Over the next decade, the Australian Government is planning to acquire seven MQ-4C Triton unmanned maritime surveillance aircraft, which will operate alongside between eight and 12 manned P-8A Poseidons. Together, they’ll replace the RAAF’s 18 AP-3C Orions. The high altitude and long endurance of the Triton are capabilities that manned platforms can’t match, and robots are good at carrying out boring tasks. These qualities make Triton a uniquely attractive platform for surveilling Australia’s vast maritime territories.

Australian interest in the Triton can be traced back to at least April 2001, when a Global Hawk completed a non-stop 23-hour flight from southern California to South Australia. But Australia’s commitment to the platform has been hot and cold—especially in earlier years— despite its clear value to the RAAF’s future needs. In order to understand why, it’s worth looking at the development history of Triton and its predecessor platform, the better-known Global Hawk.

The histories of Global Hawk and Triton, presented in Figure 1, show the change in estimated unit procurement cost (excluding R&D) over the program life of both platforms. The curved line represents the average trend of cost estimates over the life of a developmental program, baselined to the 2002 estimate for Global Hawk costs. (The situation is actually a little worse than it looks here; Global Hawk development started prior to 2002 and earlier estimates were even lower.)

Figure 1: Predicted average unit procurement cost – Global Hawk and Triton

Source: GAO Assessments of Selected Weapons Programs 2004-2016 and ASPI analysis of data in Augustine’s Laws

Over the period 2002–2006 the estimated unit cost of Global Hawk increased by about 60%. US legislation requires that a development program be examined by Congress if costs exceed ‘25% of the current baseline or 50% of the original estimate’. As a result, the Global Hawk program was nearly cancelled by Congress in 2006. Instead, a restructure delayed planned increases to production rates and prioritised operational testing to iron out problems.

From 2005 to 2009, Global Hawk cost estimates were relatively consistent, and planned production remained steady at 54 aircraft. But in 2010, an increase in planned quantities of the Block 30 and relatively expensive Block 40 aircraft drove costs up again. The program was saved again in 2011 by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who certified the platform as ‘essential to national security’, but numbers suffered even so—in 2012 Global Hawk procurement was capped at 45 aircraft.

In 2006, Australia considered collaborating with the USN to develop the broad area maritime surveillance (BAMS) variant of Global Hawk that would later become Triton. But Australian collaboration was formally ruled out in 2009, after the Government decided to wait for a more mature platform. Given the history of Global Hawk, it’s easy to understand why.

But, as the graph above shows, cost estimates for the Triton have been much more consistent than Global Hawk. That’s likely due to more realistic baseline estimates USN had the advantage of starting with an airframe that had already been in development for a decade.

The first Triton was delivered to USN in 2012, after which estimated costs declined—perhaps reflecting dedicated efforts to rein in costs, as the USN’s planned quantity has remained steady at 70 units. Triton’s first flight took place in May 2013, and in February 2014 Prime Minister Tony Abbott announced that the Triton had been given first-pass approval to proceed to a more detailed evaluation.

The other half of Project AIR 7000, the Poseidon, received first-pass approval in 2007. The development history of the Poseidon, as reflected in progressive cost estimates, is in stark contrast to the Global Hawk/Triton. The Poseidon is based on a Boeing 737 commercial airliner, with much of the production work occurring on the same assembly line. This has helped make it an extremely cost-effective and predictable acquisition. But it’s also in some ways less ground breaking than the Triton, and innovative capabilities carry significant higher development risks.

The corresponding Poseidon graph (figure 2) shows how remarkably consistent cost predictions have been.

Figure 2: Predicted average unit procurement cost – Poseidon

Source: GAO Assessments of Selected Weapons Programs 2007-2016 (2008 data point unavailable)

The 2016 Defence White Paper reaffirmed Australia’s plans to acquire seven Tritons for around A$3 billion. In the context of development costs, it’s easy to understand Australia’s earlier reservations about committing to the platform. Compared to the predictable development of the Poseidon, the Triton’s predecessor had a turbulent history. But the benefit of experience has given Triton a much more stable development. And, in the meantime, Global Hawk’s operating costs have been driven down repeatedly, which could translate into further benefits for the Triton.

Even with a recent setback in the form of flawed wing manufacturing, Triton appears to be well on its way to maturity. A shift from development phase to low rate initial production could be approved by October this year, and USN initial operational capability is scheduled for 2018. Australia’s acquisition of the aircraft should be pretty smooth.

The Battle of the Beams was a period during World War II concerning German attempts to harness radio navigation for night bombing in the UK and the resulting British countermeasures. The British eventually managed to jam or distort all three iterations of German radio signals, making it more difficult for the bombers to hit their targets. That episode dramatically illustrates the ephemeral nature of advantages in electronic warfare, especially when operating against an agile and sophisticated foe.

Since the end of the Cold War and the onset of the War on Terror, the principal targets of Western military power have been relatively low-tech groups in the Middle East. Electronic warfare platforms like the US Navy’s EA-6B Prowler were used to jam enemy communications during operations, and the relatively low tech of the enemy limited their ability to counter. But the constant threat to ground troops from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) led to the development of counter-IED jamming systems, and a new ‘invisible war’ emerged. As quickly as vehicle-mounted jammers could be reprogrammed, insurgents made use of a variety of commercial technologies—cell-phones, key-fobs, door remotes—to adapt.

The focus of electronic warfare understandably changed to deal with the threat of the day, but a focus on counter-IED systems has had consequences for wider development. For example, the ALQ-99 jamming pod used on the Prowler, and on the new EA-18G Growler, was first used as far back as the Vietnam War and its successor is still years away.

A lack of new developments in electronic warfare since the end of the Cold War has led to a closing of the technological gap between the US (and allies such as Australia), and potential adversaries such as Russia or China. This trend has been especially clear since Russian EW capabilities were used in Eastern Ukraine. The Russian land-based Krasukha-4 jamming system proved too much for the Ukrainians to handle, and was described by Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, commander of US Army units in Europe, as ‘eye-watering’ in sophistication.

Last year, Russia deployed the Krasukha-4 to Syria in support of its operations there, along with its S-400 radar-guided missile system. The S-400 uses AESA (active electronically scanned array) radar to track multiple aerial targets out to 600km, and can fire supersonic missiles up to 400km. Russia is exporting the S-400 to China and India, and its predecessor platform, the S-300, is operated by several countries including China and Iran. Because of this proliferation, any conflict with Russia, China or even Iran is likely to involve a substantial electronic warfare component.

The Australian Defence Force will need new and advanced tactical EW capabilities to contribute in the event of conflict with an adversary that’s technologically capable. There are systems ‘on the way,’ but there are a few things that strategists and observers should be aware of when considering the future of Australia’s EW capability.

First, the Australian government announced in 2013 that it would purchase 12 new-build Growler aircraft from the US to complement the 24 F/A-18F Super Hornets already in service. Former RAAF Air Marshal Geoff Brown said that the Growler ‘will have the biggest strategic effect on the ADF since the F-111 in the 1970s’. They’ll still operate the obsolescent ALQ-99 jammer pods, but the ADF will likely seek to acquire the US Navy’s Next-Gen Jammer (NGJ) when it arrives sometime after 2021. Essentially, the new jammer is ‘a move from dumb jamming to smart jamming,’ and it’s being designed with Growler compatibility as a priority. The RAAF Growler will also field the ALQ-218 electronic intelligence (ELINT) system, used to detect and analyse signals in the operating environment.

Second, the F-35 Lightning-II will have an exceptional AESA digital radar system that will also be a capable electronic warfare system. It will be able to function as a jammer and generate false targets. It’s not clear if the F-35’s EW capability will be as substantial as the NGJ’s, since the F-35 radar is ‘optimised to be a targeting radar,’ and is limited to X-band frequencies. However, the F-35 development program will continue to evolve a ‘cognitive EW’ capability, which will allow the F-35 to adapt its electronic detection and emissions with increasing agility.

Third, electronic warfare needn’t be restricted to electronic attack or ELINT capabilities. In fact, maintaining a technological edge in those capabilities is the bare minimum that the US Armed Forces and the ADF should be doing. The outcomes of conflicts of the future are being determined in the research labs of today. Electromagnetic spectrum capabilities include a growing role for microwave technology, such as high-power microwave weapons that can disrupt or even destroy the electronics of enemy vehicles and drones. Also of note are developments in non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse weapons and offensive lasers.

Australia is well positioned to reap the capability benefits of US electronic warfare development, which has the added benefit of improving interoperability, but the ADF should investigate opportunities to contribute to future research in the field. The Defence Science and Technology Group already employs a team of world-class radar specialists to work on the Jindalee Operational Radar Network.

Finally, the US Navy will continue to bear the brunt of testing Australian platforms’ networking capabilities, as they are the primary operators of the Super Hornet and Growler, as well as the P-8 Poseidon and MQ-4C Triton platforms which Australia is planning to acquire. The ADF should also seek to confirm the F-35 and NGJ’s networking compatibility with the RAAF’s E-7A Wedgetail and Gulfstream 550, and the RAN’s Air Warfare Destroyer and future frigates and submarines. The ADF will need to align its structure and EW doctrine to capitalise on the capability provided by networked EW and signals intelligence collection systems.

In the event of conflict, Australia should be able to employ modern electronic warfare platforms, either independently or in concert with allies. Otherwise we could end up on the wrong side of the next Battle of the Beams.

It’s been five years since ASPI last took a detailed look at the capability of the ADF. Our 2010 Capability Review series looked at each of the services and the overall ability of the ADF to network its forces. The picture back then was very much a ‘work in progress’ of implementing the 2000 Defence White paper and of patchiness in some key areas.

The picture today is quite different. The Air Force, which is the subject of the first paper in our 2015 series, is well advanced in a period of renewal that will see effectively the entire fleet replaced and its business processes reengineered from end to end. The Navy is a few years behind, with most of its recapitalisation still ahead of it, but it has made good progress in remediating its most serious shortcomings. Army has embarked on a fundamental restructuring of its brigade structure and is in the early stages of replacing its fleet of armoured vehicles.

Overall, the ADF is in much better shape today than it was five years ago. We’re seeing a consolidation of plans formulated back in 2000 and the years of consistent investment required to implement them. I think that’s a good argument for white papers to be used judiciously. It takes time to turn force structure plans into reality, and the bigger the changes the more time it takes. A glance through the major capability proposals of the 2000 white paper—15 years on it’s a task still not finished—shows just how many of today’s top end capabilities originated there. That includes the Wedgetail airborne early warning and control and KC-30A tanker transports that deployed successfully into Iraq last year, and Navy’s forthcoming air warfare destroyers.

A white paper every 15 years is probably about right. If governments want to have something to say about their view of the world and the role of the military, strategic updates in between white papers could provide the outlet. The essay at the start of the white paper can easily be updated; the resources allocation and force structure plans at the back take time, effort and money. The ADF’s force structure represents about $150 billion of investment over decades. Like an aircraft carrier at high speed, it doesn’t turn around quickly (video). And the government of the day can always decide to make ‘out of cycle’ purchases if it sees the need—C-17s, LHDs, Super Hornets and HMAS Choules all fit that description.

But onto the first part of the series. Last year the RAAF deployed a package of aircraft into Iraq as part of a multi-national coalition and hit the ground running. Not only has it since flown hundreds of combat missions, it’s really pulling its weight. Unlike previous coalition contributions, Australia has provided not just strike fighters at the ‘pointy end’, but a complete package with its own combat support enabling aircraft including Wedgetail and tankers. That’s allowed Australia to assist coalition partners with those services—which are usually oversubscribed in any lengthy air campaign. Australian controllers have been able to control the air campaign at times when other assets aren’t available.

Clearly the Air Force is doing a lot right. As the table below shows, most capability areas have shown significant improvement since ASPI’s 2010 survey. Not coincidentally, the RAAF has been remarkably successful in winning government support for its acquisitions over the past decade, to the point where the RAAF can pretty much sit out the next defence white paper. Importantly, the money has turned into real capability. There are a couple of areas where more work is required, the most important of those being anti-submarine warfare. And that’s more dependent on the training required to develop operator expertise than it is on additional equipment purchases.

I was far from convinced by Deane-Peter Baker’s recent post on Australia’s gun laws and their allegedly deleterious effect on our Army’s effectiveness and safety in combat. But it evidently struck a chord with readers, judging by the number of Facebook ‘likes’ it got, so I’d offer the following thoughts in response.

I see two main problems with Baker’s argument. Firstly, he presents no evidence of any capability shortfall, other than comparing the shooting expertise of a few individuals with that of an American visitor. There’s no doubt that weapon proficiency and reliability are both critical in combat—but it’s the adversary that has to be outshot.

To be sure, there were Australian servicemen killed in exchanges of small-arms fire, but the majority of the fatalities that the ADF suffered in Afghanistan were due to rockets, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), or tragic so-called ‘green-on-blue’ attacks. The roadside bombs are evidence of the reluctance of the enemy to get into a fair fight with Western forces and of their preference for adopting asymmetric tactics. That’s been a clear trend in the more than a decade since the Afghan and Iraq wars began. And green-on-blue attacks (where indigenous Afghan forces working alongside Australians turn on them without warning) can’t really be solved through better weapons proficiency. Read more

In discussions about the future of ANZUS last week, I introduced a discussion of Australia–US cooperation in air combat and strike. Because of recent force structuring decisions, I think Australia’s well set up to make substantial contributions to coalition air-power operations in the future, but it’s worth thinking through how we might best do that.

History provides some valuable lessons. Australia’s first air operations with the United States were during WWII’s Pacific campaign. Australia started the war with equipment that wasn’t up to speed, and relied heavily on imports from the US and UK. Both of those nations had their own priorities and it took the RAAF some time to catch up. Read more