South Korea Archives

Australia and South Korea: Leveraging the strategic potential of cooperation in critical technologies

11 December 2024

Executive summary

Cooperation between Australia and the Republic of Korea (hereafter South Korea or the ROK) in a range of critical technology areas has grown rapidly in recent years. Underpinned by the Australia – South Korea Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Cyber and Critical Technology Cooperation signed in 2021, collaboration is currently centred around emerging technologies, including next-generation telecommunications, artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum computing. Such technologies are deemed to be critical due to their potential to enhance or threaten societies, economies and national security. Most are dual- or multi-use and have applications in a wide range of sectors.¹

Intensifying geostrategic competition is threatening stability and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region. Particularly alarming is competition in the technological domain. ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker, a large data-driven project that now covers 64 critical technologies and focuses on high-impact research, reveals a stunning shift in research ‘technology leadership’ over the past two decades. Where the United States (US) led in 60 of the 64 technologies in the five years between 2003 and 2007, the US’s lead has decreased to seven technologies in the most recent five years (2019–2023). Instead, China now leads in 57 of those technologies.

Within the Indo-Pacific region, some countries have responded to those shifts in technology leadership through the introduction of policies aimed at building ‘technological sovereignty’. The restriction of high-risk vendors from critical infrastructure, the creation of sovereign industrial bases and supply-chain diversification are examples of this approach. But a sovereign approach doesn’t mean protectionism. Rather, many countries, including Australia and South Korea, are collaborating with like-minded regional partners to further their respective national interests and support regional resilience through a series of minilateral frameworks.

The Australia – South Korea technological relationship already benefits from strong foundations, but it’s increasingly important that both partners turn promise into reality. It would be beneficial for Australia and South Korea to leverage their respective strengths and ensure that collaboration evolves in a strategic manner. Both countries are leaders in research and development (R&D) related to science and technology (S&T) and are actively involved in international partnerships for standards-setting relating to AI and other technologies. Furthermore, both countries possess complementary industry sectors, as demonstrated through Australia’s critical-minerals development and existing space-launch capabilities on one hand, and South Korea’s domestic capacity for advanced manufacturing on the other.

This report examines four stages common to technological life cycles — (1) R&D and innovation; (2) building blocks for manufacturing; (3) testing and application; and (4) standards and norms. For each, we examine a specific critical technology of interest. Those four life-cycle areas and respective technologies—spanning biotechnologies-related R&D, manufacturing electric-battery materials, satellite launches and AI standards-setting—were chosen as each is a technology of focus for both countries. Furthermore, collaboration through these specific technological stages enables Australia and South Korea to leverage their existing strengths in a complementary manner (see Figure 1). Supporting the analysis of these four stages of the technological life cycle and selected critical technologies is data from ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker and the Composite Science and Technology Innovation Index (COSTII) jointly released by South Korea’s Ministry of Science and ICT (MSIT) and the Korea Institute of Science & Technology Evaluation and Planning (KISTEP).

Informed by that examination, this report identifies a set of recommendations for strengthening cooperation that is relevant for different stakeholders, including government and industry.

Policy recommendations

Biotechnologies

Australia and South Korea can enhance knowledge-sharing in biotechnologies-related R&D through people-to-people exchanges. Links should be formalised through an MoU between relevant institutions—such as Australia’s Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) and the Korea Research Institute of Bioscience and Biotechnology. An MoU could be used to implement initiatives such as a virtual mentoring program and long-term in-person exchanges (preferably at least 12 months in duration). Such exchanges would support immersive in-country interaction, enabling the transfer of specialised R&D expertise. Australian researchers could share knowledge about advances in early-stage clinical trials processes, while South Korean researchers could contribute insights into synthetic biology and AI tools in drug-discovery clinical-trial methodologies. Financial support from Australia’s National Health and Medical Research Council could facilitate the exchanges.² There remains a need to address visa constraints impeding the free flow of researchers between both countries. While this report focuses on R&D, we suggest that there’s equal value in considering cooperation in the manufacturing stages of the biotechnologies value chain.

Recommendation 1: Formalise links between Australia’s and South Korea’s key biotechnologies R&D institutions by facilitating long-term people-to-people exchanges aimed at transferring specialised expertise. This includes in areas such as clinical trials, synthetic biology and AI integration in biotechnologies.

Electric batteries

Australian companies should consider the production of battery materials, including lithium hydroxide and precursor cathode active materials (pCAM), through joint ventures with South Korean battery manufacturers. Such ventures would benefit from jointly funded and owned facilities geographically close to requisite critical minerals. Since spodumene is needed for lithium hydroxide and nickel, cobalt and manganese are required for pCAM, Western Australia provides the ideal location for those facilities. Furthermore, BHP’s recent suspension of its Western Australian nickel operations provides an ideal opportunity for a South Korean battery company to purchase those operations— securing nickel sulphate supplies necessary for pCAM manufacturing.³ There’s also the potential for South Korea to invest in cathode active manufacturing (CAM) manufacturing in Australia by taking advantage of the co-location of mining and pCAM operations.

The provision of loans with relatively low interest rates from South Korean Government–owned banks,⁴ as well as tax credits and energy incentives provided by the Australian Government, would assist in offsetting the relatively high operational costs (including for labour and materials) associated with establishing joint battery-material plants in Australia instead of South Korea.⁵ Environmental regulations will need careful consideration in assessing such proposals, such as those covering the disposal of by-products. In the case of sodium sulphate, that by-product can be used in fertilisers and even recycled for future use in battery-material manufacturing.⁶

Recommendation 2: Consider the establishment of facilities in Australia under joint venture arrangements between Australian and South Korean companies to enable expanded production of battery materials (including lithium hydroxide and pCAM).

Space and satellite technologies

Australia and South Korea should establish a government-to-government agreement that would facilitate the launch of South Korean satellites from northern and southern locations in Australia. This would be similar to the Australia–US Technologies Safeguard Agreement. The agreement would increase the ease with which companies from both countries can pursue joint launches by streamlining launch permit application processes, export controls, taxation requirements and environmental regulations. The agreement can establish a robust framework for joint operations and continued R&D in space and satellite technologies while ensuring that both countries protect associated sensitive technologies. Any such agreement should prioritise consultations with community stakeholders to further inclusive decision-making focused on addressing the social and environmental impacts of space launches.⁷ Engaging with Indigenous landowners to ensure the protection of cultural heritage, sacred sites and traditional land stewardship is particularly key.⁸

Recommendation 3: Establish a government-to-government agreement similar to the Australia–US Technologies Safeguard Agreement to bolster the ease with which Australian and South Korean companies can conduct joint satellite launches on Australian soil.

Artificial intelligence technologies

Closer collaboration between Standards Australia and the Korea Standards Association in establishing international AI standards will be beneficial. The established positive record of Australian and South Korean stakeholders in relation to international norms and standards relating to critical technologies, and comparative regional strengths, provide a means to ensure that international AI standards continue to evolve in a way that fosters interoperability, innovation, transparency, diversity and security-by-design. One recommended body through which Australian and South Korean stakeholders could coordinate their respective approaches is the international, industry-led multistakeholder joint subcommittee (SC) created by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) known as the ISO/IEC Joint Technical Committee 1 Subcommittee 42 on AI (ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 42).

Recommendation 4: Coordinate the approach of Standards Australia and the Korea Standards Association in establishing international AI standards in international technology standards bodies, for example, through ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 42.

Full Report

For the full report, please download here.

J Wong Leung, S Robin, D Cave, ASPI’s two-decade Critical Technology Tracker, ASPI, Canberra, 28 August 2024, online. ↩︎
Austrade, ‘Australia: A go-to destination for clinical trials’. ↩︎
‘Western Australian Nickel to temporarily suspend operations’, BHP, 11 July 2024, online. ↩︎
Government-owned banks in South Korea are currently funding a similar joint venture in the form of the POSCO – Pilbara Minerals lithium hydroxide facility in South Korea. For more information, see A Orlando, ‘POSCO Pilbara Lithium Solution executes US$460 million loan agreement to help fund chemical facility in South Korea’, Mining.com.au, 27 February 2023, online. ↩︎
In particular, the high cost of a joint lithium hydroxide plant in Australia rather than South Korea was the primary reason for the joint POSCO – Pilbara Minerals plant to be built in Gwangyang, South Korea. For more information, see P Kerr, ‘Lithium processing is 40pc cheaper in South Korea, says POSCO’, Australian Financial Review, 22 May 2023, online. ↩︎
M Stevens, ‘Cathode manufacturing: solutions for sodium sulphate’, Worley, 29 May 2024, online. ↩︎
‘Koonibba Test Range launches large commercial rocket’, Asia–Pacific Defence Reporter (APDR), 6 May 2024, online; J Hamilton, A Costigan, ‘Koonibba looks to the future as a rocket launch site, but one elder is concerned about the impact on sacred sites’, ABC News, 11 May 2024, online. ↩︎
M Garrick, ‘Equatorial Launch Australia lodges plans for expansion to 300 hectares for Arnhem Space Centre’, ABC News, 8 November 2023, online. ↩︎

The 16th Madeleine Award: truths and totems in tumultuous times

9 January 2025

Amid tumultuous times, it’s the annual moment to lift the curtain, up the lights and open the envelopes for the 16th Madeleine Award for symbol, stunt, prop, gesture or jest.

The Madeleine is a silly-season special, served at year’s start with a soupcon of seriousness, seeking sense in sayings, signs and symbols.

The award is inspired by the late Madeleine Albright, the US ambassador to the United Nations (1993 to 1997) and US secretary of state (1997 to 2001), who sent diplomatic messages via her lapel brooches. Now displayed at America’s diplomacy museum, those lapel pins expressed ‘hopes, determination, impatience, warnings or warm feelings’.

For Albright, it wasn’t ‘read my lips’ but ‘read my pins’. Her favourite mistake was taunting Vladimir Putin over Russia’s military brutality by wearing three monkey brooches, representing Putin’s stance of ‘See no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil’. Putin went ape. Sometimes the message is just too sharp, Albright reflected, judging ‘I’d gone too far’.

With no monkeying about, we turn to the minor Madeleines. The first is the OOPS! Award for blooper and blunder. This slip-up star is almost always won by a politician. The prize’s nickname is ‘The Boris’, in honour of Boris Johnson who provides the OOPS! axiom: ‘There are no disasters, only opportunities. And, indeed, opportunities for fresh disasters.’

The Boris winner is South Korea’s President Yoon Suk Yeol, for imposing martial law. Yoon’s power grab—the first use of martial law in 44 years—was a gamble that crashed in six hours. The president declared emergency rule at 10:30 pm on 3 December, only to lift it at 4:30 am on 4 December after the members of the National Assembly rushed to vote to overturn the decree. By 14 December, the assembly had impeached the president, and he faces the possibility of a separate charge of treason. For conjuring up a disaster that destroyed his leadership, Yoon becomes a worthy member of the Order of the OOPS!

Next is the ‘Diana prize’, marking ‘the utility and force of photographs’. The trophy is named for Diana, princess of Wales, a noblewoman who understood that you’re nix without pix: ‘As Diana used to say, the picture is what counts,’ former British prime minister Tony Blair wrote.

The Diana goes to the photo of Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese being welcomed to Papua New Guinea with headdress and garb. The picture by the ABC’s Melissa Clarke is a winner, not least, because it overturns the don’t-look-silly-rule of the political minder class: never let your boss wear a strange hat or unusual costume. Context beats the minder rule. Albanese was on his way to walk the Kokoda Track with PNG’s prime minister. The image shows a cheerful leader paying homage to PNG as well as to the military legend of Kokoda.

While giving the Diana to Albo in PNG headdress, the judges point to one of the greatest ever news pix, the July photograph of a bloodied Donald Trump with his raised fist and an American flag in the background, after he’d been wounded in an assassination attempt. The photo by Associated Press photojournalist Evan Vucci is in the same class as that of the US Marines raising the American flag on Iwo Jima in World War II. Journalists use the word ‘iconic’ too often, but Vucci’s image reaches that rare grade. The only defences for not gonging Vucci’s magnificent work is that the Diana tends toward light, not shade, and Trump was last year’s Diana winner, for his scowling police mugshot after being indicted on racketeering charges.

Now to the George Orwell prize for double think. In Orwell’s novel Nineteen Eighty-Four, Winston Smith labours in the Ministry of Truth, rewriting the past so history meets the shifting needs of the Party. In that spirit, the Orwell goes to Russia for creating a modern Ministry in RuWiki, to counter Wikipedia. In the RuWiki rendering of Vladimir Putin’s truth, Russian atrocities in Ukraine are merely ‘Western disinformation’.

As Foreign Policy commented: ‘RuWiki is an isolated digital ecosystem that has created an alternate reality. In this version, Holodomor, the man-made famine under Stalin’s rule that killed up to 8 million Ukrainians by some estimates, never happened.’ RuWiki lives the slogans Orwell describes carved into the concrete facade of the Ministry of Truth: ‘War is peace. Freedom is slavery. Ignorance is strength.’

We stay in Russia for the Madeleine Award itself. Finding hope in Putin’s Russia is the mark of an award that arcs towards optimism, channelling a great Albright line: ‘I am an optimist who worries a lot.’

In that spirit, the 16th Madeleine goes to an inspiring Russian politician, Alexei Navalny, killed in jail by the regime on 16 February 2024, at the age of 47. A fine obituary judgement of the opposition leader is that Navalny didn’t just defy Putin, he showed up his depravity, exposing the fear and greed at the heart of Russia’s regime.

Putin’s first attempt to murder Navalny was in 2020, when the lawyer was poisoned by nerve agent. Navalny survived and recovered in Germany. Then, he bravely returned to Russia, knowing exactly what he would face—a rigged trial and exile to the modern gulags. At the close of his trial, Navalny blasted the court with a favourite movie line: ‘Tell me, where does power lie? I believe that power lies in the truth.’

Alexei Navalny was a proud Russian nationalist who used his own life to symbolise what Russia should be. More than gesture, this was sacrifice expressed as greatness.

After a rocky year in Northeast Asia, prepare for another

20 December 2024

2024 proved to be an unexpectedly dynamic year for Northeast Asia, and we must be ready for an equally unsteady 2025. Changes in political leadership, evolving ententes and uncertain policy trajectories may all contribute to confrontation, or they could open policy windows to de-escalation and cooperation. Both risk and opportunity await in the new year, and it will be up to policymakers to recognise them and take deliberate steps towards desired outcomes.

To prepare for the new year, it is essential to set the scene for the current political-military situation among the major Northeast Asian players: Russia, China, North Korea, South Korea and Japan. This builds a foundation for tackling the regional issues that await.

Immediate attention will fall to Russia, whose war of aggression against Ukraine has gained from participation by North Korean soldiers. Although both Pyongyang and the Kremlin disavow formal North Korean involvement, its personnel and materiel support reflects deepening ties, that were formalised in what they called the ‘Treaty of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’ signed during Vladimir Putin’s visit to the North Korean capital in June. An outstanding question heading into the new year is what North Korean soldiers will be bringing back from the Ukrainian front lines, be it tactics, techniques, and procedures; Russian equipment and technology; or all of the above.

Another lingering question is how deepening Russo-North Korean ties will affect each country’s relationship with China. North Korea has demonstrated its capacity for deftly playing the Kremlin and Beijing off one another, and while China still maintains substantial economic leverage over the North Koreans, financial and resource support from Russia shifts the power dynamics.

China has also expanded outreach and contact with other governments since the last meeting of the National People’s Congress in March, including resumption of the Military Maritime Consultation Agreement mechanism meetings with the United States, a trilateral summit with South Korea and Japan in Busan, and a stated ‘turnaround’ in relations with Australia in 2024. While Russia seems unfazed by this outreach, its impact on Sino-North Korean relations bears observation.

Meanwhile, North Korea began the year with its most important policy declaration since its announcement in 1993 that it was withdrawing from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. The government said in January that it was abandoning its decades-old unification policy with South Korea and, for the first time in its history, would recognise two sovereign states on the Korean peninsula. Steps to implement this policy soon followed, including dismantlement of inter-Korean related organisations and infrastructure. It also made substantial efforts to harden the boundary between the two Koreas with fences, walls and landmines.

Tensions on the Korean Peninsula were low throughout 2024. While Pyongyang employed tactics such as propaganda broadcasting and delivering trash into South Korea with balloons, it took measures to mitigate risk of runaway escalation. This was evident in early October when North Korea notified the US-led United Nations Command before dismantling roads and railways in the northern half of the demilitarised zone, as well as by its muted response to South Korea’s unexpected political turmoil in December. The forthcoming end-of-year Workers’ Party of Korea meeting will offer insight into its policy priorities for 2025, including possible signals to foreign governments—particularly the incoming US administration. Given its policy trajectory since abandoning unification with the South, North Korea may seek to normalise its status as a separate sovereign state in the coming year.

Elsewhere on the Korean peninsula, South Korea will enter 2025 in political disarray. Yoon Suk Yeol’s short-lived declaration of martial law led to his swift impeachment. While this demonstrated the strength of South Korea’s democratic institutions, the saga is not yet over. There is still a constitutional process to determine Yoon’s fate, which could take up to six months, including for deliberations in the country’s constitutional court. If it confirms Yoon’s removal, final resolution of the crisis with a general election may take a further two months.

While the exact date is unknown, observers should expect a new presidential administration in South Korea in 2025. Assuming the transition happens, a shift in power from the country’s conservatives to its progressives will be all but certain. As it stands, the current conservative platform, which champions South Korea’s role as a ‘global pivotal state’ and embraces multilateral security ties, will likely give way to a platform that returns the government’s focus to rekindling engagement with North Korea. While those two lines of effort are not mutually exclusive, past progressive administrations in South Korea have treated them as such, leading many observers to wonder what may come of the country’s outreach to NATO, its increased joint training with foreign partners such as Australia, and its improving relations with Japan.

In Japan, meanwhile, the Liberal Democratic Party will enter the new year as a minority government for the first time in decades. Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru won his spot atop the government by a narrow margin in a surprise victory over intraparty opponents, further complicating the political landscape. Ishiba’s administration must navigate fraught political waters when attempting to pass legislation in the parliament, and the prime minister must do the same to build consensus within his own party.

Political discord and uncertainty tend to reinforce Japan’s foreign and security policy trajectory. In other words, formulation and implementation of those policies falls back to the historically strong bureaucracy that continues to move forward under the standing legislation and guidance. While this offers some stability, it presents challenges for championing new initiatives or adjusting to rapidly evolving situations. This may make it difficult for the Japanese government to respond to the changes that come with new US and South Korean presidential administrations or to any sudden shifts in Russian, Chinese or North Korean behaviour.

These conditions demand an agile approach to security decision-making in 2025. A new trilateral alliance forming between Russia, China and North Korea is not a foregone conclusion. Once-in-a-generation political conditions in South Korea and Japan should be given particular consideration by states looking to engage and respond to security issues. Those hoping for success must be ready to anticipate, assess and adjust to tackle the challenges that await in the new year.

Tech cooperation between Australia and South Korea will bolster regional stability

10 December 2024

Greater alignment between Australia and South Korea in critical technologies would produce significant strategic benefit to both countries and the Indo-Pacific. Overlapping and complex regional challenges, such as climate change, economic shocks and pandemics, underscore the need for international cooperation in critical technologies

Although these technologies have a range of beneficial social, economic and security outcomes, they are increasingly being deployed by regional adversaries for malign purposes, including espionage, cyberattacks and spreading disinformation. This is particularly alarming for many countries in the region amid intensified geostrategic competition.

The latest data from ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker highlights challenges posed by technological advancements by emphasising the shift in technology leadership from the US to China over the past two decades. The tracker shows that China is now the leading country for high-impact research on critical technologies.

Enhanced collaboration between likeminded Indo-Pacific partners can counter China’s edge in technological research. ASPI’s new report recommends coordination and cooperation between Australia and South Korea in critical technologies, as the two regional powers have complementary technologies and are committed to upholding the US-led rules-based order.

In this report, we examine bilateral technological collaboration through the framework of four stages common to technological life cycles (innovation, research and development; building blocks for manufacturing; testing and application; standards and norms) and four corresponding critical technologies of joint strategic interest to both Australia and South Korea (biotechnologies, electric batteries, satellites and artificial intelligence).

Using this framework, we provide policy recommendations for Australian and South Korean government, research and industry stakeholders. We outline how they can build cooperation in the areas of biotechnology-related research and development, battery materials manufacturing, satellite launches and artificial intelligence (AI) standards-setting.

First, long-term exchanges between key R&D institutions will facilitate knowledge-sharing in the field of biotechnologies, a field relevant to both countries’ goals to become regional clinical trial hubs. We suggest that the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation and the Korea Research Institute of Bioscience and Biotechnology lead this initiative.

Second, due to Australia’s abundance of critical minerals and South Korea’s desire to elevate its capacity to manufacture electric batteries, battery material manufacturers from both countries should collaborate in the joint production of such battery materials as lithium hydroxide and precursor cathode active materials. Although the POSCO-Pilbara Minerals plant is an existing example of a joint factory operating South Korea, we highlight the strategic benefit of building future factories on Australian soil to take advantage of a secure supply of critical minerals.

Third, a streamlined government-to-government agreement will help South Korean companies to take advantage of Australia’s geography for joint satellite launches. This could emulate an agreement between Australia and the US for joint satellite launches. It would make it easier for both Australia and South Korea to collate satellite data for civilian and defence purposes.

Finally, Australian and South Korean stakeholders involved in international standards-setting bodies should align their approaches to ensure that the development and implementation of AI technologies is consistent with both countries’ respective interests. ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 42, a joint subcommittee on AI standards shared by the International Organization for Standardization and the International Electrotechnical Commission, is one recommended mechanism for coordinating the approaches of key Australian and South Korean stakeholders in AI standards.

The current political situation in South Korea may sow doubt in the mind of regional counterparts about its domestic stability and suitability as a partner. However, the quick overturning of martial law showed the robustness of South Korea’s democratic institutions. There may be short-term challenges to bolstering bilateral technological initiatives as the domestic situation continues to evolve, but the long-term trajectory for technological cooperation remains optimistic.

Aside from the economic, innovation and technology pillar of the bilateral Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and the Memorandum of Understanding on Cyber and Critical Technology Cooperation, the two countries are also active in furthering multilateral dialogue relating to critical technologies. Particularly, each country is internationally engaged in for a including the 3rd Generational Partnership Project, International Electrotechnical Commission and Minerals Security Partnership.

Technological cooperation between Australia and South Korea has can be leveraged to address regional challenges. This report serves as a starting point for furthering this cooperation. To ensure that the Indo-Pacific remains safe, secure and stable in the coming decades, now is the time for industry, research and government stakeholders in Australia and South Korea to jointly adopt a much greater and meaningful strategic role in regional technological collaboration.

From the bookshelf: ‘Engaging North Korea’

4 November 2024

North Korea is again in the global spotlight. By providing first munitions and now troops to support Russia, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has expanded the scope of the Ukraine conflict while driving its relations with the West to a new low. And, by aligning with Russia, sidelining long-time patron China and abandoning its goal of unification with South Korea, North Korea has escalated tensions in Northeast Asia.

The last time the hermit kingdom was this visible was in June 2018, when its leader, Kim Jong Un, met US president Donald Trump at a summit held in Singapore amid cautious optimism that North Korea might gradually open up to the West. But in a follow-up summit in Hanoi in 2019, the gaping differences between the two parties became clear and negotiations collapsed.

The Biden administration adopted a wait-and-see policy, paying little attention to North Korea. Most foreign missions in Pyongyang closed during the Covid-19 pandemic and have not reopened.

In 2022, however, Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine dealt the North Korea a fresh hand. With rapidly depleting military resources, Moscow turned to Pyongyang, which in 2023 began exporting artillery shells and weapons to Russia, in return receiving much-needed food, raw materials and weapons parts.

In January this year, Pyongyang relinquished its constitutional commitment to Korean unification and said it would consider the South to be its principal enemy. To underline the shift, in October North Korea blew up parts of two roads connecting it to the South. Munitions exports to Russia have accelerated, and now Pyongyang has sent troops to fight for Russia in Ukraine.

In Engaging North Korea, 12 international experts put their heads together to review experience in relations with North Korea and provide pointers on how to deal with it in the future. The contributors include leading Korea experts from Japan, Singapore, South Korea, the US and Vietnam, a director of humanitarian aid and a Swedish diplomatic envoy. The two last-mentioned have hands-on experience working inside North Korea.

The authors start from the widely divergent interests behind the six-party talks, which sought to address North Korea’s nuclear program and broke down in 2009. The United States, Japan and South Korea want denuclearization, North Korea wants to keep its nuclear capabilities and have economic sanctions lifted, while China and North Korea have a special relationship based on inter-party cooperation. Japan must also deal with the domestically sensitive issue of citizens abducted by North Korean agents. The sixth party in the talks was Russia.

Singaporean and Vietnamese viewpoints are also discussed in the book, as either country may be called on to facilitate future negotiations. Should the North Korea ever consider opening its economy, Vietnam might serve as a model. With the world focusing on geopolitics, the authors remind us of North Korea’s deep humanitarian crisis. Given the range of interlinked issues, the book highlights the need to deal with North Kora comprehensively rather than piecemeal.

A fascinating chapter reviews the special role played by Sweden in keeping the door to North Korea ajar, though sometimes only minimally. It was the first Western country to recognise North Korea, in 1973. In 1975 it set up an embassy that it has kept open, although since the Covid-19 outbreak staffed entirely with North Korean nationals.

In the early 1990s, after a change of government, Stockholm was about to shut its embassy when the US asked it to represent it as a diplomatic protecting power—a representative. Washington lacked official relations with Pyongyang and wanted Sweden to serve as a neutral go-between. Sweden kept the embassy open and now serves as the protecting power for Australia, Canada, Germany and the US. It also represents several other countries in consular matters.

Engaging with North Korea is a daunting task but one that is essential for world peace. The authors liken it to the Sisyphean challenge of repeatedly pushing a boulder up a hill only to have it roll down again, but they consider the chances of success greater if countries work ‘collectively, patiently and purposefully’. They propose doing this through informal working groups rather than showy summits. However, North Korea’s recent policy shifts make even this unlikely, at least in the short term.

Its playbook consists of bluster, threats and unpredictability, which its leaders have used ruthlessly to gain strategic advantage. However, behind the enigmatic facade there is a method, usually opportunistic, to North Korea’s unpredictability.

Frustrated at being ignored by the Biden administration, North Korea predictably undertook missile launches in September and October in the run-up to the US presidential elections. We should remember that its warming relations with Russia are transactional and do not change the reality that China is North Korea’s closest neighbour and only major trading partner.

With North Korea sending soldiers to support Russia and with tensions on the Korean Peninsula at a new high, the search is on for fresh ways to deal with the hermit kingdom. Engaging North Korea is essential reading for diplomats and security specialists, especially those handling Northeast Asia and Russia’s war on Ukraine.

Space: an opportunity for South Korea and Australian defence cooperation

17 October 2024

Australia and South Korea should collaborate on space technology by building and launching small surveillance satellites from Australian space launch facilities. It would be in the military and industrial interests of both countries to do so.

Over the past 30 years, South Korea has made significant progress in space technology. In 2022, it became the seventh nation capable of independent space launches, with its Nuri rocket. A few months later, South Korea’s first lunar probe, Danuri, reached the Moon’s orbit, where it is surveying future lunar landing sites.

As middle powers with similar interests in the Asia-Pacific, the two countries should pursue joint research and development projects to foster mutually beneficial technological advancements in this domain. By jointly developing small surveillance satellites and using Australian launch facilities, this collaboration will promote the national defence of both countries. It will also help to accelerate innovation in a high-technology field, significantly reduce the high costs associated with space development and help to create new industries.

Deployment of small satellites must be the priority. Compared with traditional large satellites, small ones, weighing 100kg or less, are cheaper to develop, build and deploy. Their development cycles are shorter, allowing for rapid technological innovation. Each launch can deploy several simultaneously. They are also easier to replace if they malfunction or are destroyed.

South Korea said in 2022 that it aimed to deploy 40 small satellites by 2030 to monitor nuclear and missile threats from North Korea. Given the average three-year lifespan of small satellites, maintaining the entire development and launch cycle independently will be a challenge for South Korea, so it should seek international cooperation. Other countries should see reason to help, especially as the surveillance target is the global threat of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal.

Australia is the best candidate partner, because it has a nascent space program with similar goals. As emphasised in Australia’s Earth Observation from Space Roadmap, international collaboration would strengthen Australia’s satellite manufacturing capabilities.

Once the satellites are in operation, their information could also be used for Australian defence as well for civil tasks such as tracking floods and gathering data on climate change. Additionally, the Australian government’s cancelled National Space Mission for Earth Observation could be revived for a much lower cost if it were part of collaboration with South Korea.

Furthermore, both countries could use this partnership to strengthen their commercial space launch services. South Korea intends to launch its small satellites using solid-fuel rockets developed by its Agency for Defence Development. However, to meet the demand for frequent launches, South Korea will likely have to use commercial services. South Korean companies are already pursuing use of Australian launch sites.

Australian has the advantage of proximity to the equator and good weather. These factors reduce launch costs and increase the choice of orbits.

This partnership would help Australia to establish itself as a global space hub. The Arnhem Space Centre in the Northern Territory is already set to launch several South Korean rockets in 2025 and can be expanded.

It would be helpful if South Korea joined AUKUS Pillar 2 for cooperation on advanced technologies.

For satellite development and launch cooperation, technologies, parts and systems classified as strategic goods will need to flow between South Korea and Australia. To ensure this process runs smoothly, it is essential to align their export control procedures.

Given the security sensitivities involved, it would be safest to implement regulatory adjustments under the framework of a technology alliance like AUKUS Pillar 2.

In a joint statement marking the third anniversary of AUKUS last month, the leaders of Australia, the US and Britain expressed interest in exploring advanced capability cooperation with Canada, New Zealand and South Korea under AUKUS Pillar 2. Although South Korea lacks deep historical, political and military ties with Australia, a space technology agreement would begin to close that distance.

Space cooperation between South Korea and Australia holds immense potential, promising to open new frontiers in both technological innovation and strategic security for both nations.

South Korea’s impressive force of cruise and ballistic missiles

28 August 2024

South Korea’s force of indigenously developed ballistic and cruise missiles may be the most underappreciated set of weaponry in Asia.

With little publicity, this strike-missile capability has been growing for decades, and it’s poised to surge following the end of a deal in which Washington and Seoul agreed to limits on what South Korea could develop.

South Korea has a family of Tomahawk-like cruise missile designs that can fly as far as 1500km against land targets. It also has a variety of ballistic missile types of increasing range and payload capacity, with one forthcoming weapon to be capable of submarine launch and another, for land-launch, with a range in the intermediate category, meaning 3000km to 5500km.

Official statements from Seoul consistently present the far-reaching strike-missile capability in terms of retaliation against North Korea, even though no part of that country is farther than 500km from the border with South Korea.

The specific policy that the strike missiles are said to serve is Korean Massive Punishment and Retaliation, which would target such facilities as underground command centres and nuclear missile sites. National Defence Minister Shin Won-sik embellished that policy in October with one of his own called ‘Punish Immediately, Strongly and Until the End.’

‘If the enemy carries out military provocations, first, punish them immediately; second, punish them strongly; third, punish them until the very end,’ he said. South Korea could deter North Korea’s provocations if Pyongyang felt it had more to lose than to gain from attacking, he added.

South Korea’s indigenous cruise missiles share the family name Hyunmoo 3 and have progressed through successive versions (or types) called Hyunmoo 3A, 3B and 3C. They probably offer high precision, and are well-suited for counter-force targets such as military installations, critical infrastructure and command and control systems. Hyunmoo 3D is reportedly in development. These weapons can be launched from trucks or ships.

The Haesung 2 is a supersonic cruise missile for launching from ships.

Whereas cruise missiles fly like aeroplanes—sometimes very low, to avoid defences—ballistic missiles fly high and descend at enormous speed, which makes them hard to shoot down. They’re usually not as precise as cruise missiles, but their warheads can be very heavy, and the velocity of their arrival helps them penetrate earth and concrete.

The former agreement that the United States imposed in 1979 limited South Korean ballistic missile payloads to 500kg and ranges to 180km. The payload limit was removed in 2017 and the range limit in 2021.

The US agreed in 2020 that South Korea could develop space launchers with solid propellant. Such a rocket or its technology could be adapted to create an intermediate-range ballistic missile, especially since South Korea, already having medium-range types, has no immediate need for more of them. South Korea successfully tested a solid-propellant space rocket in 2022.

Scrapping of warhead restrictions has enabled South Korea to develop ballistic missiles that can carry heavier warheads to penetrate tunnels and destroy underground missile storage chambers. Such capability strongly supports its position in the military balance on the Korean Peninsula.

This year South Korea said it had developed and successfully tested the Hyunmoo V ballistic missile, which will reportedly carry independently targetable re-entry vehicles and manoeuvrable re-entry vehicles. The Hyunmoo 5 may have a range of 3000km and is termed a ‘monster missile’. South Korea is also focused on developing hypersonic glide vehicles, which present different challenges to defenders and could be launched by a missile such as Hyunmoo 5.

Hyunmoo 5 may be carried by an arsenal ship, whose purpose would be to serve as a mobile magazine and launcher, not as a combat vessel. Hyunmoo 5 also reportedly uses the cold launch method, improving its survivability.

The Hyunmoo 4-4 submarine-launched ballistic missile is under development. Weapons of that category are even harder to hit before launch than those carried in surface ships. Seoul is also working on a ship-to-surface ballistic missile with features similar to those of Hyunmoo 4-4.

Back on land, South Korea’s short-range ballistic missiles of the Hyunmoo 2 family can be viewed as strategic as well as tactical, because they could reach any target in North Korea.

Against all this, North Korea has only weak defences, though it is trying to modernise them. Its other countermeasure is attempting to destroy South Korean missiles before they are launched, though that task becomes much harder if they move on ships or submarines.

Hanwha Ocean buying Austal would probably suit the United States

31 May 2024

It looks like the United States has changed Australia’s mind. In April, the Australians doubted private shipbuilder Austal could be sold to South Korea’s Hanwha Ocean, but now they have no concerns.

The most likely explanation is that Australia at first worried about what the US would think but found that the Americans thought it was not a bad idea.

The main consideration on the Austal side was US regulation related to the sensitivity of the company’s operations. As Austal owns Austal USA, which builds ships for the US Navy and Coast Guard, Hanwha Ocean’s acquisition of Austal would need approvals from major US government bodies, including the Committee on Foreign Investment and the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency.

While Hanwha Ocean argued that the acquisition would benefit many stakeholders, Austal said on 2 April it was ‘not satisfied that these mandatory approvals would be secured’.

But on 1 May, Defence Minister Richard Marles said: ‘Ultimately, this is a matter for Austal. They are a private company.’

‘From the government’s perspective, we don’t have any concern about Hanwha moving in this direction.’

There was no hint of hesitation that might reflect reservations in Washington.

So what happened? Quite likely, Washington told Canberra that, actually, it would be quite satisfied in working with Hanwha Ocean through Austal.

About a month before Hanwha Ocean announced its bid for Austal, US Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro visited South Korea. His trip included Hanwha Ocean shipyards. He expressed interest in further cooperation in maintenance of US warships in these shipyards. Moreover, he even invited Dong Kwan Kim, a vice chair of Hanwha Group, to the US to further discuss maintenance cooperation. Later, Del Toro told the Navy League’s annual Sea-Air-Space conference that he was ‘floored’ by South Korea’s shipbuilding industry.

The US would like to ‘attract the most advanced shipbuilders in the world to open US-owned subsidiaries … here in the US’, he said, interest in inviting Hanwha Ocean to do so. If that’s his attitude, the US regulations that have concerned Austal cannot be a significant problem. The US is not concerned with using South Korean shipbuilders.

US admiration for the low costs of the South Korean naval builders and its willingness to work with them may not be the main reason behind Washington’s apparent comfort with Hanwha Ocean’s bid. A larger factor may be its desire to see its Pacific allies, notably Japan, South Korea and Australia, develop security relationships with each other. The Biden administration has repeatedly encouraged multilateral security cooperation beyond the conventional hub-and-spoke arrangement in which several Western Pacific countries are allies with the United States but not with each other. It has been particularly active in pushing its allies to work together in maritime security.

Moreover, it is particularly aiming to enhance the relationship between Japan and South Korea, as was evident at the Camp David Summit of the three countries in 2023. They made a joint statement expressing mutual commitment to regional security challenges. It was the first time that the trilateral summit had directly addressed the Taiwan and South China Sea issues together.

Since then, South Korea and Japan have increased maritime cooperation in the breadth and frequency of exercises. Australia and Japan, meanwhile, have been stepping up defence cooperation.

Hanwha Ocean buying Austal would further South Korean and Australian cooperation. The two countries mutual interests in 2+2 meeting on 1 May and have recognised South Korea’s potential contribution to AUKUS Pillar 2, the part of the Australian-British-US security partnership focused on technology other than nuclear submarines.

Ownership by Austal by Hanwha Ocean, one of three main shipbuilders for the Republic of Korea Navy, would increase the chance of Australia choosing the South Korean Daegu class for a program to build 11 general-purpose frigates as replacements for the current Anzac class. Three other foreign designs are also contenders. The Daegu design, of 3600 tonnes displacement at full load, was developed by DSME, which has become the core of Hanwha Ocean.

Whichever designer is chosen, the first three frigates of the new Australian class will be built abroad.

If Hanwha Ocean can buy Austal, it could offer corporate integration of the foreign and local side of the design and construction effort and, implicitly, smoother management.

South Korea’s demand for critical minerals

4 March 2024

In December 2021 the then president of the Republic of Korea, Moon Jae-in, made a largely unexpected working visit to Australia, at the end of his term, and at unusually short notice. Media speculation was that the visit was all about China, given that both Australia and Korea had been subjected by China to costly economic coercion measures, and China’s aggressive actions continued to provoke concern in both countries.

The speculation was partially right, the visit was about China. But in fact it was about South Korea’s deep concern at the stranglehold China had on the production and refining of critical minerals, and an intent to build a closer reliable supply of them from Australia. Korea is poor in mineral and energy resources and has few reserves of critical minerals, but as a major global producer of batteries, semiconductors and EVs it has a compelling need for reliable supplies of them to fuel its industry.

Korea’s geostrategic situation feeds a sense of strategic and economic insecurity—it is close to an assertive China prepared to demonstrate displeasure by imposing costly economic coercion measures, while the ever-present threat from North Korea drives the south’s priorities for military resilience, including a hi-tech military industry. As well, Covid-19 and Russia’s war in Ukraine disrupted markets and associated supply chains, further elevating Korean perceptions of risk. The Trump administration’s ‘America first’ policies had already undermined global free trade commitments and confidence in the US-Korea alliance.

Underlying Korea’s policies is a compelling need to reduce these vulnerabilities, both strategic and economic, to build resilience and to position itself as a leader in advanced technologies. Korea is now an economic giant, heavily dependent on advanced manufacturing and exports for its continued economic prosperity and future growth, but one heavily exposed to international disruption. It is also focussed on the need domestically to transition away from its heavy dependence on imported fossil fuels, not least to meet international climate commitments to decarbonise, but to transform industry to a post-smokestack clean energy economy. Korea is committed to carbon neutrality by 2050.

Big business in Korea—the ubiquitous chaebol conglomerates—initially arose from government intervention and support in the 1950s and 1960s. While they are now key components of a massive private sector, they still work closely with government and look to government for policies supportive of their (and, interchangeably, Korean) interests. Korean governments have been responsive to chaebol pressures and priorities, notably in resource diplomacy. Hence Moon’s 2021 visit to Australia.

Samsung SDI, SK Innovation and LG Energy Solution, in particular, are totally dependent on critical mineral imports for production of batteries, while Samsung and SK Hynix need specialised critical minerals for semiconductor manufacture. Steelmaker Posco and LG Chem aspire to be major producers of battery-grade raw materials. Korea is the world’s second largest manufacturer of semiconductors and holds about 26% of the global EV battery market, but it is 95% dependent on imports for its processed critical minerals supply and over 80% of this supply comes from China.

The outcome is that Korea’s government has developed a series of policies to reduce dependence on a single supplier through an activist resource diplomacy, while also being prepared to offer industry support. In February 2023, Korea’s Ministry of Trade, Industry and Economy (MOTIE) issued a list of 33 critical minerals eligible for policy support, with 10 of these considered highest priority. Stockpiles are to be increased from 54 days to 100 days of anticipated demand. Korean investment in overseas exploration and development projects will be supported through access to loans, guarantees, insurance and tax credits, lessening the risks involved for Korean investors.

Korea’s critical minerals policies, alongside chaebol searches for opportunities, have already led to significant investment in Australia. Major steelmaker Posco has invested in lithium producer Pilbara Minerals (and has a joint venture with Pilbara to produce lithium hydroxide in Korea), taken a 30% stake in Ravensthorpe Nickel and cobalt in WA, and invested in graphite producer Black Rock Mining, amongst others. LG Chem has a 7.5% stake in Queensland Pacific Minerals (QPM), mining nickel and cobalt. And Australian rare earths miner Australian Strategic Minerals (ASM) produces neodymium and other rare earths in Korea, sourced from its mine in Dubbo.

Despite some lingering concerns about Australia’s energy export policies, shared with Japan, Korea overall sees Australia as a reliable and stable long-term partner and well-endowed in the minerals it seeks, with a highly skilled exploration and mining industry. Posco is the single largest private customer for Australian exports, valued at over $7 billion annually—and is a respected long-term investor with a relationship over more than 50 years with Australia. But as the global economy transforms, other Korean chaebol are accelerating their procurement and investment portfolios and Australia stands to benefit.

The Australia-Korea Business Council (AKBC) has a specialist sub-committee on critical minerals, intended to promote cooperation between Australian and Korean companies on their exploitation and trade. It led a delegation of hydrogen and critical minerals producers to Korea in 2022 and has produced a report Critical Minerals, Urgent opportunities which can be ordered from the AKBC website.