Tag Archive for: North of 26° south

Darwin is key for undersea data links. We must promote their resilience there

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Australia needs further investment into Darwin’s digital infrastructure to leverage the city’s proximity to Asia and support the resilience of international data flow through subsea cables.

Actions should include establishing an office to coordinate industry and government agencies, and it should build a substantial capability in Darwin to repair cables.

The importance of acting is underscored by Google’s November statement that it would lay a data cable from Darwin to Singapore via Christmas Island and by ongoing joint efforts by Australia, the United States and Japan to increase connectivity in the Pacific.

As subsea links, such as the existing Darwin-Jakarta-Singapore Cable, become Australia’s digital lifelines, their security and resilience become paramount. Disruption to them would have profound consequences for both Australia’s economy and national security.

Darwin’s role in the Indo-Pacific digital ecosystem is growing ever faster, making the city increasingly central to global data flows. Vulnerabilities come with dependence on such infrastructure. Incapacitation of these cables—whether through physical damage or cyber threats—would severely affect Australia’s economy, security, and geopolitical standing.

The government’s current approach to managing subsea cable security lacks the coordination needed to address the growing challenges in this space. With multiple agencies involved, from the Department of Infrastructure to the Australian Communications and Media Authority, Australia needs a more unified and proactive approach to safeguarding these assets.

Given the national security stakes, Australia must establish a dedicated domestic subsea cable coordination unit to oversee construction, maintenance and security. This unit should serve as a clearinghouse, working closely with key government stakeholders, telecommunications regulators and private sector players—including major tech firms, such as Google and Meta. By integrating their expertise, the unit could ensure that subsea cables were shielded from physical and cyber threats, coordinating national security efforts and fostering a unified response to emerging risks.

As Darwin continues to evolve as a data hub, Australia’s capacity to swiftly repair damage to its subsea cables is becoming increasingly critical. To maintain resilience, the government must establish a local repair hub. This includes building up domestic repair capabilities, which could be achieved through partnerships with international cable operators or by developing local expertise within the Northern Territory. A dedicated repair ship, staffed with a rapid-response team based in Darwin, would be invaluable, ensuring that cable damage was addressed quickly to minimise disruption. This approach would further strengthen Australia’s position as a reliable player in the global digital infrastructure arena.

To support this growing digital infrastructure, Darwin’s physical and digital capabilities must also be scaled up. This requires robust terrestrial backhaul connections and investment by large cloud-service providers in world-class AI data centres.  We also need a regulatory framework that supports the increasing volume of data while addressing potential physical and cyber threats.

The Northern Territory offers geological stability and an advantageous position for connections to Singapore, itself an important node in the global submarine cable network. These advantages make it an ideal place for increasing Australia’s overall telecommunications and subsea cable resilience by diversifying submarine cable landings from clogged areas like Sydney and existing areas like Perth.

As the volume of data flowing through the region rises, so too must the capacity to handle it securely and efficiently. Strong, resilient infrastructure will not only bolster Australia’s own security but position the country as a reliable alternative to higher-risk regions. It will also attract investment and foster deeper international partnerships, particularly with allies such as the United States and Japan, who are already deeply engaged in securing subsea cable infrastructure.

Australia must also step up its role in the global dialogue surrounding subsea cable security. Given the interconnectedness of these cables and their importance to international trade and security, it cannot afford to act in isolation. Active participation in global initiatives is essential. For example, in September, Australia endorsed the New York Statement on Undersea Cables, which calls for international cooperation to safeguard the links.

By engaging in these discussions, Australia can share insights on emerging threats, establish best practices for protection and help shape global responses to subsea cable disruptions. This leadership would further cement Australia’s position as a key partner in global digital infrastructure security.

The time for action is now. Australia’s government must move decisively to secure the subsea cable infrastructure of the Northern Territory, ensuring long-term resilience and reliability.

With its strategic location in the Indo-Pacific, Darwin is poised to be a cornerstone of global digital connectivity, not only serving as a gateway for Australia but also reinforcing regional security and economic stability. By securing subsea cable infrastructure, Australia will pave the way for a secure, resilient and interconnected future, reinforcing both its national interests and its partnerships with key allies.

As Australia’s naval focus moves north, so must missile reloading facilities

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The Royal Australian Navy needs missile reloading facilities in the north of the country, most obviously at Darwin and Cairns. The southern ports where Australian warships now take on munitions are too far from where the fleet is most likely to fight, though their reloading capabilities must also be retained.

The rising threat from China is shifting the geopolitical focus northwards, to chokepoints between archipelagic islands and to flashpoints in the Western Pacific. Australia must ensure its naval support infrastructure responds.

The lack of northern reloading facilities diminishes the navy’s combat capability by throttling its operational tempo.

Warships in action can quickly empty their magazines of air-defence or strike missiles. They might take three days to sail from an operations area north of Australia to Darwin, if they could replenish there; to reach HMAS Stirling, near Perth, they might need seven days. Then just as much time is spent in returning to the area of operations.

Similar calculations apply for operating in the Southwest Pacific. For that theatre, Cairns would be a far closer location for reloading than Eden, the New South Wales port where the process is currently done for ships using Fleet Base East in Sydney.

Intense, high-tempo operations in the north are just not possible when tied to the more southerly facilities.

Darwin and Cairns are prime candidates for northern missile reloading facilities because each has a deep port and is already equipped with substantial defence infrastructure. To the extent that they must already be protected against air and missile attack, there would be no further burden in protecting new facilities.

Both cities also play key roles in Australia’s strategic partnerships, particularly with the United States, which regularly conducts joint operations and training in the region. So building missile reloading facilities at these locations would enhance interoperability with allied forces, particularly under the AUKUS framework.

Indeed, it is quite likely that the US Navy would want to use northern Australian missile reloading facilities in the event of war, if Australia had any.

Australia should also keep its southern installations, however, because the ships are mainly based in the south. In war, the southern facilities would offer redundancy in case of damage or destruction of the better-placed northern ones.

The specific infrastructure needed for reloading at Darwin and Cairns would mainly be the specialised storage buildings that are needed for missiles. For security, those buildings would be at nearby defence base, not alongside wharves.

Sending munitions north by truck or train when they’re needed is not a suitable alternative. The process could impose delays, and roads and rail lines can be vulnerable.

Developing missile loading installations in the north would significantly improve Australia’s deterrence posture and enhance operational flexibility.

The Australian government must take immediate action to address this pressing need. It should look at whether a quick enhancement of current facilities can provide a stop-gap solution.

Then Defence must secure funding to fast-track construction of permanent facilities in the north. Because of the value to the US Navy of missile reloading in northern Australia, the government must involve it in the effort. For example, the US Navy may have special requirements.

This collaboration will not only enhance our operational capabilities but also strengthen our alliance.

Avoiding downstream consequences: Australia’s role in promoting water security in the Middle East

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Australia can partner with Middle Eastern countries on something we both really understand: how to manage scarce water.

Australia’s experience with water management can help to strengthen existing approaches in the Middle East and build capacity in an area that is of critical importance to the region. The government should facilitate two-way knowledge transfer between the Middle East and Australian agriculturalists to better engage the region and as an exercise in whole-of-nation foreign policy.

Highlighted in a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), water scarcity in the Middle East is increasingly perilous and may worsen instability in the region. Improved approaches to water use are a critical security need across the region.

Australia’s agricultural sector has water-saving solutions that can improve primary production in the Middle East and help protect against some of the worst outcomes of water insecurity. Lending Australian expertise would improve Australia’s diplomatic presence in the region through an uncontentious aid program while also creating new connections for Australian industry. And in working in the Middle East to share their knowhow, Australian experts may learn a thing or two about water management from people there.

According to the hydraulic theory of civilisation, when Mesopotamian farmers in modern-day Iraq became the first irrigators in around 6000BC, the need to ensure the just distribution of water from the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers created perhaps the first organised form of government. Today, those same river systems in the fertile crescent of the Middle East are central to the region’s future stability. Water there is drawn not just from rivers, lakes and so on but from increasingly depleted underground sources. A warming climate is worsening scarcity by increasing surface evaporation and plant transpiration.

A lack of water precipitates social and economic challenges that can contribute to instability. Water scarcity in the Middle East has pushed people off rural land and caused environmental damage, social unrest and even international conflict.

Water scarcity and resulting threats to peace, prosperity and stability are not unique to the Middle East. Similar issues arise around the Nile, Mekong, Ural and Indus Rivers. Globally, disputed water rights present challenges to prosperity and security for individuals, communities and societies.

As the CSIS report outlines, technical, governance and social measures, if implemented in concert, can mitigate water scarcity and therefore the associated risks.

Biophysically, water is perhaps the ultimate growth limiting factor in plant production and, by extension, livestock farming. Other measures to promote crop and pasture yields, such as applying fertiliser, have little effect if there isn’t enough water.

The solution must be higher efficiency in managing and using water. And that comes down to integrating technical, economic and governance measures, areas in which Australian farmers, researchers and industry collaborators have made great advances.

The Middle East and Australia both have large swathes of arid, semi-arid and Mediterranean climate zones, and they are therefore suitable for similar agricultural products. Australian agriculturalists can produce profitably despite hydrological constraints.

For example, water use per kilogram of Australian cotton production has halved over the past 25 years thanks to improved irrigation infrastructure and management efficiencies.

Among approaches developed or used in Australia to mitigate the effects of water scarcity are use of drought resilient plant and livestock breeds, enforcement of water allocations, agricultural diversification, effective governance of water infrastructure, water pricing, applying machine learning to irrigation decisions, and, in places, economic diversification for a mix of agricultural and non-agricultural income streams.

In its Murray-Darling Basin Plan, for all of its shortcomings, Australia has learned internally how to build consensus in sharing water from rivers and lakes that cross political boundaries—in that case, state borders.

Nearly all these advances have been possible because of combined industry and government investment in research and development.

In Australia, water saving policy is routinely explained, discussed and therefore widely understood through conferences, academic journals and industry newsletters. Such communications would not be enough to strengthen water security in the Middle East, however. A hands-on approach would be needed.

The government should take action, including providing funding, to better enable Australian agriculturalists—from producers to researchers and government officials—to directly share their approaches in water management in the Middle East. Methods would have to adapt to the specific governance, economic and cultural contexts of partner nations.

In turn, existing water-smart innovations from the Middle East, many of them long-standing and with cultural value (such as drought-resilient livestock breeds, indigenous plant varieties and underground aqueducts or qanats) can be combined with approaches from Australia, allowing also for a two-way exchange of knowledge

Australian agriculture has thrived despite operating in some of the driest land on Earth. It has knowhow that it should share.

Together, northern Queensland cities can offer great Defence potential

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Northern Queensland has a pivotal role to play in the future of Australia’s defence industry, but its cities and local governments must work together to fully realise the potential. Collectively they have more to offer than any of them has alone.

The region can support the three armed services far beyond what it has traditionally done for them: providing bases and training areas. Its strengths in geography, demography and resilience make it unusually well suited to building a logistic and industrial support base for Australian Defence Force operations.

The catalyst for north Queensland attracting more military presence and associated business is Defence’s spending plan, the 2024 Integrated Investment Program (IIP). The emphasis on Australia’s north in the IIP and accompanying National Defence Strategy points to a new priority and focus.

There is already a strong military presence in northern Queensland: the army’s largest barracks, the navy’s patrol boat base, and some of the air force’s main training areas and two of its bases for mounting offshore operations. Historically, though, the region’s private and public sectors haven’t sufficiently understood how these arrangements fit within the broader defence and national security strategy.

The region must consider its assets collectively. Currently, each city or region identifies and advocates for its own bespoke investment opportunities—as, for example, in Townsville’s Unlock the North submission to the state and federal governments.

In future, similar submissions could be combined for those projects or opportunities that benefit the entire region, with delegations and representations made as collective entities. For example, political advocacy meetings with the minister for defence could be attended jointly by mayors from Cairns, Townsville and Mackay to present a united front and demonstrate collective capability.

This approach will encourage Defence investment across northern Queensland and ensure a good return on it.

The IIP outlined spending of billions of dollars on equipment that will be kept in northern Queensland. This includes the army’s huge investment in armoured vehicles and helicopters, the navy’s expanded patrol boat fleet and a renewed requirement to upgrade northern bases. Army landing ships built under project Land 8710 are likely to be based in northern Queensland.

The plan for supporting and maintaining this equipment is less certain—and therein lies an opportunity for the region. By demonstrating that it has the capacity to take on this role, the region can encourage industry to locate key support capabilities close to the equipment. This would improve logistics and cut costs for both industry and Defence.

Northern Queensland’s key strength is geographic resilience, especially if its cities can support one other. It faces some of Australia’s regions of interest—the South Pacific, Hawaii and the US west coast—and is the obvious place from which to mount ADF operations into the Pacific. Its cities are well positioned to provide the base for deployed forces, offering well-serviced logistics hubs with robust supply chains and local manufacturing capable of sustaining ADF operations. Also, the cities are dispersed around the region; should the support capacity of one become disrupted, others can keep operations running, using fast transport networks across rail, road, sea and air.

The population of northern Queensland is often overlooked as a strength for the region. The area between Rockhampton and Cairns has more than 500,000 people, comparable to Newcastle, which has a significant and growing defence industry hub. Similar depth of defence activity could be supported in northern Queensland. The region’s workers in manufacturing, maintenance, heavy machinery and agriculture have strong technical skills that can be rapidly pivoted to supporting Defence equipment.

Northern Queensland also has many veterans who have remained in the area after leaving navy, army and air force service—8 percent of the people of Townsville, for example—who can offer their experience. Additionally, an increasing number of professionals are relocating to Queensland’s northern coast, chasing better affordability, a family-friendly lifestyle and an unmatched climate.

The advantages of the region work best when they are considered as a collective. For example, the army’s decision to concentrate its helicopters in Townsville presents an opportunity best exploited by the entire region. The maintenance workforce, from the engineers to the refuellers and mechanics, need a training pipeline for service personnel and contracted civilians. Townsville alone cannot provide this training, but the region can use existing aviation training organisations in Cairns. Northern Queensland can create a system that can support the army’s aviation maintenance from recruitment and training to employment.

Land 8710 is a similar example. Its vessels will need maintenance and support, which Cairns and Townville should provide collectively. If either city tries to become the sole base of operations and sustainment, it is unlikely to attract the necessary investment, to the detriment of both the ADF and northern Queensland.

The region has a strong, diverse and resilient network that can provide infrastructure and a firm industrial base to support Defence. Plans announced so far will attract significant investment in northern Queensland, but unless there is collective action these opportunities will not take full advantage of the region’s potential. Any logistician can tell you that shortened lines of communication, resilient supply points and a well-positioned workforce are cost-savers and force enablers. Northern Queensland can provide all this, if its cities and local governments can combine their strengths and work together.

Northern deterrence demands full use of civilian infrastructure

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Australia’s National Defence Strategy presents a central challenge to the ADF: deterring adversaries from projecting power through our northern approaches. To do this effectively, the ADF must maximise use of civilian infrastructure, particularly in northern Australia, where the local economy cannot always sustain necessary facilities alone.

A strong example of what needs to be done is making the most of Horn Island, in the Torres Strait.

In the 1980s and 1990s, the ADF mapped and assessed infrastructure across northern Australia. This initiative included extensive aerial surveys, satellite imagery and ground assessments, producing detailed maps of roads, bridges, ports, fuel storage, communication networks and more. Collaboration with government agencies and local stakeholders was key to ensuring accurate and valuable data, bolstering military readiness and community development.

However, by the late 1990s, shifting defence priorities and a focus on joint operations reduced these critical assessments, leaving gaps in our understanding of the infrastructure landscape that must now be addressed.

This landscape is rapidly changing with government and private infrastructure investment in northern Australia. And some old facilities—like those in Weipa, where dredging of the port will cease—are being decommissioned as commercial operations shut down, while others are nearing the end of their operational life.

Historically, Horn Island was a key military outpost, with two runways, ammunition storage and defensive installations. Today, it mainly supports regional commercial flights under the management of the Torres Shire Council. Its proximity to Papua New Guinea—makes it an ideal location for a forward military base.

Horn Island already has Jet A-1 fuel, commonly used by the RAAF, and a bulk fuel storage capacity of 600,000 litres at its pier. This infrastructure could be expanded to ensure the island remains self-sufficient during prolonged military operations, reducing logistical dependency that could hinder operational effectiveness and enhancing local resilience.

One of Horn Island’s most significant advantages is its ability to improve the capabilities of Cairns and Townsville within a unified northern defence posture. While Cairns serves as a naval hub for patrol boat operations, Horn Island could act as a forward support base, extending these vessels’ operational range and endurance. Using Horn Island for resupply and maintenance, patrol boats from Cairns could sustain longer missions in the Torres Strait and other northern waters. Its airfield could also extend the ranges of both crewed and uncrewed aircraft.

Maintaining Horn Island’s civilian airfield is commercially justified, but enhancing it may not be. The types of infrastructure that Defence could use for military purposes would no doubt also bolster community resilience across the Torres Strait Islands. But who would pay for such improvements?

The issue applies to much of northern Australia’s infrastructure. The ADF cannot reasonably be expected to alone pay for infrastructure development throughout northern Australia.

As a first step, the ADF must recommence systematic data collection on the region’s infrastructure. A comprehensive understanding of the infrastructure landscape is essential for ensuring operational readiness and resilience. By mapping existing facilities and assessing their capabilities, Defence can identify gaps and determine how best to enhance the strategic use of these assets.

Regular use of such infrastructure will not only enhance the ADF’s readiness but will also contribute to the viability of essential services in northern Australia. These benefits reinforce the argument for investing in upgrades, ensuring that Defence commitments align with local community needs.

The Australian government must adopt a holistic approach to the ADF’s requirements, prioritising ongoing maintenance of critical infrastructure that can support both military and civilian demands, especially in areas where commercial viability is limited. Such foresight is not merely a matter of defence strategy; it is an investment in the social and economic fabric of northern Australia.

By leveraging civilian infrastructure, Australia can significantly enhance its military capabilities and deterrence. The time for action is now, and a collaborative effort among Defence, government and local communities is required.

The urgent need for a strategic overhaul in Australia’s Defence approach to fuel resilience

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Over the last three decades, the Australian Defence Force (ADF), enjoying an era of peace and strategic stability, shifted from prioritising sovereign fuel resilience to investing heavily in outsourcing. With strategic warning times shrinking and supply chain vulnerabilities surfacing, the ADF must elevate fuel security to a Fundamental Input to Capability status.

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 was not merely a symbolic end to the Cold War; it heralded a new era of unprecedented globalisation. It accelerated the development of just-in-time supply chains, centralised production, offshoring and privatisation.

Nations and businesses alike redefined their strategies to embrace economic efficiency and streamlined operations. However, this transition came with significant trade-offs for Australia: sovereign capability and national resilience.

The ADF, like many other institutions, has adopted a market-driven model, focusing on leveraging external providers and technological innovations. While this shift was intended to enhance operational flexibility and cost-effectiveness, it has also introduced critical vulnerabilities, particularly in supply chain management. This strategic shift has inadvertently compromised our sovereign capability and national resilience, underscoring the need for a more robust approach.

The lessons learned from the International Force East Timor (INTERFET) in 1999 and the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the need for change.

The ADF’s participation in INTERFET illustrated the critical importance of effective logistical coordination and the need for adaptive strategies in complex operational environments. The mission highlighted the necessity of robust supply chain management and the ability to integrate and synchronise efforts with international partners to ensure operational success.

The COVID-19 pandemic exposed Australia’s logistics resilience vulnerabilities, particularly in the supply chain for essential products like AdBlue, a crucial component for diesel engine emissions control. In this case, both Russia and China decided to restrict the compound necessary to make the product. Without it, Australia’s trucking industry would grind to a halt. This experience highlighted the urgent need for Australia to enhance its domestic liquid fuel production capabilities and build more robust and resilient supply chains to mitigate future disruptions.

Despite these valuable lessons, the ADF has continued to rely on market forces to resolve supply chain issues. Recent geopolitical tensions and a reduction in Australia’s strategic warning time have created a burning platform for immediate change.

For the ADF, liquid fuel resilience presents a challenging supply chain vulnerability. Liquid fuels are not just a logistical component but a strategic asset.

Recognising this, the ADF must elevate fuel security to a Fundamental Input to Capability status. This involves developing a comprehensive fuel strategy integrating robust storage and distribution networks. The focus should be on creating redundancy in supply lines and ensuring backup systems are in place to mitigate local, regional and global disruptions.

A secure and consistent supply of manufactured fuel is vital for sustaining military operations, powering equipment and enabling rapid response in high-stress scenarios. The ADF can reduce dependency on external sources by establishing robust domestic manufacturing capabilities, mitigating supply chain risks and strengthening national security resilience.

Effective logistics management relies on accurate forecasting and proactive planning. The ADF should invest in advanced forecasting tools and modelling techniques to better anticipate and prepare for potential disruptions. This includes implementing scenario-based planning exercises to simulate various crises and evaluate response strategies. These should consider the possibility of continuous, concurrent and cascading risks and shocks. By incorporating these tools, the ADF can improve its ability to respond swiftly and effectively to emerging threats.

The complexities of modern logistics require a collaborative approach. Fuel security and resilience are not solely concerns of the ADF but are pivotal to national stability and economic security. Disruptions in fuel supply can affect critical infrastructure, public services and the broader economy, highlighting the interdependence between military readiness and civilian sectors.

To address this pressing issue comprehensively, the ADF must collaborate with government agencies and stakeholders across various sectors to develop a unified strategy ensuring robust fuel security and resilience for the nation. The ADF must enhance its engagement with state and territory governments and private sector stakeholders. Building strong partnerships across these sectors will facilitate information sharing, resource pooling and coordinated response efforts. This collaborative framework will be instrumental in addressing logistical challenges and ensuring a unified approach to national security.

The current geopolitical landscape, marked by increased risks and reduced warning times, underscores the urgency of these recommendations. The burning platform we face necessitates a strategic overhaul in our logistics and supply chain management approach with a clear focus on liquid fuels. The ADF can build a more resilient and effective logistical framework by prioritising fuel security, enhancing forecasting and planning capabilities and strengthening collaborative efforts. This will support sustained military operations and fortify Australia’s strategic posture in an increasingly uncertain global environment.

It is time to rethink our approach and invest in the resilience and preparedness needed to navigate the complexities of the modern world.

NT construction industry report holds lessons for Defence

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Last week, the Industry Capability Network in Australia (ICN) released the second edition of its Northern Territory’s Construction Industry Mapping Report. As the Australian Department of Defence prepares to unleash a wave of construction projects on the area, both public and private sectors must understand the region’s construction industry landscape to deliver the major projects desired during this increasingly busy period.

ICN began with the simple goal of connecting buyers and sellers. Over time, it has developed into a network of state and territory-based analysts, managing thousands of transactions and substantial business volumes each year. ICN’s functions now include supporting major procurement programs through in-depth data analysis and capability mapping. This not-for-profit organisation, funded by government and industry, provides critical expertise in pre-qualification, procurement and supply chain analysis, underpinned by direct involvement in significant projects.

The construction industry in the Northern Territory is a cornerstone of the regional economy. Substantial infrastructure requirements and the demands of a globalised export market drive it.

ICN’s Report offers an essential tool for understanding and engaging with the Northern Territory’s construction sector, particularly in defence construction. It provides a detailed analysis of the local industry’s capabilities, capacity and qualifications. Its conclusions highlighted the region’s capacity to meet future project needs and emphasising the importance of tailored procurement strategies to leverage local expertise fully.

What distinguishes this report from others like it is its foundation in first-hand experience and the reassurance it provides through this approach. Unlike mere data aggregation from public sources or artificial intelligence models, ICN’s unique advantage lies in its deep-rooted, hands-on engagement with local industries and its involvement in early-stage procurement discussions. This approach ensures the report’s reliability and relevance to stakeholders.

ICN-NT has had extensive involvement in high-profile projects. The $40 billion Ichthys liquid natural gas project, one of the largest gas projects in the world, as well as the $550 million Larrakeyah/Coonawarra Facilities Upgrade and the $1.6 billion Tindal Air Force Base upgrade for Defence stand out as preeminent examples. This involvement provides it with insights into the Northern Territory’s construction landscape, enabling ICN-NT to map the region’s industry accurately.

Dick Guit, chair of ICN-NT, emphasises that capability mapping is vital for understanding market potential, which is crucial for planning new programs. This approach builds on broader economic analyses, such as the Billion Dollar Partnership Report by Master Builders NT from the previous year, which provides a comprehensive overview of the construction industry’s contribution to the Northern Territory’s economy.

Guit underscores the importance of structuring procurement processes to align with local business capacities. This strategy is crucial for ensuring project success, maintaining social license in 2024 and beyond, and making stakeholders feel included in the planning process. It ensures that the unique capabilities of local businesses are fully utilised, fostering a sense of collaboration and shared success.

ICN’s Report assesses local construction capacity relative to anticipated demand, including major Defence projects and other significant developments on the horizon. Its methodology involved scrutinising procurement structures for prominent projects like the Tindal Air Force Base program, HMAS Coonawarra, and the Charles Darwin University City Campus.

Procurement was segmented into 75 standard work packages across six categories: Building/Tier Contractors; Site Preparation and Early Works; Mechanical, Electrical and Plumbing (MEP); Structural Works; Fit-out and Internal Works; and Specialist Services. When Northern Territory businesses are mapped against these categories, the results are notable:

–68 packages had more than 10 capable businesses.

–Five packages had between six and 10 capable businesses.

–Two packages had one to five capable businesses.

Over 750 local businesses were identified as key players in the construction sector. The report concludes that the Territory possesses robust capabilities across all essential work packages. That robustness could start to falter, however, if procurement structures are not adapted to foster local competition.

It is for this reason that successful procurement depends on a nuanced understanding of the local market. If procurement is designed correctly, Territory contractors are well-equipped to deliver; a point well illustrated by the Territory’s proven track record in executing projects exceeding $500 million.

The Northern Territory’s construction industry is highly capable and ready to address the demands of the forthcoming works program. The ICN report offers Defence and other stakeholders a comprehensive understanding of the sector. Now, they need to utilise its findings to ensure that they enjoy further project successes.

A missed opportunity? The Aviation White Paper and northern Australia’s regional aviation challenges

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The Australian government’s Aviation White Paper—Towards 2050 outlines a vision for the future of civil aviation. While the White Paper represents a significant step forward, particularly in terms of decarbonising the aviation sector and enhancing consumer protections, it falls short in addressing the critical needs of regional Australia, particularly northern Australia.

With its vast distances and dispersed population, northern Australia relies on aviation in a way that urban Australia does not. For many remote and rural communities, aviation is the only means of accessing essential services such as healthcare, education and employment. It is a crucial enabler of economic activity, linking remote regions to the broader national economy.

While the White Paper acknowledges the significance of regional aviation and its role in supporting closing the gap for Australia’s First Nations populations, it does not propose sufficient targeted measures to support and sustain these vital services. The lack of immediate, actionable measures leaves regional Australia in a prolonged state of uncertainty, waiting for an outcome that should have been prioritised from the outset.

The viability of regional airline services has been a persistent challenge in northern Australia. High operational and compliance costs, low passenger volumes and the geographic remoteness of many communities create a complex and often unsustainable operating environment for regional carriers. These elements have caused the collapse of more than 20 regional airlines in Australia since deregulation of the industry in the 1990s. Moreover, the adverse influence of dominant market operators and increasingly stringent regulatory requirements not designed for remote operations further exacerbate the challenges. They all must first be understood and addressed before any sustainable policy settings can be established.

The recent voluntary administration of Rex Airlines, a major provider of regional air services in northern Australia, underscores these issues. Rex’s struggles, albeit exacerbated by an ambitious but ill-fated expansion into inter-city routes, have put the essential services it provides at risk. With few other operators remaining that can fill the gap left should Rex ultimately fail, the current situation is parlous. The White Paper’s response to Rex’s situation is limited and requires a braver dive into the inner workings of this broken industry than the document sets out.

Recommendations such as extending support measures like the Remote Airstrip Upgrade Program (RAU) and reviewing regional airfares through the Productivity Commission are to be welcomed. However, these actions are more reactive than proactive, suggesting the government is limited in its thinking.

The strategic importance of northern Australia has been clearly articulated in the Defence Strategic Review. A strong and resilient regional aviation industry is critical to supporting a Whole-of-Government approach to investment in northern Australia. Achieving this will require financial support through tailored subsidies and incentives for airlines servicing remote and regional areas. This will ensure these services remain viable in the long term. Furthermore, continued investment in regional airports and airstrips is also necessary to improve safety, accessibility and resilience against climate change. Finally, infrastructure upgrades that accommodate new aviation technologies, such as electric aircraft and hydrogen refuelling stations, should be prioritised to align with the transition to net zero emissions.

Northern Australia is well-positioned to become a significant player in the Sustainable Aviation Fuel (SAF) industry. The region’s vast agricultural resources provide a strong foundation for producing the biomass feedstocks required for SAF, such as tallow, canola oil and other agricultural residues. These resources are crucial for developing a sustainable and locally-sourced supply chain for SAF production. Doing this will reduce reliance on imported fuels and contribute to energy security.

Importantly, northern Australia’s strategic location offers advantages for both domestic and international distribution of SAF, particularly to markets in the Asia-Pacific region, where demand for low-carbon aviation fuels is expected to grow significantly. The region’s proximity to key export markets positions it as an ideal hub for SAF production, especially as global airlines and governments increasingly commit to reducing aviation emissions.

Realising this potential requires significant investments in infrastructure, research and development, and the right policy environment. The region will need dedicated SAF production facilities, blending infrastructure and logistics networks tailored to its unique conditions. Additionally, targeted government support, including financial incentives and regulatory frameworks, will be essential to attract investment and ensure the success of SAF initiatives, such as that of Jet Zero’s Project Ulysses in Townsville.

Policy innovation is also required to explore new models of regional air service delivery. Public-private partnerships or community-owned airlines will ensure that essential air links are maintained. To make this sustainable, certain operational standards will need to be relaxed that may be disproportionately burdensome for small regional carriers and remote and rural airports.

While the Aviation White Paper is a positive step, it currently lacks the specific regional focus necessary to fully leverage northern Australia’s potential. Expanding the policy framework to include tailored support for the region is crucial for maximising its contribution to the nation.

Northern Australia is the place for maintaining new armoured vehicles

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‘Amateurs talk tactics. Professionals talk logistics.’

Whether these words come from General Omar Bradley or General Norman Schwartzkopf (opinions vary), their message is clear. And when it comes to the Australian Army’s huge investment in armoured vehicles, it’s time to move on from talking about constructing them to who will service them and where.

Policy makers should acknowledge that while vehicle construction in the south of Australia is locked in, logistics support must be set up in the north.

Acquisition of heavy armoured vehicles is the Australian Army’s greatest replacement effort in two generations. The current fleet of M1A1 tanks, ASLAV wheeled fighting vehicles and venerable M113 armoured personnel carriers will soon find new homes at clubs of the Returned Services League—or storage for reactivation in time of dire need. M1A2 SEPv3 tanks, Redback infantry fighting vehicles and Boxer combat reconnaissance vehicles will be the new arsenal, with K9 self-propelled howitzers a noteworthy addition in the near future.

The government has said who will supply these vehicles and where they will be assembled. Hanwha’s Redbacks and K9s will be assembled in Geelong, and Rheinmetall’s Boxers in Ipswich, while General Dynamics’ M1A2s will come directly from the United States.

But while the new fleet will be produced in the south, it will be employed in the north.

Except for a few training platforms, every armoured vehicle in the Australian Army will be allocated to the 3rd Brigade, based in Townsville, making it the most potent fighting formation in the region. As any logistician will attest, this power comes with a cost. There will be close to 300 vehicles, all thirsty for fuel, hungry for ammunition, and worthless without spare parts, maintenance schedules and overhaul facilities.

There are several ways to provide this logistics support, although the government has not yet formally announced which one it favours. The vehicles can either return to their points of manufacture for deeper maintenance, or they can be supported locally—and that would be the best choice.

Returning vehicles to their factories has advantages. Turning a production assembly line into a suitably equipped maintenance line would be relatively inexpensive. The people who assembled the vehicles would have the expertise to maintain and overhaul them. Arguably, this strategy would provide an affordable means to ensure the army’s fighting vehicles are safe, effective and sustainable. It certainly sounds reasonable, and may be very palatable for Defence Minister Richard Marles, whose seat of Corio includes Geelong. It is not, however, the option that logistics professionals would advocate.

The vehicles will be based far from their factories. It is 2500km from Townsville to Geelong by the fastest route and 3200km via the National Highway. Regularly transporting vehicles that weigh 40 to 70 tonnes over such continental distances is an immense undertaking, requiring specialist trailers and complicated by oversize vehicle regulations. The volume of fuel consumed by M1s would pale would hardly compare to the amount needed by the fleet of prime movers hauling them and other armoured vehicles across the country. Carbon dioxide emissions would be correspondingly higher.

Crucially, the transit would add weeks to each overhaul, drastically reducing the availability of the fleet and limiting training time.

Under these circumstances, any logistician would prefer a reasonable and suitable way to provide maintenance close to where the vehicles were used.

Northern Queensland has the facilities and expertise for this. Dean Deighton of Australian Industry Group notes that the region has the capacity and capability to establish and operate maintenance, engineering and logistics support facilities, and that doing the work there is highly likely to be least expensive.  The region already supports heavy vehicles of many makes in the resources industry, particularly in the cities of Mackay, Townsville and more recently Cairns. Widening its scope to include the army’s new vehicles would leverage these existing skills and bring welcome investment.

Indeed, the army and one of its aircraft suppliers have already set a precedent: Boeing Defence Australia will support the army’s Chinook and Apache helicopters from Townsville, with deeper maintenance done at the location where the aircraft are operated. Hanwha, General Dynamics and Rheinmetall could establish similar facilities in northern Queensland so that maintenance support would be timely, inexpensive and effective.

A regional maintenance hub would also offer expanded business opportunities. Lockheed Martin and Boeing have recently approved Australian subsidiaries performing maintenance for aircraft of other countries. Similarly, a regional armoured vehicle maintenance hub could provide local maintenance to visiting defence forces so that their vehicles stationed in Townsville Field Training Area, Shoalwater Bay and other locations remain ready to fight at a moment’s notice. This would demonstrate Australia’s reliability as a partner of choice and strategic point of departure for regional operations, as well as meeting the needs of national strategy and local logistics.

The advantages are far too great to ignore. Australia’s vehicles will be operated in the north, and that’s where they should be maintained.

Low-hanging fruit: linking Australian agriculture and foreign policy

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Australia must look to agriculture as a critical part of global engagement and better leverage its agricultural sector to deepen the country’s international relationships. We have a strong agricultural sector and, thanks to the Cairns Group, a history of leadership in international agricultural trade policy. Integrated Australian agricultural diplomacy can engage a diverse range of partners at the bilateral, minilateral and multilateral levels while supporting our domestic industries.

Australia’s agricultural sector is a national asset. Fifty-five percent of Australia’s land use is for primary production, we export approximately 72 percent of our agricultural product, and in 2022–23 Australian agricultural exports hit a record value of $80 billion. As Australia pursues a whole-of-nation approach to international policy and ways to tangibly strengthen our connections with the international community, our agriculture sector is low-hanging diplomatic fruit.

Within our immediate region, agriculture provides a handful of clearcut opportunities. Growing conditions across northern Australia are complementary to those of international partners (in that they are similar to the conditions of many of our regional neighbours). As the populations of Southeast Asian nations continue to grow, and their wealth increases, Australia’s importance as a close and secure source of food will also grow. Existing people-to-people links (including through seasonal labour and diaspora groups) also bridge cultural divides and open new markets for labour and products.

Australia already has strong agricultural-diplomacy foundations. Murray Watt, Australia’s agriculture minister at the time, in a 2023 address to the Australian Institute of International Affairs, highlighted areas that already bound together Australia’s agriculture sector and foreign policy. They include our agriculture-heavy trade relationships, our global reputation for producing high-quality food and fibre, the Pacific Australia Labour Mobility scheme, the Australian-Chinese agricultural trade relationship, and international cooperation through the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research. While only briefly mentioned by Watt, the Cairns Group is a unique element of Australia’s foreign policy environment that we should seek to strengthen and replicate.

The Cairns Group is a coalition of 20 agricultural exporting countries, established in Cairns in 1986 on the eve of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations—talks that ultimately led to the founding of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The group is made up of a diverse range of medium-sized agricultural exporters: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Ukraine, Uruguay and Vietnam. It seeks to ‘push for liberalisation of global trade in agricultural goods’, principally through the WTO. It contrasts with the relatively high, trade-distorting subsidies provided to farmers in countries such as Norway, Switzerland, South Korea, Japan and the United States, as well as the European Union.

Since the establishment of the WTO, the Cairns Group has been the principal driver of global agricultural trade reform. It continues to bring agriculture to the fore in trade negotiations. ‘Agriculture remains the most important unfinished business of the WTO’, the statement of the 43rd Cairns Group Ministerial Meeting in February 2024 reads, ‘and should be at the heart of ongoing reform efforts and advanced at [the WTO’s 13th Ministerial Conference]. It is recognised globally that agricultural trade reform is fundamental to the health of the multilateral trading system and future rule-making.’

The Cairns Group cumulatively represents a concerted effort by an unlikely collection of politically, economically and geographically diverse nations to cooperate on major global reforms. Australia’s founding role and leadership of the group—significantly promoting policies in opposition to many of our traditional international partners—is exceptional. At times, Australian foreign policy is perceived, both domestically and internationally, as overly influenced by the US, but our agricultural diplomacy is largely free from that stigma. It is proof of Australia’s independence, capacity to engage with diverse partners and commitment to the international rules-based order. It exemplifies middle-power diplomacy and coalition building.

The breadth of Cairns Group membership also bucks the global trend. Most multilateral groupings are region-specific (ASEAN, APEC, PIF), ideologically aligned (AUKUS, Five Eyes, BRICS), both (NATO, EU), or accessible to all or nearly all nations (UN, WHO, IMF). But the Cairns Group brings together a collection of nations that are geographically, politically and economically disparate. Together, the group accounts for 30 percent of global agricultural exports. It points to the unique power of agriculture to diversify foreign policy networks, the importance of the agricultural sector, and the overarching importance of national food security.

The Australia–China relationship and their ‘trade war’ often dominate conversations about Australian agriculture and foreign policy, one-dimensionally focusing on specific commodities’ access to the Chinese market. As important as that subject is, Australia’s agriculture sector is dynamic rather than one that is reliant on a single market, and the ‘trade war’ should be a lesson to both the industry and government. It is in the mutual interest of government and producers for industries to be diversified away from reliance on a foreign market.

As a heavily trade-exposed sector, Australian agriculture cannot lose sight of the domestic and international elements that both safeguard and threaten production, supply chains and market access. Importantly, if the international system continues to fracture, producers will need a diversity of trade partners and a relationship with government to ensure access to those partners.

New Zealand recognised this in its National Security Strategy 2023, expressly stating the need for diversification and flexibility to protect its national economic security. Australian policy should similarly recognise the need for market diversification and encourage greater collaboration between policymakers and industry to achieve it. And we can move beyond the economic security lens to execute—as in our National Defence Strategy 2024—a whole-of-nation approach to national security.

Australian agriculture presents a natural partner for the nation’s foreign and strategic policy. While many initiatives, including the work of the Cairns Group, have sown the seeds of that complementarity, many more opportunities are ripe for harvest.