Over the last three decades, the Australian Defence Force (ADF), enjoying an era of peace and strategic stability, shifted from prioritising sovereign fuel resilience to investing heavily in outsourcing. With strategic warning times shrinking and supply chain vulnerabilities surfacing, the ADF must elevate fuel security to a Fundamental Input to Capability status.

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 was not merely a symbolic end to the Cold War; it heralded a new era of unprecedented globalisation. It accelerated the development of just-in-time supply chains, centralised production, offshoring and privatisation.

Nations and businesses alike redefined their strategies to embrace economic efficiency and streamlined operations. However, this transition came with significant trade-offs for Australia: sovereign capability and national resilience.

The ADF, like many other institutions, has adopted a market-driven model, focusing on leveraging external providers and technological innovations. While this shift was intended to enhance operational flexibility and cost-effectiveness, it has also introduced critical vulnerabilities, particularly in supply chain management. This strategic shift has inadvertently compromised our sovereign capability and national resilience, underscoring the need for a more robust approach.

The lessons learned from the International Force East Timor (INTERFET) in 1999 and the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the need for change.

The ADF’s participation in INTERFET illustrated the critical importance of effective logistical coordination and the need for adaptive strategies in complex operational environments. The mission highlighted the necessity of robust supply chain management and the ability to integrate and synchronise efforts with international partners to ensure operational success.

The COVID-19 pandemic exposed Australia’s logistics resilience vulnerabilities, particularly in the supply chain for essential products like AdBlue, a crucial component for diesel engine emissions control. In this case, both Russia and China decided to restrict the compound necessary to make the product. Without it, Australia’s trucking industry would grind to a halt. This experience highlighted the urgent need for Australia to enhance its domestic liquid fuel production capabilities and build more robust and resilient supply chains to mitigate future disruptions.

Despite these valuable lessons, the ADF has continued to rely on market forces to resolve supply chain issues. Recent geopolitical tensions and a reduction in Australia’s strategic warning time have created a burning platform for immediate change.

For the ADF, liquid fuel resilience presents a challenging supply chain vulnerability. Liquid fuels are not just a logistical component but a strategic asset.

Recognising this, the ADF must elevate fuel security to a Fundamental Input to Capability status. This involves developing a comprehensive fuel strategy integrating robust storage and distribution networks. The focus should be on creating redundancy in supply lines and ensuring backup systems are in place to mitigate local, regional and global disruptions.

A secure and consistent supply of manufactured fuel is vital for sustaining military operations, powering equipment and enabling rapid response in high-stress scenarios. The ADF can reduce dependency on external sources by establishing robust domestic manufacturing capabilities, mitigating supply chain risks and strengthening national security resilience.

Effective logistics management relies on accurate forecasting and proactive planning. The ADF should invest in advanced forecasting tools and modelling techniques to better anticipate and prepare for potential disruptions. This includes implementing scenario-based planning exercises to simulate various crises and evaluate response strategies. These should consider the possibility of continuous, concurrent and cascading risks and shocks. By incorporating these tools, the ADF can improve its ability to respond swiftly and effectively to emerging threats.

The complexities of modern logistics require a collaborative approach. Fuel security and resilience are not solely concerns of the ADF but are pivotal to national stability and economic security. Disruptions in fuel supply can affect critical infrastructure, public services and the broader economy, highlighting the interdependence between military readiness and civilian sectors.

To address this pressing issue comprehensively, the ADF must collaborate with government agencies and stakeholders across various sectors to develop a unified strategy ensuring robust fuel security and resilience for the nation. The ADF must enhance its engagement with state and territory governments and private sector stakeholders. Building strong partnerships across these sectors will facilitate information sharing, resource pooling and coordinated response efforts. This collaborative framework will be instrumental in addressing logistical challenges and ensuring a unified approach to national security.

The current geopolitical landscape, marked by increased risks and reduced warning times, underscores the urgency of these recommendations. The burning platform we face necessitates a strategic overhaul in our logistics and supply chain management approach with a clear focus on liquid fuels. The ADF can build a more resilient and effective logistical framework by prioritising fuel security, enhancing forecasting and planning capabilities and strengthening collaborative efforts. This will support sustained military operations and fortify Australia’s strategic posture in an increasingly uncertain global environment.

It is time to rethink our approach and invest in the resilience and preparedness needed to navigate the complexities of the modern world.

The Australian government’s Aviation White Paper—Towards 2050 outlines a vision for the future of civil aviation. While the White Paper represents a significant step forward, particularly in terms of decarbonising the aviation sector and enhancing consumer protections, it falls short in addressing the critical needs of regional Australia, particularly northern Australia.

With its vast distances and dispersed population, northern Australia relies on aviation in a way that urban Australia does not. For many remote and rural communities, aviation is the only means of accessing essential services such as healthcare, education and employment. It is a crucial enabler of economic activity, linking remote regions to the broader national economy.

While the White Paper acknowledges the significance of regional aviation and its role in supporting closing the gap for Australia’s First Nations populations, it does not propose sufficient targeted measures to support and sustain these vital services. The lack of immediate, actionable measures leaves regional Australia in a prolonged state of uncertainty, waiting for an outcome that should have been prioritised from the outset.

The viability of regional airline services has been a persistent challenge in northern Australia. High operational and compliance costs, low passenger volumes and the geographic remoteness of many communities create a complex and often unsustainable operating environment for regional carriers. These elements have caused the collapse of more than 20 regional airlines in Australia since deregulation of the industry in the 1990s. Moreover, the adverse influence of dominant market operators and increasingly stringent regulatory requirements not designed for remote operations further exacerbate the challenges. They all must first be understood and addressed before any sustainable policy settings can be established.

The recent voluntary administration of Rex Airlines, a major provider of regional air services in northern Australia, underscores these issues. Rex’s struggles, albeit exacerbated by an ambitious but ill-fated expansion into inter-city routes, have put the essential services it provides at risk. With few other operators remaining that can fill the gap left should Rex ultimately fail, the current situation is parlous. The White Paper’s response to Rex’s situation is limited and requires a braver dive into the inner workings of this broken industry than the document sets out.

Recommendations such as extending support measures like the Remote Airstrip Upgrade Program (RAU) and reviewing regional airfares through the Productivity Commission are to be welcomed. However, these actions are more reactive than proactive, suggesting the government is limited in its thinking.

The strategic importance of northern Australia has been clearly articulated in the Defence Strategic Review. A strong and resilient regional aviation industry is critical to supporting a Whole-of-Government approach to investment in northern Australia. Achieving this will require financial support through tailored subsidies and incentives for airlines servicing remote and regional areas. This will ensure these services remain viable in the long term. Furthermore, continued investment in regional airports and airstrips is also necessary to improve safety, accessibility and resilience against climate change. Finally, infrastructure upgrades that accommodate new aviation technologies, such as electric aircraft and hydrogen refuelling stations, should be prioritised to align with the transition to net zero emissions.

Northern Australia is well-positioned to become a significant player in the Sustainable Aviation Fuel (SAF) industry. The region’s vast agricultural resources provide a strong foundation for producing the biomass feedstocks required for SAF, such as tallow, canola oil and other agricultural residues. These resources are crucial for developing a sustainable and locally-sourced supply chain for SAF production. Doing this will reduce reliance on imported fuels and contribute to energy security.

Importantly, northern Australia’s strategic location offers advantages for both domestic and international distribution of SAF, particularly to markets in the Asia-Pacific region, where demand for low-carbon aviation fuels is expected to grow significantly. The region’s proximity to key export markets positions it as an ideal hub for SAF production, especially as global airlines and governments increasingly commit to reducing aviation emissions.

Realising this potential requires significant investments in infrastructure, research and development, and the right policy environment. The region will need dedicated SAF production facilities, blending infrastructure and logistics networks tailored to its unique conditions. Additionally, targeted government support, including financial incentives and regulatory frameworks, will be essential to attract investment and ensure the success of SAF initiatives, such as that of Jet Zero’s Project Ulysses in Townsville.

Policy innovation is also required to explore new models of regional air service delivery. Public-private partnerships or community-owned airlines will ensure that essential air links are maintained. To make this sustainable, certain operational standards will need to be relaxed that may be disproportionately burdensome for small regional carriers and remote and rural airports.

While the Aviation White Paper is a positive step, it currently lacks the specific regional focus necessary to fully leverage northern Australia’s potential. Expanding the policy framework to include tailored support for the region is crucial for maximising its contribution to the nation.

Australia must look to agriculture as a critical part of global engagement and better leverage its agricultural sector to deepen the country’s international relationships. We have a strong agricultural sector and, thanks to the Cairns Group, a history of leadership in international agricultural trade policy. Integrated Australian agricultural diplomacy can engage a diverse range of partners at the bilateral, minilateral and multilateral levels while supporting our domestic industries.

Australia’s agricultural sector is a national asset. Fifty-five percent of Australia’s land use is for primary production, we export approximately 72 percent of our agricultural product, and in 2022–23 Australian agricultural exports hit a record value of $80 billion. As Australia pursues a whole-of-nation approach to international policy and ways to tangibly strengthen our connections with the international community, our agriculture sector is low-hanging diplomatic fruit.

Within our immediate region, agriculture provides a handful of clearcut opportunities. Growing conditions across northern Australia are complementary to those of international partners (in that they are similar to the conditions of many of our regional neighbours). As the populations of Southeast Asian nations continue to grow, and their wealth increases, Australia’s importance as a close and secure source of food will also grow. Existing people-to-people links (including through seasonal labour and diaspora groups) also bridge cultural divides and open new markets for labour and products.

Australia already has strong agricultural-diplomacy foundations. Murray Watt, Australia’s agriculture minister at the time, in a 2023 address to the Australian Institute of International Affairs, highlighted areas that already bound together Australia’s agriculture sector and foreign policy. They include our agriculture-heavy trade relationships, our global reputation for producing high-quality food and fibre, the Pacific Australia Labour Mobility scheme, the Australian-Chinese agricultural trade relationship, and international cooperation through the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research. While only briefly mentioned by Watt, the Cairns Group is a unique element of Australia’s foreign policy environment that we should seek to strengthen and replicate.

The Cairns Group is a coalition of 20 agricultural exporting countries, established in Cairns in 1986 on the eve of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations—talks that ultimately led to the founding of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The group is made up of a diverse range of medium-sized agricultural exporters: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Ukraine, Uruguay and Vietnam. It seeks to ‘push for liberalisation of global trade in agricultural goods’, principally through the WTO. It contrasts with the relatively high, trade-distorting subsidies provided to farmers in countries such as Norway, Switzerland, South Korea, Japan and the United States, as well as the European Union.

Since the establishment of the WTO, the Cairns Group has been the principal driver of global agricultural trade reform. It continues to bring agriculture to the fore in trade negotiations. ‘Agriculture remains the most important unfinished business of the WTO’, the statement of the 43rd Cairns Group Ministerial Meeting in February 2024 reads, ‘and should be at the heart of ongoing reform efforts and advanced at [the WTO’s 13th Ministerial Conference]. It is recognised globally that agricultural trade reform is fundamental to the health of the multilateral trading system and future rule-making.’

The Cairns Group cumulatively represents a concerted effort by an unlikely collection of politically, economically and geographically diverse nations to cooperate on major global reforms. Australia’s founding role and leadership of the group—significantly promoting policies in opposition to many of our traditional international partners—is exceptional. At times, Australian foreign policy is perceived, both domestically and internationally, as overly influenced by the US, but our agricultural diplomacy is largely free from that stigma. It is proof of Australia’s independence, capacity to engage with diverse partners and commitment to the international rules-based order. It exemplifies middle-power diplomacy and coalition building.

The breadth of Cairns Group membership also bucks the global trend. Most multilateral groupings are region-specific (ASEAN, APEC, PIF), ideologically aligned (AUKUS, Five Eyes, BRICS), both (NATO, EU), or accessible to all or nearly all nations (UN, WHO, IMF). But the Cairns Group brings together a collection of nations that are geographically, politically and economically disparate. Together, the group accounts for 30 percent of global agricultural exports. It points to the unique power of agriculture to diversify foreign policy networks, the importance of the agricultural sector, and the overarching importance of national food security.

The Australia–China relationship and their ‘trade war’ often dominate conversations about Australian agriculture and foreign policy, one-dimensionally focusing on specific commodities’ access to the Chinese market. As important as that subject is, Australia’s agriculture sector is dynamic rather than one that is reliant on a single market, and the ‘trade war’ should be a lesson to both the industry and government. It is in the mutual interest of government and producers for industries to be diversified away from reliance on a foreign market.

As a heavily trade-exposed sector, Australian agriculture cannot lose sight of the domestic and international elements that both safeguard and threaten production, supply chains and market access. Importantly, if the international system continues to fracture, producers will need a diversity of trade partners and a relationship with government to ensure access to those partners.

New Zealand recognised this in its National Security Strategy 2023, expressly stating the need for diversification and flexibility to protect its national economic security. Australian policy should similarly recognise the need for market diversification and encourage greater collaboration between policymakers and industry to achieve it. And we can move beyond the economic security lens to execute—as in our National Defence Strategy 2024—a whole-of-nation approach to national security.

Australian agriculture presents a natural partner for the nation’s foreign and strategic policy. While many initiatives, including the work of the Cairns Group, have sown the seeds of that complementarity, many more opportunities are ripe for harvest.

While Australia and its critical-minerals partners agree that supply-chain diversity, security and sustainability are essential, inconsistent national policies continue to inhibit the development of the end-to-end supply chains they seek. In the dynamic landscape of at-risk supply chains, harmonising national policies has emerged as a key factor for achieving shared goals.

If industrialised nations are to assure their critical-minerals supply chains and if Australia is to reap the economic benefits, they must move quickly to ensure greater policy harmonisation between partners.

That alignment is not merely a matter of regulatory conformity but a strategic imperative to foster collaborative frameworks and bolster friendshored minerals development and supply security. It is also not just about changing Australian policies but also finding ways in which supply-chain partners can achieve greater synchronisation and mutual benefits.

For Australia and its partners, critical-minerals security is driving a plethora of policy initiatives, many with significant financial allocations behind them. To date, however, neither national policies nor funding facilities always harmonise to deliver secure critical-minerals supply chains. Sometimes, Australia’s and its partners’ policies diverge, presenting obstacles to seamless integration and collaborative innovation. That discord is evident in several key areas.

While Australia and its partners have endorsed initiatives to develop a global network of critical-minerals supply chains, Australia’s policy framework remains focused on stimulating domestic production. That narrow scope limits the potential synergies created by integrated approaches that engage dynamic global supply and value chains.

The recent agreement between African nations and South Korea to collaborate on critical-minerals development and related initiatives such as infrastructure, backed by US$10 billion of aid to 2030 and US$14 billion of financing to South Korean companies, offers Australian and Canadian companies leverage. Together, Australian and Canadian companies generate nearly 60 percent of minerals exploration in Africa. The Canadian and Australian governments should work to assist their companies to access the opportunities generated. However, while Canada maintains 17 trade offices in Africa, Australia is limited by the downgrade of its trade offices to just one.

Disparities in the application of financial support for critical-minerals development highlight another area of difference. Some of Australia’s partners have implemented robust incentives to stimulate domestic and international investments in critical minerals. As Gracelin Baskaran of CSIS observes, however, the United States’ principal funding vehicle for development of minerals production outside the US, the International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), is restricted by legislation to making investments only in low-income countries. The DFC can’t, for example, invest in lithium projects in higher-income countries, including Australia, that combined hold 63 percent of the world’s lithium reserves. The DFC is severely restricted or prohibited from investing in nations, including Australia, that together account for 50 percent of the world’s graphite and 58 percent of nickel reserves.

While the US Export-Import Bank also finances critical-minerals projects to supply US manufacturers, there remains a project financing gap that is often filled by China, with resultant supply chains potentially triggering the Foreign Entities of Concern provisions of the US Inflation Reduction Act and severely restricting market access in the US.

The DFC has, however, extended concessional loan funding for the Australian-operated Balama graphite mine in Mozambique, while the  in the US, operated by the same Australian company, has received loan funding from the US Department of Energy.

Meanwhile, Australia’s incentives do not always fully align with partners’ measures and, at times, work at cross-purposes. Export Finance Australia’s loan funding for critical-minerals production is restricted to domestic projects only; for example, a graphite refinery in Western Australia is being funded, but Australian-operated graphite mines in Tanzania, which will supply the refinery, are currently ineligible for support.

It remains to be seen how the road map to be developed under the recently signed critical-minerals agreement between the European Union and Australia and how the EU’s new Critical Raw Materials Act will result in harmonised policies and activities domestically and in third countries.

Partner policy initiatives may have strict incentive eligibility criteria. For example, the US Inflation Reduction Act has strict equity criteria for companies and projects seeking to qualify for assistance and tariff concessions. Of course, Australian incentives and measures should focus on providing developers with flexibility to implement the best arrangements for their projects. However, Australian policymakers ought to look for opportunities for companies to access the commercial and economic benefits of partner incentives, especially when they could optimise economic and security outcomes. Coordinated Japanese, Australian and US funding support for different components of the Lynas Rare Earths supply chain is a prime example of how that can be achieved.

Australia and its partners have mutually committed to developing both secure and sustainable critical-minerals supply chains. However, there remains a notable absence of universally agreed-upon standards, particularly concerning sustainability practices. Harmonised policy efforts are needed to establish and maintain norms that uphold environmental stewardship, social responsibility and good governance across all stages of supply chains.

Australia can adopt several strategic approaches to enhance alignment with international supply-chain objectives.

First, as a prominent player in global mining, Australia has an opportunity to spearhead the adoption of comprehensive sustainability standards for supply chains. Supporting and endorsing standards, such as those being developed through the industry-led Consolidated Mining Standard Initiative, can position Australia as a leader in responsible resource production at home and abroad.

Second, Australia should overhaul its policies in order to support unequivocally a diverse global network of end-to-end friendshored supply chains, originating in Australia and elsewhere.

Third, Australia should encourage its supply-chain partners to implement coherent finance mechanisms, adjust its own to harmonise with them, and incentivise corporate equity and finance structures that comply.

Geopolitical uncertainty and an increasing greying of the line between security and trade ensure that secure and resilient supply chains, especially for commodities such as critical minerals, will only increase in importance. Harmonising Australian critical-minerals policies and those of its supply-chain partners is not merely a matter of alignment but a strategic imperative.

The government risks exacerbating Defence workforce challenges, particularly retention, if it does not adequately engage with the needs of the families of soldiers who will soon be relocating to northern Australia. But if the families are consulted and happily settled, they can bring expertise in key industries such as health and education that the region urgently needs.

As part of the federal government’s new strategic focus on northern Australia announced in September 2023, an additional 500 military personnel will relocate to Townsville from the start of 2025. However, with Defence Families of Australia, the official advisory body representing the interests of Australian Defence Force families, operating in a limited caretaker capacity since August 2023, there are concerns that important perspectives from military families may be overlooked during this relocation process.

Defence families must be considered as key stakeholders in the smooth running of the ADF, as they play an important role in the retention of armed forces personnel. The stereotype of military spouses as ‘silent, self-sacrificing’ partners no longer holds true—‑they increasingly expect their needs to be addressed to help ease the disruptions caused by frequent relocations. Military organisations don’t yet fully accommodate these needs, but the shift north provides an opportunity to change.

Housing is a critical factor in an ADF family’s satisfaction with service life. The property’s location dictates school zoning, affecting educational choices for children. It may also influence a range of lifestyle or financial choices, such as whether the family can own a pet or whether the spouse can run a business from home.

As with many regional centres, housing availability in Townsville is at a premium, with the vacancy rate at 1 percent in the first quarter of 2024 while the number of residential building approvals has declined. The complexity of the challenge has been recognised, and the Department of Defence is in consultation with Defence Housing Australia and the Queensland Government to identify strategies, but detailed solutions are yet to be announced.

In addition to suitable housing, employment opportunities and strong social connections must also be considered in ensuring the wellbeing of Defence families, research suggests.

Defence partners struggle to sustain employment because of the frequent relocations and additional caring responsibilities. Potential employers may be wary of them, too.

The 2019 ADF Families survey found that partner employment was a key concern for families, and almost two-thirds of partners reported that it was difficult or very difficult to reestablish employment following relocation. Although it is encouraging that Townsville’s unemployment rate, at 2.7 percent in October 2023, is one of the lowest in Queensland, there have been reports of employers not viewing Defence partners’ skills and experience as an asset, instead perceiving their mobility as a risk to business continuity.

Defence families will need support in establishing strong social connections or risk being viewed as a drain on resources. The imminent arrival of the soldiers and their families has marked Townsville as the new Army capital, but they need to be welcomed by a community that understands the requirements of service. Any tension with local stakeholders about the impact on housing, healthcare and education and other services need to be resolved.

To ensure that Defence families are happily settled and welcomed in Townsville, it is important to highlight the key contributions they will make to the community. For example, many Defence partners work in health, education or other industries that regional areas need to boost. The north will benefit from the influx of new skilled professionals, and the ADF will benefit from a stable workforce and an improved social licence in the region.

The government’s big shift north requires more than additional Defence personnel to succeed. The families arriving with the soldiers are key stakeholders in this complex relocation, and they must be engaged in the decision-making process.