Tag Archive for: Organised Crime

The Pacific cocaine corridor: A Brazilian cartel’s pipeline to Australia

Australia faces an emerging national security threat from Brazilian transnational crime groups. Once a domestic concern, Brazilian organised crime has evolved into a powerful narco-insurgency with transnational reach, making Brazil the world’s second-largest player in the cocaine trade after Colombia.

While Brazilian organised crime previously posed little threat to Australia, this report, The Pacific cocaine corridor: A Brazilian cartel’s pipeline to Australia, examines how Brazil’s expanding role in global cocaine supply, rising criminal network sophistication, and growing demand in Australia’s lucrative cocaine market are increasing the presence of Brazilian organised crime on Australian shores.

The report highlights how Brazil’s Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) has become a major transnational criminal threat, exploiting weaknesses in political, legal, and economic systems. It explores Brazil’s geography and criminal networks with South American cocaine producers and examines the PCC’s global distribution networks, with a focus on how the Pacific is increasingly used to transport drugs destined for Australia. A recent case study demonstrates the prioritisation of the Australian market in these operations.

The report concludes with recommendations for strengthening police cooperation, enhancing financial surveillance, and proactively detecting and disrupting PCC activities. By addressing key enablers of the PCC’s resilience and closing gaps in international information exchange, a coordinated approach will not only mitigate the immediate threat but also bolster Australia’s long-term defences against transnational organised crime.

‘High rollers’ A study of criminal profits along Australia’s heroin and methamphetamine supply chains

This report helps develop an understanding of the quantum of profits being made and where in the value chain they occur. Australians spent approximately A$5.8 billion on methamphetamine and A$470 million on heroin in FY 2019.

Approximately A$1,216,806,017 was paid to international wholesalers overseas for the amphetamine and heroin that was smuggled into Australia in that year. The profit that remained in Australia’s economy was about A$5,012,150,000. Those funds are undermining Australia’s public health and distorting our economy daily, and ultimately funding drug cartels and traffickers in Southeast Asia.

One key takeaway from the figures presented in this report is that the Australian drug trade is large and growing. Despite the best efforts of law enforcement agencies, methamphetamine and heroin use has been increasing by up to 17% year on year. Falling prices in Southeast Asia are likely to keep pushing that number up, while drug prices and purity in Australia remain relatively stable.

Authors Dr John Coyne and Dr Teagan Westendorf write that, ‘While ever-larger drug busts continue to dominate the headlines, the underlying fact is that methamphetamine and heroin imports continue to rise despite authorities seizing up to 34% of imported drugs’.

As production prices for methamphetamine continue to decline along with wholesale prices, more sophisticated transnational organised crime actors are likely to begin to examine their business models in greater detail. Industrial production of methamphetamine for high-volume, low-profit regional markets like Australia has significant benefits for them.

The data suggests that the more sophisticated transnational organised crime groups will seek to expand their control of the heroin and methamphetamine value chains to include greater elements of the wholesale supply chain as well as alternative product lines, such as synthetic opioids.

The authors note that ‘in the absence of supply reduction, and even with more effective supply-chain disruption, our federal and state governments will need to invest more heavily in demand reduction and harm minimisation.’

Anti-Money Laundering. A case study

The Australian Government’s technological monopolies have ended. Technological developments, especially those that have been disruptive, have been driven primarily by private corporations for at least the past 10 years. Meanwhile, legislative responses to those changes, be they disruptive or otherwise, have been increasingly delayed.

Acceleration in the development and use of technology has been matched by changes in the capability of those who would do us harm. In the face of rapid social change, governments have lost more than a technological edge, as the very conceptualisations of sovereignty and geographical jurisdictions are being challenged. Law enforcement agencies’ traditional business models for dealing with organised crime are under significant pressure from threat actors that are able to operate more agile decision-making cycles and exploit seams between jurisdictions and in law enforcement agencies’ capabilities.

In this context, Australian law enforcement agencies face an increasing number of challenges from emergent technologies. A key policy challenge underpinning these issues relates to the limited capacity of law enforcement to introduce innovative strategies in response to disruptive technology. Another is how to make cross-jurisdictional cooperation simpler and easier.

ASPI’s latest Special Report by Dr John Coyne and Ms Amelia Meurant-Tompkinson, explores technological innovation in law enforcement through a specific crime type case study of anti-money laundering (AML) provisions. It analyses the factors that support or restrict technological innovation in federal law enforcement’s AML efforts and argues that the current ecosystem for innovation for AML needs to be enhanced to engage with the dual challenge of disruptive technology, and the integration of existing pockets of AML excellence into a holistic whole-of-government innovation program. The initial steps for responding to this challenge should include an analysis of the central assumptions that underpin innovation, policymaking, strategy and finance in this space.

In this video, Madeleine Nyst discusses the report with John Coyne and Amelia Meurant-Tompkinson.

‘Santa Muerte’, are the Mexican cartels really coming?

Whether in Mexico, the US or Australia, the image of the transnational serious and organised crime (OC) threat from ‘Mexican cartels’ used to construct policy doesn’t appear to engage with the reality that there’s no homogeneous Mexican cartel, cartels or OC group.

This report argues that, for Australia and Asia, the menace of Mexican OC is no longer looming on the horizon; it has already arrived.

However, the nature of the Mexican OC problem in Australia and Asia is not likely to be the same as that found in either the US or Mexico. To respond effectively to this rising threat, Australian policymakers need to approach the issue with a more informed perspective that engages with the complex nature of the various groups that collectively form what’s broadly considered to be Mexican OC.

Furthermore, the policy response to Mexican OC will need to more agile than the measures contained in Australia’s current National Organised Crime Response.

Response to Mexica cartels report to his Excellency Ambassador Armando G. Alvarez

For the right reasons, in the right ways (Part 1): A four-nation survey of information sharing about organised crime

This special report examines how government, business and the community in four nations share information about organised crime. Its key finding is that the Australian Government, businesses and community as a whole must be open to new kinds of information sharing partnerships.

The field work involved over 80 interviews, including visits to or discussions about a range of information sharing mechanisms in Israel, the UK, the Netherlands and the US.

This is an abridged version of a report submitted to the Churchill Memorial Trust in June 2016.

Opportunities abound abroad: Optimising our criminal intelligence system overseas

Criminal intelligence (CrimInt) is so useful in serious criminal investigations that it’s difficult to envisage a situation where it shouldn’t be sought and used if it’s available.

This special report argues that Australia’s current arrangements for gathering and disseminating CrimInt overseas are suboptimal.

While additional resources are needed to address this condition, there’s also a need to streamline priority setting and associated collection requirements, provide ways to evaluate and better coordinate the collection of information and intelligence product, and expand opportunities to improve training in CrimInt.

The paper provides recommendations to improve the quality and utility of our overseas CrimInt effort for law enforcement, policy and regulatory agencies.

Investing wisely: Spending political capital on Australia’s criminal intelligence capabilities

This report examines a recent proposal to merge the Australian Crime Commission (ACC) and the CrimTrac Agency. There are two distinct—but not irreconcilable—views about this proposal. Reconciling these views will require detailed research about how a merged organisation would benefit all stakeholders—especially the frontline police and criminal intelligence operators in all the jurisdictions.

But does the merger proposal actually address the right question? This report argues that a better way to view this problem is to ask how the Commonwealth can play a role as a steward for national criminal intelligence.

Importantly, this question presents an opportunity for the Australian Justice Minister to give the federal Cabinet a chance to consider the Commonwealth’s role in law enforcement more holistically.

Tag Archive for: Organised Crime

Understanding ’ndrangheta operations in Australia

The ’ndrangheta, the Calabrian mafia, plays a significant role in the global cocaine trade and is deeply entrenched in Australia, influencing the cocaine trade and engaging in a variety of illicit activities.

A range of ethno-geographic criminal groups facilitate the production, supply and distribution of cocaine to Australia’s highly lucrative consumer market. ASPI’s recent report highlighted the emerging threat posed by Brazilian crime groups. But such new players must be considered alongside the threat posed by multi-generational groups that have become well entrenched in Australia.

The ’ndrangheta operates through two organisational models in Australia, one local and one transnational.

The first is the Australian (rather than Calabrian or Italian) ’ndrangheta, which has been entrenched in the country for about a century, its founders having arrived in 1922. This group of criminal families, commonly known as clans, has adeptly manipulated the cultural values brought by the Calabrian diaspora, the second largest Italian group in Australia, just behind the Sicilian community.

The Australian ’ndrangheta is entrepreneurial and operates through complex formal and cultural structures. It has built its operations on local partnerships, engaging in the cocaine trade while maintaining a facade of legitimacy through fully and semi-legal businesses. These businesses cultivate community support and consensus, essential for any mafia group seeking power and influence.

The second organisational model is that of the transnational ’ndrangheta, which retains strong connections to clans based in Calabria and elsewhere in Italy. This group of clans operates across Europe—particularly in Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands—and extends its reach into Canada, the United States and parts of Latin America. These groups are based on transnational families and associates who can use a range of connections and brokers to secure a foothold in the lucrative cocaine trade.

The two organisational models of the ’ndrangheta raise significant concerns and amplify the reach of both homegrown clans and transnational networks.

While the Australian ’ndrangheta has historically engaged in drug trafficking alongside local partners, they strategically separate their illegal ventures from their legitimate enterprises. Intergenerational changes favour diversification of their business structures as families and their activities evolve. Diversification not only facilitates money laundering; it also fortifies a clan’s standing within the community, making it more challenging for authorities to dismantle its operations. This increases clans’ resilience, allowing them to maintain prominence in the criminal landscape, even as authorities attempt to target specific activities, most notably drug trafficking.

Money laundering and business integration are crucial aspects of the Australian ’ndrangheta’s activities. By integrating illicit profits into legitimate businesses, clans mask the origins of their funds, facilitating continued operations and growth. The use of fully and semi-legal enterprises serves as a cover for these activities.

This not only poses a challenge for law enforcement but also risks undermining the integrity of Australia’s financial systems. If left unchecked, money laundering can have broader economic consequences, including destabilisation of legitimate markets and erosion of public trust in financial institutions.

Additionally, political proximity poses a risk as it fosters an environment where organised crime can thrive. Australian ’ndrangheta clans have a history of cultivating relationships with local politicians and influential figures, potentially allowing them to operate unchallenged by law enforcement. The ’ndrangheta can use such connections to influence local economies and communities, making it difficult for authorities to understand their operations as they may not look criminal. Political entanglement thus hinders efforts to address the challenges posed by the transnational clans of the ’ndrangheta still engaged in drug trafficking in Australia.

On one hand, a coordinated and comprehensive transnational approach is essential to effectively counter the threat posed by Italian crime syndicates investing in the drug trade. However, the existence of pockets of ’ndrangheta power in Australia gives the transnational clans an edge in business diversification.

To tighten money laundering regulations, Australia needs to criminalise certain behaviours associated with criminal groups, not solely respond to individual crimes.  Australia also needs a better understanding of upperworld-underworld interconnectivity. Australia has used this kind of anti-consorting approach to address outlaw motorcycle gangs.

Australia’s cocaine trafficking issue is complex and requires a nuanced understanding of the various organised crime groups involved but also of what happens alongside the drug trade. The ’ndrangheta’s dual operational models emphasise the need for a response that not only addresses immediate threats but also strengthens long-term defences against transnational organised crime. By addressing the enablers of criminal resilience, closing gaps in law enforcement and mitigating the risks associated with money laundering and political connections, Australia can better protect itself from the evolving landscape of drug trafficking.

Australia’s new security threat: cocaine trafficking by Brazilian crime groups

Australia faces an emerging national security threat from Brazilian crime groups. Once only a domestic concern in Brazil, organised crime there has evolved into a powerful narco-insurgency with transnational reach, making the country the world’s second-largest player in the cocaine trade, after Colombia.

Until now, growth in Brazilian organised crime posed no threat to Australia. However, as detailed in ASPI’s newly released report, The Pacific Cocaine Corridor: A Brazilian cartel’s pipeline to Australia, Brazil’s growing role in global cocaine supply and its expansion into new markets (including new Pacific routes), the rising sophistication of its criminal networks, and growing demand in Australia’s lucrative cocaine market are increasing the presence of Brazilian crime groups on our shores.

Brazil’s two major drug syndicates are the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) and the Comando Vermelho. The PCC has become a particularly serious transnational criminal threat, exploiting weaknesses in political, legal and economic systems.

Brazil’s long coastline, abundant port facilities, unguarded inland waterways and well-developed air networks provide many channels for global cocaine distribution. Its vast 8000km border with Andean cocaine-producing countries and its 1365km of crossings with Paraguay further facilitate drug trafficking. The Triple Frontier between Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina—much like Asia’s Golden Triangle of Thailand, Myanmar and Laos—serves as a key illicit logistics hub.

Historically, cocaine sent to Australia embarked from Europe, China, South Africa, the United States or Canada, though the drugs originated in South America. Now, the PCC maintains a cocaine distribution network with connections in Oceania, using routes along the Pacific coast of South America. This means that cocaine can be routed to Australia more directly. This may reflect greater prioritisation of the Australian market, and the potential for increased exports to Australia.

Brazil’s new trade route with Vanuatu, primarily for importing chicken meat, presents an increasing drug trafficking risk, as such commodities need refrigerated containers, which are harder to inspect thoroughly. The trade originates mainly from Parana, a state bordering Paraguay and a key entry point for cocaine trafficked into Brazil from Bolivia and Peru.

Vanuatu’s proximity to Australia makes it a potential transit point for illicit drug shipments. New or less scrutinised trade routes, such as the one involving Vanuatu, may have weaker customs controls, increasing the risk of undetected drug trafficking. From there, smaller vessels or yachts can transport cocaine via another Pacific island or directly to Australia, taking advantage of the region’s vast and difficult-to-monitor maritime space.

Australians pay some of the highest prices in the world for cocaine: one kilogram is valued at around $3000 in Colombia, can sell for $10,000 in Brazil and for between $160,000 and $200,000 in Australia. While transporting cocaine to Australia adds cost, the enormous profit margin is understandably driving expanded PCC operations.

Concealing drugs on the submerged parts of ships has become more common. Skilled divers place and receive packages at ports, often at night and without the crew’s knowledge.

In 2020, the Australian Federal Police intercepted a PCC shipment to Sydney comprising half a tonne of cocaine concealed in banana pulp bags.  In 2022, a Brazilian diver was found floating and unresponsive in the Port of Newcastle near packages containing 54kg of cocaine with an estimated street value of around $20 million. This case demonstrated the PCC’s ability to move people across continents and provide logistical support to buyers in Australia.

Like most organised crime groups, the PCC thrives on exploiting gaps in law-enforcement coordination, in financial oversight and in border security. Given its extensive transnational operations, a unified and coordinated effort against it is essential.

To counter the targeting of the Australian market, our report recommends that Australian and regional authorities adopt a comprehensive, strategic approach and work closely with Brazilian and international partners. Strengthening police cooperation and enhancing financial surveillance will help detect and disrupt PCC activities. Timely sharing of criminal intelligence, including travel patterns and aliases, can prevent further PCC infiltration of Australia, while stricter scrutiny of visa applications, detection of forged documents, and the establishment of watchlists will limit movement of PCC operatives. Additionally, collaboration on offender management—such as prison security, post-release monitoring, and reintegration programs—will prevent the PCC from expanding its networks within correctional systems.

By addressing key enablers of the group’s resilience and closing gaps in international information exchange, this approach not only mitigates the immediate threat but also strengthens long-term defences against transnational organised crime.

To fight disinformation, treat it as organised crime

The Australian government’s regulatory approach to tackling disinformation misses the mark by focusing on content moderation and controlling access to platforms. This focus on symptoms is like fighting a flood by mopping the floor: it feels like you’re dealing with the immediate problem, but it ignores the root cause.

The government should instead treat disinformation like organised crime and focus on dismantling networks.

Laws governing organised crime are effective because they focus on patterns and networks, not necessarily the commodities criminal syndicates trade in. Laws treating disinformation similarly would focus on scale, coordinated inauthentic behaviour, financial patterns and systematic manipulation for profit or influence, not content or controlling platform access. This would target orchestrated disinformation infrastructure while preserving freedom of expression.

The approach would allow governments, social media companies and their cyber allies to better tackle disinformation networks and actors. They would be able to take down malign disinformation enterprises, instead of playing Whac-A-Mole with content—shifting to controversial community notes or applying ineffective and unenforceable blanket access bans to groups of citizens.

Every disinformation campaign begins with an initiator, someone who deliberately spreads untruthful content to distort our view of reality. Disinformation differs from misinformation, which is unknowingly false—an honest mistake.

We used to think that content moderation and fact checking were the solution, but alone they are ineffective.

Human content moderation costs too much time and money, so companies have been experimenting with AI-assisted processes.

But automated moderation can’t reliably understand nuance, context or intent, which all help determine whether content is truly harmful or simply controversial. AI systems struggle with basic linguistic challenges. They often fail to catch harmful content in non-English languages, regional dialects and culturally specific contexts. Or they frequently misclassify content, struggling to distinguish between disinformation and legitimate discussion about disinformation.

Controlling platform access, such as recent regulation in Australia banning children under 16 years old from using social media, is another approach. But enforcement is difficult.

Yet the biggest problem is neither technical nor practical. It is philosophical.

Liberal democratic societies value freedom of speech. Content moderation is problematic because it treats freedom of speech as merely a legal or technical problem to be solved through rules and algorithms. But freedom of speech, open discourse and the marketplace of ideas are central to the democratic process.

Age-based social media bans present a fundamental tension with democratic and liberal philosophical principles as they impede young people’s development as democratic citizens. Social media is a key space for civic engagement and public discourse. Blanket age bans prevent young people from gradually developing digital citizenship skills. Consequently, young people would suddenly gain access to digital spaces without prior experience navigating them.

Approaching disinformation as organised crime focuses on the root cause of the problem—the malicious actors and networks creating harmful content—rather than trying to regulate the average citizen’s platform access or speech. Such an approach would target specific malicious groups, whether traced back to foreign information manipulation and interference, domestic coordinated inauthentic networks, or financially motivated groups creating fake news for profit.

Laws that treat disinformation as organised crime would require the prosecution to show several elements: criminal intent, harm or risk to public safety, structured and coordinated efforts, and proceeds of crime.

The first two elements should be covered by the definition of disinformation as the intent to deceive for malicious purposes. For the past four years, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation has warned of the threat of foreign interference. In 2022, foreign interference supplanted terrorism as ASIO’s main security concern and in 2024, it was described as a real, sophisticated and aggressive danger.

ASPI data supports this assessment, exposing widespread cyber-enabled foreign interference and online information operations targeting Australia’s elections and referendums, originating from China, Russia, Iran and North Korea.

Together, ASIO and ASPI’s work indicates intent and harm—to individuals, institutions, organisations and society—for financial or political purposes.

Structured and coordinated efforts are equally provable. Disinformation is already known to involve coordination by organised networks, akin to organised crime syndicates. Meta, Google, Microsoft, OpenAI and TikTok already detect and disrupt covert online influence operations. They understand the tactics, techniques and procedures malicious actors use on their platforms—including identity obfuscation, impostor news sites, bot networks, coordinated amplification activity, and systematic exploitation of platform vulnerabilities.

Finally, disinformation is a funded enterprise, so profits can be classed as proceeds of crime. Like any criminal venture, disinformation is a calculated operation funded to undermine society, through advertising, fraudulent schemes or foreign funding. Laws that target financial aspects of disinformation operations—such as shell companies, front organisations, suspicious financial transactions or use of fake, compromised or stolen accounts—would differentiate malign enterprises from authentic individuals expressing genuine beliefs, however controversial.

Regulating content and platform access risks either over-censorship that chills legitimate discourse or under-moderation that allows harmful content to spread. We already have the tools and legal frameworks to prove malign online influence without undermining liberal democratic values. It’s time to change our approach and classify disinformation as an organised crime.

Editors’ picks for 2024: ‘Geopolitics, influence and crime in the Pacific islands’

Originally published on 14 March 2024.

Getting caught up in geopolitical competition may seem uncomfortable enough for Pacific island countries. What’s making things worse is that outside powers’ struggle to influence them is weakening their resistance to organised crime emanating from China. 

And that comes on top of criminal activity that’s moved into Pacific islands from elsewhere, including Australia, Mexico, Malaysia and New Zealand. 

This situation must change if peace and stability are to be maintained and development goals achieved across the region. 

The good news is that, Papua New Guinea excluded, Pacific island countries have some of the lowest levels of criminality in the world. The bad news is that the data suggests the effect of organised crime is increasing across all three Pacific-island subregions—Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia. 

The picture is worst in Melanesia and Polynesia, where resilience to crime has declined. In many cases, Pacific Island countries are insufficiently prepared to withstand growing criminal threats, exposing vulnerable populations to new risks. 

As China has gained influence in these countries, its criminals and criminal organisations have moved in alongside honest Chinese investors. Some of those criminals, while attending to their own business, are also doing the bidding of the Chinese government.  

If the criminal activity involves suborning local authorities—and it often will—then so much the better for Beijing, which will enjoy the officials’ new-found reliance on Chinese friends that it can influence. 

Democracies competing with China for influence, such as the US, Japan and Australia, are unwilling to lose the favour of those same officials. So, they refrain from pressuring them into tackling organised crime and corruption head on. The result is more crime and weaker policing. 

But more factors are at play here. Growing air travel and internet penetration have helped turn the islands into more accessible destinations and better-integrated points along global supply chains of licit and illicit commodities. 

When one starts mapping who is behind major organised criminality, the protagonists are almost always foreigners. The islands do have home-grown gangs but, when there is a lot of money to be made, there is usually the involvement of a Chinese triad, a Mexican cartel, a law-defying Malaysian logging company, or some similar criminal organisation. 

Groups that have entered the islands, such as Australia’s Rebels and New Zealand’s Head Hunters, both outlaw motorcycle gangs, or the Mexican Sinaloa drug cartel, are overtly criminal. Yet, some hybrid criminal actors are making their presence felt even more in some of the islands, and they are arguably even more pernicious and complex to eradicate. They tend to be foreign individuals who operate in both the licit and illicit economies, have become associated with local business elites, and enjoy political connections both at home and in the Pacific. 

As their operations have become bolder, as seen in Palau and Papua New Guinea, there are substantiated concerns that the perpetrators may be, or could become, tools of foreign political influence and interference. 

The poster boy of this cadre of actors is Wan Kuok Koi, aka Broken Tooth, a convicted Chinese gangster turned valued patriotic entrepreneur. Despite being sanctioned by the US, Wan has leveraged commercial deals linked to China’s Belt and Road Initiative and established cultural associations that have enabled him to co-opt local elites. He has also exploited links with the Chinese business diaspora to identify entry points for his criminal activities (such as establishing online scam centres) and has used extensive political connections to ensure impunity in his operations. 

Although they have a lower profile than Wan, many other foreign business actors are active across the region. They often gain high political access, preferential treatment and impunity through the diplomatic relations between their countries of origin (not just China) and the Pacific countries in which they operate. A further risk is that criminal revenues could also be channeled into electoral campaigns, undermining local democratic processes. 

These entrepreneurs have exploited favourable tax regimes, limited monitoring and enforcement capabilities and corrupted political connections. They often operate in extractive industries, real estate and financial services. 

As bribes pass from hand to hand, and as outside countries weigh their political considerations, Pacific citizens lose out. Some are vulnerable to labour and sexual exploitation at the hands of unscrupulous (and criminal) foreign businesses. Others see their lands, forests and waters degraded, or they are exposed to the introduction of new narcotics for which health services are unprepared.  

Fighting this transnational organised crime is critical to strengthening institutions in Pacific island countries and helping them build long-term sustainable prosperity. 

Outside countries should consider lateral approaches to crime fighting in the Pacific that may provide a framework for action that is more palatable to island-country governments than more sensitive, purely law-enforcement-driven strategies.  

Crime can be both a cause and an enabler of fragility and underdevelopment. With that in mind, the fight against crime and corruption could be framed as necessary primarily to address those two issues. They deeply impact Pacific populations, so it would be crucial to engage with affected communities along the way.

In the absence of such an approach, and with geopolitical and diplomatic considerations taking precedence, criminals will continue to exploit the limited attention that is paid to crime fighting and will profit as a result.

A new risk on the horizon: organised criminals as mercenaries of disinformation

At a time when controlling the narrative is power, are organised crime groups acting as mercenaries of disinformation, using their skills to manipulate minds for profit? A recent Australian Federal Police (AFP) operation suggests an intersection is forming between crime, disinformation and technological exploitation.

Last month, the AFP arrested six members of a Sydney-based criminal syndicate implicated in drug importation as part of Operation Kraken. The operation targeted Ghost, an encrypted messaging app designed for illicit communications. It played a crucial role in the syndicate’s activities, used to send more than 125,000 criminal messages.

What makes this case particularly interesting is that one senior member of the syndicate allegedly orchestrated a disinformation campaign. This involved fabrication of a terror attack, a false narrative aimed at perverting the course of justice and diverting law enforcement resources.

Criminal groups are known to exploit social and technological developments for profit. Cybercriminals in Europe are already engaging in disinformation as a service for customers. AFP and criminal intelligence organisations should be wary of that happening in Australia.

Further, criminal organisations are now selling services to both state and non-state actors.

In Myanmar, for instance, ethnic armed groups have increasingly relied on drug production to finance their operations. By partnering with organised crime syndicates, they monetise their control over territory, granting protection and resource access in exchange for a share of the profits. This not only perpetuates the cycle of violence and instability but also entrenches the drug trade within these communities, as they become reliant on revenue generated from opium and methamphetamine production.

So we see a complex interplay of local power dynamics and organised crime.

For many years, criminal groups have offered money laundering as a service, creating a new dimension in financial crime. They provide tailored solutions for individuals, businesses and even governments aiming to obscure origins of illicit funds. The criminals charge for their expertise in navigating complex financial systems. A notable example is the case of the Panama Papers, which exposed how many high-profile individuals and corporations used offshore shell companies in jurisdictions such as Panama to launder money and evade taxes.

Criminal groups also offer hacking services on a subscription basis, enabling clients—ranging from individuals and groups to state entities—to breach security systems, steal sensitive data or deploy ransomware. This trend allows customers with limited technical skills to engage in sophisticated attacks, effectively broadening the reach of both state and non-state actors.

For instance, Eastern European cybercriminals have been linked to the proliferation of bot farms, which are used to automate attacks and disseminate disinformation at scale, amplifying the impact. By providing these illicit services, hackers create immunity for their customers, who become difficult to trace and prosecute or, in the case of rogue states, hold accountable.

There is a reasonable assessment that the demand for disinformation services is growing among state and non-state actors, reflecting a shift in how information is weaponised for strategic advantage. As geopolitical tensions rise and digital platforms proliferate, various groups—from rogue states to organised crime syndicates—are increasingly turning to disinformation as a tool for manipulation and control. This can range from spreading false narratives to create confusion and distract law enforcement, to launching smear campaigns to discredit adversaries.

If this demand evolves disinformation from a tool of deception into a service available for hire, Australian law enforcement will face complex new challenges. The intertwining of disinformation with organised crime complicates the national security landscape.

Australia must evaluate whether existing legislation is sufficient to address the commodification of disinformation. The Operation Kraken case should prompt further investigation into intelligence surrounding criminal fee-for-service disinformation schemes. A coordinated approach involving law enforcement and intelligence agencies is essential to counter the threat.

Encrypted messaging apps: a persistent challenge in fighting organised crime

Last month, about 700 Australian Federal Police (AFP) officers executed arrest warrants nationwide under Operation Kraken. This operation targeted Jay Je Yoon Jung, the alleged architect behind Ghost, an encrypted messaging app explicitly designed for organised crime groups.

While Operation Kraken showcased Australia’s ability to disrupt sophisticated criminal networks, it also highlighted a pressing issue: the persistent challenge posed by evolving encryption technologies that organised criminal groups are so quickly adopting, allowing them to outpace law enforcement efforts.

Ghost represented a significant leap in the technological capabilities of organised crime. Allegedly developed by Jung as a business venture, it facilitated a range of illicit activities, from drug and weapons trafficking to money laundering. An estimated 800 devices were in circulation globally, 376 of which in Australia. Disguised as standard smartphones, they allowed users to create anonymous profiles and communicate securely. The breadth of activities coordinated through Ghost reinforces the escalating sophistication of organised crime groups and, just as importantly, their ability to adopt and operationalise new technology.

Ghost was brought to the AFP’s attention by Europol, the European Union’s international policing division. Europol prompted formation of a global task force, with the AFP joining forces with the US Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Through technical ingenuity and undercover operations, the AFP accessed Ghost’s software. This replicated the success of previous operations, such as Operation Ironside, which had effectively dismantled another encrypted messaging app, AN0M.

Despite these victories, the operation highlights the broader implications of encrypted messaging apps for law enforcement. While they challenge law enforcement with their encryption, they also raise significant questions regarding privacy and mass surveillance.

Operation Kraken exposes three significant challenges for Australian law enforcement when targeting organised crime groups: disrupting their current use of encrypted technology, accelerating law enforcement adoption of new technologies and preventing criminal exploitation of future advancements.

The success of Operation Kraken hinged on the delicate interplay between human intelligence and technological expertise. The authorities’ initial breakthroughs in identifying and infiltrating Ghost were achieved through human sources in organised crime groups.

But another encrypted messaging app will surely emerge to take its place. So collaboration between human intelligence and cutting-edge technology must remain a cornerstone of law enforcement strategies to stay one step ahead of evolving criminal threats.

Australia’s 2018 encryption laws have enabled law enforcement to compel tech companies to grant access to encrypted communications. However, this has sparked a debate over the potential creation of backdoors that could compromise user privacy and safety. Both the debate and government policy responses must recognise that encryption is essential to modern life and that security is key to tech companies’ commercial success. It’s little wonder that achieving a delicate balance between safeguarding privacy and ensuring public safety remains a contentious issue that requires careful navigation.

The Australian government and law enforcement agencies must prioritise ongoing innovation and international collaboration to stay ahead of criminal use of encrypted messaging. Maintaining operational secrecy while maximising intelligence gains is essential to ensuring that authorities can remain proactive in their fight against organised crime. Investment in training and resources for law enforcement agencies will empower them to combat these evolving technologies.

To ensure sustained success, Australia should consider establishing a dedicated task force focused on proactively assessing encrypted messaging apps and investing in training for a new generation of digital investigators. Engaging in ongoing dialogue with technology firms will be crucial, enabling law enforcement to strike a balance between privacy concerns and the necessity of access to encrypted communications during critical investigations.

As we navigate the complexities of organised crime in the digital age, the insights from Operation Kraken should catalyse Australia’s law enforcement community to embrace innovation, foster cooperation and remain agile in the face of emerging challenges. Only through a multifaceted approach can we ensure the safety and security of our communities while effectively countering the threat posed by organised crime.

Taiwan’s exclusion from Interpol is the world’s loss

Politicking by the Chinese Communist Party has blocked Taiwanese membership of Interpol since 1984, preventing the timely sharing of criminal information and intelligence. The absence of Taiwan in the world’s largest international police organisation weakens global security, to the advantage of organised crime.

Placating the CCP is an insufficient reason for excluding Taiwan from Interpol. To improve global security, Taiwan should finally be granted observer status at Interpol’s 92nd General Assembly in Glasgow in November 2024. It must be given at least a limited capacity to cooperate with Interpol and better combat transnational crime.

Taiwan is a crucial law enforcement stakeholder in the Asia-Pacific region with critical intelligence and operational capabilities. Its police forces, overseen by the National Police Agency (NPA), are known for their professionalism and advanced expertise. Abroad, the NPA actively engages in international efforts against terrorism, cybercrime, human trafficking and drug smuggling. Little wonder that Taiwan has some of the lowest rates of crime in the world.

Despite this success, Taiwanese nationals are still victims of crime at home and abroad, and some are involved in transnational organised crime. The NPA’s absence from Interpol restricts the region’s capacity to effectively combat such activities.

For example, in 2022, Taiwanese police uncovered a new type of human trafficking in Cambodia and Myanmar. Sophisticated organised crime syndicates were promising overseas employment to vulnerable people from around the world, including almost 5000 from Taiwan. Victims were held captive in Cambodia and Myanmar, forced to work in scam call centres under horrendous conditions and subjected to physical and psychological abuse.

In this incident, Taiwanese police submitted reports to Interpol but could not directly work with its member states, despite Taiwan’s crucial role in uncovering the scheme and its duty to protect its citizens.

As Taiwan is neither a member state nor an observer, it cannot access or contribute to Interpol’s 19 criminal intelligence databases. Nor can it access or assist with Interpol’s systems for requesting international cooperation. The complex arrangements for requesting assistance worldwide to locate and provisionally arrest a person pending extradition, surrender or similar legal action are central to Interpol’s operations and invaluable for combatting transnational organised crime.

Taiwan was a member of Interpol from 1961 to 1984, until the organisation recognised Beijing as the legitimate government of China. The CCP argues that Taiwan, under the One China principle, cannot join international organisations that require statehood for membership, including Interpol.

Interpol’s position on Taiwan was clarified accordingly by its secretary general, Jurgen Stock, in 2023, who argued against granting the island observer status: ‘In 1984, the Interpol General Assembly recognised the PRC as the sole representation of China. As such, Interpol recognises Taiwan as part of China, and as China is a member of Interpol, Interpol cannot grant Taiwan observer status in the General Assembly.’

Stock, the CCP and the member states in Interpol who oppose Taiwan’s participation have seemingly forgotten that the organisation is about police cooperation. Its focus is on sharing information and intelligence and connecting police forces—not countries.

Taiwan’s appointment as an observer would not undermine the One China principle nor threaten Beijing. Instead, Taiwan’s inclusion would formalise and strengthen cooperation, enabling more efficient and coordinated responses to global security threats.

By denying Taiwan’s participation in Interpol, the international community risks sending a message that political considerations outweigh principles of justice and human rights. This is a dangerous precedent in the fight against impunity. Article 3 of Interpol’s constitution even prevents the organisation from undertaking political operations, although it does not prevent political omissions and exclusions. The case for approving Taiwan’s observation status is grounded in fairness, effectiveness and global security. The case against is purely partisan.

The CCP’s influence within Interpol is instrumental in preventing Taiwan from gaining membership or observer status. Chinese authorities consistently block Taiwan’s attempts to participate in Interpol’s meetings, share information or contribute to international law enforcement efforts. This exclusion isolates Taiwanese police and limits Interpol’s ability to combat cross-border crime effectively.

With little prospect of full Interpol membership, Taiwan has instead persistently pursued observer status. In recent years, it has gained support from numerous member states, including the United States, who recognise its contributions to global security.

Taiwan meets the criteria for observer status based on its law enforcement capabilities and willingness to cooperate internationally. Interpol observers include international organisations as well as non-member countries and are afforded limited participation rights. They can access Interpol’s databases and attend meetings like its general assembly.

Crucially, Taiwan’s exclusion raises human rights and humanitarian issues. Victims of transnational crimes, including human trafficking and terrorism, suffer regardless of geopolitical boundaries. Taiwan’s inclusion would give better protection to victims and enhance international efforts to prevent and prosecute crimes against humanity. Its exclusion allows transnational crime networks to operate across borders and exploit gaps in international cooperation.

Taiwan’s exclusion from Interpol is a glaring omission. By granting it observer status, the international community would be upholding principles of fairness and justice, and meaningfully enhancing global security cooperation. Setting aside political considerations and de-politicising the fight against transnational crime is essential for advancing shared goals of security, justice and human rights on a global scale.

Protecting Australia beyond its traditional borders: apps and policing in the internet age

The success of Operation Ironside, led by the Australian Federal Police with a host of international partner agencies, hinged on the use of a messaging app thought by criminals to be encrypted. The numerous arrests and seizures announced last week show how globalised the business model of transnational and serious organised crime groups has become.

Digital sovereignty requires a democratic state to take a forward-looking approach to mitigating the various intersecting, compounding and increasing threats presented to it and its people by advances in digitisation and technological innovation.

Operation Ironside is a reminder that strategic policing sits at the forefront of this effort. Old threats like violent extremism, organised crime, child exploitation and adult sex crimes have exploded in new ways online. Terrorist attacks have been livestreamed, inspiring other extremist actors; criminal networks have become globalised; and online child abuse and revenge pornography have proliferated. This has happened through the incredible ease of connecting with likeminded individuals and amassing a real-time audience on social media platforms and websites, and the agility of business communications enabled by the internet of things that benefit illegal as much as legal enterprises.

Keeping up with the unprecedented volume and diversity of data-enabled criminal activity has stretched the resources and capabilities of policing and intelligence agencies. In Australia, the push to respond more effectively to digitally exacerbated threats has led to calls for the parliament to provide policing and intelligence agencies with greater powers. Creating a legislative framework to police the new spaces created by the digital age is part of a proactive, strategic response to these threats.

This is not to say, however, that police powers should be increased without due process and debate.

There are two parts to this move. The first is increasing police tools to respond to online threats, both reactively to prosecute and proactively to frustrate and prevent criminal activities; the aim is to remove the conditions in which these threats flourish online. The second part is balancing the legislative powers given to intelligence and policing agencies with the protection of the civil liberties that are core to the democratic state.

This is not a mutually exclusive tussle. It is the same process democracies have always followed in the physical, offline world. And just because the parliament or the public can’t easily decide which argument is more important doesn’t mean there’s a problem. Democracy is about enduring the ongoing debate and tension between different points of view; the alternative is the Chinese government’s ‘Skynet’.

To this end, four new bills have put to parliament since 2018 that seek to increase the powers of the AFP, the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission and eSafety Commissioner to police and regulate online criminal activity. Only one, the Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Bill 2018 (TOLA), has been enacted so far. The other three, which are still before the parliament, are the Identify and Disrupt Bill 2020, the International Production Orders Bill 2020 and the Online Safety Bill 2021.

The spectacular success of Operation Ironside has prompted questions about whether Australia’s policing and intelligence agencies really need greater powers to police the internet—especially given that the one bill that has passed (TOLA, which makes it mandatory for industry to decrypt and hand over encrypted data in some cases) doesn’t appear to have been necessary because the app used in the operation was developed and cleverly dropped into criminals’ hands by the AFP and the FBI.

The AFP has confirmed that TOLA was used in Operation Ironside, but declined to clarify how, or if it was the basis for the court order that enabled the beta test of the AN0M app in Australia. In response to  a media enquiry from ASPI, the AFP said that Commonwealth legislation required it to withhold such details ‘until these matters are lawfully disclosed in open court’.

The success of this operation is evidence of the AFP’s capacity to engage in multilateral efforts to great effect. It has also demonstrated the AFP’s ability to study and adapt to a threat that has grown into a resilient, globalised network of criminals and ‘trusted insiders’ (corrupt lawyers, accountants, airport and freight logistics staff).

But it all hinged on access to an app that criminals thought was encrypted. And organised crime groups will surely not fall for that twice.

If there’s one thing we’ve learned from this bust, it’s that these groups are not a bunch of unsophisticated thugs (though they definitely employ some). They are an innovative network of often ordinary people with a globalised business model and strategy that makes their profits and operations resilient to busts even this big. The profit margins for methamphetamine and heroin trafficked from Southeast Asia into Australia in 2019 were 82% and 83%, respectively, despite border seizures of 31% and 23%. These margins are so high that international businesses would be insulated from border seizures even if they doubled or tripled.

So, could the AFP have played such a key role in this multinational operation if Australia hadn’t had the extra powers provided by TOLA? It won’t be possible to definitively answer that question until we know how the act was used.

Australia actually has fewer policing powers on the international stage than some of our allies and partners. We are yet to legislate Magnitsky-style sanctions like our Five Eyes partners have, despite compelling evidence of their effectiveness as a targeted policing tool against transnational organised crime. And suggestions that the AFP’s involvement was sought purely because it has a legal power to access encrypted data ignores the AFP’s proven record in bilateral and multilateral operations to counter organised crime and child exploitation.

There is much room for debate on the intended positive and possible unintended negative effects of the remaining three bills to be passed. Those discussions need to be informed by sufficient parliamentary and public scrutiny, and industry consultation, to ensure maintenance of civil liberties and guard against unintended consequences. The legislation should not be rushed through parliament despite significant concerns, like TOLA was in late 2018.

The key for Australia is to take on this challenge without debating it as a zero-sum game between democracy and policing. There must also be full transparency in the upcoming Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security’s review of how TOLA has been used so far (pending court cases permitting) and how it would be used in a future instance like Operation Ironside with an industry app.

If AFP Commissioner Reece Kershaw and Prime Minister Scott Morison are hoping to convince the parliament and the public that TOLA is justified and more bills are necessary, doing so by citing Operation Ironside as an example but not explaining how the bill was used in the operation won’t be fair or effective.

Surely explaining that the next time the AFP wants to snoop on criminals’ encrypted messages it won’t have AN0M in play, and therefore would rely on the bill, would be a more effective strategy to gain public trust and encourage the debate required to get the remaining bills passed in a format that still protects our privacy.

In order for these efforts to be successful, the Australian people need to be brought along on the journey through transparent processes that ensure they understand how both sides of this debate are honoured. That’s especially true in the post-Covid landscape where Australians have rediscovered how much we value our democratic freedoms.

‘Whac-A-Mole’: Why we’re losing the fight against organised crime

In 1975, Japan’s Kazuo Yamada invented a brilliantly simple yet addictive arcade game that would eventually be affectionately known as ‘Whac-A-Mole’. The premise for the game is simple. A player waits for plastic moles to intermittently raise their heads out of one of six holes. If a mole appears above its hole, the player tires to hit it on the head with a big rubber mallet to score points. The more moles you ‘whack’, the higher your score.

Lately I’ve been struck by the parallels that can be drawn between this game and the daily grind of Australia’s efforts to combat transnational serious and organised crime both at home and across Southeast Asia.

In the Mekong subregion’s ‘Whac-A-Mole’ game with organised crime groups, law enforcement agencies are the players. They use their operational police as the mallet to whack—or more correctly in this case, arrest—the criminals when they appear. To be fair, though, with the support of good intelligence and good policy, law enforcement is far more proactive than the traditional ‘Whac-A-Mole’ player.

Low-level criminals make up the majority of the moles in the game. Sometimes the criminal moles emerge from their holes by mistake, or they stay in the open for a little too long. Other times they are forced out of their holes by other moles or by the mechanical parts of the game.

The game itself is the criminal economy, operated behind the scenes by a small number of savvy, experienced moles. These moles don’t play the game, but simply make it work. In the original ‘Whac-A-Mole’, it often escaped the attention of the player that despite racking up high scores they never won; the moles just kept coming. Playing the game was so intoxicating that few seemed to notice the futility.

It seems to me that Australia’s and ASEAN member states’ current law enforcement strategies for fighting organised crime in the region are bogged down like the original ‘Whac-A-Mole’ players. Arrests and seizures of drugs and cash are increasing, but the game continues unabated.

In August 2017, the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission released the sixth edition of its biennial report on organised crime in Australia. It estimated that the annual cost of organised crime to Australia had more than doubled in the two years since the last report, from around $15 billion to around $36 billion. These figures gave the clearest indication to date that the Commonwealth’s law enforcement agencies were losing ground in the fight against organised crime.

In September 2018, the ACIC released its Illicit drug data report, an annual analysis of drug seizures and arrests. The report’s findings, coupled with data from the commission’s national wastewater drug monitoring program, provided an unprecedented level of detail on Australia’s illicit drug demand and supply patterns, and ample evidence that ‘Whack-A-Criminal’ isn’t working.

In July 2019, the UN Office of Drugs and Crime released its latest assessment of regional transnational organised crime. The report paints a bleak picture in which policy success against organised crime in Southeast Asia has been fleeting at best. Worse still, the region is awash with illicit drugs while organised crime kingpins are probably enjoying record profits from increased production levels.

Over the past decade, Australian law enforcement has increasingly used the term ‘disruption’ in its key policy and strategy documents on combating organized crime. This is in recognition of the limited impacts of the traditional arrest-and-seize response.

Disruption involves introducing measures designed to inhibit criminal freedom of movement, business models and profit-making opportunities. Unfortunately, for many in law enforcement, disruption has become a synonym for arrest and seizure.

If law enforcement is to break free of the ‘Whack-A-Criminal’ cycle, it will need to do much more to define, develop and employ disruption methodologies. A much more strategic approach to law enforcement focused on disruption effects is what’s needed.

Policymakers now need to develop a lexicon for disruption effects. Such a lexicon needs to assist in achieving a range of goals, including:

  • reducing the timing and tempo of opportunities to commit serious and organised crime
  • increasing the exposure of key figures and organisations to law enforcement action
  • increasing criminals’ perceptions of risk, including the likelihood and consequences of being caught
  • increasing the costs associated with undertaking serious and organised criminal activities
  • decreasing the profit margins for the illicit economy
  • decreasing the vulnerability of the licit economy to organised crime
  • reducing the national, bilateral and regional jurisdictional silos that can be exploited by criminals.

Australia is in a strong position to lead the development of innovative approaches to disruption. The ACIC, and its disruption unit, provide the much-needed strategic picture of criminality in Australia and the region.

The establishment of the Home Affairs portfolio has seen the development of a critical mass of policy professionals who have the capacity to develop a national disruption policy. The more recent establishment of the Office of the Commonwealth Transnational Serious and Organised Crime Coordinator provides a mechanism to lead and strengthen national disruption efforts.

While Australian law enforcement can’t, and shouldn’t, stop targeting criminals, it’s time to introduce new disruption techniques that break open the current ‘Whac-A-Mole’ game.

Policing illicit drugs: big hauls are easily replaced

On last week’s International Day against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking, most nations took the opportunity to reaffirm their commitment to an international society free of illegal drugs.

Police from London to Washington, Canberra to Bangkok, and Dubai to Djibouti have been putting this commitment into practice by seizing more drugs and ‘banging up’ more crooks than ever before. However, my fieldwork continues to reveal an intensifying groundswell of awareness in the global police community that, despite these successes, little progress is being made in reducing the supply.

While it’s great to see police leaders starting to acknowledge that we’re not going to arrest our way out of the illicit drug problem, they’re not opening up to the idea that the high rate of seizures is masking the failure of their law enforcement strategies.

Last month, Thai authorities seized 10 million made-in-Myanmar methamphetamine pills and nearly half a tonne of crystal methamphetamine hidden in packages of tea. But if the authorities are honest with themselves, they’ll realise that this seizure is unlikely to result in any change in the availability or price of illicit drugs in the region. The massive volume of production of illicit drugs in mega-laboratories in China, Myanmar and Mexico ensures that the drugs seized in these police operations are seamlessly replaced with little or no change in availability to users.

Last week, a Sydney-based criminal syndicate was arrested for attempting to import 300 kilograms of cocaine into Australia with an estimated street value of $105 million. In 2017, the syndicate had tried to do the same, but their drugs didn’t arrive. Police suspect that they were ripped off by other criminals. The most alarming thing about this is the fact that the syndicate lost 300 kilograms of cocaine but was able to continue to operate as a going concern.

With a global surplus of illicit drugs like cocaine, heroin and synthetics, prices at the wholesale level are low. Conceivably, it’s a buyers’ market. While law enforcement valued this latest seizure of cocaine at $350,000 a kilogram, the criminals involved could have purchased the drugs in South America for $4,000 to $9,000 a kilogram.

The ramifications are clear. Intercepting large shipments of illicit drugs may no longer force syndicates out of business. From Thailand to Australia, new drug seizure records are being set every couple of months. It seems unlikely that increasing the overall weight of drugs seized, or the number of individual seizures, will have an impact on supply. Losing large quantities of drugs to law enforcement is regarded as part of the cost of doing business by today’s transnational criminals.

Custodial sentences, or even capital punishment, don’t seem to be shaping future criminal behaviour in terms of discouraging participation. There are plenty of would-be wholesalers, facilitators, shore parties (small teams sent into Australia by syndicates in advance of an importation to rent facilities and set up distribution hubs), and street dealers willing to quickly fill the vacancies in networks created by arrests.

Since the fall of the infamous Chicago gangster Al Capone, police have been convinced that removing a major organised crime gang’s leadership will disrupt its criminal activity. The death of Medellin Cartel leader Pablo Escobar in 1993 and the arrest of Sinaloa Cartel leader Joaquín ‘El Chapo’ Guzmán in 2017 show that removing leaders may not stop the dispersal of drugs. Both of these experiences resulted in the fragmentation of large cartels but had limited long-term effects on the illicit drug supply. Even with such leaders removed, the low barriers for market entry in terms of capital and expertise, coupled with the high profits on offer, ensure a steady supply of market participants.

While I personally support the decriminalisation of the use of drugs by addicts, and the possession of these drugs for personal use, that too will not resolve the organised crime challenge. It will, however, help relieve the pressure on criminal justice systems from prosecutions of minor drug possession offences. The legalisation of marijuana in some US states has shown that decriminalisation will not necessarily disrupt the activities of organised crime. These groups just find new ways to profit from decriminalisation.

The establishment of the office of the Commonwealth Transnational, Serious and Organised Crime Coordinator creates an opportunity to update Australia’s organised crime response plan and national drug strategy. AFP Deputy Commissioner Karl Kent, who has been appointed to this position, needs to consider whether our law enforcement capabilities are fit for purpose. Key to this process should be an expanded focus on enhancing Australian efforts to reduce the availability of illicit drug precursors—especially in China and Myanmar. This innovation cannot come at the cost of reduced responsive law enforcement operations in Australia, lest this be interpreted by organised crime as the nation being open for business.

The Minister for Home Affairs should also consider establishing an independent organised crime and illicit drug advisory committee. The committee, chaired by the Home Affairs secretary, should have a broad membership with representatives from academia, marketing, medicine, education and industry. The key focus of this group should be the development of innovative ideas on disrupting the supply of illicit drugs, as an alternative to the law enforcement focus.