Tag Archive for: Philippines

A task for Trump: stop China in the South China Sea

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For more than a decade, China has been using an increasingly aggressive hybrid-warfare strategy to increase its power and influence in the strategically important South China Sea. Countering it will be one of the defining challenges for US president-elect Donald Trump’s incoming administration.

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Chinese dream of global preeminence depends significantly on achieving dominance in the South China Sea and ending America’s primacy in the Indo-Pacific region, an emerging global economic and geopolitical hub. And China has not hesitated to use coercive tactics in service of these objectives.

In recent years, boats belonging to countries whose territorial claims China disregards, such as the Philippines and Vietnam, have faced blockades, ramming, water-cannon attacks, and even bladed-weapon assaults by Chinese vessels. Offshore energy operations endure frequent harassment. Simply fishing in waters that China calls its own can expose a person to a Chinese attack with iron pipes. Such violent confrontations have heightened regional tensions and undermined stability in a crucial corridor linking the Pacific and Indian Ocean.

One might have expected the United States to take action to rein in China’s behavior, especially given its mutual defense treaty with the Philippines. And yet, three successive presidents—Barack Obama, Trump, and Joe Biden—have failed to offer anything beyond statements of support and symbolic action. In 2012, Obama allowed China’s brazen seizure of the disputed Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines to go unpunished.

This was hardly the first time the US had failed to live up to its defense commitments to the Philippines. In 1995, the Philippines requested US help to block Chinese forces from capturing Mischief Reef, just 129 nautical miles from the Philippine island of Palawan. US President Bill Clinton, smarting over the termination three years earlier of America’s right to maintain military bases in the Philippines, refused. Mischief Reef is now an important Chinese military base.

The more China has got away with, the bolder it has become. Following the capture of the Scarborough Shoal, Xi embarked on a land-reclamation frenzy, creating 1300 hectares of land in the South China Sea, including seven artificial islands that now serve as forward operating bases. China has built 27 military outposts on disputed islands, which now bristle with short-range missiles, reconnaissance gear, radar systems and laser and jamming equipment. Its larger islands also feature aircraft hangars, runways and deep-water harbors. By unilaterally redrawing South China Sea’s geopolitical map, China is ensuring that it is uniquely positioned to project power in the region.

Even as China has gradually eroded the Philippines’ security, including Philippine control of areas within its exclusive economic zone, the US has continued to underscore its ‘ironclad’ defense commitment to its ally. Late last year, the Biden administration affirmed that any armed third-party attack against the Philippine military, coast guard, aircraft or public vessels ‘anywhere in the South China Sea’ is covered by the US–Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty. Yet China remains unpunished—and undeterred.

What explains this yawning gap between rhetoric and action? First and foremost, the US fears escalation, especially when its resources and attention are being consumed by the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. Moreover, the US prefers not to weigh in on sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea, where it has no territorial claims of its own. It has not even taken a position on the sovereignty of the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands, which China also claims.

The US has, however, made clear that its security treaty with Japan covers those islands and cautioned against ‘any unilateral action that seeks to undermine Japan’s administration.’ It should do the same for the Philippines, stating unequivocally that its treaty commitment to the country covers any efforts to compel a change in areas currently under Philippine administrative control, including Second Thomas Shoal, which China has been attempting to besiege.

In support of this stance, the US could cite the 2016 ruling by an international arbitration tribunal that China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea have no legal basis and that Chinese actions within the Philippine exclusive economic zone violated the Philippines’ sovereignty. But China’s open contempt for that ruling should dispel any hope that the South China Sea’s future will be decided by international law, which is why the US must be prepared to back up such a statement with action.

If the US does stand up for its treaty ally, it can take advantage of the nine Philippine naval and air bases to which it has gained access within the last decade, two of which are located just across from Taiwan and southern China. If it does not, China will continue to solidify its dominance over the South China Sea, thereby cornering the region’s rich energy and fishery resources and gaining the ability to disrupt supply chains and punish countries for acts it deems unfriendly.

China will not stop at the South China Sea. Under Xi’s leadership, China has used a similar combination of deception, bullying, coercion and surprise to expand its territorial control elsewhere, from the East China Sea to the Himalayas, sparing not even the tiny country of Bhutan. As with any bully, the only way to stop China is to confront it with a credible challenger. The US must be that challenger, and it should start by defending the Philippines.

High noon at Second Thomas Shoal

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China has identified the beleaguered garrison at Second Thomas Shoal as a weak link among the South China Sea features physically occupied by the Philippines and, by extension, the US-Philippines alliance.

While Manila has held its nerve against Beijing’s mounting pressure tactics and holds the moral high ground in the South China Sea, it’s not clear yet that it has a viable strategy to counter Beijing’s maritime juggernaut.

China is obviously willing to escalate. As it does, the Philippines, in trying to hang on, will probably need military support from the United States, its treaty ally. Another violent incident could invoke the US obligation to defend the Philippines against armed attack.

Since taking power in 2022, the administration of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr has got several important things right in the South China Sea.

First, Marcos has publicly laid out a clear and principled stance, founded on international law. This has helped generate sympathy and support for Manila as a plucky David standing up to Beijing’s Goliath. The turnaround in the Philippines’ international standing since the term of former president Rodrigo Duterte is remarkable.

The Marcos government has successfully revived international interest in the 2016 award of an ad hoc tribunal that ruled that China’s claims to Philippine waters were unlawful. The award had languished in abeyance under Duterte. Also in the legal realm, Manila on 15 June submitted an extended continental shelf claim to the United Nations, showing China it had not been intimidated from pursuing claims in the South China Sea. The continental shelf claim is likely to provoke protests from other Southeast Asian countries, but Manila has been quietly working at ameliorating boundary disputes with such neighbours, especially Vietnam.

Second, the Philippine Coast Guard’s campaign to bring transparency to China’s coercive actions in the maritime domain and information warfare has brought a new level of awareness to the South China Sea. China cannot credibly refute bullying allegations when the evidence is in plain view and on social media.

Third, in April, the president’s office created a National Maritime Council to coordinate South China Sea policy. This comprises the key government maritime stakeholders, including the departments of defence, foreign affairs and transportation; the latter oversees the Coast Guard. The new body, which met this week, should subsume the existing National Task Force for the West Philippine Sea.

Fourth, the Philippines is implementing archipelagic defence. In doing so, it is partially reconstituting the armed forces’ capabilities for external defence after decades of internal-security focus. The armed forces have acquired Brahmos cruise missiles from India for coastal defence and are fielding them in western Luzon—within range of Scarborough Shoal though not yet Second Thomas Shoal, which is far to the south. The Marcos administration has embraced a closer military relationship with the United States, resulting in increased exercises and expanded access for visiting US forces. Manila has also courted closer defence cooperation with Australia, Japan and others. These changes are collectively intended to counter-balance China’s maritime expansionism as broadly and deeply as possible.

Progress has been significant, but a number of policy shortcomings need to be addressed.

One is that the current approach is plainly insufficient. China has not been deterred from disrupting recent resupply missions by the Armed Forces of the Philippines to the garrison at Second Thomas Shoal. These have including a botched air drop and the latest attempt by small boats on 17 June, which was brazenly interdicted by China Coast Guard  personnel alongside the grounded Sierra Madre landing ship, the accommodation of the  Philippine garrison.

Also, different arms of the Philippines government issue multiple, overlapping statements on the South China Sea, suggesting there is a coordination problem. Moreover, a creeping emotionalism has coloured the language of some of these statements and related social media postings.

Third, the Philippines may have passed the point of diminishing returns from the Coast Guard’s name-and-shame campaign against China. Manila has probably realised all its diplomatic gains from the increased transparency and awareness about China’s misbehaviour, while it is clear that China will not be shamed into better behaviour for the sake of its reputation. Transparency, while useful, is not a stand-alone policy and needs back-up.

And the Philippines is paying a price for Marcos’s comment at the Shangri-La Dialogue that ‘if a Filipino citizen was killed by a wilful act, that is very close to what we define as an act of war’. He had earlier ruled out using fire hoses on its vessels to counter the China Coast Guard’s aggressive use of water cannons against Philippines vessels.

Such attempts to communicate Manila’s resolve and peaceful intentions to Beijing, while well intentioned, have only emboldened China to escalate at Second Thomas Shoal. Red lines and grey zones do not mix well with China, as Beijing is adept at blurring the former into irrelevance. Now, as a result of China’s escalation, the grey zone around Second Thomas Shoal has a much darker hue. We are perilously close to the brink of an incident that triggers the United States’ treaty commitment to defend the Philippines.

So, what lies ahead?

China appears intent on maintaining an escalatory path at Second Thomas Shoal because it believes Manila is likely to blink first. In May, Beijing announced new powers for its coast guard to arrest foreigners for ‘trespassing’ within China’s ambiguous ambit claim, even where these waters overlap with the exclusive economic zones and territorial seas of other countries. On the present trajectory, there is little reason to doubt that China will follow through by apprehending Filipino fishermen or military personnel participating in future resupply missions to Second Thomas Shoal.

The current predicament is not Manila’s fault. China is clearly the aggressor at Second Thomas Shoal. But the Philippines, as a US treaty ally, must consider the consequences before it escalates. If Manila aims to maintain active control over the feature, it is likely to require US military support in doing so. At this stage, nothing short of direct involvement by the United States appears likely to convince China otherwise. And given Washington’s patchy record of hanging the Philippines out to dry by failing to prevent China from taking control of Scarborough Shoal in 2012 and not backing Manila diplomatically after it won the award in 2016, US credibility as an ally is on the line at Second Thomas Shoal. A joint Philippines-US operation to resupply the Sierrra Madre would send a firm signal of deterrence and alliance cohesion to China. But this is ultimately a decision and a request for the Philippines to make.

Manila also needs to exert tighter control over its strategic communications, to prevent duplication, policy dissonance and over-personalisation. What the Philippines needs most of all at this juncture are cool heads, cold blood and a steady hand on the tiller.

A national defence strategy for the Philippines

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Manila’s recently published national security policy recognises that there are multifaceted threats to the country. Some of these threats are more urgent than others, and the fiscal environment in the Philippines makes the task of prioritising funding for more immediate threats increasingly difficult.

This is why a national defence strategy that takes a hard-nosed look into security threats that have a bearing on the Philippines’ territorial integrity is essential now more than ever. There are four categories the Department of National Defense (DND) should look at: external threats; humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; emerging issues such as cybersecurity and advanced technologies; and internal security and public safety.

The South China Sea will remain the Philippines’ top security concern precisely because it is an existential problem. The DND and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) should refocus their attention on the issue. China seems undeterred by the approach that the Philippines has taken. Defense planners and strategists must be realistic about the deceptive threat coming from Chinese assets, whether they are the navy, the coastguard or the maritime militia; there is simply no evidence that China plays so-called black-and-white diplomacy. The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the Israeli–Hamas conflict and the illegal invasion of Ukraine by Russia are proof that unpreparedness for war remains the most existential threat to a nation’s independence, security and survival.

Given the Philippines’ geographic location, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief will be a critical component of the country’s defence plan. The Philippines experiences typhoons, volcanic eruptions and earthquakes on a regular basis. Responding to these disasters should be part and parcel of defence planning as it is only the AFP that has the logistical tools to act.

Recent incidents involving data breaches in several government agencies point to cyber infrastructure as a critical vulnerability of the country. That, along with the challenges and the disruptive nature of artificial intelligence and similar advanced technologies, means the DND and the AFP must be forward-looking in responding. The conflict matrix is ever evolving for every piece that shifts, whether big or small.

Threats to internal stability and public safety are an ongoing area of concern. However, the military can’t afford to focus too much on internal issues, simply because external concerns are far more urgent and far more critical. It is time to develop more coherent responses and timely analyses of internal threats by enabling public-safety services such as the coastguard, the police and the National Bureau of Investigation to respond to domestic security concerns. These agencies combined have the capacity in terms of sheer numbers to counter threats to public safety.

By focusing on these four threat areas, the DND and AFP can prioritise their plans and programs as well as propose realistic budgets that Congress can support.

More concretely, there are four important policy areas that the defence establishment needs to embark on. Much of what the Philippines has been doing for the past two decades has been catching up to the latest technology, doctrine or asset on the shelf. It needs to be more proactive in planning its defence posture.

Modernisation is a chief concern. Discussions on modernising the Philippines’ armed forces have advanced in recent years, but the same can’t be said with regard to the country’s internal security agencies. All security agencies need to modernise and that must include hardware and software upgrades. Beyond the desire to develop a shopping list of new assets to purchase, procurements must be directly related to Manila’s security needs and aligned with strategies that deal precisely with the threats it perceives in its strategic environment. With China’s President Xi Jinping unveiling plans and directions for the modernisation of People’s Liberation Army, particularly its naval assets, the Philippines should give greater attention and more resources to its navy and air force as the first line of military defence.

There’s also a need to re-examine the Philippines’ defence posture. It would take a level of candour and sobriety to admit that Manila isn’t where it wants to be in terms of capacity and capabilities, despite its recent efforts. Institutional reforms must be given overdue attention. The Philippines won’t be able to move forward, and at a pace commensurate with dynamic geopolitical realities, if its institutions don’t enact the necessary reforms.

This means dealing with the pension nightmare, right-sizing the AFP’s force structure to align with threat realities, and addressing procurement woes. Another important component is modernising the defence bureaucracy. Part of that needs to involve updating the rules governing the civil service so that it moves away from providing boxed solutions for personnel issues that preserve inefficiencies and protect tenure and towards an approach that focuses on rewarding innovation and prioritising national security interests.

Having the capacity for unilateral defence doesn’t mean that Manila should rely only on its own strength and on doing things alone. There must be a strong awareness that Manila can’t always do things its own way and that, ultimately, an independent foreign policy is one that expertly navigates the geopolitical realities of an otherwise uncertain security landscape and that is not born out of empty platitudes.

Manila must turn to its partners who share its values and appreciation of the international regime of laws and share in the burden of protecting the normative foundations of international relations. It must accept the fact that civility in interstate relations is often maintained by the credibility of a state’s force and its willingness to use it. Engaging and operating jointly or in coordination with like-minded countries in defence and security is the way forward.

Lastly, given all the attention the Philippines is receiving from its strategic partners, treaty ally and other potential partner countries, partnership and alliance management is becoming more important. This is the crux of the matter: the Philippines’ executive and legislative branches of government need to understand that its ally (the United States) and partners (Japan and Australia are some examples) are non-negotiable and foundational security realities, and that these must exist within the sovereign domain of its national integrity.

Manila needs to develop more coordinating mechanisms and crisis-management architecture while at the same time increasing its public diplomacy efforts to encourage mutual awareness. It should also demonstrate its alliance resolve by holding year-round war games and promoting more rotational deployments and the prolonged presence of strategic assets to prepare for the unthinkable regional scenarios.

If the Philippines pursues its national security interests by leveraging and balancing between internal and external needs, it will have demonstrated a truly independent foreign policy. And there’s no better way for the Philippines to display this than ending its self-imposed reactive ‘grey zone’ mindset, sailing in its internationally recognised maritime zones despite the PLA Navy’s presence, and leading an international coalition to compel compliance with agreed rules of international behaviour in regional and multilateral forums.

The Philippines’ high-stakes options at Second Thomas Shoal

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The Philippine Coast Guard’s highlighting of China’s harassment of its vessels near Second Thomas Shoal has undoubtedly boosted sympathy for Manila in its David-versus-Goliath struggle to maintain jurisdiction and sovereignty in the South China Sea. Under daily challenge from Beijing, the Philippines has run an effective name-and-shame campaign against China’s disruption and absorption tactics. Yet it remains to be seen whether increased international awareness of China’s predatory tactics will manifest in more than just moral support.

As the events of 5 August have made clear, the coast guard’s principled stand has done nothing to deter China from pressing its claims and determined efforts to force Manila to abandon its military outpost at Second Thomas Shoal. China evidently considers the coast guard to be fair game for increasingly brazen challenges by its maritime militia and its own coast guard vessels. Beijing has aggressively upped the ante at Second Thomas Shoal, in what could be the beginning of a sustained maritime blockade of the feature.

So, what should Manila do next? The immediate focus is likely to be on resupplying the beleaguered BRP Sierra Madre garrison, which the government has indicated it intends to do soon—for practical as well as political reasons. One important consideration is whether the Philippine Navy should take over the rotation and resupply role from the coast guard. That would be consistent with the Philippines’ lawfully exercising navigation rights and maritime operations within its exclusive economic zone.

It would also arguably be a calculated escalation, subjecting the Philippines to the risk that China will seize the opportunity, as it did at Scarborough Shoal in 2012, of militarising its blockade. That would bring Beijing the added advantage of proximity to the Chinese base at Mischief Reef, not far over the horizon from Second Thomas Shoal. China can overmatch any combination that the Philippine navy and coast guard can muster. Now that China has achieved ‘escalation dominance’, what can the Philippines do to press its case and maintain a tenuous hold on Second Thomas Shoal?

Given the capability asymmetry, the American back-stop role in this evolving situation is obviously critical to maintaining deterrence. Also overhanging the decision-making calculus at Second Thomas Shoal is the ghost of Scarborough Shoal, where the credibility of US defence guarantees was left in tatters, in Filippino eyes, when China took over effective control without suffering meaningful consequences. Washington’s reaction to the most recent incident at Second Thomas Shoal was contrastingly impressive in its speed and expression of common purpose with a treaty ally. But China may still be tempted to road test this renewed US commitment to deterrence.

One joint way forward for Manila and Washington would be to initiate joint naval patrols, including US Navy surface escort for resupply missions to Second Thomas Shoal. In extremis, the US could heli-lift supplies to the Sierra Madre from Antonio Bautista Air Base in Palawan. That would be expensive, but the base is a site approved under the US–Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Arrangement, so it would help undergird the agreement’s importance to the Philippines, giving it a kickstart useful to both countries. The Philippines would, of course, need to agree. But some physical US involvement near Second Thomas Shoal may be essential for both deterrence and assurance.

Washington and Manila could also announce that they are consulting under Article III of the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty. That would politically reinforce a message of deterrence to Beijing, helping to fix in Chinese minds that Second Thomas Shoal would not be a rerun of Scarborough Shoal, even though some key US decision-makers from 2012 continue to serve in President Joe Biden’s administration.

Other countries can help by giving diplomatic support to the Philippines and should consider contributing to joint naval patrols. Australia and Japan are the obvious candidates among regional US allies. Within ASEAN, Vietnam increasingly finds itself in the same boat as the Philippines, fending off increased pressure from China in the South China Sea. Coincidentally, Australia is this week sending a small naval task group to the Philippines. While unlikely to be diverted from its scheduled exercises with the AFP and US military, its presence underlines the strengthening of defence relations with Manila in recent years.

China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, has offered bilateral dialogue with the Philippines as a means to ‘resolve differences’ in the South China Sea. But this will cut little ice in Manila, where faith in direct talks with China has all but collapsed. One prominent Filipino maritime expert advocated terminating the tortuous ASEAN–China code of conduct negotiations in the wake of Beijing’s latest provocations at Second Thomas Shoal, while the coast guard has declared its bilateral hotline with Chinese counterparts to be officially defunct following fruitless attempts at communication during the latest standoff.

In parallel, the Philippines has recourse to legal options if China persists in harassing Philippine vessels within its EEZ. Manila could initiate proceedings before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea challenging China’s interference with freedom of navigation. That was noted in the US State Department’s 5 August statement. A provisional determination could theoretically be obtained within four to eight weeks if the tribunal acts with urgency.

After the Philippines’ mixed experiences following the 2016 arbitral tribunal award, the government may instead choose to prioritise a new domestic law that comprehensively delimits the Philippines’ maritime claims.

The coast guard has valiantly held the Philippines’ frontline claims in the South China Sea. But fundamentally the armed forces would bear the brunt of any armed flare-up with China. The marines garrison the Sierra Madre and therefore the secretary of defence and the Philippine government must plan beyond the short-term exigencies of resupplying the crumbling ship. Unless Manila replaces the Sierra Madre with another beached ship or more durable structure, ultimately it must withdraw. For its days as a viable outpost are strictly numbered, and China’s increasingly heavy-handed tactics are asking a fundamental question. In this context, Manila needs to swallow hard and accept some calculated risks.

China–Philippine relations sail on calmer seas—for now

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On 4 January, Chinese President Xi Jinping clasped hands with his Philippine counterpart under very different circumstances from the last time he welcomed a Philippine leader to Beijing.

During that September 2019 visit, which Xi hailed as a ‘milestone’, Ferdinand Marcos Jr’s predecessor, Rodrigo Duterte, told a crowd in the Great Hall of the People: ‘I’ve realigned myself in your ideological flow’ and ‘I announce my separation from the United States’.

Almost four years later, China’s incessant bullying and unsafe brinksmanship towards the Philippines and other Southeast Asian nations over rival claims and privileges in the South China Sea have scuttled Duterte’s era of good feelings and drawn Manila even closer to Washington. Before landing in Beijing, Marcos admitted that ‘maritime issues … do not comprise the entirety of our relations’ but emphasised that sabre-rattling in the South China Sea remained a ‘significant concern.’

Practising the art of the geopolitical pivot, Xi largely side-stepped the South China Sea conflict during his meeting with Marcos and doubled down on previous promises of greater economic interdependence. A slew of initiatives emerged from the summit, including joint oil and gas development projects, renewable energy investment, increased trade and a crisis hotline to resolve maritime disputes.

This course correction towards calmer seas underpins Beijing’s decision to rehabilitate relations with Manila and other neighbours by reverting to its old narrative of non-interference and inter-Asian ‘cooperation’. Recent actions and statements, like a pledge that China would never use its military might to ‘bully’ smaller nations, reflect China’s acknowledgment that its decade-long pugnacious campaign to dominate the South China Sea has done more harm than good. By embracing ‘peaceful outcomes’, Beijing seeks to recast itself as a regional force for good, a hegemon that can spread economic growth and ensure Asian affairs are settled by Asian countries—not ‘aggressive’ foreigners like the US.

In doing so, this kinder, gentler China pledges to embrace cooperation, not confrontation, benevolence not belligerence, in pursuit of ‘win–win outcomes’. These outcomes, according to the Global Times, will usher in a ‘new golden age’ in Sino-Philippine relations. But as the saying goes, all that glitters is not gold. If the Marcos administration is committed to upholding its South China Sea claims in the face of Chinese revanchism, it cannot grow too comfortable with Beijing’s ‘cooperation’ approach.

China has pressed its expansive maritime sovereignty claims in the South China Sea since the late 1940s; it wasn’t until the early 2010s that these claims (often unfounded) gained a sharp set of teeth. In accordance with Xi’s ‘national rejuvenation’ goal, Xi-era Chinese military doctrine stresses control of the ‘near seas’, which these sovereignty claims support.

‘Near seas’ control offers manifold benefits. It would enable China to actualise its anti-access/area-denial concept, solidify power projection throughout the first island chain, and raise the counter-intervention risk calculus for Washington and its allies, all while expanding a security buffer zone to protect the mainland. In addition, unrivalled ‘near seas’ (or South China Sea) control legitimises access to vast and untapped natural resources while safeguarding critical sea lines of communication, which China’s leadership believes could be threatened in a conflict with the West.

Yet after a decade of dredging disputed reefs into military bases, forcing sovereignty showdowns, sinking fishing vessels, harassing survey and resupply vessels, and touting its sovereignty over nine-tenths of the South China Sea, China’s ‘sea control’ campaign has come at a steep geostrategic cost.

In Manila alone, the security establishment has mounted a fierce resistance to China’s maritime encroachments, even pressuring Duterte to reverse rapprochement with China and rescind plans to slacken ties with the US military. The same goes for other Southeast Asian nations. According to the 2022 State of Southeast Asia survey report, which gauges Southeast Asian leaders’ temperature on a range of regional policy issues, only 26.8% of respondents trusted China to ‘do the right thing’. Of those respondents who didn’t trust China, half of them attributed it to China using its economic and military power ‘to threaten my country’s interests and sovereignty’. Concurrently, some ASEAN countries have distanced themselves from Beijing by strengthening partnerships within ASEAN and with the Quad alliance. Other states, like Malaysia, have increased their defence budgets to protect their South China Sea territory.

China’s renewed goodwill campaign should not be taken at face value. Cooperation doesn’t mean China will bury its ambitious South China Sea interests. It means China will try pursuing those interests peacefully to quell tensions until it can no longer achieve those interests without reverting to an aggressive posture—just like the last time it swapped ‘win–win’ cooperation for win–lose brinkmanship.

The Philippines will then find itself between a reef and a hard place. China will likely offer savoury economic carrots to Manila. In exchange, it may seek Manila’s tacit approval to militarise Scarborough Reef, remove the embarked marine detachment on Second Thomas Shoal, or permit Chinese hydrocarbon survey and drilling operations in the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, thus making it neither exclusive nor economically beneficial.

But Chinese control of the South China Sea is not a foregone conclusion, despite what Duterte believed. Beijing has already adjusted its risk calculus when the price of international opprobrium outweighed the benefits of maritime belligerence. The Philippines, ASEAN nations and the Quad alliance can continue imposing and signalling that cost. It will require the usual antidote of hard-power prescriptions: jets, corvettes, patrol boats, littoral craft and missiles.

Holding Chinese warships and activities at risk, however, demands more than just a platform and a weapon. The missile must be capable of striking the target. Quad partners should begin integrating the Philippines (and other willing countries) into parts of the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness to provide improved joint awareness, information-sharing and targeting solutions. Quad leaders should also offer economic programs to counterpoise China’s overtures.

Already, Marcos’s decision this month to grant the US temporary and rotational access to four military bases and resume joint maritime patrols in the South China Sea was a wise one because it will help strengthen the Philippines’ defence capabilities, interoperability with allies and commitment to resisting Beijing’s aggressive maritime behaviour. More of that cooperation and coordination is needed, although Marcos has made it clear that the burgeoning US–Philippine military ties pose no direct threat to China, despite being a direct response to China’s militarisation and disruption of the South China Sea.

For now, Marcos is right to balance China and the West with economic agreements for the former and military pacts with the latter. Frank, clear dialogue can cool tensions. But all parties interested in upholding a rules-based order in the South China Sea must keep fielding an appropriate defence of that order, regardless of what ‘win–win outcomes’ China may promise. Then, and only then, can everybody win.

Establishing peace in southern Thailand

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The situation in southern Thailand, although unique, rings eerily similar to that of the southern Philippines.

Economic underdevelopment and political grievances plague the two countries’ southern provinces. For decades, the Thai and Philippine governments have been accused of marginalising Muslims. Although a national minority, Muslims represent an overwhelming majority in each country’s south. Long-term, multi-generational dissatisfaction with political representation in both countries has resulted in greater engagement with violence as a means of political expression.

Perhaps the success of the Philippine government in working with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) to create the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) could serve as the blueprint for peace in Thailand.

Since 2004, southern Thailand has experienced sporadic violence by secessionist insurgents hoping to gain autonomy for the Muslim-majority region. They view their Pattani Malay identity as under threat from oppression.

Factions of insurgents raising violence across the region are countered by heavy-handed policies and excessive force from the Thai government. Intermittent peace agreements involving the largest armed group have failed to hold as wafer-thin confidence and splinter groups spoil the process.

The Thai government refuses to view the insurgency as a political threat and therefore puts low priority on the situation. The lack of focus on the issue has resulted in a failure to understand the political nature and root causes of the violence. Instead, the Thai government has deployed troops to the region to put down the insurgents. Its failure to deal effectively with the threat itself has allowed a continuous cycle of violence that has caused more than 7,000 deaths.

The hiatus in peace negotiations brought on by the Covid-19 pandemic, as well as the success of the Taliban in Afghanistan, has likely reinvigorated the insurgents’ cause. The first rise in casualties since 2012 occurred in 2021. Over the past few months, multiple explosions have ripped across southern Thailand. The most recent targeted a railway near the Malaysia border, killing three and injuring four.

The Thai government retains the upper hand in negotiations and has refused to budge on its political agenda. With the rise in violence, insurgents in southern Thailand are looking to force the government’s hand, increasing the urgency for peace.

Discussions to date have brought little success. Neither side has demonstrated the commitment or integrity required to achieve a lasting solution. However, consistent meetings and short pauses in the violence provide potential building blocks of confidence.

Throughout this process, Malaysia has helped mediate peace negotiations even though the country’s own political situation has made it difficult for the government in Kuala Lumpur to develop a clear approach.

Since his election in November last year, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has faced repeated questions about Malaysia’s efforts to resolve the conflict in southern Thailand. During the first week of December, Thailand’s deputy prime minister, Prawit Wongsuwon, visited Malaysia as Anwar reaffirmed Malaysia’s commitment to brokering peace. He continues to reiterate that Malaysia will more aggressively support the Thai push for a peaceful resolution. A more hands-on approach, combined with Anwar’s experience and the respect both parties have for him, could reinvigorate the peace process.

In the lead-up to the next round of negotiations, the first under Anwar’s leadership, the Thai government and the National Revolutionary Front (known as the BRN) are drafting a ceasefire agreement in the hopes of rejuvenating peace talks. The last ceasefire occurred in 2022 during Ramadan. The BRN is the leading separatist insurgency group in Thailand, and even with the recent increase in violence it insists that it’s committed to finding a solution.

The major difficulty facing any proposed peace plan is finding a compromise on power. The Thai government is set on preserving its regime and its perceived power, while the insurgents want some sort of decentralisation or autonomy.

The Thai government should look towards the Philippines and its peace agreement with the MILF as a potential template for a lasting peace. While there are key differences between the two situations —primarily that the violence in Thailand is on the rise with no decline in sight—if Thailand has any hopes of peaceful mediation, it will need to adapt its approach.

The pandemic has hindered the establishment of the BARMM. Yet there is great hope that decades of conflict in the Philippines can be ended. While many gaps remain, the Philippine government hopes to hold the first elections for the region in 2025.

The Philippine model will help the Thai government balance the efforts of security forces with regional development. Improvements in the Philippines’ economy, public health and education are difficult to deny. Violence has decreased as thousands of MILF fighters have turned in their weapons.

In the next round of peace negotiations, the Thai government needs to show that it takes the situation seriously and is willing to apply the necessary resources. It must seek to understand the grievances of the insurgents, recognising that finding a long-term peaceful solution will help accomplish its main goals of establishing legitimacy for the monarchy and ensuring the regime’s survival. Benchmarks must be set for the cessation of violence and stabilisation of institutions. Transition authorities with the backing of all parties will work towards achieving those benchmarks. Throughout this process, the Thai government must show patience and accept assistance from outside sources.

Malaysia’s proximity and ethnic connections to the conflict make it the suitable party to mediate negotiations. The recent change in Malaysian leadership makes this the perfect opportunity to seek new solutions. The Philippines should join peace negotiations and use its own experience to help Thailand navigate the situation in its southern region.

Insurgents will likely increase their use of violence to improve their bargaining position even as peace negotiations progress, but the Thai government must look seriously at options for a resolution. The longer the conflict lasts, the greater the potential for the violence to spread across beyond Thailand’s border. The Thai government’s willingness to address the situation and work with partner nations will determine the degree of security not only within its own borders but across the region.

Philippine elections will shape Indo-Pacific security

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When more than 50 million Filipinos cast their ballots on 9 May for a new president, they’ll decide far more than who will be the next occupant of the Malacañan Palace. At stake are the country’s foreign policy and its impact on US–China strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific region. Pending the result, Washington can close its ‘credibility gap’ with Manila and bolster regional security vis-à-vis Chinese maritime belligerence.

Hyperbole abounds when chewing over national security. But these electoral ramifications are nothing short of rational. Since the turn of the century, Philippine presidents have tried balancing Beijing and Washington—its powerful neighbour and long-time ally, respectively. But this balance, which should emulate a delicate geopolitical tightrope, is as subtle as a seesaw.

Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (2001–2010) upheld the American alliance but primarily sought Chinese trade and investment deals. Benigno Aquino III (2010–2016) opted to confront China while fortifying the US–Philippine security alliance. Aquino fought for the country’s 2016 legal victory that invalidated China’s expansive maritime claims in the South China Sea. He also strengthened security ties with Asian neighbours and devised a 15-year military modernisation plan that would build a ‘minimum credible deterrence’ against Chinese militarism.

The balance shifted again when Rodrigo Duterte assumed the presidency in 2016. Duterte derided the US for its imperial past. He long deemed American security guarantees worthless after China seized Mischief Reef in 1995 and Scarborough Shoal in 2012 from the Philippines, and Washington never rallied to its defence.

Four months into his term, Duterte kissed goodbye to Washington and embraced Beijing. He decided that the militarily weak Philippines should appease, not oppose, a rising China. Recent memories in Manila of South China Sea disputes or Chinese bullying became faint, almost non-existent.

For most of his administration, Duterte matched his Sinophilic words with his deeds. He secured US$15 billion worth of Chinese investment pledges. To Beijing’s glee, he cancelled key security initiatives with the US, including the 2014 enhanced defence cooperation agreement (which permits US military pre-positioned equipment and troop rotations) and the 1999 visiting forces agreement (which allows US forces to effortlessly operate in the Philippines during a crisis). Duterte hoped Beijing would reward his ‘goodwill’ by underwriting Philippine economic development and dialling back its aggressive South China Sea claims. Whoops.

Five years later, Duterte’s grand appeasement has left much to be desired. Only about 20% of the US$15 billion in Chinese infrastructure pledges ever made it to the Philippines. China provided as many soft loans and grants to the Philippines in 2019 as the US did. Duterte also gained little on the high seas.

Over the past three years, China has warred against Philippine vessels and staked bold claims in the South China Sea. Chinese coastguard or maritime militia vessels have rammed and sunk Philippine fishing boats, thwarted military upgrades to Philippine-claimed features, swarmed disputed reefs with hundreds of fishing vessels, and water-cannoned resupply ships near disputed features to exhaust, intimidate and force Manila into ceding control over parts of this critical waterway to China.

The pressure appears unrelenting with no signs of abatement. Just recently, on 14 March, the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs issued a démarche to the Chinese ambassador for the ‘illegal intrusion’ of a Chinese navy Dongdiao-class electronic reconnaissance ship into Philippine waters after lingering in the Sulu Sea for three days.

Duterte now recognises that China is no longer the friend he once believed in or dreamt of. Having incurred the costs of military aggression but reaped none of the economic rewards, Duterte performed an about-face. In April last year, he vowed to send ‘grey ships to stake a claim’ over oil and minerals in the South China Sea. By August, he walked back 18 months of threats to cancel the visiting forces agreement and began repairing his fragile relationship with Washington. The Filipino die of American rapprochement was cast.

Duterte is not alone in his newfound views. Most of the Philippine military and diplomatic establishment maintained ties with Washington despite their leader’s pro-China bent. Now, however, these officials and Duterte recognise that ‘the freedom of the Filipino people depends on the balance of power in the South China Sea’, as Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin pronounced. The people concur. A June 2019 survey found that 93% of Filipinos wanted to regain control of China-occupied islands in the South China Sea.

This year’s presidential contenders are attuned to the foreign-policy pendulum between Washington and Beijing—and the recent consensus towards favouring America. Frontrunner Ferdinand Marcos Jr advocates a Filipino military presence in the South China Sea to defend its economic rights, although he also wants a ‘bilateral consensus’ with Beijing. More hawkishly, incumbent Vice President Leni Robredo promises a multilateral coalition to counter Chinese maritime coercion.

Although the contenders’ opinions vary, their administrations will each likely mix economic cooperation and military confrontation towards Beijing. Concurrently, Manila will reinforce and strengthen its alliance with Washington and other regional partners to ensure that the South China Sea doesn’t morph into a ‘Chinese lake’.

That’s good for the US—and its Quad partners. Duterte’s preservation of bilateral security agreements and a new administration will bolster the Indo-Pacific alliance network through increased training, exercises and access to Filipino bases. This will enable American forces to persistently deter Chinese aggression and rapidly deploy during emergencies.

But anticipated benefits beget more work.

For starters, Washington should revise the visiting forces agreement or the mutual defence treaty to stipulate that an attack on Philippine forces in the South China Sea would trigger an American response. (So far, Washington has promised such a reaction at the lectern, but never codified it at the negotiating table.) Both countries should also update their naval rules of engagement to reflect the advent of Chinese paramilitary and grey-zone forces. Bilateral security exercises must also tackle and solve the hybrid threat from Chinese vessels.

Lastly, the US should help expedite the Philippines’ military modernisation effort to achieve ‘minimum credible deterrence’ against China. The remedy is predictable but practical: more corvettes, patrol ships, fourth-generation fighter jets and small submarines.

Whoever becomes the next president of the Philippines must craft a deft foreign policy that balances two increasingly antagonistic great powers. Washington can avoid tipping the scales against itself by no longer taking Manila for granted. It must clarify its commitments and provide the Philippines with the guidance and capabilities to fulfill those commitments. After all, that’s what allies are for.

The BrahMos missile system and the Philippines’ quest for deterrence

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At the end of last year, the Philippines released initial funding for the purchase of the Indian–Russian BrahMos missile system. The contract for three batteries to be operated by the Philippine Marine Corps was signed by Secretary of National Defense Delfin Lorenzana in January, with delivery of the first systems expected in 2023.

The director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Gregory Poling, called it the ‘most strategic purchase the AFP [Armed Forces of the Philippines] has made in years’.

The Philippines has long desired to procure land-based missiles as part of its military modernisation program. While previous efforts failed due to ‘changed priorities’, the need for these weapons was catalysed by increasing Chinese aggressive actions in the West Philippine Sea; the most recent was the harassment of Philippine resupply efforts to Ayungin (Second Thomas) Shoal in November.

BrahMos is an impressive weapon, known as one of the world’s fastest (supersonic, not hypersonic) cruise missiles. Its deployment could allow the Philippines to enact its own version of an anti-access/area denial strategy.

However, it would be premature to say that BrahMos by itself is a gamechanger. Due to restrictions under the Missile Technology Control Regime (to which India is a signatory), BrahMos missiles supplied to the Philippines will be limited to a range of 290 kilometres (156 nautical miles). While such range is a first for the Philippines, it isn’t enough to cover the full 370 kilometres (200 nautical miles) of the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone. Being stuck on land-based launchers in an archipelago also limits the system’s strategic mobility.

Even at its export-limited range, BrahMos must be supported by an effective intelligence, surveillance, target-acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) system to find and track targets, and a resilient command and control (C2) complex to ensure that command can use it. The AFP’s C2ISTAR system is hobbled by a still-developing C2 complex and limited numbers of vulnerable crewed observation aircraft and drones. Even if it were fully operational, a C2ISTAR complex could be disrupted; in the event of war, an adversary would do its utmost to disrupt and destroy the Philippines’ C2ISTAR capabilities. Maintaining BrahMos’s deterrent capability will require not only building this complex but ensuring that it can withstand any attempts to degrade it in battle.

Neither does possessing a robust C2ISTAR complex combined with BrahMos suffice for establishing reliable deterrence. Effectively deterring an adversary requires material capability to inflict ‘unacceptable damage’ and the political will to fight. The former leads to questions of risk calculus and damage tolerance; the latter requires willpower and understanding the consequences of the use of weapons.

Although such analyses are usually done in the context of nuclear deterrence, these concerns are also relevant for conventional deterrence. In the Philippines’ case, conventional deterrence may well depend on the ability of the AFP to dissuade a possible fait accompli, specifically by the People’s Liberation Army, over some or all the Philippine-held features in the Kalayaan Island Group (Spratly Islands).

While China has yet to directly comment on the Philippines’ plans, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, in a forum on Philippines–China relations held shortly after the announcement, promised that China ‘will not use its strength to bully smaller countries’. China also pushed through with a donation of assorted non-offensive materiel worth US$19.5 million to the AFP.

Perhaps China feels that it need not consider Philippine BrahMos in its equations. As the largest plans of the AFP modernisation program call for five batteries, saying that that’s not enough is an understatement when considering the scale of the potential opposition.

Still, an AFP with BrahMos is better than an AFP without it, because it increases its chances of defending the country from external aggressors. This and other efforts to strengthen Philippine defence—including maintaining alliances and partnerships with like-minded countries—should, to paraphrase Poling, keep coercion at the grey-zone level instead of open warfare.

The Philippine defence establishment needs to do more beyond just purchase new weapons. The AFP needs to integrate BrahMos and other new capabilities into its operations, through wargaming and enhanced training.

The Philippines must continue to develop and enhance its ideas and strategy for achieving its deterrence objectives. Tools like the US net assessment method, if appropriately adapted and updated to suit the Philippines’ particular needs, contexts and situation, may be useful. It is imperative as well to study Chinese strategic culture and assess the damage tolerance threshold of the Chinese Communist Party.

The road ahead for the Philippines is challenging given its own complicated and inward-looking strategic culture. But for the country to make the most of its new purchases and safeguard its sovereignty, the Philippines must evolve its deterrence and strategic thinking now, while there’s still time.

Hungry and tired: the decline of militancy in Mindanao

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At 4 am on 8 May, 20 heavily armed militants occupied a public market at Datu Paglas, Maguindanao, in the southern Philippines. Abu Jihad, the group’s spokesperson, claimed that they were from the Karilalan faction of the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF). While no shots were fired, the presence of BIFF militants struck fear into the hearts of the town’s residents.

The militants retreated immediately after the Philippine Army engaged them in combat. An army spokesperson asserted that the militants had occupied the town to loot food from the market. While the BIFF had launched attacks on markets before, it had not plundered from civilian populations. Other jihadi terrorist groups in Mindanao, including Abu Sayyaf, have also attacked civilian assets for food. Does the change in modus operandi signal the decline of terrorist groups in Mindanao?

In 2008, Ameril Umbra Kato and some militants splintered from the separatist group Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) to form the BIFF. The BIFF opposed the peace talks between the MILF and the government of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao and often launched attacks to try to thwart the negotiation process. Such actions have bred distrust between the locals and the MILF.

Like other groups in Mindanao, the BIFF has rarely launched attacks beyond its area of influence. Militancy in Mindanao is characterised by strong clan or tribal affiliations. BIFF militants, who are primarily ethnic Maguindanao, have a stronghold in the Maguindanao region. Militants from Abu Sayyaf and the Maute Group have also displayed a similar terror–territory–tribe nexus.

Jihadi terrorism in Mindanao has declined since 2020, and militant groups in southern Mindanao have suffered territorial losses. The BIFF, for example, ceded its base at South Upi, Maguindanao, to the Philippine armed forces in February 2021. The army also overran the bases of other groups, such as Abu Sayyaf and the Maute Group, in the same month.

Concurrently, the BIFF and Abu Sayyaf experienced a spike in militant surrenders. Reasons cited for surrendering include starvation, fatigue and the waning of financial support.

The territorial defeat and surge in surrenders are not coincidental. Militant groups in Mindanao had depended on their control of territory for their militant activities. Territorial safe havens have been used for organisational and operational purposes. In addition, control of safe havens could allow alternative forms of governance, thereby enabling terrorists to cultivate support from the local population.

But beyond the tactical utility of safe havens, militants depended on them for physical sustenance. Control of territory allows a group to grow its support base or exact taxes from the local people to feed its members. It’s no surprise, then, that terrorists cite starvation as one of the main reasons for surrender, because their physical space is being constricted.

A group’s ability to hold territory is also dependent on the number of trained militants in its ranks. The increase in surrendered militants affects the group’s ability to defend against military incursions. In addition, the military can get intelligence about militant groups by interrogating surrendered militants.

Some observers have attributed the decline of terrorism in Mindanao to Covid-19 measures, particularly the cessation of international travel, which has prevented non-regional foreign fighters from entering Mindanao. However, Southeast Asian militants could still smuggle themselves into Mindanao through the tri-border area with Malaysia and Indonesia. The Philippine government’s enhanced community quarantine strategy may further restrict the movement of local militant groups, though its effectiveness in conflict regions in Mindanao is questionable.

Arguably, cumulative military efforts over the years might have worn militants out. Since the Marawi siege in 2017, the military has continued conducting operations against terrorist groups in Mindanao, which led to the steady decline of militant strength.

Militants became desperate even before the Covid-19 pandemic. Jihadism researcher Quinton Temby has suggested that militants in Mindanao turned to suicide bombings in 2019 because they had to adopt a more aggressive posture in light of their smaller numbers. Suicide bombings were believed to be more effective in waging a war of attrition, in which both parties tried to wear their adversary’s resources out. However, the sheer difference in resources was sufficient for the military to wear down the militants.

As the difference in strength between the Philippine armed forces and militant groups increases, the bargaining power of the authorities increases proportionally. This increase in bargaining power has made surrender packages more attractive, which helps to explain the surge in surrenders that has further weakened militant groups.

While the number of active militants has decreased, the BIFF has maintained an effective presence on social media during the Covid-19 pandemic and is attempting to establish itself as the ‘leader of jihad’ in Mindanao. Spiritual leaders of the BIFF made multiple calls to fight the military during the pandemic. The group has regularly distributed videos about its training and operations and also published recruitment videos amid the Covid-19 crisis in an attempt to bolster its numbers.

An avenue of recruitment is from internally displaced people in Mindanao. More than 15,000 individuals have been displaced due to skirmishes between the military and various militant groups. The harsh living conditions in temporary shelters may result in pent-up anger that militant groups can exploit to make up their numbers.

Authorities must capitalise on what’s likely to be a temporary decline in terrorist numbers to refocus their efforts to build strong civil–military relations. This can be achieved by rebuilding disrupted communities. Beyond human rights, rehoming people who have been displaced by the conflict is critical to counterterrorism as it restricts the pathways for militant recruitment. The authorities should consider expediting the rebuilding of Marawi City, which is yet to be completed despite the ending of the siege there in October 2017.

A reprieve for the US–Philippines military alliance

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Long waits can let cooler heads prevail and reverse hot-headed decisions.

In January, President Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines threatened to terminate the 1998 Philippine–US Visiting Forces Agreement—a treaty-level pact that provides the operational framework for the alliance between the two countries—unless the White House reversed the cancellation of Philippine Senator Ronald dela Rosa’s visitor visa. Dela Rosa is a close confidant of Duterte and the chief architect of his signature ‘war on drugs’.

On 11 February, the Philippine government informed the US embassy in Manila that it planned to withdraw from the VFA. That move triggered the agreement’s 180-day cooling off period before termination.

Fifteen weeks later, on 1 June, the Philippine government sent a letter to the US embassy in Manila freezing the countdown to termination until at least 1 December 2020. Fortunately, the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty and 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement between the two countries offer even longer periods for reconsideration. Both stipulate a one-year cooling off period in their termination clauses.

The 1 June temporary suspension came about despite the US side disappointing Duterte over his friend’s cancelled visa. The VFA, and by extension the US–Philippine alliance, will be safer from 1 December onwards if Duterte is disappointed again. He could be stripped of his power of termination. On 9 March, a majority of senators filed a petition with the country’s supreme court arguing that concurrence of the senate is required for terminating the VFA. The court has yet to hear this petition. If the court rules in favour of the senators, the VFA may well be taken off its suspended death clock.

It’s hard to envision a majority of senators supporting termination of the agreement, particularly given the depth of Philippine public opinion in favour of the US and against China. Duterte cannot run for re-election in 2022. Despite a super-majority of senators being aligned with the president, the Senate hasn’t done as he would wish before. Unlike the more pliant House of Representatives, the Senate has repeatedly blocked the president’s push for a federalist constitution and for reinstating the death penalty.

The supreme court, belying criticisms of being beholden to the president, also has issued rulings not favoured by the executive. In April 2019, it ruled against the solicitor-general and ordered the release of police files on thousands of alleged victims of the war on drugs.

It’s unlikely that US President Donald Trump’s administration or its successor will strengthen Manila’s support for the VFA by addressing a deeper Philippine disappointment with the alliance. The 2012 loss of control of Scarborough Shoal within the Philippine exclusive economic zone to China, and Beijing’s subsequent building of an artificial island and military base on the Philippine continental shelf at Mischief Reef, undercut the Philippine government’s belief in the bilateral alliance.

Secretary of National Defense Delfin Lorenzana expressed this alliance angst at his 2018 end-of-year press conference when he called for a review of the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty and pondered its possible cancellation. Manila wants a clearer and broader US commitment to support the Philippines in its territorial and maritime rights disputes with China in the South China Sea. It’s not clear what the Philippines is willing to offer the US in return, beyond not threatening to walk away from the alliance. Eighteen months on from Lorenzana’s call for a review, none has been announced.

The fate of the VFA and the US–Philippine alliance matters to Australia, the only other country with a status-of-forces agreement with the Philippines. Australia’s defence relationship with the Philippines works best when US–Philippine defence relations are strong. In 2017, Australia, under its agreement with the Philippines, provided vital aid to the country’s armed forces during the terrorist siege of Marawi City. Australian support complemented the much greater support provided by American forces under the VFA that no other country could have provided. Japan is currently negotiating a status-of-forces agreement with the Philippines; termination of the VFA could certainly dampen Tokyo’s interest.

Duterte’s disappointments with the US and the bilateral alliance were behind his January threats and his February decision to withdraw from the VFA. Disappointing Duterte again with a supreme court ruling in favour of the Senate may be the best way to ensure that the temporary suspension is transformed into a reversal of this ill-considered decision. Cooler heads then will have prevailed to the benefit of the Philippines, the US, Australia, Japan and Southeast Asia.

The author spoke at ASPI’s webinar on 16 June on the changing nature of Philippines–US defence relations, along with ASPI senior analyst Huong Le Thu; Jingdong Yuan, associate professor at the University of Sydney; John Powers, executive director of Intel Dynamics; and John Coyne, head of ASPI’s Strategic Policing and Law Enforcement and the North and Australia’s Security programs.