A nation that can’t feed itself can’t defend itself. Yet policymakers fail to grasp that food security doesn’t just happen. Food should be recognised for what it is: a fundamental input to Australia’s defence capability and national resilience.

The 2024 National Defence Strategy, released in April, is not what it claims to be: a strategic framework that ‘harnesses all arms of Australia’s national power to establish a holistic, integrated and focused approach’ to protect Australia and our interests.

Its authors, along with those of the 2023 Defence Strategic Review, reframed the narrative of what is needed to defend Australia. The defence of this nation now transcends the Australian Defence organisation and becomes everybody’s responsibility. By introducing the concept of ‘national power’, it tells us that we all have a role to play in defending our homeland from potential adversaries and increasing climate volatility.

Truth be told, defence and prosperity of our nation has always been a whole-of-nation and whole-of-government responsibility. It’s just that, now, the fracturing of the post–World War II rules-based order has completely distorted our strategic circumstances—so much so that it’s become necessary to drastically rethink our understanding of security and resilience.

The government is grappling with how to alert an otherwise oblivious population to the potential trouble we might find ourselves in over the coming years and to explain that it’s now necessary to prepare for that trouble like no generation has had to before. To that end, the National Defence Strategy claims to be a holistic and whole-of-nation approach to Australia’s national defence. That’s fine, aside from a fundamental problem: it’s not. The strategy has not transcended with the narrative, and the longer we kid ourselves into thinking that it has, the less time there is to prepare the ‘rest of us’ to play our role.

The public version of the strategy applies only to guns, ships, submarines, planes and the technology and people required to operate and support them. It begs the question: where is the plan for the rest-of-nation component of the strategy’s whole-of-nation approach?

Food security is a prime example. It’s critical for us and our neighbours because we’re living in an age when great-power competition and climate change have overpowered the markets’ ability to assure food security without action. The fact is we aren’t as food secure as we would like to believe; nor does our status as a net exporter of food equate to future food security.

Our trade exposure and our geography put the food system squarely at the mercy of increasing geostrategic challenges and a rapidly changing geo-economic landscape. This is because our ability to produce enough food and fibre to feed and clothe more than 70 million people worldwide relies on key inputs like fuel, fertiliser, labour, spare parts and technology—all of which we import. More than $31 billion worth of agricultural output can be attributed to the use of crop-protection products, most of which are imported. About 80 percent of Australia’s fertiliser requirements are imported, mostly from North Africa and China. Our liquid fuel and maritime shipping vulnerabilities are well understood and, in the horticulture sector alone, up to 34 percent of growers are considering leaving the industry due to workforce shortages, growing input costs and reduced margins.

Our connections to the world are also evolving, as we have prospered under a rules-based system that’s no longer the dominant influence of international trade. The decline of that system has also driven the Future Made in Australia Act, which the prime minister tells us is a function of needing ‘to be more assertive in capitalising on our comparative advantages and building sovereign capability in areas of national interest’.

But it also overlooks the fundamental role that Australia’s agriculture and food system plays in maintaining our social cohesion, our stability and our national security. There are no strategic interventions in that initiative to shore up our basic ability to produce food and fibre. There needs to be, because Australia’s food system is exposed to all the strategic challenges outlined in the National Defence Strategy.

And, despite our strategic vulnerabilities having been laid bare by a recent government inquiry into food security, there is no visible plan to safeguard it. The inquiry’s recommendations included the development of a national food plan to secure our food security and government intervention to target food waste and to support the manufacturing of critical inputs such as fertiliser and chemicals. It also recommends mapping our domestic food supply chain to identify and mitigate vulnerabilities and improve transport resilience. Those recommendations represent an unmissable opportunity to act.

Renowned psychologist and author Steve Biddulph has written that ‘our kids will live in far worse times than we have, and our grandchildren even more so.’ That’s a view echoed in the same future that the National Defence Strategy seeks to prepare us for. We should all be driven to improve that future, and food has a fundamental role to play.

Australia needs a food-security strategy that can dovetail into our nation’s broader national defence and preparedness planning. That strategy can play a key role in Australia’s statecraft, cementing our role as the partner of choice for our neighbours, helping to maintain a stable region and countering the influence of potential adversaries. If we are to accept the narrative that Australia’s national defence now transcends guns, tanks, planes, ships and submarines, then the strategy must go beyond our war-fighting capability and rise to meet this whole-of-nation challenge.

We were on the right track in 2015 to make the most of northern Australia. A white paper in that year laid out a development vision for 2035 and called for changes in governance arrangements to capitalise on the region’s vast potential.

But three major governance changes that accompanied the white paper have been weakened or reversed. What’s left lacks the mandate and the teeth to drive significant change.

The current government wants to reinvigorate the effort to develop northern Australia, but it isn’t likely to make much progress unless it fixes governance structures. Indeed, we need to go further than the policies of 2015 did: we should look at strengthening the Northern Territory’s political representation.

In connection with the 2015 white paper, the Office of Northern Australia (ONA) was relocated to the north, reporting directly to the deputy prime minister, to coordinate the implementation of the white paper. The aim was to facilitate business, reduce regulatory burdens and leverage private investment to improve governance.

The Northern Australia Strategic Partnership (NASP) was established on 1 June 2015 as an inter-jurisdictional body. The body comprised the prime minister, the premiers of Queensland and Western Australia and the chief minister of the Northern Territory. NASP was responsible for providing high-level leadership on the development of northern Australia, ensuring accountability and commitment to that vision.

And a Joint Standing Committee on Northern Australia was established in September 2016 to inquire into and report on matters relating to the development of the north referred to it by either house of the parliament or a minister.

Unfortunately, current arrangements differ significantly from that original concept.

The ONA now sits within the monolithic Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications and the Arts, reporting to a minister for northern Australia.

NASP was replaced in 2022, with the re-establishment of other mechanisms, including the Northern Australia Indigenous Reference Group and the Northern Australia Ministerial Forum (NAMF). The NAMF comprises jurisdictional ministers with overlapping portfolios rather than the originally intended first ministers.

The joint standing committee was dissolved by the then government on 11 April 2022, replaced by a Joint Select Committee on Northern Australia. That committee’s focus on specific, often time-bound issues further diminishes the power of the governance arrangements.

The watering down of the governance arrangements has occurred at the same time as northern Australia’s importance on the global stage has continued to increase. Geopolitically, the region is a front line in the Indo-Pacific—a theatre of growing strategic competition. The stability and development of northern Australia are crucial for national security and for maintaining influence in this contested region, both for Australia and for our partners.

Further, the fragility of global supply chains, exacerbated by recent geopolitical tensions and the Covid-19 pandemic, underscores the need for a resilient and self-sufficient northern Australia. The region’s rich resources, from rare-earth minerals essential for modern technologies to vast agricultural potential, are vital both for domestic supply and for export markets. Effective governance can harness those resources, driving economic growth and enhancing Australia’s strategic autonomy and sovereign capability.

The Albanese government reaffirmed its commitment to the northern Australia agenda, allocating $1.7 million in 2023–24 to update the 2015 white paper to identify opportunities to address new and emerging geographic and economic challenges in the region. The refresh promises to enhance economic development, support Indigenous-led initiatives and address environmental sustainability.

Unless the refresh addresses the fundamental challenges in the governance structures, implements the policy mandate and uses the levers needed to effect real change, the refresh will deliver more of the same. Currently, the most influential people with their hands on the levers are not in northern Australia.

Northern Australia’s representation in the federal parliament is disproportionately low compared with its landmass and economic importance. With only eight members in the House of Representatives and limited Senate representation, the region lacks the political clout to drive substantial policy changes. In contrast, Tasmania, with a much smaller landmass, has five House of Representatives members and 12 senators.

That imbalance limits the region’s ability to advocate effectively for its needs and priorities at the national level. To address these challenges, a more robust governance structure is needed.

Consideration should be given to reinstating the NASP or a similar model with the involvement of the prime minister, deputy prime minister and first ministers of northern jurisdictions to ensure high-level commitment and accountability. That level of accountability would reflect the strategic importance of the region from the perspective of our international partners and support the achievement of the aspirations of government, business, industry and the local communities by ensuring that decisions are in the hands of those with the powers to enact them.

If Australia aims to genuinely deliver on the northern Australia agenda, it is crucial to ensure leadership at the highest level. For the northern Australia agenda, consideration should be given to re-establishing a joint standing committee with a broader and long-term mandate. As part of the governance structure, this would help to ensure sustained focus and continuous oversight on the development and strategic priorities of northern Australia.

If we’re serious about effecting change in northern Australia, we need to explore mechanisms for increasing the political representation of the region to better reflect its significance and ensure that its voice is heard in national decision-making. One mechanism worth considering is the elevation of the Northern Territory to statehood.

Statehood would grant the Northern Territory equal representation in the Senate with 12 senators and secure a minimum of five House of Representatives seats. Increased representation would strengthen the territory’s (and by virtue of this, northern Australia’s) hand in national policy decisions. Through increased legislative power and autonomy, it also has the potential to enhance economic stability in the long term.

A less powerful option would be to implement the recommendation of the inquiry into the 2022 federal election by the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, which recommended that the representation of the territories in the Senate be increased from two to four senators each.

A noteworthy side benefit of increased federal representation would be more equitable and inclusive governance thanks to acknowledging the unique demographic, cultural and land interests of the region. This could pave the way for greater First Nations representation, ensuring their voices are authentically represented in the federal parliament. Strong First Nations political leaders across northern Australia highlight the transformative potential of such changes, providing opportunities for better integration and more inclusive governance.

Northern Australia stands at a crossroads, with the potential to significantly contribute to Australia’s economic prosperity and the broader strategic security of the region. However, realising that potential requires a governance model that is visionary, inclusive and equipped with the necessary authority to drive change.

By implementing stronger governance arrangements and elevating the region’s political representation, Australia can ensure that the north fulfils its promise as a vital and dynamic part of the nation’s future. It’s time to move beyond aspirational statements and take concrete steps to enact the leadership and governance needed to transform the vision into reality.

Australia should establish a separate budget allocation for special defence industry grants to build up companies in the north in support of the armed forces.

Northern Australia is strategically crucial, and so, therefore, is developing a defence-supporting industry there. But northern Australia’s limited economic depth presents huge problems for its companies in showing the business capacity needed to secure current Australian Defence Industry Grants.

To overcome these obstacles, the budget line for separate Northern Australian Industry Grants need not be large. Yet the targeted funds would create a scalable defence industrial base in northern Australia and foster economic growth there.

Discussions on northern Australia’s industry capability and capacity often fall into generalisations that the region is too hot, far, expensive or complex. However, these perceptions are usually based on outdated or no lived experience. They overlook the evidence of northern Australian industry achievements, such as the remarkable success of INPEX’s Ichthys liquefied natural gas project and the significant contributions that industry and communities in Darwin, Townsville and Cairns have made to support past Australian Defence Force operations and exercises. These achievements are a testament to the potential of northern businesses, which, with the right support, can significantly contribute to the Australian defence industry.

Northern Australia certainly experiences livability challenges. Similarly, the capacity and capability of the market within a limited economy need to be better understood: that market will only sometimes fix problems as well as markets do in the southern states. But that does not mean we should give up on defence-supporting industry in northern Australia.

Some people in Defence believe the ADF can raise, train and sustain itself in and from Australia’s southern states. They routinely argue that the ADF needs to be able to go to or through northern Australia when required.

The 2020 Defence Strategic Update, the 2023 Defence Strategic Review and the 2024 National Defence Strategy are remarkably consistent in emphasizing northern Australia’s importance. If shortening internal lines of communication is key to winning wars, we all need to consider what can be done in the north. Unfortunately, policy has been slow to catch up. The Australian Defence Industry Grants initiatives illustrate this point.

They’re crucial to fostering growth and innovation within the defence sector, aimed at enhancing defence capabilities while stimulating economic development. By providing financial assistance and incentives, they empower Australian defence companies to invest in research and development, upgrade infrastructure and expand their manufacturing capabilities. This support is instrumental in nurturing a robust domestic defence industry, contributing significantly to Australia’s sovereignty and security. The process reduces our reliance on foreign suppliers for critical defence equipment and technology. Furthermore, the grants foster collaboration between industry, academia and government, driving innovation and competitiveness in the global defence market while creating job opportunities and economic growth across the country.

As taxpayers would expect, the assessment criteria for these grants focus on reducing the risk of failure and, in doing so, ensuring a high return on investment. In practice, the assessment criteria lock out small and medium enterprises in Northern Australia.

It is hard for such companies to show necessary indicators of commercial success and capacity when they still lack equipment or personnel needed to participate in defence supply and value chains. It’s a chicken-and-egg problem that presents a systemic barrier for northern Australian companies seeking to enter defence supply chains.

It’s tough for a business in Townsville, Cairns or Darwin, operating in smaller economies, to compete with companies in Adelaide or Perth. If we want economic growth in northern Australia and the ADF to have resilient supply chains there, intervention is needed.

Success for many of northern Australia’s small and medium enterprises involves a modified version of consultancy firms’ ‘land-and-expand’ strategy. Their business models focus on securing capital to create capability or capabilities that will allow them to secure an anchor client with which they can crowd in other businesses and build further capacity and capability.

Our defence grants system is necessarily competitive, designed to give the Australian government a high return on investment. However, if we are to have a scalable industry base that grows to meet the needs of the ADF and allies and those of the broader public and private sector, some adaptation is needed. This does not mean a significant increase in the overall budget but rather a reallocation of funds to ensure a more balanced distribution across the country while still focused on strategic objectives.

Rather than balancing the existing grant system and introducing positive discrimination, the best approach would be to create a parallel grants system with its own budget line focused on building northern Australian capacity and capability. The focus for such a system would differ from that for a program focused on all of Australia and the defence ecosystem.

If Australia is to harness greater economic and geostrategic value from northern Australia, it must implement tailored policies. While the federal government cannot directly address the challenges of distance and climate, it can facilitate the establishment of a scalable industry base across northern Australia. Adapting the Australian Defence Industry Grants system to provide a focus and dedicated funding line is not just critical but a strategic move to stimulate new industry capacity in northern Australia, which will contribute significantly to the country’s overall economic growth and security.

It’s customary for policy wonks reading documents like the National Defence Strategy and the Integrated Investment Program to play a spot of word bingo. Read between the lines, tally up the number of times a concept is mentioned and, voila!, infer Australia’s policy priorities. It’s a classic Canberra-bubble game.

Players at home would have struck gold searching for ‘Northern approaches’, which appears eight times across both documents. ‘Northern bases’ got 15 hits. And ‘northern Australia’ had its name up in lights five times. Not bad.

And in this case the word mentions are a good guide to the substantial issue of where spending is going.

Northern Australia had already got a big boost in the 2023 Defence Strategic Review, including $3.8 billion to improve the Australian Defence Force’s ability to operate and project force from our northern bases. Of that, $2 billion will be spent in the Northern Territory.

The Integrated Investment Program, which is Defence’s capability acquisition plan, doubles down on that commitment, with northern bases getting their own chapter and being promoted as one of the top 11 spending priorities of the Department of Defence.

In the decade out to 2034, Australia will spend 4 percent of a whopping $765 billion defence budget—more than $30 billion—on hardening and upgrading northern bases. And $14-18 billion of that is coming down the pipeline soon. That’s big money.

Projecting force and assistance into the region north of Australia and sustaining wartime operations are the clear explanation for why we need robust northern bases.

Neither document spells out the exact kinds of operations in mind, but partly it’s about airpower.

Our airfield on the Cocos (Keeling) Islands will support P-8 Poseidons conducting maritime surveillance, giving us sharper situational awareness of the South China Sea and Indian Ocean. Works at the Royal Australian Air Force’s Learmonth base, at the most westerly point of Western Australia, will also extend the reach of air operations. The improvements will enable KC-30A MRTT tankers to refuel F-35A Lightning fighters, stretching their combat radius.

RAAF Darwin is undergoing runway upgrade works so it can withstand heavy use by military and civilian aircraft, which is vital, and RAAF Tindal, 280 kilometres southeast, will host far-flying MQ-4C Triton, uncrewed maritime patrollers that will begin arriving this year.

But here, the Integrated Investment Program gets a bit spicier, by pointing to a scenario that could test our northern bases. We know that a saturation strike by enemy aircraft, cruise missiles or drones is a realistic scenario, a modern equivalent of the Japanese attacks on the north in 1942.

If modern-day attackers flew towards the Top End, our F-35As and F/A-18F Super Hornets would fly out to engage them with air-to-air missiles, defending our infrastructure and population centres. Picture the manoeuvres of the British and US planes that shot down Iranian missiles heading for Israel in April—only this time over the Arafura Sea, again.

In the maritime domain, upgrades to HMAS Coonawarra, the Royal Australian Navy’s base at Darwin, will ensure it can host our surface combatants and submarines and those of our allies. Darwin is the nearest Australian port to their likely areas of operation and therefore the one to which they would return for replenishment.

Then there’s the army, which gets $7-10 billion for new littoral manoeuvre capabilities and $5-7 billion in related facilities in Queensland and Darwin, where three army units with 18 medium landing craft and eight heavy landing craft will be based. That equipment is central to our ability to transform the army into an amphibious force that can operate in the archipelagos and islands to our north and east.

East Arm, a locality on Darwin Harbour, is ideal for a base for one of those units, since it already has extensive infrastructure, including a road from Robertson Barracks with high and wide clearances. East Arm also has a maritime industrial precinct with a barge ramp and a ship lift, and the Adelaide-Darwin railway terminates there.

The National Defence Strategy clearly identifies that our northern bases have a key role to play in helping the ADF to recover from an attack and strike back at the enemy. And northerners, who carry the burden of defending southern population centres, play that role willingly.

The Yemeni Houthi rebels’ continued attacks on shipping in the Red Sea serve as a reminder that global supply chains remain highly vulnerable to disruption. Moreover, it highlights how food insecurity can simultaneously be an effect and cause of conflict.  

To address this, the international community must move quickly to combine its hard and soft power, mitigating the push and pull factors leading people to terrorism, violence, and piracy—factors that include food insecurity itself. 

The UN Food and Agriculture Organization defines food security as ‘when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life’. The latest UN statistics suggest that 691 million to 783 million people are food-insecure, many of them in fragile and conflict-affected states. 

This latest disruption in Red Sea maritime traffic has historical precedent. The name of the maritime area in question is Bab el-Mendab, which translates to ‘the gate of lamentations’ or ‘the gate of grief’. In the current episode of the maritime drama, the grief for millions of people who depend on the life-giving goods transiting through this narrow strait may yet wax greater. 

The Houthis’ disruption of Red Sea maritime traffic has already significantly affected the global movement and price of goods for some nations. Container traffic has slowed, and 95% of the container shipping that once sailed through the Red Sea is now often diverted around Africa, adding nearly 5000km to the voyage in some cases. The additional distance is already significantly increasing the cost of such essentials as food, medicine and fuel. For the same reason, the Red Sea attacks are increasing the price of inputs for food and agriculture. 

For the globe’s most vulnerable populations, cost increases of this kind threaten to exacerbate pressures on food security and precipitate the kinds of downstream consequences that erode prosperity and security, fueling conflict. 

In response to Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea, ongoing since the 19 November hijacking of an Israeli-linked ship, Galaxy Leader, the US initiated the multinational Operation Prosperity Guardian to protect maritime safety in the waters around Yemen. The operation received implicit endorsement from a UN Security Council resolution passed on 10 January. The next day, the US and Britain launched strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen. 

Until 11 January, it seemed Operation Prosperity Guardian would only respond to Houthi attacks if the group successfully damaged civilian or military vessels. Some may read the two-month delay in responding to Houthi attacks as a vulnerability in the international system ripe for exploitation. 

It’s unlikely that a state, perhaps except Iran, whose government has form on this matter in the Strait of Hormuz, would engage in such tactics around the world’s eight most important maritime chokepoints. They are Bab el-Mandeb at the Horn of Africa; the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf; the Suez Canal, Egypt; the Panama Canal, Panama; the Strait of Gibraltar, between Spain and Morocco; the Strait of Malacca between Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia; the Turkish Straits, Turkey; and the Cape of Good Hope, South Africa. 

Whether by design or accident, the Houthis renown has received a boost from the maritime attacks. Other non-state actors may get inspiration from the Houthis’ use of these attacks to achieve political, ideological and military objectives. Of particular concern are the militant groups that operate around Bab el-Mendeb. 

Beyond the immediate challenge of maritime terrorism and insurgency, events in the Red Sea are a reminder of the role of food insecurity in conflict. As former WFP executive director David Beasley outlined, ‘there is plenty of information on how conflict impacts food security, but there is very little evidence on how food insecurity can drive conflict or how food security might contribute to the building of more peaceful societies’. 

Nevertheless, food insecurity can sometimes be linked to factors that promote conflict: the recruitment of combatants; mortality and morbidity rates that undermine stability in already fragile societies; disputes over land and water in resource-constrained settings; and the mass displacement of food-insecure people. The 1992 famine in Somalia illustrated how food insecurity could accentuate political, economic or social dysfunction. 

The tragic irony of the Houthis attacks is that hunger is rife across Yemen itself, where 17 million people are food-insecure. Food insecurity has undoubtedly continued to undermine peace and stability in Yemen. It has been exacerbated by the conflict there and used to radicalise Yemenis to the Houthis’ cause. Strikes on Houthi positions and facilities through Operation Prosperity Guardian or otherwise under the Security Council resolution could deepen Yemen’s humanitarian disaster if such action harms civilians or civilian infrastructure. 

Governments and multilateral bodies, particularly through the UN, must work to secure maritime trade to avoid food insecurity contributing to further conflict in the Middle East and beyond.