The North Korean missile test over the weekend has emphasised the point President Obama reportedly made to President-elect Trump shortly after his electoral success: North Korea should be at the top of the new President’s to-do list. Obama’s policy of “strategic patience” had run its course.

Since taking office, Kim Jong-un has consolidated power and raced ahead with developing a nuclear capability, testing two nuclear devices in 2016 alone. There are also indications that North Korea’s economy is starting to change; market forces have been allowed to play a role in the country’s economic recovery since the 1990s and, while estimates vary wildly, most point to at least positive GDP growth even under increasingly harsh economic sanctions.

But what’s perhaps been most surprising aspect has been the pace at which  Pyongyang has been able progress the technologies in its missile and nuclear program since the Six-Party Talks were suspended in 2009. This recent chart from The Economist does a pretty good job of visualising the achievements (and failures) North Korea has made in its nuclear program. They include satellite launches, improvements in short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, and the beginnings of an SSBN program. It appears that the missile tested over the weekend is a land-based version of the solid-fuelled KN-11, a SLBM first tested in 2015. North Korean media has labelled this version of the missile the ‘Pukguksong-1.’

What’s been lost among the swirl of analysis and commentary about the test—and the ensuing controversy over how Trump’s team handled the briefing of the president and Prime Minister Abe during the incident—is that the Pukguksong-1 is solid-fuelled and comes with a tracked transporter-erector launcher (TEL).

That represents a notable climb up the missile-technology tree for North Korea and may well change deterrence dynamics on the Korean Peninsula.

To date, North Korea’s medium- and long-range missiles have used various forms of liquid rocket fuel, often highly unstable and difficult to handle. As liquid rocket fuel can’t be safely stored or kept in the missile during peacetime, such missiles can often take up to an hour to fuel and launch, making them vulnerable to attack and somewhat unreliable. Mobile liquid-fuelled rockets also require large and numerous logistic support vehicles to accompany the launcher, limiting how far off-road they can go and making their visual footprint from the air much harder to hide.

Solid-fuelled missiles solve some of those deficiencies. They can be launched within minutes, are far more reliable and don’t require as much supporting infrastructure. The new tracked TEL that goes along with the Pukguksong-1 opens up a significant amount of countryside in which to hide the mobile missiles. If Pyongyang continues with the systems development and eventually fits it with warheads, it will decrease any warning and decision-making time on the Peninsula during a crisis. Any full operational deployment of the missile system would certainly complicate efforts by the US and South Korea to continuously track North Korea’s nuclear forces. That makes a pre-emptive strike, even in a leadership decapitation scenario, much riskier.

While this new missile can’t reach the continental United States (its range is likely around 1,000km), it’s only a matter of time until North Korea crosses that line. We know they’ve been making progress on improved engines needed for multiple-staged ICBMs, and have demonstrated their ability to put a satellite into space. The last big hurdle seems to be mastering the re-entry.

The trip by Secretary of Defense Mattis to South Korea and Japan earlier this month has widely been seen as an ally-reassurance tour. But it’ll also feed into the North Korea policy review the White House is reported to be undertaking. The review will likely suggest some new policy options for the Trump administration in regards to North Korea. Advances in mobile, solid-fuelled missiles will make any potential military options unrealistic and difficult. Doubling down on ballistic missile defence is another option, but the Pukguksong-1 will even challenge THAAD. US Secretary of State Tillerson has flagged the possibility of ‘secondary sanctions’ on Chinese companies that violate UN Security Council sanctions on North Korea imposed last year in an effort to compel Beijing to bring these enterprises into line. That might work, but it’s likely such efforts will be too slow—it can take several years for sanctions to bite.

If the goal is to prevent North Korea from developing an ICBM, that really only leaves us with diplomacy. While restarting diplomatic negotiations with the DPRK would be difficult under any American administration after years of failed efforts, for the Trump administration it’s going to be an effort in prioritisation. Everyone, even Trump, knows that China is crucial in bringing North Korea to the table. And while the President’s recent back down on the ‘One China’ policy is a signal to some that he intends to pursue a more normalised relationship with Beijing, there’s still a strong sentiment across the administration (including in the Departments of Defense and State) and within the White House that the US needs to take a harder line with China across a range of longstanding issues, including trade, the South China Sea and Taiwan. Pressuring China on all fronts at once while also seeking a new way forward with North Korea seems incompatible at present. The Trump administration will need to decide where the DPRK stacks up against its broader China strategy.

Intra-Asian defence diplomacy is surging. After laying dormant for decades—thanks to the San Francisco hub-and-spokes system of alliances and regional multilateral dialogues which seldom advance actual security cooperation—defence exchanges and strategic relationships are enjoying a new lease of life among Asia–Pacific nations. Indeed, the region has more defence engagement today than at any other time in its history.

In December, Australia and Indonesia renewed a defence cooperation agreement committing to more military personnel exchanges. Also in December, Shinzo Abe visited India, providing fresh impetus to security ties between Tokyo and New Delhi, and Narendra Modi paid a surprise visit to Pakistan. Practical defence cooperation is also on the rise: Japan agreed to supply the Philippines with 10 patrol vessels for its coast guard and similarly pledged to give Vietnam 6 used patrol vessels, the first arriving in August last year.

But there’s one security relationship which hasn’t flourished in the way that some might expect: the Japan–South Korea relationship. Despite sharing a mutual ally in the US and similar external threats (North Korea’s nuclear and missile provocations, for example), Tokyo and Seoul haven’t been able to put historical grievances aside and push towards mutually beneficial security cooperation. In all likelihood this relationship will look increasingly anomalous as intra-Asian defence cooperation continues to grow.

Despite what realism says about the huge potential—theoretically at least—for security cooperation between Tokyo and Seoul, the relationship demonstrates the pivotal role history can have in hindering otherwise natural security partnerships. Anti-Japanese sentiment is high in South Korea and vice-versa—so much so that Japanese cyber nationalists were recently riled up, airing their anti-Korean sentiments online, over a McDonald’s ad that apparently showed Korean-style bowing.

The major points of conflict that make headlines every now and then include visits to the Yasukuni shrine by Japanese prime ministers, the comfort women issue and the ongoing territorial dispute over the Takeshima/Dokdo islands. The Yasukuni shrine houses a number of ‘class A’ war criminals, who committed crimes against peace, and is seen in South Korea as a symbol of Japan’s historical military aggression; visits by Japanese prime ministers to pay their respects always provokes backlash from Seoul.

The comfort women issue is an ongoing one which made its way back into headlines late last year when an 80-year old South Korean set himself on fire in a protest calling on Japan to apologise for the comfort women. The two countries released statements on the issue in December that (apparently) ‘finally and irreversibly’ resolved the issue. But this hasn’t lasted long and the issue flared up again in February.

And while much of the attention on the Asia–Pacific  is currently focused on disputed islands in the South China Sea, Japan and South Korea contest sovereignty over a small set of islands in the East Sea—the Takeshima/Dokdo islands. The rocks have been a flashpoint for bilateral disputes in the past: in 2013, South Korean shop owners launched a nationwide boycott of Japanese products over the disputed islands and in its 2015 Defence White Paper, the Japanese government reiterated its sovereignty (PDF) over the islands which drew criticism from Seoul.

Those sore spots wouldn’t cause much concern to strategists if they didn’t affect the overall bilateral security relationship—but they do. In 2012, a military information-sharing agreement was put on hold due to domestic backlash in South Korea. Anti-Japanese sentiment proved strong enough to prevent mutually beneficial and strategically important defence cooperation.

The main actor that has previously been able to prompt outbursts of cooperation has been North Korea—a major security concern to both countries. In 2014, South Korea, Japan and the US signed a military pact agreeing to share intelligence on Pyongyang’s progress towards a nuclear missile. The agreement does not, however, facilitate direct sharing between Japan and South Korea—instead uses the US as an intermediary—highlighting the depth of their bilateral grievances.

Following the DPRK’s most recent provocations, President Barack Obama was able to bring together President Park Geun-hye and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe for a trilateral summit to discuss how to manage the North Korean threat. On 18 April, the South Korean Army Chief of Staff visited Japan and met with the Japanese Defence Minister to discuss strengthening defence exchanges in light of the North Korean challenge.

Provocation by North Korea combined with US facilitation as a mediator has therefore proven to be the recipe for increased defence diplomacy between Japan and South Korea. But it’s unclear whether Pyongyang’s growing nuclear capability will be able to spur meaningful and sustained developments in the security realm—North Korean provocations aren’t the only concern for either country. In all likelihood, the Japan–South Korean relationship will fail to keep pace with the quickening tempo of intra-Asian defence cooperation. And given the potential this relationship has to reshape Northeast Asian security dynamics, that’s a difficult pill to swallow.

The US released its Cybersecurity National Action Plan on 9 February, which will see the US government invest US$19 billion in cybersecurity in the 2017 budget. The overall intent of the plan, noted by President Obama in a new editorial for The Wall Street Journal titled ‘Protecting US Innovation from Cyberthreats’, is to retain the US’ competitive advantage in cyberspace, enabling the US to gain the maximum possible commercial and economic benefits.

The plan consists of both short-term actions to improve public and private cybersecurity capacity, and long term recommendations to investigate ways to shore up the future cybersecurity of the country. Specific actions identified include the establishment of a Federal Chief Information Security Officer (although only a relatively paltry salary is on offer), a new Commission on Enhancing National Cybersecurity, a campaign to encourage the use of multifactor authentication and the establishment of a National Centre for Cybersecurity Resilience to provide a test environment for critical infrastructure operators. Criticism has been levelled at the passive defence focus of the strategy, and they’ve called for a renewed deterrence approach that inspires fear of retribution in America’s cyber enemies.

The US also saw the release of the report ‘Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community’, by Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, which ranked cyber espionage as the second highest threat to US security, after terrorist attacks in the US. In his congressional testimony on the report, Clapper singled out Chinese and Russian spies for targeting critical information systems and warned that North Korea probably retains the capability and intent to conduct disruptive cyber activities.

A little closer to home, China, Russia and Indonesia have been blamed for a steep rise in attempts to hack the Australian Government’s Intra-Government Communications Network (ICON). In response, security agencies have sought funding to roll out encryption technology from the bean counters at Finance who considered selling the network last year, but according to Cameron Stewart from The Australian, the funding hasn’t been forthcoming.

The Russian cyber threat may have prompted its neighbour Finland to propose amendments to its national security legislation that would allow its intelligence services and armed forces to conduct ‘offensive’ cyber operations. Another Russian neighbour, Ukraine, recently concluded its investigation into the December hacking of its power grid and while avoiding directly blaming Russia, noted that the hackers had used Russian ISPs and made phone calls within Russia. Ukrainian Deputy Energy Minister Oleksander Svetelyk told Reuters that the attack had been well planned and coordinated, and had possibly taken six months to prepare. Russian hackers are also a concern for the European Union and NATO, who last week agreed to increase information sharing on cyber threats between the CERT-EU and NATO’s Computer Incident Response Capability.

In the UK, a legal challenge of the Government Communications Headquarters’ (GCHQ) authority to conduct cyber espionage both overseas and in the UK has failed. It did, however, force GCHQ to confirm that they do conduct such activities. A case brought to the Investigative Powers Tribunal by human rights advocacy group Privacy International alleged that GCHQ’s operations breached European law, however the tribunal found that the legal framework that GCHQ operates under adequately balances privacy and intelligence requirements, and didn’t breach the European human rights convention.

And finally, the South Korean government has raised its cyber attack alert level to three (out of a possible five) this week, warning of the increasing threat of a North Korean cyber attack. The Information Operations Condition alert system had previously been raised from five to four only last month after the North Korean nuclear test. The most recent increase is likely tied to the DPRK’s latest long range rocket test.

North Korea has delivered a major blow to freedom of expression in the US and emboldened Internet hackers everywhere by successfully coercing Sony Pictures into axing the release of its new film, The Interview. The movie, which is about a plot to assassinate Kim Jong-un (and looks terrible), was due to premiere on Christmas Day but now won’t be shown in theatres. The decision was made in response to a massive malware attack on Sony, claimed to be the most damaging cyber attack ever on an American company and included threats of 9/11-magnitude violence on cinemagoers.

The attack, which the FBI has linked to North Korea, has been called an ‘act of war’ by Senator John McCain and labeled ‘cybervandalism’ by President Barack Obama. In response to the attack, the US is considering putting North Korea back on the list of state sponsors of terrorism while Republicans are calling for a restoration of sanctions lifted under the Bush Administration. So, what else can be done? A number of responses have been proposed, including prevention and punishment.

On the prevention side, cyber security experts and North Korea analysts have recommended that businesses fortify their Internet security through encrypting data and creating stronger passwords and safeguards as well as making an IT security team a vital component of their organisations (which Sony didn’t do). Read more

Kim’s back on deck, albeit walking with a cane. His reappearance yesterday brought to an end a 40-day absence from public view, during which speculation ran rampant about what might have caused it. In response to his reappearance, international media seem to have set aside half-wishful thoughts that he might have been overthrown and returned to a theme of all’s-well-that-ends-well in Pyongyang. But it’s worth unpacking the issue of the missing Kim just a little more. True, no regime change occurred. Still, the absence was so poorly handled by the North there might well be other issues in play here besides Kim Jong Un’s health. Perhaps future absences beckon. In any event, Kim’s health matters—it’s tied up with both his authority in North Korea and the broader issue of the post-Kim North Korea.

During the leader’s absence from public view, North Korean media suggested that Kim was undergoing a course of medical treatment and had been experiencing ‘discomfort’. Speculation about the source of that discomfort ran thick and fast, including gout, diabetes, strained tendons, and ankle injuries. But given the unusual political circumstances of North Korea—Kim’s a young dictator trying to lock down his succession in a country about whose inner-circle politics we know almost nothing—it’s not entirely surprising that other, more sinister, explanations also received an airing. It’s probably true that if Kim Jong Un’s going to be toppled, that’ll occur while he’s still settling into the job—because if he makes it through the early years he’ll probably be there for decades. So any unexplained absence of the leader is bound to draw attention—hence the occasional bursts of black humour that Kim’s discomfort might have been caused by a ‘nine-millimetre headache’. Read more