Tag Archive for: Russia–Ukraine war

In a divided world, momentum behind negotiations grows

At a time of rising geopolitical tensions and deepening global fragmentation, the Ukraine war has proved particularly divisive. From the start, the battle lines were clearly drawn: Russia on one side, Ukraine and the West on the other, and much of the Global South hoping only for the conflict to end. Now, however, alignments are shifting. Whether this will advance efforts to resolve the conflict and strengthen global stability remains to be seen.

After more than three years, Europe—including the European Union, Britain and Norway—remains largely steadfast in its support of Ukraine. The largest armed conflict in its neighbourhood since World War II has deeply affected the European psyche, as it has challenged basic assumptions about continental security and revived the spectre of nuclear annihilation that loomed over Europe throughout the Cold War. The prevailing view has always been that a Russian victory—including a peace deal that ceded some Ukrainian territory to Russia—would amount to an existential threat.

The United States, however, has decided that it no longer wants to ‘pour billions of dollars’ into what Secretary of State Marco Rubio calls a ‘bloody stalemate, a meat-grinder-type war’. So, US President Donald Trump is seeking to negotiate a peace deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin. To press Ukraine to accept the concessions such an agreement will undoubtedly entail, the Trump administration suspended and later resumed military aid and intelligence support.

This is not about ending a ‘savage conflict’ for ‘the good of the world’, as Trump claims. While years of sanctions were supposed to drain Russia, economically and militarily, to America’s benefit, they bolstered an unholy Sino-Russian alliance against the West, while sustaining a conflict that kept US attention and resources in Europe. With his push for a peace deal in Ukraine, Trump is seeking to cut the US’s losses and shift its strategic focus and military resources toward the Indo-Pacific—the home of America’s real enemy: China.

As Trump’s predecessor Joe Biden recognised, only China has the resolve and capability to surpass the US as the foremost world power. Yet the US still has more than 100,000 troops stationed in Europe. That is why US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth recently warned that the US can ‘no longer tolerate’ an ‘imbalanced’ transatlantic relationship that ‘encourages dependency’. Europe must take ‘responsibility for its own security’, Hegseth said, so that the US can focus on ‘deterring war with China’.

The question is whether Europe is capable of managing its own security. The answer probably should be yes. As Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk recently pointed out, Europe does not lack economic strength. Nor does it lack people: there are ‘500 million Europeans begging 300 million Americans to defend them against 140 million Russians.’ What is missing is the EU’s belief that it is a global power. The result is a rudderless Europe.

When it comes to supporting Ukraine, Europe has another critical shortcoming. As NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte has noted, Europe lacks the necessary military-industrial base to provide sufficient arms support to Ukraine. That is why some, including Rutte, want to make a deal with the US: you keep supplying Ukraine with weapons, and we will foot the bill. Unless the Trump administration accepts such an arrangement, the British-French plan to build a ‘coalition of the willing’ to do the heavy lifting on Ukrainian security will face powerful headwinds.

Meanwhile, the Global South is still struggling to cope with the Ukraine war’s economic fallout, especially sharply higher food and energy prices, which have had particularly devastating consequences for small and vulnerable developing countries with limited foreign reserves. Sri Lanka is a case in point. In the months that followed Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, skyrocketing global prices drained its reserves, leading to fuel, food, medicine and electricity shortages. The resulting economic meltdown pushed a frustrated population over the edge, triggering widespread protests that toppled a political dynasty.

This explains why developing countries remain largely unified in advocating an early negotiated end to the war, even if that means leaving a sizable chunk of Ukrainian territory under Russian occupation. If anything, calls for a peace agreement have grown since 2023, with even NATO member Turkey and close US ally Israel charting more independent stances on the conflict. It does not help that, for many countries in the Global South, the West’s contrasting responses to the wars in Ukraine and Gaza reek of hypocrisy.

For now, Ukraine and Europe remain committed to seeking peace through strength. But as admirable as Ukraine’s resistance has been, and as important as it is to defend the international legal principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity that Russia has flagrantly violated, the fact is that the conflict has reached a stalemate, while the international fallout continues to grow. Rather than repeat the mistakes of the 1950-53 Korean War—in which an armistice agreement was reached only after two years of military deadlock—all parties should adopt a realistic approach to ending the war and negotiate accordingly.

Europe can still prevent a Russian victory

When Russian President Vladimir Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, he knew that he was upending Europe’s security order. But this was more of a tactical gambit than a calculated strategy and he could not have predicted what would follow. Though Donald Trump’s return to the White House has caught Europe flat-footed, it can still keep Putin from walking away a winner.

For now, Putin seems to hold all the cards. The transatlantic relationship is fracturing, as Trump’s isolationist administration criticises its European allies and casts doubt on his commitment to NATO. Worse, Trump appears to be aligning the United States with Russia in the Ukraine war. While he has threatened to impose new sanctions and tariffs on Russia until a ceasefire and peace deal are reached, he has blamed Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky for the fighting and suspended military aid and intelligence support for Ukraine (now apparently set to resume).

But Europe still has a chance to turn things around. Already, it is abandoning its post-Cold War ‘end of history’ mindset, according to which international law reigned supreme, European militaries were for keeping peace, not fighting wars, and the US could be counted on to safeguard Europe’s security.

Finland and Sweden were perhaps the first to realise that history is back, and their accession to NATO—in 2023 and 2024, respectively—provided a major boost to the Alliance’s northern flank. Now the European Union also appears to be coming to terms with its new security situation, having just announced an $840 billion rearmament plan. Even Germany, for which the return of history is particularly fraught, is preparing to rearm: incoming Chancellor Friedrich Merz and his likely coalition partners have agreed to create a €500 billion infrastructure fund and loosen fiscal rules to allow for greater investment in defence.

The significance of this move should not be underestimated. Since the end of World War II, Germany has eschewed hard power in favour of the soft kind, serving as an engine of European integration and a bulwark of the rules-based world order. Beginning in the 1960s, this included the pursuit of constructive engagement—a foreign-policy approach known as Ostpolitik—with the Soviet Union and then Russia. This explains former Chancellor Angela Merkel’s embrace of Russian energy supplies, despite the objections of other EU members and the US.

Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine drove a stake through the heart of Ostpolitik. Within days, Merkel’s successor, Olaf Scholz, announced an ‘epochal change’ (Zeitenwende) in Germany’s defence and foreign policy. But it is Merz who is set to oversee a true break from Germany’s postwar past—a change that will require the country to confront the most daunting, destructive ghosts of its history.

For starters, there is the fiscal revolution. Germany’s frugality has been a source of considerable tension in the EU, particularly during the eurozone debt crisis of the early 2010s. But Germans—not least Merkel—recalled all too well how hyperinflation had paved the way for the rise of Adolf Hitler, and in 2009 Merkel’s first government introduced a constitutional restriction on structural budget deficits to 0.35 percent of GDP annually, also known as the debt brake. Against this backdrop, Merz’s planned overhaul of borrowing rules—including the modification and possible elimination of the debt brake—represents a radical change in Germany’s priorities.

More broadly, Merz appears prepared to embrace European leadership. Despite being the EU’s largest economy, Germany has long been reluctant to assume a genuine leadership role in Europe, particularly in the security domain. The combination of Russian revanchism and US isolationism, however, has made this stance untenable. As Europe’s most populous country, situated in the continent’s ‘geostrategic centre’, Merz says, Germany must ‘take greater responsibility for leadership’ on defence.

Any effort to keep Europe secure starts with Ukraine. As it stands, Trump wants to have his cake and eat it: ‘negotiate’ a peace deal—which will almost certainly involve capitulation to Russia and an economic shakedown of Ukraine—then walk away and let Europe enforce it. But what good is a peace broker who offers no guarantees?

To avoid a repeat of the Munich Agreement of 1938—when France and Britain forced Czechoslovakia to cede territory to Hitler, setting the stage for WWII—Europe must step up quickly to improve Ukraine’s position on the battlefield and, thus, at the negotiating table. Fortunately, substituting lost US financial aid will not be as difficult as Trump would have us believe: to date, Europe has provided far more support for Ukraine’s war effort in dollar terms than the US has. Fulfilling the weapons gap would, however, be far more challenging and probably impossible in the all-important short term.

Once a peace agreement is reached, Europe will have to act as its guarantor—and that means delivering effective deterrence against Russian aggression. A credible nuclear umbrella is essential. That is why Merz has suggested replacing US nuclear warheads in Europe with French and British alternatives. There is even talk of Germany becoming a nuclear power itself.

When NATO intervened in the Kosovo War in 1999, Germany’s then-chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder, ruled that sending ground troops to fight in a country that had once been occupied by Hitler’s Wehrmacht was ‘unthinkable’. Today, as Merz seems to recognise, the unthinkable has become necessary. Only if Germany—and Europe as a whole—puts aside its moral and political inhibitions can it continue to perform its most important role: as a global force for peace and a defender of democratic principles.

How Russia will reassess its ties with North Korea after Ukraine

An agreement to end the war in Ukraine could transform Russia’s relations with North Korea. Moscow is unlikely to reduce its cooperation with Pyongyang to pre-2022 levels, but it may become more selective about areas of cooperation.

Regardless of how favourable a settlement it can achieve in Ukraine, Russia will want to challenge the US-led security architecture in Asia. Cooperation with North Korea can be a tool for this.

Russia has already made clear that it wants to be more involved in Asia: during meetings with Chinese, North Korean and Vietnamese leaders last year, it called for new security mechanisms in the region.

Military cooperation is a core of the deepened partnership between Russia and North Korea, with Moscow helping Pyongyang to modernise its military capabilities. Reportedly, Russia has sent air-defence systems, provided technologies for intercontinental ballistic missiles and agreed to supply North Korea with fighter aircraft.

Still, Moscow may be wary of sharing too much, as North Korea could become a competitor on the arms market by making cheaper copies of Russian weapons. So the pace of transfers from Russia to North Korea may decline.

Arms trade between Moscow and Pyongyang has weakened the nonproliferation regime and undermined international sanctions. This collective resistance highlights a lack of effective enforcement mechanisms: Russia simply ignores the threat of punishment, as the US ability to coerce North Korea and Russia to adhere to sanctions is limited. North Korea is notorious for its sophisticated schemes to evade sanctions and can easily work around new restrictions. Furthermore, North Korea can cooperate with Russian entities to diversify its own illegal supply chains.

North Korea has exported military equipment to Russia during the war, but Russia’s demand for it will diminish when the fighting stops. A step-up in supplies of civilian goods from North Korea is unlikely to replace this trade, because of the limitations of its economy.

North Korea can offer few goods that would be competitive in the Russian market. Its primary exports—natural resources—are abundant in Russia. Moreover, North Korea is not a useful conduit for Russia to import Western goods, because it has limited trade with Europe, unlike China, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. As sanctions are partially lifted, Moscow will prioritise restoring economic ties with the West to boost its economy.

Russia will also want South Korea to lift sanctions and normalise economic relations with it. South Korea is one of Russia’s major trading partners, and the two economies have complementary structures. To approach Seoul, Moscow will need to scale down its military and technology cooperation with Pyongyang.

Still, Russia will want to keep a friendly North Korea as a backup option in case the West and its friends decide to reinstate sanctions.

When the fighting ends, the future of North Korean troops in Russia will become a controversial issue. While a peace deal would reduce the need for them militarily, they will probably be used as labourers in Russian-occupied territories.

Since the start of the war, Russia’s labour market has shrunk due to high enlistment numbers and a decline in foreign workers. In 2022, Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin proposed to invite around 50,000 North Korean workers to supplement the Russian workforce. In 2024, the number of North Korean workers sent to Russia skyrocketed.  If Russia continues to struggle with labour shortages, it may persist with this policy.

Moscow and Pyongyang can also continue cooperation in non-sanctioned areas, such as tourism. Their diplomats have discussed ways to simplify travel regulations to encourage Russian tourists to visit North Korean resorts. Still, North Korea remains a niche destination for Russians. In 2024, only 1500 of them visited North Korea, compared with 200,000 who travelled to South Korea, despite a lack of direct flights.

Academic collaboration is another avenue for cooperation. North Korean agreements with Russian universities include access to advanced technologies and training for specialists. North Korean delegations have visited Russia’s Moscow State University, Novosibirsk State University, Far Eastern Federal University and others, where they focused on joint projects in chemistry, medicine and information technology. As well as sending more students to Russia, North Korea will have opportunities to send illegal workers posing as students.

A loss in Europe is a loss in the Indo-Pacific

The United States shocked the world last week with President Donald Trump’s very public rift with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. This was followed by a US pause on military aid and some intelligence sharing with Ukraine, all intended to push Ukraine to agree to a ceasefire on terms favourable to Russia. But Russia’s interests are also China’s. A bad peace in Europe may mean more bad behaviour in the Indo-Pacific.

Trump campaigned for the presidency in part on a commitment to end Russia’s war on Ukraine, without regard for who is the aggressor and who is the victim. He seems to want a legacy as the president who ended wars, contrasting with his predecessors, both Republican and Democrat. The overall direction of US foreign policy is now being shaped to fit within these constraints.

This has empowered voices within the Republican Party who see China, not Russia, as the pacing threat of our time. Key figures in the administration, such as nominee for Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby, have for several years pushed the idea that to meet the threat posed by China, the US must direct resources away from Europe and the Middle East and towards the Indo-Pacific. That position has been widely, though not universally, adopted within the Republican Party.

There is certainly bipartisan agreement in the US that East Asia is now the key theatre for US grand strategy, and that China’s global ambitions and growing military prowess pose a pacing threat to the US and its democratic allies and partners.

In his Senate confirmation hearing this week, Colby said the US must focus on ‘denying China regional hegemony’ and that it ‘would be a disaster for American interests’ if Taiwan were to fall to China. But US aid to Ukraine and Israel has delayed arms shipments to Taiwan, and Colby has said the US simply doesn’t have the capacity to support conflicts in three regions. By his logic, and perhaps now that of the White House, the US must remove its support for Ukraine so it can concentrate its resources against China and in support of Taiwan.

But the reality is that the European and Indo-Pacific fronts are intricately linked as long as Russia and China support each other and their interests are aligned. Countering one adversary will require addressing the influence of the other.

The two countries declared a no-limits partnership just days before Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. Chinese President Xi Jinping reaffirmed that partnership last month on the three-year anniversary of the war. The partnership has been material and substantial: China has provided assistance to Russia’s war machine, geospatial intelligence for its military, markets for its natural resources and sanctioned companies, and backing at the United Nations.

Russia, meanwhile, is strengthening military cooperation with China, including in the Indo-Pacific. In 2024, the US intercepted Chinese and Russian bombers flying for the first time together near Alaska, and Russia joined China in military exercises in the Sea of Japan.

Both countries echo each other’s propaganda, and their massive media and covert disinformation apparatuses amplify each other’s messaging.

Why would China dedicate its resources and risk its reputation in Europe to support Russia in Ukraine if leaders in Beijing did not believe that a Russian win in Ukraine was vital to Chinese interests? Indeed, a Russian victory would be an immense victory for China as well. It would shatter the image of a strong and unified west, show NATO to be a paper tiger and sow doubt throughout the world about the value of US security guarantees. These are all goals that Beijing has pursued for decades, and that are key to the revisionist world order Beijing hopes to craft.

A Russian win in Ukraine, moreover, would create a clear precedent for one of Xi’s most important goals—taking Taiwan. That’s why the Taiwanese government, which has more to lose than anyone else in the Indo-Pacific region, has for three years loudly cheered US support for Ukraine. If Colby’s argument were correct—that is, if US military support for Ukraine ran counter to Taiwan’s interests—Taiwan would now be rejoicing. Instead, Taipei is filled with trepidation.

If the war in Ukraine ends on terms favourable to Russia, both China and Russia will be free to concentrate more of their joint efforts in the Indo-Pacific. Instead of a cautious China and a distracted Russia in the eastern theatre, the US will have to deal with an emboldened China and a vindicated Russia—even as US allies and partners in the region view the US with newfound skepticism. If the US at some point calls on Europe for assistance in East Asia, few would expect them to heed that call.

If Trump’s US abandons liberal idealism, others must pick up the baton

Donald Trump’s description of himself during last week’s excruciating Oval Office meeting as a ‘mediator’ between Russia and Ukraine was revealing even by the standards of the past six weeks.

It showed an indifference to who the goodies and the baddies are; who is responsible for a three-year war, who shares traditional US values; who is democratic; who is a war criminal. The US is no longer the leader of the free, rule-abiding world that stands up for principles; it’s some kind of neutral mediation panel that tries to get two equally aggrieved litigants to resolve their differences.

Yet a pretense to neutrality is nonsensical. Trump sees Russia as a globally and historically relevant major power. That’s who he wants to work with over the long term, not its small and annoying neighbour that keeps asking for weapons and keeps fighting a war he thinks it can’t win.

Trump and senior members of his administration have said they want the US to have a geopolitical and economic relationship with Russia. The outcome of his Ukraine-Russia ‘mediation’ will reflect his perceived long-term desire for not just stable, but prosperous relationships with other major powers.

There’s a kind of awful realism to Trump’s attitude. It says that the world is dog-eat-dog, the law of the jungle—that rules are fictions that only idiots observe. Remember when Trump boasted that paying no federal income tax ‘makes me smart’? Psychological and personality assessments are admittedly risky, but there is an undeniable pattern here: Trump has by all accounts conducted himself this way his whole life, regarding rules as being for losers and wimps.

Trump’s world view is yet to be tempered as it was during his first term. His instincts are being translated into policy without any evident filter. Barely six weeks into his second term, there are so many signs that this jungle philosophy will guide his actions that other countries need to start planning accordingly.

This means two things. First, someone else, most obviously European democracies, must take up the baton of foreign policy idealism. The past 80 years, in which the US led the liberal international order it now questions, have been the best 80 years of the modern era. The idealistic system says countries that launch unprovoked aggression should be penalised and countries that face such aggression should be helped. You form lasting friendships with countries which share your values of justice and work with you in security, and you keep a distance from those that don’t. You show loyalty and trust to your friends, and you maintain readiness to use force when absolutely necessary against countries that threaten this network of friendships.

Over time, the preponderance of countries that believe in, and abide by, the system of rules creates a stable international order. The past eight decades are testament to this.

Australia needs to support this idealistic world view through public statements, economic measures such as sanctions, and hard power when possible—which is why Prime Minister Anthony Albanese is right to consider further support to Ukraine.

In the meantime, we need to worry about our immediate circumstances, which depend on a continuing relationship with the US.

Europe, including Britain, has two nuclear weapons powers, four G7 countries, and the NATO alliance. The European Union’s economy is about 10 times that of Russia’s. If the US walks away, Europe should be able to manage its security handily—and the belated sense of urgency it’s now showing suggests it can get there.

Australia has an alliance with New Zealand, a close-to-allied relationship with Japan and good friendships with India, South Korea and some Southeast Asian countries. But we can’t ensure our own security on this basis. We can’t turn ourselves into an independent power, nor convene an Asian NATO overnight, and so we need the US in ways that Europe does not.

Our region’s would-be hegemon, China, is the peer competitor to the US for the foreseeable future. If the US walks away from the Indo-Pacific, China will dominate. Worse, if the US under Trump or his successors decides it can deal with Beijing the way Trump is dealing with Moscow, the Indo-Pacific could face a regional hegemon that feels even less constrained.

The good news is that Russia and China are quite different. China is structurally stronger and therefore more of an ongoing threat to the US. Based on Trump’s history of commentary, he sees China as having got rich at the US’s expense. The Trump Administration has backed both AUKUS and the Quad—a positive indication.

Australia can still work towards greater national resilience and self-reliance. This, along with our advantageous geography and our good relationships with neighbours, might persuade the US that it has Indo-Pacific allies worth supporting. In parallel, we should use what influence we have to remind the US that rules are good for everyone. If the post-war global order is, as Secretary of State Marco Rubio has said, ‘now a weapon being used against us’, that’s a good argument for working with friends to modernise it, not to abandon it entirely and throw the world back into the jungle.

Trump is making the mistake that FDR shunned

In April 1941, Charles Lindbergh, the America First Committee’s most prominent leader, outlined his position that Nazi Germany’s victory was inevitable, that the United States should stay neutral and that Britain was ‘a belligerent nation’ which should agree to ‘a negotiated peace’. Lindbergh said, ‘It is a policy not of isolation, but of independence.’

The upheaval of the Oval Office meeting on 28 February between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and US President Donald Trump, punctuated by the interjection of Vice President JD Vance, did not reveal the US switching sides to join Russia but rather a foreign policy shift towards the notion of US independence and neutrality advocated by Lindbergh’s America First.

During the meeting with Zelenskyy, Trump made his position clear: ‘I’m not aligned with Putin. I’m not aligned with anybody. I’m aligned with the United States of America and for the good of the world.’

Such an impartial statement would be fair in many circumstances, such as a valuer in a property sale or an umpire officiating a sports match. But here we are dealing with a powerful nation committing war and war crimes on an innocent democracy, so sides are exactly what should be taken, and the US should be on the side of right, not might.

Those who describe Trump’s US as isolationist are simplifying a more complex foreign policy shift that sees the US role in the world no longer as the global policeman expending resources on holding aggressors to account, but as the global peacemaker between other nations in conflict, regardless of which is at fault.

Trump has not withdrawn from the world, as shown by his support for Israel and distrust for Iran, his focus on China, and even his aims to end the war in Europe. And, of course, it is always possible that in the art of the deal what we are hearing is not necessarily what we will see.

So it is Australia’s job as America’s most trusted ally to help show the dots connecting each corner of the globe and to ensure the next phase of American exceptionalism doesn’t result in geographic spheres of influence.

The US in effect joining the non-aligned movement would more likely result in a ceasefire that rewards Russia’s aggression, proves the effectiveness of the Russia-China ‘no-limits’ partnership and emboldens China in the Indo-Pacific.

What happens in Europe and NATO does matter to the Indo-Pacific. The Oval Office train crash reverberated across the globe, unsettling the US’s closest allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific. As European leaders rushed to London for a conference hosted by British Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer, governments across Australia, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Taiwan were all examining the implications for our own security. Worse, China was no doubt doing the same—only looking at the possibility for territorial and strategic gain, not loss.

The US would be mistaken to think we live in an age in which China and Russia are separate. Just as US actions are raising questions about the value of its democratic alliances, the axis of authoritarian regimes is becoming more aligned.

So have we seen lasting damage? Diplomatic bust ups between friends are generally temporary, as seen by the Australian experience with the infamous first phone call between then prime minister Malcolm Turnbull and Trump in January 2017. More important is the potential for permanent policy changes relating to the US’s international friends and foes.

Trump’s desire for peace and to be seen as a peacemaker is not inherently a bad thing. The US should use its strength to stop aggression—but not in a way that stops the victim fighting back, which is why any belief that the US can achieve peace by serving as a detached conflict mediator is seriously flawed.

Justice and lasting peace is not achieved through moral equivalence. The reality is stark: one side, Ukraine, was invaded, while the other, Russia, initiated an unjust war. A neutral America treating both parties as having equally legitimate claims rewards the rule breaker and would simply incentivise more of it. Indeed, in referring to Ukraine as not having the cards at the table, Trump seemed to be suggesting that Russia’s more powerful status carried with it an automatic right to come away from the negotiation with more. This shift from the US’s role as global enforcer to conflict mediator would result in a weaker world, a weaker US and Trump’s legacy being peace in his time but at any cost.

Trump has expressed admiration for former president William McKinley and has a bust of Winston Churchill in the Oval Office. His team should want to help him avoid being remembered more like Lindbergh—or like Neville Chamberlain, who appeased Hitler by signing the Munich Agreement which gave up the Sudetenland ‘for peace for our time’. Trump’s staff should put Winston Churchill’s response to the Munich Agreement alongside his bust in the Oval Office:

You were given the choice between war and dishonour. You chose dishonour and you will have war.

After all, not supporting Ukraine now would have been akin to Franklin D Roosevelt’s United States not supporting Churchill’s Britain to carry on the fight against Nazi Germany. FDR did expect some recompense for US materiel support, including leasing of British bases, which is why the proposed US-Ukraine minerals deal is not the outrage some mistake it to be. But FDR did not demand Churchill sign a bad peace deal with Hitler. And Churchill made it clear in 1940 that Britain would not accept an end to the war that involved surrender.

We shall defend our Island, whatever the cost may be, we shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender, and even if, which I do not for a moment believe, this Island or a large part of it were subjugated and starving, then our Empire beyond the seas, armed and guarded by the British Fleet, would carry on the struggle, until, in God’s good time, the New World, with all its power and might, steps forth to the rescue and the liberation of the old.

Churchill’s ‘New World’ was the US as the global leader fighting against tyranny and for freedom. The battle in the Oval Office was a loss for democracy but the war is not yet over. The US would shortchange itself if it were to choose independence and fail to recognise the contribution of others to US security.

If instead the US, Europe and allies in the Indo-Pacific, including Australia, can stick together, our collective might will ensure the side of right will still win in the end.

The US is gone—Europe must replace it

Donald Trump and JD Vance’s verbal assault on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in the Oval Office will mark 28 February 2025 as an infamous moment in US and world history. The United States is rapidly destroying its good name and alienating everyone except the world’s most brutal dictators. The damage to the US’s credibility and reputation will take decades to repair—and may be irreparable.

More broadly, with the end of the postwar US-centred international order, we are witnessing the collapse of any global authority. As rogue states seek to capitalise on the chaos, Europe must step up and assume the role once played by the US. That starts by fully supporting Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression.

Yes, Europe is not as powerful as the US militarily; but that does not mean it is weak. In fact, it holds all the cards that it needs. Its combined military forces are among the world’s strongest, most experienced and most innovative. The Oval Office quarrel—which Trump and Vance seemed all too eager to provoke—should be the final impetus for Europe to get its act together, after decades of complacency. It has everything it needs to stand on its own, to support Ukraine and to deter Russia.

Moreover, Trump’s shameful behaviour is pushing the US’s dearest ally, Britain, closer to Europe, helping to bridge the post-Brexit divide. It is galvanising the forces of democracy and compelling political elites to wake up. Europe may soon have a moderate two-party ruling coalition in Germany and a committed democratic one in Austria. After a terrible year, French President Emmanuel Macron’s star is rising again.

Europe has a half-billion people and a GDP comparable to the US. We may not be as innovative, but the gap is not as large as pundits would have you believe. If we forge a coalition with Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, we can close it soon—especially now that Trump, Vance and Elon Musk are destroying the pillars of US power with their own cultural revolution.

In addition to raising costs for US consumers with tariffs, the Trump administration is waging a war on immigrants—long a unique source of US strength. Europe should capitalise by welcoming the best and brightest—including those being hounded out of the US’s world-class federal agencies.

As for defence capabilities, Germany’s industrial base is sufficient to arm the continent, while France and Britain’s nuclear umbrella can replace the US’s. The five largest European countries and Britain all currently have responsible, predictable governments that make a mockery of those now in power in Washington.

Poland has an especially important role to play in what happens next. Economic trends are on our side. Our army is growing. We made the right arms purchases while there was still time. Not even Trump can find a bad word to say about us. All of Europe can see this. The French (slightly jealous) speak of le moment polonais. Poland’s current leaders are among the most experienced, respected and resolute statesmen to be found anywhere.

At the recent Munich Security Conference, I spoke with many US politicians—including those, such as Senator Lindsey Graham, who are bending the knee to Trump—and I did not see much self-confidence. Rather than saying what they really think, they debased themselves and toed the Dear Leader’s line. It was embarrassing to watch.

When the Trump administration’s Ukraine envoy, Keith Kellogg, was asked backstage whether ‘we still have an alliance’, he admitted that he himself doesn’t know. Power in Washington is now completely concentrated in Trump. There are no longer any ‘adults in the room’, only sycophantic parrots competing to amplify their foolish master the loudest.

The historian Timothy Snyder struck the right note in arguing that 2025 is not about what America thinks; it is about what Europe can do. The Trump policy (a generous term) can only be profitable in the short term; for now, no one will dare to go head-to-head with the US. In the long run, however, the dismantling of the US state, the pointless tariffs and the alienation of friends and allies will cause lasting damage.

This is the moment to stand behind Ukraine. The treatment that Zelensky received was an absolute disgrace, loudly cheered by Russia. And no, he would not have gotten a better result if he had let himself be pushed around. This US government has shown where its loyalties lie. The same thing happened with the critical minerals agreement that Trump’s advisers have been forcing on Ukraine. The first version amounted to mafia-style extortion and Zelensky rightly rejected it. When a follow-up deal came, it was much better.

I will not be surprised if Trump and Vance’s disgusting behaviour provokes a backlash from the US public. But Europeans cannot afford to wait. With Trump back in the White House, Americans will have their own very big problems to worry about. Europeans must take our future into our own hands.

US-Russia negotiations won’t bring peace to Ukraine

Will US President Donald Trump be able to forge a peace between Russia and Ukraine, or are we facing a repetition of the infamous Munich Agreement? When Britain and France forced Czechoslovakia to cede the Sudetenland to Nazi Germany in 1938, they believed that doing so would ensure long-term peace. But appeasing a revisionist aggressor had the opposite effect, setting the stage for another world war one year later.

If peace means settling all the issues that now divide Russia and Ukraine, the likelihood of achieving such an outcome is extremely slim. The origin of the war lies in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s determination to prevent Ukraine from becoming ‘anti-Russia’, namely by forcing it back under Kremlin control. A democratic, sovereign Ukraine that sought cooperation and integration with the West was incompatible with what Putin regards as his historic duty. He has long maintained that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a catastrophe, and that Ukraine is not, in fact, an independent nation-state.

This means that a true peace between Russia and Ukraine will not be possible until Putin has left the Kremlin, and a more realistic vision of Russia’s future has gained ascendancy there. Nothing of the kind appears imminent. But if peace is not possible in the near term, a halt to the fighting and the beginning of a political process to reduce tensions might still be achievable.

Trump’s promise to end the war in 24 hours obviously was never serious. He is now facing a challenge that will take months, not hours. Putin previously made clear that he will not accept a ceasefire that does not result in Russia’s territorial expansion and Ukraine’s political and military submission. He will now try to extract as much as possible from a direct meeting with Trump, and judging by past meetings between the two men, his maximalist approach could pay off. Recall Trump’s private meeting with Putin in Helsinki in 2018, when he declared that he believed the Russian leader over his own intelligence agencies.

But can Trump really deliver Ukraine to Putin?

In September 1938, Czechoslovakia did not have a choice about what happened to it. It wasn’t even at the table for the discussions in Munich, where Adolf Hitler persuaded French and British leaders to accept its dismemberment. Within six months, Hitler violated the agreement, and German tanks were rolling into Prague. Trump and Putin are equally adamant that Ukraine should not be at the table. Their intention seems to be to draft an agreement and then force Ukraine to accept its terms.

Putin will likely be very ambitious with his demands, because he knows that this is his big chance. In his own opening bid, Trump will probably seek a straightforward ceasefire, with political talks later. But Putin will want more. He will not only press his original demands but also ask for relief from Western sanctions. The risk, of course, is that he will overplay his hand, demanding more than even Trump believes he can deliver.

But even if Putin resists that temptation and the two men agree on territorial and political terms, it is far from certain that Trump can force Ukraine to accept them. In 1938, Czechoslovakia decided not to fight, because its military prospects were essentially hopeless. But Ukraine’s are not. The chances that it would simply swallow a blatantly unjust and unfair diktat are slim to none.

To be sure, there is war fatigue in Ukraine after years of attritional warfare and routine Russian strikes on civilians and critical infrastructure. But the Ukrainians also recognise what is at stake. In February 2022, almost everyone assumed that they would break under Russian pressure within the space of just days or weeks. But now, three years later, Russia controls only around 19 percent of Ukraine’s territory. Moreover, Ukraine itself has taken control of territory in Russia’s Kursk region.

While the stakes are existential for Ukraine, they are also very high for the rest of Europe. If a US president not only refuses to acknowledge a brazen act of aggression, but also forces the victim into submission, much of what NATO stands for risks going up in smoke. Would the United States still come to the defence of the Baltics or other vulnerable NATO members?

And the risks are not Europe’s alone. What would become of NATO’s security guarantees and alliances in Asia and elsewhere? If the US is unwilling to defend Ukraine, would it really defend Taiwan?

Critical days lie ahead. A new and powerful source of global instability—the US government—must now be reckoned with.

A Westless world

Each February, members of the transatlantic strategic community head to Munich to discuss the state of international security, making the Munich Security Conference a not-to-be-missed event on the foreign-policy calendar.

This was true even during US President Donald Trump’s first administration, when it seemed as though very little was still binding the West together. After watching the debates at the 2019 conference, when key figures talked past each other and failed to find common ground, I coined the term ‘westlessness’ to describe the new state of play. Not only was the rest of the world becoming less Western, but so too were many Western societies.

Eager to reverse the tide, those attending the Munich conferences in recent years took great pains to signal Western unity and determination, as if to suggest that westlessness had been just a passing phenomenon. Joe Biden’s election to the US presidency led Europeans to believe that the United States was back, and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine a year later gave the West a new sense of shared purpose. But by the time that the 2024 gathering arrived, Western self-doubt had returned; and at this year’s conference, westlessness returned with a vengeance.

Following the news of Trump’s call with Putin and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s comments acceding to Russian demands before negotiations had even begun, the audience in Munich anxiously looked to Vice President JD Vance for clarity on the new administration’s transatlantic security strategy. But the speech that Vance gave did not seem to be about security at all. Instead, he used his time to scold Europeans for their alleged departure from shared values, condemning Europeans’ interpretation of freedom of speech even as his own administration uses lawsuits and other threats to crack down on the US’s free press.

With Germany’s federal elections just a week away, Vance then condemned European governments’ unwillingness to rein in ‘out-of-control migration’ and lambasted German liberal-democratic parties for refusing to work with the far right. ‘I’ve heard a lot about what you need to defend yourselves from’, he noted. ‘But what has seemed a little bit less clear to me and certainly, I think, to many of the citizens of Europe, is what exactly it is that you’re defending yourselves for.’

To those in attendance, these remarks looked like a direct attack on the values at the heart of the North Atlantic alliance. Vance offered up the illiberal-nationalist alternative to the liberal-internationalist order that has underpinned intra-Western relations—and debates at the Munich Security Conference—for many decades.

The Europeans in Munich duly pushed back. Shocked to find themselves being lectured to by a government that is waging war on the rule of law and freedom of the press at home, they rejected Vance’s attempt to interfere in their domestic political affairs. ‘We do not only know against whom we are defending our country, but also for what’, German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius replied. ‘For democracy, for freedom of expression, for the rule of law, and for the dignity of every individual.’

These are the principles that once bound the West together. While members of the broad transatlantic community often disagreed (sometimes vehemently) about specific policies, their shared commitment to these values always allowed them to mend fences and overcome whatever crisis was at hand.

But now the ballroom in the conference hotel, not much larger than a basketball court, must accommodate two fundamentally incompatible worldviews. The Trumpists and their European critics each maintain that the other side has deviated from the norm. As Vance sees it, the biggest threat ‘is not Russia, it’s not China, it’s not any other external actor. What I worry about is the threat from within.’

Despite Vance’s insistence that ‘we are on the same team’, the majority view at the conference was that the US has become a free agent. Just a month after Trump’s inauguration, it has already abandoned its role as a benign hegemon and the leading power within a global community of liberal democracies. To Europeans’ shock and dismay, the US is behaving like a nineteenth-century great power, seeking territorial expansion and pursuing deals with other powers to carve out spheres of influence.

Four years after Biden announced that ‘America is back’, Europeans see the US abandoning transatlanticism and everything it stood for. Trump’s America is not only making deals with the liberal West’s enemies. It is also openly supporting illiberal, anti-democratic forces within the West.

If there is any silver lining, it is that the US’s volte-face has shaken European leaders out of their complacency. They agree that they must come together to increase defence spending and reduce their dependence on the US. If they follow through, we could well end up with a rejuvenation of the transatlantic partnership between two equal powers.

But this outcome is unlikely. The Trump administration’s support for illiberal, anti-European and pro-Russian forces within Europe will make it far more difficult for Europeans to focus on their own security together, even though that is ostensibly what the Trump administration wants.

In this respect, Europeans can agree with Vance: the greatest threat to the West is indeed coming from within.

Europe is only as weak as it thinks it is

Europe has just held a rapid-fire series of high-profile summits. Following the Paris AI Action Summit and the Munich Security Conference, European leaders gathered for two emergency meetings in Paris to address the disturbing signals coming from the new administration in the United States. In each case, a central question was how Europe can catch up with the US and China technologically and militarily.

By now, it is obvious to everyone that US President Donald Trump’s administration intends to treat Europe with contempt, and that Europeans must take responsibility for their defence and security fully into their own hands. The US is not only sidelining European governments to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine; it has also thrown its support behind European far-right parties and accused European liberals and democrats of betraying Western values.

Is there a method to this madness? Could the overture to Russia be an attempt to repeat president Richard Nixon’s strategy of breaking the alliance between communist China and the Soviet Union? We know that Trump is obsessed with China, and that Russians themselves have good reason to fear Chinese dominance. If sacrificing some part of Ukraine would allow Trump to strike a blow against his bete noire, he would surely seize the opportunity.

But this Nixonian manoeuvre is unlikely to succeed unless Trump secures Europe’s participation, and that seems unlikely. Paralysed by fear since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, Europe has forgotten that it can say no. But the Trump administration has shaken European leaders from their slumber. They are now taking an inventory of their strengths and exploring their options. Ukraine is not up against a wall yet. With increased support from Europe, its battle-hardened, highly innovative military can continue to resist Russia’s aggression.

Moreover, the Trump administration has not done much of anything yet except talk. Its real focus is on the home front, where it is busy gutting its own state capacity by mass firings. Trump’s war on the civil service—presumably the prelude to installing a skeleton crew of political loyalists—will inevitably cost the US money and reduce his ability to carry out his policy agenda.

The European Union, for its part, should not respond with the usual search for unity. Given the parties in power in Hungary, Slovakia and elsewhere, that is neither possible nor necessary. The better strategy is to build a coalition of willing EU member states and other countries that Trump is pointlessly alienating, such as Canada, Britain and South Korea.

This seems to be what French President Emmanuel Macron has in mind, judging by his recent statements. Many of his past warnings are now coming true. He remains one of the only leaders, alongside British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, who is not ruling out sending troops to Ukraine or the surrounding area. And lest we forget, France and Britain both have nuclear weapons.

Lost in the coverage following the rupture with the US is the fact that Western Europe is more fearful than Eastern Europe. We are arguably more familiar with crises, but we also are not the ones in Trump’s crosshairs. We do not have a huge trade surplus with the US, and we spend hundreds of billions of dollars on US-made weapons. Unlike the Netherlands (ironically the home of NATO’s new secretary-general), which spent around 1.7 percent of its GDP on defence in 2023, Poland spends almost 5 percent.

Judging by the flurry of recent speeches and statements from Republican officials, one might think that there are actually two Republican parties. On one hand, there is the old party that always sought to raise defence spending, strengthen US military alliances, and confront autocrats such as Russian President Vladimir Putin. On the other hand, there is the party of Trump’s MAGA movement, which seems to believe that national greatness requires dismantling the US state and abandoning longstanding alliances, all justified with primitive blood-and-soil rhetoric and conspiracy theories.

While it feels as if the entire world has changed overnight, the truth is that nothing really has happened yet. If Europeans would only open their eyes, they would see that they have all the resources, talent, and instruments they need to secure their sovereignty and restore peace and stability. They do not need an invitation to the table. They should take inspiration from Ukraine, which has single-handedly halted Russia’s march of aggression through sheer willpower.

This is no time for Europeans to panic. On the contrary, Trump has given us what we need the most: a reason to get our act together.

Tag Archive for: Russia–Ukraine war

The Economist’s Shashank Joshi on Trump, Ukraine and Europe’s rearmament

Donald Trump has upended US foreign policy—in particular his nation’s role in supporting Ukraine’s self-defence against Russia’s unprovoked invasion, and its traditionally close relationship with its NATO allies in Europe. As a consequence, Europe is scrambling to lift its defence investment and capability with a sense of urgency not seen in the post-War years.

The Economist’s Defence Editor Shashank Joshi gives us his expert take on the latest developments, what they mean and where the world is headed from here. Shashank helps us to understand what Trump is trying to do, how Europe sees the threat from Russia in a possible future in which Putin’s aggression is rewarded rather than penalised, and the increasingly positive signs of strong European leadership to take up the role defending a liberal international order. Finally he gives his view on what it all means for Australia and the Indo-Pacific.

Stop the World: A new world order? Ukraine’s Ambassador on Russia, the United States and Europe

In this special episode of Stop the World, ASPI’s David Wroe speaks with Ukraine’s Ambassador to Australia, Vasyl Myroshnychenko, on the morning after US and Russian representatives met in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

The Ambassador responds to the blizzard of recent developments affecting the prospect of a peace agreement to end Russia’s unprovoked war of aggression against its democratic neighbour as we approach the third anniversary of the full-scale invasion. He talks about signs of a turning point in the world order, Ukraine’s hopes of joining NATO, recent remarks from the Trump administration, a security guarantee for the Ukrainian people, and the grim future the world faces if aggression is allowed to go unchecked.

Guests:

David Wroe

Vasyl Myroshnychenko

Stop the World: Strategic shifts with Thijs van der Plas, Anita Nergaard and Scott M. Oudkirk

In the latest episode of Stop the World, ASPI’s Executive Director Justin Bassi is joined by Netherlands Ambassador to NATO Thijs van der Plas, Norway’s Ambassador to NATO Anita Nergaard and the US Chargé d’affaires to NATO Scott M. Oudkirk. 

Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, NATO has undergone a strategic shift with increased collective defence spending and the expansion of the alliance to include Finland and Sweden. This conversation explores NATO’s recent evolution and how Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine contributed to it. 

Justin, Thijs, Anita and Scott also discuss the current state of the war in Ukraine and whether the conflict is headed towards a stalemate, or if there is a credible path towards a Ukrainian victory. They also talk about China’s role in enabling the Russian war effort, the introduction of North Korean troops into the conflict and how to deter Russia’s increasing hybrid warfare. 

Finally, they explore NATO’s relationship with the Indo-Pacific, including its ties with the Indo-Pacific Four countries – Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand – and they discuss the indivisibility of Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security. 

Guests:
Thijs van der Plas
Anita Nergaard
Scott M. Oudkirk

Stop the World: Not just another conversation on Russia, with Mark Galeotti

This week on the pod, David Wroe interviews Russia expert Mark Galeotti. Mark is a renowned author of many books, including ‘We Need to Talk About Putin’ and ‘Downfall: Prigozhin, Putin, and the new fight for the future of Russia’, and host of the podcast ‘In Moscow’s Shadows’.

David asks Mark for an update on Russia’s war on Ukraine, whether time is on Ukraine or Russia’s side, the impacts of the war on Russia domestically and Putin’s hold on power. They also discuss the increase of Russia’s sabotage activities across Europe and the potential impacts of the US elections on Russia’s war on Ukraine. Mark is a true Russia expert and he’s full of insights that you’re unlikely to have heard elsewhere.

Guests:

⁠David Wroe⁠

⁠Mark Galeotti

Stop the World: EU security and strategic stability in the Indo-Pacific

This week on Stop the World, ASPI Senior Analyst Alex Bristow speaks to Niclas Kvarnström, Managing Director for Asia and the Pacific at the European ExternalAction Service, to discuss the European Union’s engagement in and relationship with the Indo-Pacific.

With war in Europe and conflict in the Middle East, they discuss how much capacity the European Union (EU) has to focus on the Indo-Pacific, how Russia’s war on Ukraine has forced a rethink of the EU’s future security, as well as its relationship with China.

And in the episode’s second segment, Alex is joined by William Leben, Expert Associate at the Australian National University’s National Security College, to unpack his recent ASPI report ‘Escalation risks in the Indo-Pacific: a review for practitioners’. They discuss the main threats to strategic stability in the Indo-Pacific, how a potential crisis in the region might develop, and whether or not AUKUS will contribute to a balance of power in the region.

Mentioned in this episode:

⁠https://www.aspi.org.au/report/escalation-risks-indo-pacific-review-practitioners#:~:text=The%20outbreak%20of%20war%20in,potential%20miscalculations%20heighten%20the%20risk⁠.

Guests:

⁠Alex Bristow⁠

Niclas Kvarnström

⁠William Leben