serve as a neutral go-between. Sweden kept the embassy open and now serves as the protecting power for Australia, Canada, Germany and the US. It also  represents several other countries in consular matters.

Engaging with North Korea is a daunting task but one that is essential for world peace. The authors liken it to the Sisyphean challenge of repeatedly pushing a boulder up a hill only to have it roll down again, but they consider the chances of success greater if countries work ‘collectively, patiently and purposefully’. They propose doing this through informal working groups rather than showy summits. However, North Korea’s recent policy shifts make even this unlikely, at least in the short term.

Its playbook consists of bluster, threats and unpredictability, which its leaders have used ruthlessly to gain strategic advantage. However, behind the enigmatic facade there is a method, usually opportunistic, to North Korea’s unpredictability.

Frustrated at being ignored by the Biden administration, North Korea predictably undertook missile launches in September and October in the run-up to the US presidential elections. We should remember that its warming relations with Russia are transactional and do not change the reality that China is North Korea’s closest neighbour and only major trading partner.

With North Korea sending soldiers to support Russia and with tensions on the Korean Peninsula at a new high, the search is on for fresh ways to deal with the hermit kingdom. Engaging North Korea is essential reading for diplomats and security specialists, especially those handling Northeast Asia and Russia’s war on Ukraine.

Space: an opportunity for South Korea and Australian defence cooperation

Australia and South Korea should collaborate on space technology by building and launching small surveillance satellites from Australian space launch facilities. It would be in the military and industrial interests of both countries to do so.

Over the past 30 years, South Korea has made significant progress in space technology. In 2022, it became the seventh nation capable of independent space launches, with its Nuri rocket. A few months later, South Korea’s first lunar probe, Danuri, reached the Moon’s orbit, where it is surveying future lunar landing sites.

As middle powers with similar interests in the Asia-Pacific, the two countries should pursue joint research and development projects to foster mutually beneficial technological advancements in this domain. By jointly developing small surveillance satellites and using Australian launch facilities, this collaboration will promote the national defence of both countries. It will also help to accelerate innovation in a high-technology field, significantly reduce the high costs associated with space development and help to create new industries.

Deployment of small satellites must be the priority. Compared with traditional large satellites, small ones, weighing 100kg or less, are cheaper to develop, build and deploy. Their development cycles are shorter, allowing for rapid technological innovation. Each launch can deploy several simultaneously. They are also easier to replace if they malfunction or are destroyed.

South Korea said in 2022 that it aimed to deploy 40 small satellites by 2030 to monitor nuclear and missile threats from North Korea. Given the average three-year lifespan of small satellites, maintaining the entire development and launch cycle independently will be a challenge for South Korea, so it should seek international cooperation. Other countries should see reason to help, especially as the surveillance target is the global threat of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal.

Australia is the best candidate partner, because it has a nascent space program with similar goals. As emphasised in Australia’s Earth Observation from Space Roadmap, international collaboration would strengthen Australia’s satellite manufacturing capabilities.

Once the satellites are in operation, their information could also be used for Australian defence as well for civil tasks such as tracking floods and gathering data on climate change. Additionally, the Australian government’s cancelled National Space Mission for Earth Observation could be revived for a much lower cost if it were part of collaboration with South Korea.

Furthermore, both countries could use this partnership to strengthen their commercial space launch services. South Korea intends to launch its small satellites using solid-fuel rockets developed by its Agency for Defence Development. However, to meet the demand for frequent launches, South Korea will likely have to use commercial services. South Korean companies are already pursuing use of Australian launch sites.

Australian has the advantage of proximity to the equator and good weather. These factors reduce launch costs and increase the choice of orbits.

This partnership would help Australia to establish itself as a global space hub. The Arnhem Space Centre in the Northern Territory is already set to launch several South Korean rockets in 2025 and can be expanded.

It would be helpful if South Korea joined AUKUS Pillar 2 for cooperation on advanced technologies.

For satellite development and launch cooperation, technologies, parts and systems classified as strategic goods will need to flow between South Korea and Australia. To ensure this process runs smoothly, it is essential to align their export control procedures.

Given the security sensitivities involved, it would be safest to implement regulatory adjustments under the framework of a technology alliance like AUKUS Pillar 2.

In a joint statement marking the third anniversary of AUKUS last month, the leaders of Australia, the US and Britain expressed interest in exploring advanced capability cooperation with Canada, New Zealand and South Korea under AUKUS Pillar 2. Although South Korea lacks deep historical, political and military ties with Australia, a space technology agreement would begin to close that distance.

Space cooperation between South Korea and Australia holds immense potential, promising to open new frontiers in both technological innovation and strategic security for both nations.

South Korea’s impressive force of cruise and ballistic missiles

South Korea’s force of indigenously developed ballistic and cruise missiles may be the most underappreciated set of weaponry in Asia.

With little publicity, this strike-missile capability has been growing for decades, and it’s poised to surge following the end of a deal in which Washington and Seoul agreed to limits on what South Korea could develop.

South Korea has a family of Tomahawk-like cruise missile designs that can fly as far as 1500km against land targets. It also has a variety of ballistic missile types of increasing range and payload capacity, with one forthcoming weapon to be capable of submarine launch and another, for land-launch, with a range in the intermediate category, meaning 3000km to 5500km.

Official statements from Seoul consistently present the far-reaching strike-missile capability in terms of retaliation against North Korea, even though no part of that country is farther than 500km from the border with South Korea.

The specific policy that the strike missiles are said to serve is Korean Massive Punishment and Retaliation, which would target such facilities as underground command centres and nuclear missile sites. National Defence Minister Shin Won-sik embellished that policy in October with one of his own called ‘Punish Immediately, Strongly and Until the End.’

‘If the enemy carries out military provocations, first, punish them immediately; second, punish them strongly; third, punish them until the very end,’ he said. South Korea could deter North Korea’s provocations if Pyongyang felt it had more to lose than to gain from attacking, he added.

South Korea’s indigenous cruise missiles share the family name Hyunmoo 3 and have progressed through successive versions (or types) called Hyunmoo 3A, 3B and 3C. They probably offer high precision, and are well-suited for counter-force targets such as military installations, critical infrastructure and command and control systems. Hyunmoo 3D is reportedly in development. These weapons can be launched from trucks or ships.

The Haesung 2 is a supersonic cruise missile for launching from ships.

Whereas cruise missiles fly like aeroplanes—sometimes very low, to avoid defences—ballistic missiles fly high and descend at enormous speed, which makes them hard to shoot down. They’re usually not as precise as cruise missiles, but their warheads can be very heavy, and the velocity of their arrival helps them penetrate earth and concrete.

The former agreement that the United States imposed in 1979 limited South Korean ballistic missile payloads to 500kg and ranges to 180km. The payload limit was removed in 2017 and the range limit in 2021.

The US agreed in 2020 that South Korea could develop space launchers with solid propellant. Such a rocket or its technology could be adapted to create an intermediate-range ballistic missile, especially since South Korea, already having medium-range types, has no immediate need for more of them. South Korea successfully tested a solid-propellant space rocket in 2022.

Scrapping of warhead restrictions has enabled South Korea to develop ballistic missiles that can carry heavier warheads to penetrate tunnels and destroy underground missile storage chambers. Such capability strongly supports its position in the military balance on the Korean Peninsula.

This year South Korea said it had developed and successfully tested the Hyunmoo V ballistic missile, which will reportedly carry independently targetable re-entry vehicles and manoeuvrable re-entry vehicles. The Hyunmoo 5 may have a range of 3000km and is termed a ‘monster missile’. South Korea is also focused on developing hypersonic glide vehicles, which present different challenges to defenders and could be launched by a missile such as Hyunmoo 5.

Hyunmoo 5 may be carried by an arsenal ship, whose purpose would be to serve as a mobile magazine and launcher, not as a combat vessel. Hyunmoo 5 also reportedly uses the cold launch method, improving its survivability.

The Hyunmoo 4-4 submarine-launched ballistic missile is under development. Weapons of that category are even harder to hit before launch than those carried in surface ships. Seoul is also working on a ship-to-surface ballistic missile with features similar to those of Hyunmoo 4-4.

Back on land, South Korea’s short-range ballistic missiles of the Hyunmoo 2 family can be viewed as strategic as well as tactical, because they could reach any target in North Korea.

Against all this, North Korea has only weak defences, though it is trying to modernise them. Its other countermeasure is attempting to destroy South Korean missiles before they are launched, though that task becomes much harder if they move on ships or submarines.

Tag Archive for: South Korea

ASPI and STEPI sign MoU for future cooperation on technology policy

Read more

ASPI co-hosts Australia-ROK Critical Tech Track 1.5 in Seoul

Read more

ASPI luncheon briefing with Korean ambassador, His Excellency Mr Kim Wan-joong

ASPI’s Justin Bassi, Afeeya Akhand and Dr Alex Bristow had the pleasure of briefing the Ambassador of the Republic of Korea, His Excellency Mr Kim Wan-joong, on ASPI’s report about the future of the Australia-Republic of Korea partnership. The meeting took place over lunch at the Ambassador’s residence.

Co-authored by Afeeya Akhand and Dr Alex Bristow, the report recommends ways to strengthen cooperation across the Australia-Republic of Korea Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, including in defence, critical technology, clean energy and people-to-people ties.

ASPI also had the opportunity to brief stakeholders from the Embassy of the Republic of Korea, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Department of Defence, National Security College and Korean Institute for Defense Analysis through the report’s pre-launch event at the ASPI office.

The report can be accessed here.

Left to Right: Ms Jung Hyunjung, Ms Afeeya Akhand, His Excellency Mr Kim Wan-joong, Mr Justin Bassi, Mr Jeon Joyoung, Dr Alex Bristow