Tag Archive for: North of 26° south

House of cards: northern Australia’s liquid fuel resilience

Northern Australia’s liquid fuel infrastructure is the backbone of defence capability, national resilience, and economic prosperity. Yet, it faces mounting pressure from increasing demand, supply chain vulnerabilities and logistical fragilities.

Fuel security is not just about stockpiling: it hinges on accessibility when and where it’s needed, diversity in suppliers and supply routes, and adaptability to changing circumstances to maintain a stable supply, even in times of crisis.

Australia should consider activating dormant fuel reserves, developing a domestic fuel refinery, hardening logistics chains and preparing contingency measures.

At first glance, northern Australia’s fuel security appears robust, with key Defence bases (HMAS Coonawarra, RAAF Darwin and RAAF Tindal) providing guaranteed demand. Meanwhile, regional economic activity is sustained by reserves at Melville Bay, Nhulunbuy and Darwin’s East Arm Precinct, which includes both Vopak’s commercial and Crowley’s eventual Defence reserves.

Crowley’s East Arm facility will, when complete, be the linchpin of the region’s fuel security, holding 300 million litres of jet fuel, 90 percent allocated to defence operations. By comparison, RAAF Darwin’s 12 million litres and RAAF Tindal’s 14 million litres are fully committed to military use, while HMAS Coonawarra contributes 6 million litres of diesel for naval readiness. Civilian infrastructure supports industry and local communities, including reserves such as Vopak’s 174 million litres, Melville Bay’s 30 million litres of commercial diesel and Nhulunbuy’s estimated 20 million litres.

This dual-purpose system attempts to balance military preparedness with economic necessity, yet these figures tell only part of the story. The apparent stability of northern Australia’s fuel network is an illusion: the system works well only without supply disruptions or rapid demand increases.

90 percent of all liquid fuel is imported and northern Australia remains highly vulnerable to supply disruptions. Seasonal flooding can sever road links between Darwin, Tindal and the air force’s bare bases (RAAF Curtin, Learmonth and Scherger). This shows up a fragile logistics network that adversaries could exploit, or natural disasters could disrupt.

Australia’s national fuel security has been steadily eroding for years, with national stockpiles consistently falling short of the International Energy Agency’s 90-day benchmark. The 2022 Russia-Ukraine war highlighted these vulnerabilities. As global supply chains tightened, Australia’s limited reserves became more apparent. While additional storage alone couldn’t eliminate supply shocks, in a crisis it would provide an important time buffer.

The risks are particularly acute in the Top End. Disruptions in Asian refineries, blockages in key shipping lanes such, as those through the South China Sea, or a severe cyclone hitting Darwin’s port could cripple fuel supplies, leaving aircraft grounded, naval operations stalled, and communities isolated. The region’s dependence on limited road transport further amplifies the challenge, particularly when considering fuel delivery to the air force’s northern bare bases.

To address these vulnerabilities, Australia should activate Melville Island’s dormant fuel reserves; develop a domestic fuel refinery in the Northern Territory; harden the logistics backbone; and integrate Vopak and Nhulunbuy into a contingency network.

Just 80 kilometres from Darwin, Melville Island’s port and 30 million litres of existing fuel storage could be a valuable defence asset. With infrastructure upgrades, including new pipelines, tanker berths and integrated defence agreements, Melville could evolve into a dual-purpose hub, reinforcing Australian Defence Force operations and supporting regional economic activity. Increasing redundancy in supply locations enhances operational flexibility and minimises the risks posed by bottlenecks in a single storage site.

Australia’s dependence on imported aviation fuel is a glaring strategic risk, so it should consider a domestic fuel refinery in the Northern Territory. Even a modest refinery capable of processing 10,000 barrels (1.6 million litres) per day could meet at least half of RAAF Tindal’s requirements. While refining capability is not a silver bullet, it would strengthen Australia’s self-sufficiency, ensure a baseline level of operational continuity in a prolonged crisis and reduce Australia’s fuel vulnerabilities.

The Northern Territory’s logistics backbone should be hardened, as it is highly vulnerable to seasonal disruptions: the 320 kilometre highway connecting Darwin and Tindal is a single, flood-prone artery. The government should consider paying for all-weather road upgrades, developing redundant transport routes and exploring alternative logistics solutions, such as a dedicated rail spur. Prepositioned fuel caches near the RAAF’s bare bases could provide a buffer in times of crisis, ensuring operational continuity when primary supply lines are compromised.

Finally, integrating Vopak and Nhulunbuy into a contingency network would establish a reliable fallback system. Nhulunbuy’s fuel capacity of 20 million litres presents a potential strategic reserve but is geographically isolated. Infrastructure improvements, combined with an ADF contingency agreement to access Vopak’s 174 million litres, could ensure continued fuel availability if Darwin’s primary storage and distribution networks were disrupted. A dispersed and resilient fuel network minimises single points of failure, reinforcing Australia’s ability to sustain prolonged operations.

Fuel security demands long-term commitment, but it would reinforce Australia’s defence capabilities. Without assured fuel supply, even the most advanced military platforms become useless.

Without further investment in supply chain resilience, infrastructure modernisation and domestic production, fuel shortages will continue to undermine Australia’s capacity to project force and sustain operations. It is time to double down on what works and strengthen what does not.

How Australia, with friends, can secure its place in critical minerals

Australia’s critical minerals sector is at a crossroads. As the United States recalibrates its industrial policies under President Donald Trump, Australia’s role in securing non-Chinese supply chains for critical minerals has never been more important.

To secure its critical minerals industry in partnership with friends such as the US, Australia must ensure US trade policies actively support its push to move up the value chain. It also needs a strategy to sustain key production during downturns, must better align critical minerals, defence and industrial policies, and it should push for stronger reciprocal investment from allies, especially in processing and refining.

While Australia is at the centre of such initiatives as the US’s Minerals Security Partnership and AUKUS, practical outcomes such as viable new supply chains depend on targeted investment and policy coherence. The 2024 suspension nickel mines in Western Australia and ongoing challenges in rare earth and lithium processing expose serious vulnerabilities. Australia risks becoming a weak link in the supply chain, rather than a strategic powerhouse.

Established in June 2022, the Minerals Security Partnership was designed to promote responsible mineral production and processing among partner countries. Joe Biden considered Australia a key part of this vision, but Trump’s return adds uncertainty. While his administration is pushing for reduced dependence on China, his inward-looking trade policies could unintentionally harm Australia’s contribution.

If tariffs extend to processed or refined critical minerals, as they cover aluminium, Australia may be discouraged from moving up the supply chain. As of 2023, Australia supplied about half of the world’s raw lithium but lacked the processing capacity to realise the material’s full value. Mineral refining remains a weak point; China dominates the sector. Australia needs investment to compete, and the US is the partner of choice. Yet Australia supplies relatively few critical minerals to the US, limiting its leverage​.

At least five Western Australian nickel mines suspended operations in 2024 due to global oversupply and falling prices. The closures resulted in major job losses and raised concerns about supply chain resilience.

Nickel is a strategic material, with uses in batteries and defence. Indonesia, the world’s top nickel producer, is aligning itself closely with China and has joined the BRICS. So declining production in Australia is a strategic misstep.

Rather than waiting for market forces to decide the fate of its nickel industry, Australia should have used its 2023 critical minerals strategy to stabilise production. More importantly, countries in the Minerals Security Partnership, particularly the US, should have stepped up and invested in Australia’s mining and processing capabilities. Friend-shoring needs to be more than just rhetoric.

Despite setbacks in nickel, Australia is making progress in rare earths. Lynas Rare Earths is expanding its processing facilities in Kalgoorlie, and Iluka Resources is developing Australia’s first fully integrated rare earths refinery at Eneabba. Federal funding supports these projects.

China controls more than 90 percent of the world’s rare earth refining. It also has used export restrictions and bans as a geopolitical tool.

Australia’s Critical Minerals Production Tax Incentive—a 10 percent tax credit for onshore processing—raises serious questions. Since Australia lacks a viable downstream industry, such as refining, alloy production, or manufacturing, these processed materials still go to China. Australian taxpayers are just subsidising the middle stage of the supply chain, only for China to capture the higher-value downstream benefits. Without a full industrial chain, this policy doesn’t create real resilience in supply; it just makes Australian critical minerals slightly cheaper for China.

Australia’s critical minerals strategy also affects its national security one. Nuclear submarines rely on more than a dozen critical minerals, including rare earths for sonar systems, cobalt for high-performance batteries and titanium for hull construction. Other advanced defence systems depend on stable critical mineral supplies.

Securing these materials requires a coordinated approach. The US, through the Defense Production Act, can prioritise domestic mining, refining and processing of key materials for defence and high-tech industries, reducing reliance on imports from potentially hostile nations. In 2024 Australia was designated as a domestic source for funding, showing the potential for deeper collaboration and greater supply chain resilience.

If the US and Britain see Australia as a long-term defence partner, they should be investing in its critical minerals sector. AUKUS should be a platform for strengthening Australia’s industrial base, including processing and refining critical minerals.

Australia’s approach to critical minerals is guided by a suite of strategic policies and documents that play a role in securing supply chains, strengthening Australia’s industrial base and strategic position, but better alignment is needed.

Closer coordination of critical minerals policy with its defence, industry and trade strategies can revitalise capacity in the industry while helping to diversify mineral supply chains away from China.

Australia can’t afford to take a passive approach. Global supply chains are shifting fast. If Australia wants to be a cornerstone of Western critical mineral security, it must act decisively and demand that its allies do the same.

Darwin is well-placed for an uncrewed systems hub

Australia often relies on overseas facilities for uncrewed systems’ maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO), exposing the country to operational delays, escalating costs and potential security risks. To address this vulnerability, it should establish an MRO facility for uncrewed systems in Darwin.

Uncrewed systems, including drones, uncrewed aerial vehicles and uncrewed underwater vehicles, are transforming Australia’s defence, security and commercial sectors. They have a range of applications in defence operations, border security, environmental monitoring and industrial applications such as extraction of natural resources, including natural gas.

Darwin’s strategic location, existing infrastructure and proximity to major defence and commercial partners mean it is the ideal hub for maintaining these vital assets.

The city’s strategic significance, long recognised by Australia’s defence planners, makes it the natural location for a dedicated MRO facility. As the gateway to the Indo-Pacific, Darwin’s proximity to regional and global markets, particularly Asia, provides an unparalleled advantage for servicing domestic and international clients.

This places Darwin at the crossroads of Australia’s defence and commercial interests in the region, with clear benefits for its role as a logistics and maintenance hub for uncrewed systems. Furthermore, the city’s established infrastructure, including air and sea ports, rail connections and utilities, already supports large-scale defence operations and the growing defence footprint in the region, making it primed for expansion into a world-class MRO hub for uncrewed systems.

Australian uncrewed systems are largely serviced overseas, leaving them vulnerable to extended downtimes, longer repair times and increased risk in transportation. This reliance on foreign facilities compromises Australia’s operational readiness. It hampers the efficiency of industries, such as resource extraction, that rely heavily on uncrewed technology for monitoring, inspections and surveillance.

As the Australian Defence Force and commercial sectors increasingly deploy uncrewed systems, it is essential to ensure they can be maintained and repaired promptly to avoid delays in operations, whether they involve national security, disaster response or remote infrastructure management.

As uncrewed systems are central to the future of defence operations, creating an MRO facility in Darwin would strengthen Australia’s position as a key partner in the region, with the ability to service not only its own uncrewed systems but also those of allied nations. This strategic advantage would provide a competitive edge in defence readiness and international collaborations.

Moreover, Darwin’s potential MRO facility could support other government agencies, such as the Australian Federal Police, Home Affairs and the Australian Border Force. They all use uncrewed systems for surveillance, border protection and law enforcement.

The ability to rapidly repair and maintain these systems would improve agencies’ responsiveness and availability of capabilities, ensuring that they are always equipped to respond to emerging threats. Darwin could thus play a greater role in Australia’s broader security architecture, providing reliable, homegrown support to key domestic and international partners.

From a commercial perspective, establishing an MRO facility in Darwin would be commercially viable and a boon for local businesses.

With the growing demand for uncrewed systems in industries such as liquefied natural gas (LNG), telecommunications and mining, establishing a local MRO facility would significantly reduce the reliance on overseas service providers. This would cut transport costs and ensure faster turnaround of repairs, improving the operational efficiency of these industries.

It would also create a thriving commercial ecosystem around uncrewed systems in the Northern Territory. Local businesses would be able to engage with the growing global market for uncrewed systems, contributing to job creation and the region’s economic growth.

For this MRO facility to be commercially successful, it should be designed as a multi-use facility, capable of supporting not only defence and government sectors but also commercial enterprises. This approach would ensure financial sustainability through a diversified revenue stream.

Partnerships with commercial operators in the LNG, mining, and telecommunications sectors could provide steady demand for services.

Moreover, collaborations with international partners—such as the United States, Japan and other Indo-Pacific nations—could provide further opportunities for industry growth, turning Darwin into a regional centre for uncrewed system innovation and service.

Such collaborations could include joint research and development projects, knowledge sharing and training programs, further enhancing the facility’s global relevance.

Establishing an MRO facility in Darwin would have significant strategic, economic and operational benefits. It would enhance Australia’s defence readiness, reduce its reliance on overseas maintenance services and foster closer collaboration with key regional partners. A local MRO facility would strengthen Australia’s ability to respond to threats, contribute to the security of the Indo-Pacific region and support industries that rely on uncrewed systems.

By capitalising on Darwin’s strategic location, existing infrastructure and growing importance in regional security, Australia can establish a world-class facility that meets its future needs and reinforces its role as a key player in the Indo-Pacific.

The winners we must pick

In a modestly noted announcement in Western Australia in early December, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and Resources Minister Madeleine King announced the addition of $475 million in government loans to mining company Iluka, taking the total to $1.25 billion.

This is for processing heavy rare earths to refined oxides. I understand this was a decision heavily debated within the government. There will be more such debates in the future. The most significant rare earths here are neodymium, praesodimium, dysprosium and terbium.

Tom O’Leary, the chief executive of Iluka, pointed out that the refined oxides ‘will then be used in magnets for electric vehicles, for defence applications … renewable energy, robotics—the list goes on.’

Minister King was anxious to point to a broad Commonwealth commitment to other rare-earths enterprises: Lynas in Kalgoorlie, Arafura in the Northern Territory and Australian Strategic Materials in Dubbo. The net was cast wider to a range of further critical materials being mined and processed in Australia: a proposed graphite refinery in Townsville, vanadium projects in Western Australia and Townsville and further rare earths in South Australia.

Indeed, recently, China has focused on Australia’s reserves of critical minerals as it strives to deprive the United States of gallium, germanium and antimony. These minerals are found in Australian deposits of bauxite, lead, zinc, gold and coal. Thirty out of 51 on the US’s list of critical minerals are present in Australia in substantial quantities. Fourteen more are present in more modest amounts.

Antimony, for example, is important in a range of armaments, notably bullets. Recent pricing has shown the consequences of Chinese bans on supplying the United States. Reuters reported that the price of antimony trioxide has increased by 228 percent this year in Rotterdam to US$39,000 per metric tonne.

What is happening at Iluka’s Eaneabba project is of immediate significance. The permanent magnets and hardening processes that depend on rare earths from the project are critical to the quality of missiles, their accuracy and speed. Light and heavy rare earths are in almost all US weapon systems.

To the argument that our actions might be market-distorting, Minister King points out, ‘The whole value chain of critical minerals and rare earth around the world is highly disrupted. It faces opaque international markets where pricing is almost impossible to establish in any normal fair market. So that is why government does have to participate in this particular emerging sector of our economy.’

She pointed out that we are not alone in this exercise. The US Export-Import Bank, South Korea and the credit agencies of Japan and Canada are engaged in projects. Britain, Germany and France, which direct financial resources for critical minerals, are also engaged.

The principal distorter of the market is China. The minister made that clear. The policy was about competing. ‘China … does dominate the rare earths refining processes of the world and Australia needs to compete.’

O’Leary has pointed out that if the refining process at Eaneabba is supported by the end of this decade, it could satisfy half the world’s need for permanent magnets.

In so far as Iluka is concerned, as The Financial Times has pointed out, the principal mechanism for China’s distortion of the market is tying pricing to the Asian Metals Market. Adhering to pricing arrangements dominated by China cripples the profitability of any producer other than China. China can take profit at any point along the complex processing chain of rare earths, and it can cripple a competitor focused on any other point. As Iluka points out, long-term prices determined by the Asian Metals Market for neodymium and praseodymium are at $58 per kg. If that market were abandoned, prices would average between US$82 and US$148 per kg, O’Leary believes.

This could be achieved by negotiating bilaterally with buyers. They would pay for reliability and diversity of sources. The government loan provides an opportunity to try such an approach.

The Commonwealth has placed a tough test on the loan. To access it requires the successful conclusion of off-take agreements over the next two years. We should hope deadlines will be viewed leniently. China is well positioned to fight hard, wielding a near complete monopoly with which to defend the processing of the heavy rare earths. Helpful to Iluka and Australia are the materials that we would provide, and, indeed, China provides relatively small, but critical, manufacturing inputs. Buying from us is unlikely to seriously impede a manufacturer’s ability to sell their completed system in any market.

The point about Australia is that we have substantial reserves, and exploration continues to surge.

Further, with the exception of the Colorado School of Mines undergraduate education, we have the five best mining-engineering schools outside China. We are superb miners, and the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation and Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation are helpfully knowledgeable about processing.

But putting the whole picture together requires a continual strategic commitment. Examining the recent Chinese bans, we can see that we can encourage a broad global effort. Given incoming president Donald Trump’s intentions, he will need to take a deep interest in what we are doing. It is worth a major effort to indicate to him that we have the capacity to relieve what might be a substantial point of blackmail that cripples his strategic position. The Chinese have already demonstrated a willingness to move in this general area and have indicated a preparedness to take those bans further into the goods now covered by Iluka’s production.

Unlocking the full potential of the ADF’s northern ranges and training areas

The Northern Territory (NT) is one of the world’s most exceptional military training environments, offering vast and rugged landscapes ideally suited for large-scale exercises, live-fire drills and complex operations. Defence-owned areas such as Bradshaw Field Training Area and Mount Bundey Training Area have earned global recognition for their ability to support high-intensity training.

Yet the Australian Defence Force is not fully exploiting the potential of these assets. It is underutilising critical resources that could enhance the ADF’s operational capabilities and Australia’s broader defence posture.

The NT’s training areas have been integral to the ADF’s operational readiness, providing an ideal environment for training in conventional and irregular warfare. They have long supported complex exercises, testing of diverse military equipment and joint training with allied forces.

However, in recent years, there has been a noticeable reduction in the scale and frequency of ADF exercises in the NT. This decline, compounded by the army’s shrinking presence in the NT and competing demands on Defence, has limited the ADF’s ability to fully exploit these ranges for high-intensity, combined-arms training, leaving a significant gap in defence readiness.

The underutilisation of the NT’s training grounds is particularly clear when compared with the heavy involvement of the US military. Under the US Force Posture Initiatives, the United States has made significant spending in these areas and regularly conducted exercises on them. This engagement reinforces the strategic importance of the NT’s ranges, highlighting the gap in the ADF’s use of them. Other international partners, particularly Japan, also recognise the value of the ranges. As regional tensions rise, training alongside allies in a location as strategically situated as the NT enhances interoperability and military readiness.

Despite the NT’s exceptional training environment and the US forces’ frequent use of this advantage, the ADF’s commitment to high-intensity exercises in the region has waned. As the Indo-Pacific becomes more geopolitically significant, the NT’s ranges should be central to Australia’s defence strategy, not secondary assets used infrequently or for limited purposes.

The Australian government and the ADF must act to maximise the utility of the NT’s training areas. The ADF must significantly ramp up its commitment to large-scale, complex training exercises in the NT.

To optimise use of the ranges, Australia must increase large-scale exercises in the NT that integrate multiple military services and allies. These exercises should reflect Australia’s strategic challenges, such as maritime security, territorial defence and regional stability. A focus on rapid deployment and modern warfare scenarios will ensure that the ADF is prepared to address a broad spectrum of threats, from conventional military conflicts to humanitarian crises and natural disasters.

Equally important is fostering closer collaboration between the Australian government, the ADF and the NT government. As the ADF ramps up its training activities in the region, the NT government must actively support the expansion. The NT’s vast, sparsely populated landscape provides a unique opportunity for the ADF to collaborate with local communities and businesses, creating mutually beneficial partnerships.

Expanding military exercises can generate jobs, boost local economies and improve infrastructure, all of which will help sustain the NT’s growing role in Australia’s defence strategy. It can also stress-test the region’s transport and logistics infrastructure and industry base, while providing economic opportunities for local businesses and communities. The increased ADF activity will also enhance the region’s security and emergency response capabilities, providing direct benefits to the local population.

Australia can unlock the full potential of these invaluable resources by revitalising its commitment to these ranges, increasing international cooperation and fostering stronger partnerships with the NT government and local communities. A comprehensive policy approach, focused on increased training activity and stronger collaboration with both domestic and international partners, will ensure that the NT remains central to Australia’s defence strategy in the Indo-Pacific region. This will enhance the ADF’s operational readiness, strengthen relationships with key allies, and solidify Australia’s role as an important player in regional security.

Darwin is key for undersea data links. We must promote their resilience there

Australia needs further investment into Darwin’s digital infrastructure to leverage the city’s proximity to Asia and support the resilience of international data flow through subsea cables.

Actions should include establishing an office to coordinate industry and government agencies, and it should build a substantial capability in Darwin to repair cables.

The importance of acting is underscored by Google’s November statement that it would lay a data cable from Darwin to Singapore via Christmas Island and by ongoing joint efforts by Australia, the United States and Japan to increase connectivity in the Pacific.

As subsea links, such as the existing Darwin-Jakarta-Singapore Cable, become Australia’s digital lifelines, their security and resilience become paramount. Disruption to them would have profound consequences for both Australia’s economy and national security.

Darwin’s role in the Indo-Pacific digital ecosystem is growing ever faster, making the city increasingly central to global data flows. Vulnerabilities come with dependence on such infrastructure. Incapacitation of these cables—whether through physical damage or cyber threats—would severely affect Australia’s economy, security, and geopolitical standing.

The government’s current approach to managing subsea cable security lacks the coordination needed to address the growing challenges in this space. With multiple agencies involved, from the Department of Infrastructure to the Australian Communications and Media Authority, Australia needs a more unified and proactive approach to safeguarding these assets.

Given the national security stakes, Australia must establish a dedicated domestic subsea cable coordination unit to oversee construction, maintenance and security. This unit should serve as a clearinghouse, working closely with key government stakeholders, telecommunications regulators and private sector players—including major tech firms, such as Google and Meta. By integrating their expertise, the unit could ensure that subsea cables were shielded from physical and cyber threats, coordinating national security efforts and fostering a unified response to emerging risks.

As Darwin continues to evolve as a data hub, Australia’s capacity to swiftly repair damage to its subsea cables is becoming increasingly critical. To maintain resilience, the government must establish a local repair hub. This includes building up domestic repair capabilities, which could be achieved through partnerships with international cable operators or by developing local expertise within the Northern Territory. A dedicated repair ship, staffed with a rapid-response team based in Darwin, would be invaluable, ensuring that cable damage was addressed quickly to minimise disruption. This approach would further strengthen Australia’s position as a reliable player in the global digital infrastructure arena.

To support this growing digital infrastructure, Darwin’s physical and digital capabilities must also be scaled up. This requires robust terrestrial backhaul connections and investment by large cloud-service providers in world-class AI data centres.  We also need a regulatory framework that supports the increasing volume of data while addressing potential physical and cyber threats.

The Northern Territory offers geological stability and an advantageous position for connections to Singapore, itself an important node in the global submarine cable network. These advantages make it an ideal place for increasing Australia’s overall telecommunications and subsea cable resilience by diversifying submarine cable landings from clogged areas like Sydney and existing areas like Perth.

As the volume of data flowing through the region rises, so too must the capacity to handle it securely and efficiently. Strong, resilient infrastructure will not only bolster Australia’s own security but position the country as a reliable alternative to higher-risk regions. It will also attract investment and foster deeper international partnerships, particularly with allies such as the United States and Japan, who are already deeply engaged in securing subsea cable infrastructure.

Australia must also step up its role in the global dialogue surrounding subsea cable security. Given the interconnectedness of these cables and their importance to international trade and security, it cannot afford to act in isolation. Active participation in global initiatives is essential. For example, in September, Australia endorsed the New York Statement on Undersea Cables, which calls for international cooperation to safeguard the links.

By engaging in these discussions, Australia can share insights on emerging threats, establish best practices for protection and help shape global responses to subsea cable disruptions. This leadership would further cement Australia’s position as a key partner in global digital infrastructure security.

The time for action is now. Australia’s government must move decisively to secure the subsea cable infrastructure of the Northern Territory, ensuring long-term resilience and reliability.

With its strategic location in the Indo-Pacific, Darwin is poised to be a cornerstone of global digital connectivity, not only serving as a gateway for Australia but also reinforcing regional security and economic stability. By securing subsea cable infrastructure, Australia will pave the way for a secure, resilient and interconnected future, reinforcing both its national interests and its partnerships with key allies.

As Australia’s naval focus moves north, so must missile reloading facilities

The Royal Australian Navy needs missile reloading facilities in the north of the country, most obviously at Darwin and Cairns. The southern ports where Australian warships now take on munitions are too far from where the fleet is most likely to fight, though their reloading capabilities must also be retained.

The rising threat from China is shifting the geopolitical focus northwards, to chokepoints between archipelagic islands and to flashpoints in the Western Pacific. Australia must ensure its naval support infrastructure responds.

The lack of northern reloading facilities diminishes the navy’s combat capability by throttling its operational tempo.

Warships in action can quickly empty their magazines of air-defence or strike missiles. They might take three days to sail from an operations area north of Australia to Darwin, if they could replenish there; to reach HMAS Stirling, near Perth, they might need seven days. Then just as much time is spent in returning to the area of operations.

Similar calculations apply for operating in the Southwest Pacific. For that theatre, Cairns would be a far closer location for reloading than Eden, the New South Wales port where the process is currently done for ships using Fleet Base East in Sydney.

Intense, high-tempo operations in the north are just not possible when tied to the more southerly facilities.

Darwin and Cairns are prime candidates for northern missile reloading facilities because each has a deep port and is already equipped with substantial defence infrastructure. To the extent that they must already be protected against air and missile attack, there would be no further burden in protecting new facilities.

Both cities also play key roles in Australia’s strategic partnerships, particularly with the United States, which regularly conducts joint operations and training in the region. So building missile reloading facilities at these locations would enhance interoperability with allied forces, particularly under the AUKUS framework.

Indeed, it is quite likely that the US Navy would want to use northern Australian missile reloading facilities in the event of war, if Australia had any.

Australia should also keep its southern installations, however, because the ships are mainly based in the south. In war, the southern facilities would offer redundancy in case of damage or destruction of the better-placed northern ones.

The specific infrastructure needed for reloading at Darwin and Cairns would mainly be the specialised storage buildings that are needed for missiles. For security, those buildings would be at nearby defence base, not alongside wharves.

Sending munitions north by truck or train when they’re needed is not a suitable alternative. The process could impose delays, and roads and rail lines can be vulnerable.

Developing missile loading installations in the north would significantly improve Australia’s deterrence posture and enhance operational flexibility.

The Australian government must take immediate action to address this pressing need. It should look at whether a quick enhancement of current facilities can provide a stop-gap solution.

Then Defence must secure funding to fast-track construction of permanent facilities in the north. Because of the value to the US Navy of missile reloading in northern Australia, the government must involve it in the effort. For example, the US Navy may have special requirements.

This collaboration will not only enhance our operational capabilities but also strengthen our alliance.

Avoiding downstream consequences: Australia’s role in promoting water security in the Middle East

Australia can partner with Middle Eastern countries on something we both really understand: how to manage scarce water.

Australia’s experience with water management can help to strengthen existing approaches in the Middle East and build capacity in an area that is of critical importance to the region. The government should facilitate two-way knowledge transfer between the Middle East and Australian agriculturalists to better engage the region and as an exercise in whole-of-nation foreign policy.

Highlighted in a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), water scarcity in the Middle East is increasingly perilous and may worsen instability in the region. Improved approaches to water use are a critical security need across the region.

Australia’s agricultural sector has water-saving solutions that can improve primary production in the Middle East and help protect against some of the worst outcomes of water insecurity. Lending Australian expertise would improve Australia’s diplomatic presence in the region through an uncontentious aid program while also creating new connections for Australian industry. And in working in the Middle East to share their knowhow, Australian experts may learn a thing or two about water management from people there.

According to the hydraulic theory of civilisation, when Mesopotamian farmers in modern-day Iraq became the first irrigators in around 6000BC, the need to ensure the just distribution of water from the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers created perhaps the first organised form of government. Today, those same river systems in the fertile crescent of the Middle East are central to the region’s future stability. Water there is drawn not just from rivers, lakes and so on but from increasingly depleted underground sources. A warming climate is worsening scarcity by increasing surface evaporation and plant transpiration.

A lack of water precipitates social and economic challenges that can contribute to instability. Water scarcity in the Middle East has pushed people off rural land and caused environmental damage, social unrest and even international conflict.

Water scarcity and resulting threats to peace, prosperity and stability are not unique to the Middle East. Similar issues arise around the Nile, Mekong, Ural and Indus Rivers. Globally, disputed water rights present challenges to prosperity and security for individuals, communities and societies.

As the CSIS report outlines, technical, governance and social measures, if implemented in concert, can mitigate water scarcity and therefore the associated risks.

Biophysically, water is perhaps the ultimate growth limiting factor in plant production and, by extension, livestock farming. Other measures to promote crop and pasture yields, such as applying fertiliser, have little effect if there isn’t enough water.

The solution must be higher efficiency in managing and using water. And that comes down to integrating technical, economic and governance measures, areas in which Australian farmers, researchers and industry collaborators have made great advances.

The Middle East and Australia both have large swathes of arid, semi-arid and Mediterranean climate zones, and they are therefore suitable for similar agricultural products. Australian agriculturalists can produce profitably despite hydrological constraints.

For example, water use per kilogram of Australian cotton production has halved over the past 25 years thanks to improved irrigation infrastructure and management efficiencies.

Among approaches developed or used in Australia to mitigate the effects of water scarcity are use of drought resilient plant and livestock breeds, enforcement of water allocations, agricultural diversification, effective governance of water infrastructure, water pricing, applying machine learning to irrigation decisions, and, in places, economic diversification for a mix of agricultural and non-agricultural income streams.

In its Murray-Darling Basin Plan, for all of its shortcomings, Australia has learned internally how to build consensus in sharing water from rivers and lakes that cross political boundaries—in that case, state borders.

Nearly all these advances have been possible because of combined industry and government investment in research and development.

In Australia, water saving policy is routinely explained, discussed and therefore widely understood through conferences, academic journals and industry newsletters. Such communications would not be enough to strengthen water security in the Middle East, however. A hands-on approach would be needed.

The government should take action, including providing funding, to better enable Australian agriculturalists—from producers to researchers and government officials—to directly share their approaches in water management in the Middle East. Methods would have to adapt to the specific governance, economic and cultural contexts of partner nations.

In turn, existing water-smart innovations from the Middle East, many of them long-standing and with cultural value (such as drought-resilient livestock breeds, indigenous plant varieties and underground aqueducts or qanats) can be combined with approaches from Australia, allowing also for a two-way exchange of knowledge

Australian agriculture has thrived despite operating in some of the driest land on Earth. It has knowhow that it should share.

Together, northern Queensland cities can offer great Defence potential

Northern Queensland has a pivotal role to play in the future of Australia’s defence industry, but its cities and local governments must work together to fully realise the potential. Collectively they have more to offer than any of them has alone.

The region can support the three armed services far beyond what it has traditionally done for them: providing bases and training areas. Its strengths in geography, demography and resilience make it unusually well suited to building a logistic and industrial support base for Australian Defence Force operations.

The catalyst for north Queensland attracting more military presence and associated business is Defence’s spending plan, the 2024 Integrated Investment Program (IIP). The emphasis on Australia’s north in the IIP and accompanying National Defence Strategy points to a new priority and focus.

There is already a strong military presence in northern Queensland: the army’s largest barracks, the navy’s patrol boat base, and some of the air force’s main training areas and two of its bases for mounting offshore operations. Historically, though, the region’s private and public sectors haven’t sufficiently understood how these arrangements fit within the broader defence and national security strategy.

The region must consider its assets collectively. Currently, each city or region identifies and advocates for its own bespoke investment opportunities—as, for example, in Townsville’s Unlock the North submission to the state and federal governments.

In future, similar submissions could be combined for those projects or opportunities that benefit the entire region, with delegations and representations made as collective entities. For example, political advocacy meetings with the minister for defence could be attended jointly by mayors from Cairns, Townsville and Mackay to present a united front and demonstrate collective capability.

This approach will encourage Defence investment across northern Queensland and ensure a good return on it.

The IIP outlined spending of billions of dollars on equipment that will be kept in northern Queensland. This includes the army’s huge investment in armoured vehicles and helicopters, the navy’s expanded patrol boat fleet and a renewed requirement to upgrade northern bases. Army landing ships built under project Land 8710 are likely to be based in northern Queensland.

The plan for supporting and maintaining this equipment is less certain—and therein lies an opportunity for the region. By demonstrating that it has the capacity to take on this role, the region can encourage industry to locate key support capabilities close to the equipment. This would improve logistics and cut costs for both industry and Defence.

Northern Queensland’s key strength is geographic resilience, especially if its cities can support one other. It faces some of Australia’s regions of interest—the South Pacific, Hawaii and the US west coast—and is the obvious place from which to mount ADF operations into the Pacific. Its cities are well positioned to provide the base for deployed forces, offering well-serviced logistics hubs with robust supply chains and local manufacturing capable of sustaining ADF operations. Also, the cities are dispersed around the region; should the support capacity of one become disrupted, others can keep operations running, using fast transport networks across rail, road, sea and air.

The population of northern Queensland is often overlooked as a strength for the region. The area between Rockhampton and Cairns has more than 500,000 people, comparable to Newcastle, which has a significant and growing defence industry hub. Similar depth of defence activity could be supported in northern Queensland. The region’s workers in manufacturing, maintenance, heavy machinery and agriculture have strong technical skills that can be rapidly pivoted to supporting Defence equipment.

Northern Queensland also has many veterans who have remained in the area after leaving navy, army and air force service—8 percent of the people of Townsville, for example—who can offer their experience. Additionally, an increasing number of professionals are relocating to Queensland’s northern coast, chasing better affordability, a family-friendly lifestyle and an unmatched climate.

The advantages of the region work best when they are considered as a collective. For example, the army’s decision to concentrate its helicopters in Townsville presents an opportunity best exploited by the entire region. The maintenance workforce, from the engineers to the refuellers and mechanics, need a training pipeline for service personnel and contracted civilians. Townsville alone cannot provide this training, but the region can use existing aviation training organisations in Cairns. Northern Queensland can create a system that can support the army’s aviation maintenance from recruitment and training to employment.

Land 8710 is a similar example. Its vessels will need maintenance and support, which Cairns and Townville should provide collectively. If either city tries to become the sole base of operations and sustainment, it is unlikely to attract the necessary investment, to the detriment of both the ADF and northern Queensland.

The region has a strong, diverse and resilient network that can provide infrastructure and a firm industrial base to support Defence. Plans announced so far will attract significant investment in northern Queensland, but unless there is collective action these opportunities will not take full advantage of the region’s potential. Any logistician can tell you that shortened lines of communication, resilient supply points and a well-positioned workforce are cost-savers and force enablers. Northern Queensland can provide all this, if its cities and local governments can combine their strengths and work together.

Northern deterrence demands full use of civilian infrastructure

Australia’s National Defence Strategy presents a central challenge to the ADF: deterring adversaries from projecting power through our northern approaches. To do this effectively, the ADF must maximise use of civilian infrastructure, particularly in northern Australia, where the local economy cannot always sustain necessary facilities alone.

A strong example of what needs to be done is making the most of Horn Island, in the Torres Strait.

In the 1980s and 1990s, the ADF mapped and assessed infrastructure across northern Australia. This initiative included extensive aerial surveys, satellite imagery and ground assessments, producing detailed maps of roads, bridges, ports, fuel storage, communication networks and more. Collaboration with government agencies and local stakeholders was key to ensuring accurate and valuable data, bolstering military readiness and community development.

However, by the late 1990s, shifting defence priorities and a focus on joint operations reduced these critical assessments, leaving gaps in our understanding of the infrastructure landscape that must now be addressed.

This landscape is rapidly changing with government and private infrastructure investment in northern Australia. And some old facilities—like those in Weipa, where dredging of the port will cease—are being decommissioned as commercial operations shut down, while others are nearing the end of their operational life.

Historically, Horn Island was a key military outpost, with two runways, ammunition storage and defensive installations. Today, it mainly supports regional commercial flights under the management of the Torres Shire Council. Its proximity to Papua New Guinea—makes it an ideal location for a forward military base.

Horn Island already has Jet A-1 fuel, commonly used by the RAAF, and a bulk fuel storage capacity of 600,000 litres at its pier. This infrastructure could be expanded to ensure the island remains self-sufficient during prolonged military operations, reducing logistical dependency that could hinder operational effectiveness and enhancing local resilience.

One of Horn Island’s most significant advantages is its ability to improve the capabilities of Cairns and Townsville within a unified northern defence posture. While Cairns serves as a naval hub for patrol boat operations, Horn Island could act as a forward support base, extending these vessels’ operational range and endurance. Using Horn Island for resupply and maintenance, patrol boats from Cairns could sustain longer missions in the Torres Strait and other northern waters. Its airfield could also extend the ranges of both crewed and uncrewed aircraft.

Maintaining Horn Island’s civilian airfield is commercially justified, but enhancing it may not be. The types of infrastructure that Defence could use for military purposes would no doubt also bolster community resilience across the Torres Strait Islands. But who would pay for such improvements?

The issue applies to much of northern Australia’s infrastructure. The ADF cannot reasonably be expected to alone pay for infrastructure development throughout northern Australia.

As a first step, the ADF must recommence systematic data collection on the region’s infrastructure. A comprehensive understanding of the infrastructure landscape is essential for ensuring operational readiness and resilience. By mapping existing facilities and assessing their capabilities, Defence can identify gaps and determine how best to enhance the strategic use of these assets.

Regular use of such infrastructure will not only enhance the ADF’s readiness but will also contribute to the viability of essential services in northern Australia. These benefits reinforce the argument for investing in upgrades, ensuring that Defence commitments align with local community needs.

The Australian government must adopt a holistic approach to the ADF’s requirements, prioritising ongoing maintenance of critical infrastructure that can support both military and civilian demands, especially in areas where commercial viability is limited. Such foresight is not merely a matter of defence strategy; it is an investment in the social and economic fabric of northern Australia.

By leveraging civilian infrastructure, Australia can significantly enhance its military capabilities and deterrence. The time for action is now, and a collaborative effort among Defence, government and local communities is required.