Tag Archive for: RAAF

Air force chief says RAAF will be faster, smarter and have longer reach in its next 100 years

With the development of hypersonic missiles—and ultimately aircraft—flying at several times the speed of sound, space-based systems, armed drones and uncrewed combat aircraft, the Royal Australian Air Force is fundamentally changing as it turns 100.

Heavily involved in World War I as the Australian Flying Corps, the nation’s military aviators were part of the army until the RAAF was formed in March 1921.

RAAF chief Mel Hupfeld says the RAAF is the region’s most technologically advanced air force, but technology alone will not see it succeed.

‘We’ve spent the last two decades concentrating on expeditionary operations in the Middle East,’ says Air Marshal Hupfeld. ‘That’s no longer our strategic imperative through the lens of the defence strategic update. We need to further invest in airbases and to project air and space power into our region across “shape”, “deter” and “respond” [the update’s three strategic objectives]—and we need to do so every day from our national support bases.’

The ability to achieve strategic effects below the threshold of declared conflict will be the measure of success, says Hupfeld. ‘Arguably, we’ve not always been sophisticated in identifying that nuance. The latest air force strategy will see us realise our potential for the joint force.’

The strategic update found that the security environment had deteriorated far more rapidly and in ways that could not have been predicted four years earlier when the last defence white paper was produced. Australia could no longer assume it would have a decade’s warning of a looming conflict.

As the Australian Defence Force applies the measures in the update and the accompanying force structure plan, new weapons for the RAAF will include long-range anti-ship missiles.

To guide the RAAF’s evolution, Hupfeld issued a strategy setting out how it must adapt to carry out operations in the grey zone as part of an integrated approach across the ADF.

He says a simplistic model of ‘peace’ and ‘war’ no longer adequately describes the geostrategic environment and malign actors exploit the grey zone to avoid clear escalation points that legitimise a traditional military response.

‘We must develop our people. This means professionalisation, increasing our diversity and drawing from our whole population.’

Hupfeld says that as the RAAF’s capabilities are enhanced, it isn’t all about flying platforms. ‘Our capabilities are potent and effective because our people are talented, skilled and trained to the highest standards, the critical asset to achieve the edge. We have to continue to invest in them as we have done with the air force’s new platforms.

‘If our combat aircraft fly against an adversary with a similar level of capability, I’ll back my people. Our team’s skills and tactical awareness are first rate. Not that I want to do it, but I’ll pitch them against pretty much anyone out there.’

At home, teams specialised in areas including combat control, mobile air load, and deployable health and aeromedical services and catering helped in the response to the 2019–20 bushfires and pivoted to assist in the pandemic.

On missions against Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, RAAF aircrew often flew for 10 hours or more—a long time strapped into a seat. To equip personnel for such missions, ‘contemporary human performance optimisation’ programs, embracing performance psychology and sports science, enhance mental and physical performance for increased combat effectiveness.

Hupfeld says that while technology becomes more complex, the basic need to strive for perfection and deliver precision remains. ‘More than ever, this requires personnel focusing on the fundamentals and the removal of unnecessary distractions. This is the core premise of sports psychology through the creation of high-performance teams.’

He says discussion of future capabilities needs to move away from a platform-centric approach to an effects-based one. That means exploring the gaps and opportunities in the RAAF’s ability to generate effects that exploit range and action from different domains—land, air, maritime, space and cyber—rather than focusing on one solution.

Long-range multi-domain strike is not confined to a particular aircraft and relies on a system of systems.

The RAAF’s capabilities increasingly include technologies and systems that don’t fly. One such system is the Jindalee Operational Radar Network, set up to look far out to Australia’s north and being expanded to watch over the Pacific.

The RAAF’s airbases and its ability to deploy and operate from austere and sometimes damaged airfields was showcased most recently in disaster relief in Fiji.

Rapid development and enhancement of information warfare capabilities covering several domains including space is a key feature of the strategy.

Hupfeld rejects suggestions that the RAAF has lacked an effective long-range strike capability since the F-111 was retired in 2010. ‘This is a far more capable air combat force than when the F-111 was withdrawn.’

So, given Australia’s size, the scale of the region and the vulnerability of support aircraft such as tankers, how does the RAAF achieve the range to keep potential enemies at a distance?

Hupfeld says air combat power is critical to protecting Australia and its deployed forces, and to providing a credible capability to hold an adversary’s forces and infrastructure at a distance from Australian shores.

Integrated air and missile defence will give deterrence and protection for the joint ADF, including tankers and early warning aircraft like the E-7A Wedgetail.

‘Medium-range ground-based air defence missiles will release platforms such as air warfare destroyers and frigates, and fighter aircraft, from inner-layer defensive roles so that they can defend vulnerable support aircraft, and other friendly forces. Coupled with the Wedgetail, Australia’s fighter force can defend for other aircraft, ships or land forces throughout the region,’ Hupfeld says.

‘Releasing these highly mobile, multi-role platforms from close-in defensive roles allows them the freedom of movement to hold potential aggressors at risk, increasing the deterrent effect.’

As a fighter pilot, and despite negative publicity about the ‘fifth-generation’ F-35 joint strike fighter, he has no doubt that it’s the right aircraft for the RAAF.

‘It’s a crucial part of an integrated system tied together with the Super Hornet, Growler electronic-warfare aircraft, the tanker, surveillance aircraft, intelligence databases, space capability enhancements and cyber activities, and more broadly integrating with air warfare destroyers and the army’s air defence systems. The F-35 replaces nothing, but changes everything,’ he says.

The government is committed to purchasing 72 F-35s with 33 already delivered, and the RAAF has an option to purchase 28 more.

Will the additional aircraft be F-35s?

‘We look at all options,’ Hupfeld says. ‘What’s the sixth generation of airpower going to look like when we decide on the next round of F-35s? Is F-35 still valid if there’s a sixth-generation aircraft? Will sixth-generation air combat capability be an aircraft? I don’t know the answer to that, but they’re the things I keep my eyes open for.

‘The [uncrewed] loyal wingman is an example of what may be part of the solution when we look at the next phase of our air combat capability program. And I’d never say never to any of those.’

If the sixth-generation aircraft may not be an aircraft, what might it be?

‘This is where I’d want to get my smart young think-tank people to come in and see what they imagine. Given my experience and the baggage I carry, I have to think really hard to not imagine something like an F-35 with a pilot in the cockpit,’ says Hupfeld, ‘but it could be a space-based system operating with a ship armed with a directed-energy weapon or a railgun. There are many options we want to look at. Our younger generation aren’t constrained in their thinking like I can be.’

A development, test and evaluation program for high-speed long-range strike and missile defence, including hypersonic weapons, is underway and prototypes will be built to inform decisions on future capabilities. That includes collaboration with the US on the Southern Cross Integrated Flight Research Experiment known as SCiFIRE.

Remotely piloted and/or autonomous combat aircraft, some designed to team with crewed aircraft and ground personnel, will increase air combat capacity.

Advanced longer-range strike weapons will extend the reach of combat aircraft and allow them to avoid increasingly sophisticated air defences.

Advanced loitering munitions will allow the ADF to strike in an increasingly complex environment, and better self-protection systems will improve the survivability of aircrew and aircraft.

Hupfeld says the ability to rapidly deploy defensive missile systems across Australia and within the region is paramount.

The combined effect of the three services operating together is crucial, he says. ‘The air force provides reach and responsiveness and the army and navy provide persistence in their area of operations. The inclusion of both land and maritime long-range strike capabilities highlights the increased importance of holding our adversaries at risk further from Australia.’

In the decades to come, the RAAF will have different skills and weapon systems, agile bases and multiple redundant networks, ‘and we’ll be active in space’.

‘Utilisation of our weapon systems, airbases and people will be transformed from the traditional airpower of our past 100 years to the generation of broader air and space power effects.

‘Our personnel will be strategically aware, they’ll know their place in the joint force and their responsibilities to the government, and they’ll appreciate the strategic effects they achieve every day.’

This force will be agile in its thinking and able to seize opportunities.

‘My intent for the air force highlights that we need to be comfortable operating with constant competition,’ Hupfeld says. ‘Our strategy is to give our people the tools to be creative. Being aware of the strategic effect in everything we do is the key to success. We need to recognise opportunities and seize them wherever possible.’

The future force is likely to include crewed, uncrewed and optionally piloted aircraft.

Hupfeld says uncrewed aircraft development is progressing at a rapid pace and they’re likely to excel in a number of roles and complement crewed aircraft.

But all air forces will have crewed platforms for a long time yet. It’s far too early to predict if, or when, they’ll cease flying crewed aircraft in all roles.

‘Our co-development activity with Boeing’s loyal wingman, the Airpower Teaming System, is teaching us a lot about what’s possible, but also what’s needed to own and operate an uncrewed platform.’

Loyal wingman’s first flight shows fourth industrial revolution in defence capability has arrived

With the ongoing gloom hanging around Australia’s future submarine program and signs that the future frigate is facing some big problems, it’s great to see some good news out of the Defence Department and its Australian industry partners. And to be honest, it’s really good news. Last weekend, the Boeing Airpower Teaming System, aka the ‘loyal wingman’, successfully completed its first test flight.

This is much bigger than yet another drone taking to the sky. Certainly, the Royal Australian Air Force, Boeing and their 35 industry partners can be justifiably proud of flying the first military aircraft to be designed and built in Australia in more than 50 years. But there’s a lot more here to digest.

The ATS has gone from the start of detailed design to successful flight in three years. Those are the kind of timelines we saw back in the world wars, when technology was simpler, national survival was on the line, and governments didn’t care too much about losing some test pilots in the development process.

In more recent times, the development of combat aircraft has taken decades. The rapid progress of the ATS shows how the ecosystem of technologies that make up the fourth industrial revolution is bringing its transformative potential to the defence sector.

Key elements including advanced digital design technologies that make use of ‘digital twins’ to test and fly a virtual version of the aircraft thousands of times, allowing problems to be identified and addressed well before it takes flight. Boeing is also developing a robotic assembly line to build the aircraft.

When you combine this with the inherent advantages of unmanned systems—like not having to cram in systems to keep the crew alive, which take up space and weight and add to the cost and complexity and development timelines—not only do you get faster development, but you get a relatively small aircraft with both long range and large payload capacity.

Another factor that reduces development risk is that a loyal wingman will be part of a manned–unmanned teaming concept. That means BAE Systems, which is providing the flight controls, doesn’t have to master all of the technologies needed for high levels of autonomy to get the capability into service. Instead, it can incrementally increase autonomy over time as both technology and trust develop.

One element of digital design technologies that holds great promise for the program is that once the technologies that provide the right mix of human control and autonomy are mature and payloads are integrated into the base version of the loyal wingman, developing other variants shouldn’t be too hard. Indeed, Defence has indicated that it envisages an evolving family of aircraft of different sizes.

Of course, the payload is what the loyal wingman brings to the fight. It’s carried in the form of a modular nose that can be rapidly swapped out. Defence has ambitious plans here as well. While the air force has been slow to get armed drones into service, it’s clear it sees the loyal wingman as a combat aircraft. It won’t just be an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platform or a flying communications relay but will be equipped with kinetic and non-kinetic weapons. When we combine these two ambitions, it’s possible, for example, that we may see a multi-engine version that’s big enough to serve as a long-range strike platform at a fraction of the cost of a manned bomber.

In short, we’re on the cusp of realising the long-awaited potential of unmanned and autonomous systems to provide smaller militaries with greater mass, greater ability to suffer attrition, and greater ability to create rapidly customised force packages to deliver distributed lethality.

Another thing that has no doubt helped the pace of development is that Defence has programmed a large funding stream in its investment plan to acquire the loyal wingman if development goes well. That is, there’s a clear, funded path from innovation to commercialisation, giving industry the confidence to invest its own money and resources in the knowledge that if the capability matures, Defence will acquire it. It’s telling that Boeing is already proving its assembly processes in low-rate production (three aircraft have been built so far with an order for three more just announced) and working with the Queensland government to establish a facility for production of the mature system.

If the ATS program continues at the rate it’s going, Defence may even have to think about bringing some of that money forward from the second half of the decade. It’s a rare defence acquisition program that can spend money faster than planned.

Of course, technology is one thing; employing it is another. This may be an area where technology is maturing faster than concepts around how to use it. Working out exactly how a swarm of loyal wingmen operates with crewed aircraft will offer many opportunities for innovation not just in tactics, but in organisation, acquisition processes, sustainment and more. And while the air force has been slow to get unmanned systems, particularly armed ones, into service, this could be the positive ‘strategic shock’ that brings deep transformation.

The ATS demonstrates how the fourth industrial revolution is democratising technology for players willing to step up and embrace it. Australia could not have designed and built the F-35. However, it has designed and built an unmanned aerial vehicle that Boeing will use to compete for the US Air Force’s Skyborg program. No doubt Boeing Australia had help from Boeing’s global enterprise, but the ATS shows that Australia’s advanced manufacturing sector is very capable of developing world-leading, internationally competitive technologies when paired with the right partners.

Of course, the success to date of the ATS program makes one ask what’s stopping us from doing similar things in the maritime space in both surface and undersea warfare and meeting the government’s clear intent of rapidly developing sovereign defence capability.

When will Defence and industry step up to deliver an unmanned surface vessel that can team with the navy’s frigates and destroyers, acting as a forward sensor or an arsenal ship with a deep magazine of missiles? In that field, the US Navy is well ahead of us, but does that mean we need to accept a role as a technology taker?

Mystery US jet shows there’s a faster path to Australia’s future fighter

The United States has designed, built and flown a prototype of its latest jet fighter at startling speed. Using advanced manufacturing techniques, the US Air Force has taken its ‘next generation air dominance’, or NGAD, fighter from selection process to a virtual version and then to a flying prototype in just a year.

By comparison, it took about 20 years to develop the ‘fifth generation’ F-35 joint strike fighter from initial conceptual studies in 1996 to initial operating capability in 2016.

William Roper, the USAF’s acquisition leader, told Defense News that the full-scale NGAD prototype flew with mission systems on board.

The speed of development of the jet previously referred to as the ‘sixth generation’ fighter demonstrates just how fast the US can produce cutting-edge technology.

This new experimental ‘x plane’ is a technology demonstrator and is not yet an operational combat capability.  Even so, Roper suggests that going down a digital development path would seem to allow the USAF to move ‘pretty fast’ into actual production.

Depending on the NGAD’s operational capabilities, and noting that it is not necessarily a single airframe, but more likely a ‘system of systems’, there could be a justification for moving quickly to develop the fighter sooner, even at the expense of future planned acquisition of the F-35.

Such a move would have implications for the Royal Australian Air Force. After all, why wait another 20 or 30 years to replace the RAAF’s F-35As with a future fighter, if the US might field a successor later this decade?

This is not a call to scrap the RAAF’s acquisition of the F-35A. We should still acquire our planned 72 jets, and these aircraft are likely to be the centrepiece of RAAF air combat capability through to 2040.

The RAAF should see digital development as a potential opportunity to ensure Australia is not left behind as the next generation of combat aircraft appear. Buying into such a program makes much more sense than remaining entrenched in a 20-year acquisition cycle based on a single airframe.

Defence needs to seize opportunities to try new approaches that enhance the RAAF’s technological advantage in strike and air combat capability, and which could also increase the number of air combat capabilities it has. The result should be a larger, more powerful and more technologically advanced RAAF able to hold a major power adversary at bay at much greater range and with greater speed and precision. Seizing these opportunities would deliver capability faster and with more rapid innovation and boost our ability to deter and to burden-share with key allies.

The digital development path offers us a fantastic opportunity to embrace rapid innovation cycles, and support a paradigm suggested by the proposed ‘digital century series’ that will likely be the basis for future USAF combat aircraft.

Instead of waiting 20 years for a new boutique fighter at great cost, digital development allows us to acquire a range of new platforms, perhaps in smaller numbers and with greater role specialisation, and then to evolve generations of those platforms over shorter periods. Rather than trying to sustain airframes for 20 to 30 years, we should accept that they will have shorter operational lives—perhaps 10 years—and they’ll be replaced by newer and more capable platforms sooner.

The same approach can be applied to other military capabilities. The application of digital development and ‘fourth industrial revolution’ technologies could allow Australia to dive more deeply into building sovereign defence capability in areas such as sensors, long-range missile systems, autonomous platforms, space assets and even naval vessels.

The digital development path also brings back the welcome prospect of increased competition in the aerospace sector. Digital development opens up military aerospace in the same way that the space sector is seeing start-ups and new actors like SpaceX and Blue Origin challenging the major companies. The technology is not nation-specific and, as Australia’s vibrant space sector is demonstrating, anyone can play. Is there any reason why a new approach to developing air combat capability would be confined to prime contractors or limited to US companies? Why shouldn’t Australian companies contribute new concepts and designs into the mix for Australia, the US and other partners?

Cost matters a great deal. The F-35 has been under development since 1996 at great expense, and such a long lead time demands a long service life to generate financial returns to the contractor through high sustainment costs. The RAAF’s F-35As are likely to be in service through to the 2040s and the 2020 force structure plan suggests an evaluation of its replacement won’t happen until the late 2030s.

The systems and software on the F-35 will be modernised over its life, but in 2040 we’ll still be flying the same aircraft that we are taking delivery of now. In contrast, the digital century model of rapid procurement and innovation involves a higher upfront development cost over a much shorter period, but far cheaper sustainment costs because we replace aircraft sooner. The money saved on sustainment would then be invested in the rapid advancement of new technologies.

The upside is much faster development of new operational capabilities rather than sinking ever growing amounts into sustaining older aircraft while adversaries find ways to erode our technological edge. We have a better chance of keeping pace in a technological race through rapid digital development rather than sticking with an outdated acquisition mindset.

The news that the USAF is now flying a demonstrator for NGAD—after only a year of development—shows there’s an alternative path to traditional acquisition of advanced capability that the RAAF should not discount.

For the RAAF, there’s not a lot of concrete in the Pacific

The mantra of Australia’s 2020 defence strategic update is ‘shape, deter and respond’ with a renewed focus on the Indo-Pacific region. Unfortunately, this policy will face challenges in delivery. Shaping, deterring and responding demand understanding, access and presence.

The Australian Defence Force’s understanding of the region will need to be rebuilt. A generation of sailors, soldiers and airmen have amassed enormous experience in land operations in the Middle East. The Indo-Pacific is mostly maritime, and what landmass there is varies greatly in geography, climate and terrain.

In the 21st century, access is, in the first place, provided by air. Military personnel travel by air. Humanitarian aid and disaster relief arrive in the first instance by air. Search and rescue’s first response is usually from the air, and surveillance for fisheries protection is mostly carried out from the air and space. A refocus on the near region of the Indo-Pacific has significant implications for Australian airpower.

Two characteristics of airpower that have made it essential to modern security and military forces are reach and speed. By air, Australia is four hours wide by three hours high. By land or sea, travel times are at best measured in days. But when we set out to explore the Indo-Pacific, range comes sharply into focus. The aircraft involved in air operations against the Islamic State terror group required multiple mid-air fuel-ups and sorties were at the limit of crew endurance, yet in the near region the distances covered equate to a flight from Townsville to the eastern Solomon Islands or from Brisbane to Vanuatu—only about halfway to Tonga, Samoa or Tuvalu. Our region will challenge the ADF’s reach.

Air operations, more than those in any other domain, are affected by weather and climate. The skies over the Middle East and Afghanistan are generally clear—apart from the occasional sand storm. Air and space operations for surveillance, reconnaissance and response can be conducted essentially at will. Little can move without notice and assets can rapidly respond. Vegetation is limited to cultivated areas.

In contrast, the Indo-Pacific is a region of vast seas and jungle-covered islands, and the ground is largely invisible to air and space surveillance. The equatorial and tropical areas are in the intertropical convergence zone, a region of towering cumulonimbus clouds up to 15 kilometres high that generate spectacular and violent storms with a demonstrated ability to bring down aircraft unfortunate enough to enter them. This weather also interrupts space-based sensors and many forms of communication essential to military operations.

The paucity of infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific will challenge Australian airpower. Oil-rich Middle Eastern countries have made a showcase of infrastructure, be it communications, multi-lane highways or 3,000-metre concrete runways. There are more runways of this length in Iraq alone than in all the islands of the southwest Pacific. This will constrain operations for Australian fixed-wing aircraft. Helicopters may have greater freedom of movement once they arrive, but to get to where they’re required they’ll need to be carried aboard one of the Royal Australian Navy’s two Canberra-class landing helicopter docks.

Runway length matters. Most modern jets require at least 2 kilometres of reinforced concrete from which to operate. But they also place demands on runway strength (reinforcement and thickness), and need suitable parking areas for refuelling and loading and unloading stores and ordnance. Modern operations also demand communications access for flight planning and monitoring. The Middle East has complete radar coverage, and ubiquitous high-capacity networks. The Indo-Pacific does not.

Modern aircraft are also thirsty for fuel, including a range of additives, depending on type and role. While the larger Pacific islands have some fuel storage facilities, the smaller atolls do not. And Pacific island countries don’t produce fuel of their own.

The difficulty of sending aircraft into the Indo-Pacific first became apparent in 1941 with the Japanese advance into the region. Aircraft carriers became the ‘kings’ of the Pacific war, but the transport fleets that sustained operations and air defence demanded a lot more airfields. The US Navy ‘Sea Bees’ constructed many airfields for aircraft able to operate from airstrips as short as 300 to 400 metres, something that few military aircraft can do now.

Airfield construction occurred on an industrial scale in northern Australia and Papua New Guinea during the war, and many runways built then can still be seen around Darwin and through PNG. Most have faded back into the landscape, but some remain in the highlands of PNG and provide the only access to remote regions.

Such a building program is happening now as China constructs island airfields and ports on reefs and shoals. This is not to suggest that Australia should embark on island-building in the southwest Pacific, but it does highlight that shaping and deterring involve infrastructure and that is sadly lacking in the region we are now focusing our security policy on.

We also need to know if we would be welcome to use the limited infrastructure that does exist. We already see a reluctance of some Asian nations to support Australian access to their facilities. What infrastructure there is in the Indo-Pacific is somebody else’s sovereign territory. We need to negotiate access, and the sooner we start talking, the better.

Finally, we need to better develop knowledge and information. Decades of conflict in the Middle East have resulted in the region being one of the most mapped and closely observed places on earth. Djibouti alone hosts bases used by the US, China, France, Japan and Italy looking out into the Bab el Mandeb, the entrance to the Red Sea and southern end of the Suez Canal.

In the southwest Pacific, local populations are often dislocated from their own governments. When it comes to domain awareness, Australia and New Zealand are the big dogs on the block. What mapping, hydrography and surveillance assets exist are ours. In a region that we have until recently studiously ignored, we run the risk of not knowing what is there or what is going on, and not having the presence needed to find out.

Closing Australia’s long-range strike gap requires a robust space capability

ASPI’s Catherine McGregor has highlighted the concerns of two former air force chiefs that there’s an urgent capability gap in the Australian Defence Force’s order of battle—an absence of credible long-range strike capability for the air force and navy. Air Marshals Leo Davies and Geoff Brown told McGregor that Australia needs a long-range bomber (the only real option being the US B-21 Raider now under development) as well as long-range drones and land-based missiles.

If that suggestion is adopted by the government, it will make the strategic review that’s just getting underway a very interesting exercise indeed. It probably won’t produce a status quo document. The review, announced by Defence Minister Linda Reynolds at last month’s Sea Power 2019 conference, comes as Australia faces a deteriorating strategic outlook, dominated by concerns about a more assertive Chinese state and growing uncertainty over the longevity of US military commitments in our region.

The strategic review should examine how the ADF can double down on its strike capability, with an emphasis on range, payload and responsiveness. My colleague Marcus Hellyer has written an excellent series of articles analysing the constraints of the F-35 joint strike fighter. The F-35 is a cutting-edge aircraft, but it’s a tactical multi-role fighter that doesn’t have the range or payload to operate far from Australia’s north and west coasts.

The retirement of the F-111C in 2010—and the missed opportunity by the US to replace that platform with a new strike aircraft to fill the gap between short-range fighters and long-range bombers—now confronts Western air forces. Our potential adversaries—China and Russia—deploy a full spectrum of long-range strike capabilities.

Australia’s strategic and operational environment is characterised by large maritime domains. Short-range platforms like the F-35 struggle to deliver effects, especially in the face of ever more sophisticated long-range capabilities now being acquired by Beijing. An over-reliance on short-range tactical platforms makes it more difficult to deter an adversary or, if necessary, to defend our maritime approaches.

In this context, the call by the retired air force chiefs is spot on. We need to move away from the traditional paradigm of like-for-like replacement that the F-35 epitomises and think about long-range strike—from the air with long-range bombers and drones, or via land-based ballistic missiles equipped with non-nuclear precision-strike warheads.

The government’s quashing of any debate on land-based missiles after the recent AUSMIN talks, was, I think, premature. The US is developing a new medium-range land-based ballistic missile that’s designed to be equipped with a non-nuclear warhead. It’s likely to be deployed in a few years. The government would be wise to reconsider its unwillingness to explore that option, especially given the potential for such a capability to evolve into an anti-ship ballistic missile in much the same way that China has developed its DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile.

Also, such a capability could be the basis for an Australian strike capability centred on an eventual hypersonic glide vehicle that could be developed in collaboration with the US. Australia is a world leader in hypersonics research and development. Both the University of Queensland and commercial company Hypersonix are well placed to support the ADF’s requirements in this transformative capability.

Getting the Americans on board, whether for the air force acquiring the B-21 or the army operating land-based missiles in northern Australia, is essential. The F-35 collaboration has set a precedent, and increased Australia–US space cooperation deepens the capacity to undertake further complex endeavours. This is a discussion for political leaders in Canberra and Washington.

If we’re serious about long-range strike, we need to also think about establishing the sensor-to-shooter link, and examine how the ADF might dramatically expand its sovereign space capabilities to facilitate this capability. There’s little point in having a long-range strike capability without the ability to identify targets, plan strike missions responsively and flexibly, and then do post-strike assessments of bomb damage.

Certainly deploying our own space assets, based around small satellites and constellations of CubeSats, and supported by a sovereign responsive space launch capability, will enhance our value as an alliance partner and act as a force multiplier for our strike capabilities.

Space capabilities can be developed and launched from sites in ways that meet both the operational requirements of both the ADF and our coalition partners. As costs fall, small satellites costing a few million dollars will be able to do the job that once required large, complex, multibillion-dollar satellites. A Space 2.0 approach would not only give the ADF a sovereign space segment to directly support its new strike capabilities, but also add to our ability to burden-share in orbit with the US and other key partners.

Seeing deep is as important as striking deep, and developing a ‘reconnaissance-strike complex’ should be an essential component of any future ADF long-range strike capability. Platforms such as the MQ-4C Triton can’t fly into contested airspace, and we do need overhead persistent imagery.

Space is also increasingly contested and an ‘old space’ mindset of long acquisition cycles won’t work. Instead, the government needs to support a paradigm for responsive space access that includes local space launch and to encourage industry to focus on low-cost small satellite and CubeSat systems that can leverage models for mass manufacture generated by the fourth industrial revolution.

The battle for the space domain in future warfare is as much about rapid reconstitution and augmentation—starting with manufacture—to support terrestrial operations as it is about winning the battle in orbit.

The chiefs are right—long-range strike is missing, and we need to fill that gap. But doing so also means getting serious about developing our space capability.

Vietnam on the screen: ‘Apocalypse Now: Final Cut’ and ‘Danger Close’

Francis Ford Coppola’s 1979 film Apocalypse Now is highly regarded as a cinematic masterpiece but is, of course, much more in its impact and continuing resonance. The film is emblematic of the Vietnam War, with its atrocities and absurdities, its brutalities and bravery.

There are now three versions of Coppola’s epic; Apocalypse Now: Final Cut was released this year with an endorsement from the 80-year-old director himself. It’s the movie as it was originally envisaged by Coppola, now freed of studio constraints. Three hours long, the film is mesmerising in its dramatic intensity and overwhelming in its cinematography and musical score.

Apocalypse Now is based in part on Joseph Conrad’s signature novel, Heart of Darkness, which gives the film its narrative thread. A US special forces commander, Colonel Walter E. Kurtz (Marlon Brando), has crossed into Cambodia with his loyal tribal army. His communications, once erratic, are now spiralling into insanity. At a meeting at Nha Trang, the US military hierarchy instructs the dissolute Captain Benjamin Willard (Martin Sheen) to terminate Kurtz’s command. A nameless CIA officer present at lunch utters the chilling overview: ‘Terminate with extreme prejudice.’ The die is cast.

A friend said to me recently that Apocalypse Now is a movie to be seen on the big screen. Very true, for the viewer can be immersed in its sweep and carried inexorably along by its hidden currents.

The journey upriver is worth of Homer. Willard encounters the glitter and raunch of a USO spectacle where Playboy Bunnies are helicoptered in to entertain the boisterous troops. A bridge is being rebuilt by night under lights and under fire, even though the North Vietnamese Army will destroy it again the following day. While the American garrison is keen to desert, the command in Saigon insists on being able to claim that the road is open. It’s a truly hopeless situation.

However, the battle scene which transports the viewer to a brilliant panorama of sight and sound emerges when Lieutenant Colonel Bill Kilgore (Robert Duvall) leads his air cavalry on an airborne assault upon a Viet Cong stronghold. Kilgore pays homage to George Armstrong Custer, even wearing 19th-century battle dress, but the manner of the assault is savage in its modernity.

On the beach, as the fighting continues, the dialogue assumes prominence. Aside from the surfing fantasies, the firefight produces the most memorable line of the film, from Kilgore: ‘I love the smell of napalm in the morning … It smells of victory.’

The irony of this assertion is not lost on anyone. The combat scenes are striking, not only for their shattering ferocity but for the chilling Wagnerian orchestral accompaniment in ‘The Ride of the Valkyries’ as the air cavalry descends upon the village from the sea. It has the impact of a primeval scream.

There may be no Wagnerian opera in the rubber plantation at Long Tan, but Danger Close: The Battle of Long Tan is an excellent Australian combat film centred on our army’s most famous and most costly encounter of the Vietnam War, with 18 Australians dead.

The film’s director, Kriv Stenders (Red Dog), stays close to the real history of the battle, which occurred in mid-August 1966 in a rubber plantation beyond the Australian (and New Zealand) base at Nui Dat in South Vietnam.

Delta Company is searching for Viet Cong mortars which have brought the Australian base under fire. Led by Major Harry Smith, convincingly played by Travis Fimmel, the company collides with a battalion of Viet Cong and a skirmish quickly develops into a battle for survival.

Veronika Jenet’s seamless editing delivers a battle film at the closest of quarters: this is an existential fight in which both sides display exemplary discipline and astonishing courage.

Richard Roxburgh delivers a compelling performance as the brigade commander, weighing up the threats to his troops as US airpower proves ineffective and Delta Company is sustained only by a superb artillery performance by the New Zealanders and courageous support from Royal Australian Air Force helicopters.

This is a Vietnam movie which does not leave the battlefield. The only note from the home front is the presence of Little Pattie and Col Joye performing in a concert at the Nui Dat base. They had to be evacuated as the battle developed. They were indefatigable entertainers for our troops and they deserve an honourable mention.

The climax of Apocalypse Now is Willard’s arrival at Kurtz’s charnel house of a base, deep in the Cambodian jungle. Another US officer sent to terminate Kurtz is there, but he has also crossed the line. Willard must actually confront himself.

Marlon Brando’s performance as the shattered special forces colonel remains magisterial. Kurtz does not need the American photographer (Dennis Hopper) to underline his imposing presence. Brando does this and much more with a simple glance or a few words.

Throughout the film, Michael Herr (Dispatches) offers a laconic commentary on the American War. As in the conversation which Willard has with the French planters, nothing is as clear or as definite as the politicians in Washington are asserting. The plantation holds nothing of the lush decadence of Régis Wargnier’s Indochine, but the widow, played by Aurore Clément, graces the screen with the same manner of discretion as Catherine Deneuve.

These films offer insight into the grim consequences of war. Vietnam was an incredibly bloody confrontation, as 245 Vietnamese dead at Long Tan makes clear. For new audiences, these movies tell a story about a war which deeply affected the cultures of both the United States and Australia and changed Vietnam irrevocably.

The Australian contribution to D–Day

Shortly after midnight on 6 June 1944, Allied forces commenced landing airborne troops in Normandy, France. At dawn, naval vessels would begin landing troops on beaches codenamed Utah and Omaha for the American forces, and Gold, Juno and Sword for the British and Canadians. The landings would be preceded by an immense bombardment by Allied air forces, supported by thousands of fighter aircraft. The naval operation, involving more than 6,000 vessels, was the largest armada ever assembled. It was the first day in the liberation of Western Europe from Nazi occupation.

D–Day is one of the defining events not only of World War II but also of the 20th century. In the West, commemorations marking the anniversary of D–Day have become the most internationally significant events remembering the war. Although the bulk of the forces in the landings were British, American and Canadian, more than a dozen Allied nations participated in the operation.

Few people today likely realise that Australians, predominantly members of the Royal Australian Air Force and Royal Australian Navy, were among those who actively contributed to the operation. Australia had entered the war as a partner in the British Empire in 1939. By 1944 Australian forces and personnel were fighting the war on multiple fronts. Australia remained committed to standing strongly by Britain and continuing the fight against Nazi Germany in Europe, while simultaneously dealing with the immense challenge of facing down the Japanese advance across the Asia–Pacific region, which was turned back from Australia’s own doorstep in 1942.

The stories of the Australian men and women who participated in the battle of Normandy aren’t well known, yet more than 3,300 Australians were active in the D–Day landings (2,800 airmen, 500 sailors, and small numbers of men and women serving with the British Army), while thousands more served during the subsequent Normandy campaign. Thirteen Australians were killed on 6 June, but the campaign lasted beyond that one day. On 7 June, 20 Australian airmen were killed; on 8 June another 22 died, and the losses continued until August. In fact, more than 1,100 Australians were killed in Europe in the build-up to and during the Normandy battle (April–August 1944). To this day, June 1944 remains the costliest month in terms of casualties in the history of the RAAF.

One of the difficulties facing historians in telling the Australian D–Day story is identifying the contributions of thousands of individuals who served attached to British squadrons and naval vessels. No RAN vessel was involved in the landings, but Australian sailors were spread across the British fleet. A small number of Australian officers commanded British destroyers, corvettes, minesweepers, landing craft and torpedo boats. Others served in ships’ companies, some commanding gun turrets aboard heavy cruisers. In the air, 10 RAAF squadrons were involved, and No. 453 Squadron, RAAF, flying the Supermarine Spitfire, operated from the ground in Normandy in the weeks after the landing. But the majority of Australian airmen were spread across more than 200 Royal Air Force squadrons.

All of the Australians who served were volunteers. The airmen who served on D-Day had trained as part of the Empire Air Training Scheme, which saw 16,000 RAAF pilots, navigators, wireless operators, bomb aimers, gunners and flight engineers join RAF squadrons during the course of the war. Another 11,541 men joined RAAF squadrons formed in Britain. On D–Day, 1,000 Australians served in the 10 RAAF squadrons that participated in the Allied invasion. A further 1,800 Australians who participated on D-Day were serving attached to RAF squadrons.

In addition to those in operational squadrons on D-Day, there were 10,000 Australian airmen in training and reserve. Many of them would join operational squadrons as the battle in Normandy raged in the days and weeks after the landing and as casualties to aircrews mounted. To place the RAAF’s contribution—and Australia’s commitment—to the air war in Europe into some perspective, the number of Australian airmen in Britain in July 1944 was equal to the size of an Australian army division in the Pacific at that time.

At sea, RAN sailors served in diverse roles and were involved in all the major naval operations of the war. At least 1,100 members of the RAN served at different times, on attachment to the Royal Navy. Of the 500 serving in June 1944, more than 400 were officers of the Royal Australian Naval Volunteer Reserve. Many had enlisted in Australia under the ‘Yachtsmen Scheme’, which targeted recruits with small-ship experience. These men were ideal for training with Combined Operations and for commanding landing craft and ships.

The stories of these Australians who served in Normandy remain little known, but it is important to remember their contribution to the great Allied effort in 1944. Their service is also a reminder that from the outbreak of war in September 1939 to the final day of victory in 1945, Australia was committed to the defence of Britain and the free world. This included defeating Nazism and fascism in Europe, as well defending Australia from Japanese militarism in Asia and the Pacific.

From the bookshelf: ‘Global defense procurement and the F-35 joint strike fighter’

A few weeks ago, the Royal Australian Air Force took delivery of two new-build F-35A joint strike fighters—the third and fourth such aircraft to fly in Australian skies. They arrived a full seven years after the 2012 in-service date that appeared in early planning documents when Australia first signed up to the program in 2002. They cost about US$100 million each, around twice the price used in the early marketing by their builder, Lockheed Martin. They’ll need upgrades to their software in the next few years to meet some of the promised performance specifications and the RAAF will have to wait until sometime in the 2020s for them be able to operate with dedicated anti-ship missiles. And recently we learned of the aircraft’s higher than advertised support costs.

Despite that litany of failure to meet program targets, and the fact that would-be adversaries have now had 15 years to prepare their forces to encounter the F-35, it remains the most effective combat aircraft available from western suppliers. Barring budget issues, the F-35 will be the first choice of most advanced nations in the market when they’re looking to replace the fast jets in their inventories. On current plans, F-35s will still be flying well after 2050, and they are likely to form the backbone of Western airpower for the next two decades.

In Global defense procurement and the F-35 joint strike fighter, American academic Bert Chapman sets out to explore how the aircraft got to where it is today. Having followed the F-35 program closely for over a decade now (see my 2018 summary here), I read this book with great interest. It’s important that the strategic, program management and industrial elements of what over the aircraft’s lifetime will be a trillion-dollar investment in combat airpower are well understood—and even more important that the lessons its protracted and often mismanaged development can provide are digested. The book is certainly a timely contribution to public understanding of the largest defence project yet, as the F-35 starts entering service with the US and various export customers and has seen its first small-scale operational use in Israeli service.

At 400 pages, this book is a serious attempt to unpack the F-35 story. The research is thorough and the extensive reference list is a valuable resource. That’s especially true of the chapter on the development program and its tortured history with Congress and various US oversight mechanisms. The author has pulled together primary sources to produce a more complete story than I’ve seen in one place before; the reading list will keep anyone who wants to delve even deeper into the F-35 program busy for a long time.

That said, I can’t give this book an unqualified recommendation. The development history and associated political bun-fighting are well described, but the author is on less solid ground when it comes to strategic, budgetary and capability analysis. To give one simple example, on page 118 we find the cost reductions attained in the 2016–17 fiscal year described as ‘possibl[y] … achieved in response to President Donald Trump’s pre-presidential tweet that the program cost was too expensive’. Nope.

Also less than compelling is a chapter on the history of jet fighters, which explains the notion of aircraft ‘generations’—a construct that many analysts consider an unnecessary and potentially misleading way to think about air combat. Much of the poorly informed public debate that has plagued the F-35 over the years has fixated on what constitutes a ‘fifth generation’ aircraft, with an associated checklist of characteristics that varies depending on whether one seeks to sell the F-35 or disparage it. (The discussion hasn’t been helped by marketeers blurring the picture by pitching upgrades to 40-year-old designs as ‘generation 4.5’ capabilities.)

Like every other combat aircraft, the F-35 will succeed or fail not just on its technical merits, but also on the way in which it’s employed and supported by other force elements and—crucially—the totality of adversary capabilities it faces. The fact that China and Russia now have aircraft that tick some fifth-generation boxes might be very significant—or it might not. History shows that victory in air combat depends on technical capabilities, numbers, geography and other factors that combine in ways that don’t simplify down to a list of airframe characteristics.

In the chapter on the F-35 in Australia, the book describes the often acrimonious public debate that surrounded the program for the best part of a decade. It’s reasonable at dissecting the various arguments that did the rounds, including the seemingly damning simulations performed by arch critics of the F-35 that were picked up and amplified by the ABC and other media outlets. But again the analysis is let down by giving too much space to views that don’t really warrant it, and then by not rebutting them adequately. To be fair, the author is ultimately right in saying that ‘Australian opinion on the JSF is as divided as opinion in other participating countries … although it appears that there is enough support … across the political spectrum for the JSF to continue despite the cost overruns, repeated production delays and financial problems’.

Similarly, the overall conclusions in the book are hard to argue with:

Despite the JSF’s protracted financial and technical problems and the fiscal constraints facing many JSF partner countries, which have caused them to reduce defense spending, emerging military airpower and geopolitical and technological trends make purchasing the JSF the least problematic military aviation alternative for the US military and its international allies.

It’s salutary to ponder that the US and its allies are collectively spending hundreds of billions of dollars on the ‘least problematic’ air-combat capability. But that’s a consequence of an overly ambitious and, for most of its first decade, poorly run program that tried to do too much in one platform.

‘Loyal wingman’ drone won’t solve RAAF’s biggest challenge

The head of the Royal Australian Air Force’s air combat group says he’s excited by the prospect of Australian pilots flying alongside a ‘loyal wingman’ unmanned aircraft like the one Boeing is developing in Brisbane.

Air Commodore Mike Kitcher says the drone, which will be the first combat-capable aircraft to be designed and built in Australia since the Boomerang in 1942, will present both cultural and technical challenges but the air force will be ready to tackle them.

‘The idea behind the loyal wingman concept is quite a sound one. The practicalities of executing it will prove challenging but are well worth investing in.

‘A loyal wingman that has greater flexibility to aid the defensive or survivability characteristics of a manned platform or indeed augment the lethality of that manned platform by carrying weapons—that’s quite an exciting concept, but it’s early days yet’, he told The Strategist.

And while it might seem intuitive, he says the unmanned plane isn’t likely to lead to an overall reduction in demand for the people the air force needs.

‘I think considering less people would probably be a false economy. I would like to think that those people that are operating the airframe will be far more lethal, survivable and combat capable, enabled by that loyal wingman concept.’

Kitcher told a briefing on the status of the RAAF’s F-35 program at the Australian International Airshow at Avalon that the biggest challenge he faces as head of air combat group is attracting and retaining enough people to run his operation.

‘At the moment, in introducing the F-35 capability the biggest challenges that I see are people. Enough qualified technicians, tradespeople and engineers to actually support the aircraft and its myriad systems, and then people to fly the aircraft.’

The first two RAAF F-35s arrived on Australian soil in December last year, though there are eight more currently being used on training programs in the US. And despite the workforce challenge, Kitcher says he’s happy with the current status of the F-35 project.

‘It would be fair to say it’s very early days’, says Kitcher. ‘I’ll be much more comfortable saying that things are going smoothly in about 12 to 15 months’ time, by mid next year, when we’ve got 12 to 16 aircraft operating in Australia.

‘I think it’d be quite premature to say that everything’s under control’, he says. ‘Things are looking positive at the moment, but there’s a long way to go over the next couple of years to get to IOC.’

The plan to get the F-35 to initial operating capability involves having eight jets in Australia by the end of the year and 30 jets on the ground by the end of 2020.

Kitcher’s biggest priority on that path, though, is making sure the RAAF achieves a ‘sovereign training capability’, meaning it trains all its F-35 pilots and ground crew domestically without the need for them to go to the US, as is currently the case.

‘Being able to conduct sovereign training for Australia is very important, in fact, I think the most important component of our initial operating capability.

‘If we don’t have, if you like, the engine room that is our training capability, then it’s going to be difficult to get to our final operating capability.

That final level of readiness is due in late 2023, by which time the RAAF’s full complement of 72 jets should be in the country.

Understandably, Kitcher doesn’t want to present an opinion on whether the government should acquire an extra squadron of F-35s, as has been mooted, or pursue other options, though among geopolitical and budgetary factors, he mentions that the progress of the ‘loyal wingman’ project may be a factor in that decision.

After coming in for a large amount of criticism over the past several years, the F-35’s aerial performance is now getting more positive reports from exercises like ‘Red Flag’ in the US, which Kitcher flew in last month in a ‘Classic’ Hornet as part of an Australian contingent alongside American and British aircraft.

He says the new jet’s performance was good, but what impressed him more was the way the F-35 integrated with older aircraft like his and enabled them to better do their own jobs.

‘It was actually better than I expected at this stage.

‘Certainly I felt far more empowered and enabled by the fact that that there were F-35s there and, to a certain extent, US Navy Super Hornets as well there making our Classic Hornet capability better than what it would otherwise be.’

During the exercise the ‘blue’ side didn’t have things all its own way, but in some of the missions Kitcher flew in, the F-35 led the way in gaining superiority over the ‘red’ team.

‘They kicked the door down against a fairly determined air adversary. They then retired back towards the strike train while F-22s came over the top and held that door open.

‘The F-35s then, using their sensors and other capabilities, led a combined  strike package that took the Classic Hornet formation that I was flying in, a US Navy Super Hornet formation and a [British] Typhoon formation, supported by US Navy Growlers and US Air Force F-16s, deep into enemy territory against a significant surface-to-air threat to deliver precision-guided weapons on targets, and the F-35s provided sensor awareness that would otherwise have been unavailable to myself flying a Classic Hornet.’

While the RAAF is working to integrate the F-35 with other aircraft and use it to enhance their capabilities, Kitcher says there may be scenarios in which the jet operates on its own because it may be too risky to fly less advanced aircraft on the same missions.

‘The primary focus of our validation and verification activities will be ensuring the F-35 value-adds to the entire ADF capability and improves our entire capability while preserving the option to use the F-35 on its own if the threat environment requires that.’

It’s not just other RAAF aircraft that the F-35 will work with. Kitcher says integration with the navy’s new air warfare destroyers will be key to getting the most out of the jet.

That kind of capability, and the development of ‘sovereign mission data files’ to optimise the F-35 for Australia-specific requirements, go beyond what the RAAF has done in the past.

‘With the F-35, it’s a completely different way of doing business’, he says.

RAAF marrying minds and machines (part 2)

Super-fast machine processing will increase the speed of modern warfare, but skilled men and women will remain the crucial decision-makers, say Australia’s air force commanders.

RAAF chief Air Marshal Leo Davies and deputy chief Air Vice-Marshal Gavin Turnbull tell The Strategist that the brain may not be able to process data fast enough in future combat and the human will need to harness the speed of artificial intelligence to process all the available options. But the result of this process of ‘augmented intelligence’ needs to remain a decision made by the human.

Davies says a machine is not currently able to both make decisions and take part in combat. ‘We can program it to learn, but it learns linearly, it is not emotional and it is in many respects, in an air combat sense, quite inflexible. When we look at a pilot’s ability to assess the situation, that brings with it an amount of emotion and creativity that allows us to be agile.

‘We need the flexibility and agility of the human meshed with the speed of a machine. When we put those together, we’ve got a quite amazing outcome’, Davies says.

In the modern pilot, skills such as systems management and being able to categorise mixed options and select the correct one are as important as physical flying skills, he says.

‘At the core of what we need to do next is attracting, recruiting, training and retaining the workforce that will fly these aircraft, drive the tank, fly the helicopter, or sail the ship or submarine. The workforce that we will have across the ADF in 10 years’ time must be different to the workforce we had 10 years ago to maximise all this good gear’, Davies says.

He says this is an evolution of the RAAF’s Plan Jericho, designed to enable it to innovate faster than anybody else.

Turnbull says the ADF can exploit its advantages in being a small military which can gain maximum value from an investment in human–machine teaming. ‘We will work to make ourselves unique in that respect, because we have an agility that larger forces don’t have, and an ability to combine the innovation in our people with the future of machine teaming to accelerate the tempo in the operational domain and create very quick effects that provide conundrums and difficulties for any adversary we may have’, he says.

‘In terms of bang for buck, it’s how we can have the biggest effect in making our people successful in any combat environment that they may have to enter.

‘We have to be able to provide a level of deterrence that means, if you snap at us and we have to bite, it’s going to hurt.’

Turnbull says the RAAF is getting serious now about understanding what the F-35 brings to the joint force. ‘We’re understanding that the force mix we’ll have in the future will overwhelm us with the amount of information that we can produce, and we need to get much smarter about how we deal with that.’

The goal is an ADF that is much more powerful than the sum of its parts.

Aircraft such as the F-35, the Wedgetail, the Growler and the Super Hornet have all come along linear development paths, he says. ‘Our concept of edge processing will allow us to fully develop the capabilities of each of those linear paths, to intercept and fuse into the future. They can do highly advanced and highly effective processing on each of those platforms while communicating with each other about the information they’re gathering. And then, from the edge of that battlespace, we transmit back knowledge—not reams and reams of something that needs to be processed by lots of humans or computers.’

No matter how powerful a computer is, success will come down to the RAAF’s people, Turnbull says, and that comes down to the time and effort put into their professional training.

‘People are our quality edge. That will never change. The development of artificial intelligence is a long way off replacing the human, but certainly it is a lot closer for that intelligence to augment the ability of the human to do things that the machine currently can’t. It allows the human inside the system to make quality judgements based on the ubiquitous but accurate information and to direct the artificial systems where to go, or to respond to key decisions that the machine will elevate to the human when necessary.

‘The type of individuals that we need are not particularly different to those that we currently take, but the path that we lead them through, in their professional development, will be different. And these are the individuals who understand cyber and they understand physical systems, but more importantly, they understand a systemic approach to teaming machines with humans. And that is quite a new area.’

The air campaign in Iraq and Syria has demonstrated that human judgement is still crucial in terms of issues such as when to bomb and when not to bomb.

So does all of this lead to, or away from, an ultimate switch to unmanned combat aircraft?

A future force will evolve based on requirements, says Turnbull, but the human will always be there somewhere. The key is to put the humans in a place where they have the maximum effect while facing minimal risk. ‘So into the future you have to give consideration to what the force mix looks like between manned and unmanned combat entities. And there will always be a synergy in mixing them in some way.’

For the foreseeable future, does he believe the RAAF will have highly skilled pilots in high-performance aircraft?

‘I do. The JSF program alone commits us to 20 to 30 years of that.’