Tag Archive for: Marshall Islands

Micronesia as headline fodder in the US–China contest

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In the context of world events, an announcement that US President Joe Biden would sign agreements with Pacific island nations may not seem to be headline news. However, when those agreements are framed as a counter to China, many pay attention. Events in the Pacific islands region these days are analysed for how they contribute to great-power politics. For example, the US official announcing Biden’s plans later said that Washington ‘was playing … a little bit of catch-up’ in the diplomatic contest with Beijing.

The media headlines are closely following the ‘pushing back against China’ storyline. Observers characterised Biden’s planned trip to Papua New Guinea to sign agreements with Prime Minister James Marape and renew aspects of the Compacts of Free Association with Micronesian states as ‘nice work from the White House as it surrounds China’s upstart dictatorship in the Solomons’. But while the PNG security agreements had some novel aspects, the Micronesian compacts got lumped in with them, even though the security portions of the compacts were not the direct subject of negotiation.

Praising the signing of ‘security pacts’ with Micronesia is a celebration of deeds already done. There was really nothing new. What does it say about the media’s narrative on US–China competition when old news is news?

Each of the Freely Associated States of the Pacific—the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Republic of Palau—has had a Compact of Free Association with the US for at least 30 years. Under the agreements, the COFA states delegate to the US government ‘full authority and responsibility for security and defense matters’, including the establishment of bases (and the denial to others of the right to do so).

These security and defence rights were not the ‘agreements’ being talked about in the recent counter-Chinese narrative. The arguably irrevocable US defence prerogatives are the basis of the US interest in the COFA states. But the excessive self-congratulations about an agreement to counter China occupied only media space, since the US already occupies the legal space that gives it access to the COFA states.

The agreements that were to be signed by the US and COFA representatives in May were formalities related to existing arrangements. Memorandums of understanding had been entered into in February and the specific agreements to be signed had been initialled by US and Marshall Islands negotiators earlier in the week (and for Palau a week later). All the discussion about ‘security pacts’ to be signed was more about headline fodder for the US president’s planned visit to the Pacific than it was a substantive security watershed. (In the end, the debt crisis in the US forced Biden to cancel his trip to PNG, and Secretary of State Antony Blinken went in his stead.)

The nature of the agreements belies the fragility of the tale being spun. They are not about blunting China, but rather the amount of compensation the US will provide to the COFA states. In short, what is at issue is the level of economic support the US will extend to COFA states over the next 20 years.

Not insignificantly, the US government has served as the senior partner in a ‘privileged relationship’ with the Micronesian states for more than 75 years. Over this period, the development outcome for the Micronesian states has been less than optimal. The World Bank has listed the Federated States of Micronesia and Marshall Islands as two of six Pacific island states at high risk of debt distress, and all three COFA states have long been identified by US government auditors as dependent on US assistance for the limited program budgets they provide their citizens.

Make no mistake, these new agreements are a big deal to the COFA states. They need the support. But the signed agreements do not guarantee the monies. They merely establish a baseline that the US executive branch has submitted to Congress for approval and appropriation. In this regard, the agreements are a handoff to a body whose recalcitrance on the matter of US debt sidelined the president himself from attending the signing in PNG. Time will tell whether Congress acts positively on these agreements.

The basic context surrounding the COFA states underlines the need for the media to look beyond government releases or official statements. The storyline of a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ drowns out important details that are central to understanding what is actually happening in Oceania. As a result, a narrative focused on ‘security’ dominated the news cycle. Most importantly, it masked the essential point: the renewal of key US economic support for the COFA states is still a long way from being realised.

The false ‘security’ narrative perpetuates an experience that island states know too well. Being treated as pawns is what many in the Pacific expect from global powers. If, however, the struggle between great powers is really about the ideas of rule of law versus authoritarianism, Pacific island nations deserve better than being treated as headline fodder.

The question the media needs to answer on US–China competition is whether the treatment of ‘the least of these’ is a harbinger for us all.

The Marshall Islands mini-state plot and the price of sovereignty in the Pacific

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Last week’s news of a Chinese couple’s audacious plot to set up a mini-state in the Republic of the Marshall Islands by allegedly bribing members of parliament and officials was deeply disturbing: if successful, it could have seen the creation of a ‘semi-autonomous region’ on the remote Rongelap Atoll to expand foreign access to the Marshall Islands, according to reports.

Even more absurd than the scheme itself was how far the pair were able to get before they were busted. As reported by the BBC, a bill supporting the plan actually made it into parliament in 2018, where it was defeated by then president Hilda Heine’s government. Heine went as far as to accuse the bill’s promoters of working for China to turn the Marshalls into a ‘country within a country’. However, after Heine’s loss in the 2019 election, the new parliament endorsed the concept in 2020, paving the way for its establishment.

As it is often rightly argued, island countries’ sovereignty and their right to do business with whomever they please should be respected. However, this case demonstrates that sovereignty can put at risk by the very people entrusted with safeguarding it, which is why any such dealings should not be above question, and scrutinising them should not be seen, or portrayed, as a breach of sovereignty.

According to the charge sheet, Cary Yan and Gina Zhou bribed several Marshall Islands lawmakers with US$7,000 to US$22,000 to support the scheme. Yan also invested in a private business venture on behalf of one official, who then appointed Yan as a ‘special adviser’ on Rongelap. Both Yan and Zhou became naturalised Marshall Islands citizens.

Despite the seriousness of the case, the Marshall Islands government has ignored opposition calls for clarification, which is puzzling; in such situations, a quick and unequivocal response can help clear the air and allay undue suspicions. On the other hand, a non-responsive attitude creates public distrust and disquiet—particularly when it’s a question of threats to territorial integrity by a potentially corrupt, treasonous undertaking.

Contrary to Heine’s claims in 2018, there is no clear indication of China’s direct involvement, although the charge sheet indicates a typical Chinese strategy of conducting business by building personal connections, sometimes with elements of chequebook diplomacy. Besides cash bribes, the accused paid for the travel, accommodation and entertainment of Marshallese lawmakers to Hong Kong for a conference to establish the ‘Rongelap Atoll Special Administration Region’. One official gave a speech in praise of the concept.

This tactic is reminiscent of ‘elite capture’, often associated with the Chinese state and Chinese businesses, with the two elements said to operate in concert. Some Pacific commentators argue that the ambitions of Chinese businesses are often closely intertwined with the ambitions of the state.

Although the involvement of Chinese state officials is unclear at this stage, there’s no denying that the Marshall Islands would be a prime target and major prize for them. The country is one of only 13 that maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan, and, for China, it would be a major scoop to persuade it to defect, especially after having coaxed Solomon Islands and Kiribati to switch sides in recent years.

On top of this, the Marshall Islands’ Compact of Free Association with the United States is due to expire next year, and Washington has made it a priority to renew the longstanding treaty. Among other things, the compact guarantees the US free and open military access to the Marshalls, while denying others the same rights.

Given the stakes, it’s not inconceivable that China would try to gain influence in the Marshall Islands, especially in the context of recent developments in the region, such as Kiribati’s decision to ditch Taiwan, rewarded with a US$66 million Chinese grant, followed by its shocking move to lift the moratorium on commercial fishing in the Phoenix Islands. When Kiribati withdrew from the Pacific Islands Forum in July, its former president Anote Tong quipped that something was ‘cooking’ between Beijing and Tarawa, while opposition leader Tessie Lambourne was adamant that China influenced the decision.

Likewise, in Solomons Islands, claims by an ABC Four Corners report that a Chinese state-owned company was negotiating to buy a deep-water port and World War II airstrip raised deep suspicions. Like the Marshall Islands case, there were allegations of bribery and influence buying, with Four Corners purporting to show documents of a Chinese slush fund that dispersed nearly US$365,000 directly to MPs loyal to Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare. Head of Solomon Islands Transparency International Ruth Liloqula claimed: ‘China is keeping this government together. We all assume that China is remotely controlling the government and Solomon Islands affairs.’

While China denied the allegations and an angry Sogavare threatened a national ban on foreign journalists, the Four Corners’ claims are not easily dismissible given China’s involvement in chequebook diplomacy in the region. That said, the topic of China in the Pacific is a delicate one that’s not helped by speculation. The media don’t always get it fully right, such as reports of alleged Chinese attempts to develop a deep-water port in Vanuatu. However, playing down Chinese actions in the Pacific, and underestimating Beijing’s ambitions and power, is quite risky as well.

Evidence of the impact of China’s activities in the other regions of the world is clear and it would be naive to believe that the Pacific is somehow different and immune to trends gripping other countries where China is active.

If anything, the Marshall Islands case indicates that while national sovereignty is sacrosanct, it shouldn’t be allowed to be used as a shield to deflect legitimate questions—especially by those who may be prepared to trade national sovereignty for personal gain. In other words, national sovereignty cannot be divorced from the reality that crucial decisions in a country are often the prerogative of a few elite, potentially bribable leaders who operate in secrecy, can circumvent the wishes of the people and don’t always act in the national interest.