The attacks against Hezbollah using weaponised pagers and walkie talkies serve as a stark reminder of the dangers of compromised supply chains and why Australia must secure its own against the threats from China.

While the full details about the devices are yet to emerge, the operation—presumed to be carried out by Israel though not declared as such—indicates what could happen if supply chains were exploited in more subtle but equally insidious ways. For nations like Australia, the consequences could be just as catastrophic.

While infiltrating electronic supply chains is not a new tactic, these incidents highlight the dramatically growing sophistication of supply chain attacks. Prior to this operation, the most famous one was the Shin Bet’s 1996 assassination of Hamas’s chief bombmaker, Yahya Ayyash, using a rigged mobile phone.

With rising geopolitical tensions, particularly involving China, the risk of compromised hardware bound for Australia is alarmingly real, particularly considering China’s industrial capacity to produce at mass quantities.

China, as the world’s largest maker of electronic devices, plays a pivotal role in the global supply chain. But its dominance raises concerns, especially given its growing assertiveness and accusations of espionage and sabotage. There are genuine fears that China could exploit its control over the supply chain to insert vulnerabilities into hardware bound for Australia, whether for surveillance or sabotage.

A much-debated Bloomberg article of 2018, ‘The Big Hack’, brought hardware-based supply chain attacks into the public consciousness, citing Chinese involvement in planting microchips in American servers. Although the report’s validity remains contested, classified intelligence has long suggested that China’s role in compromised supply chains represents a significant and ongoing threat. While awareness of these threats has grown, action to mitigate them has not kept pace.

As early as 2011, the US Department of Defense warned that supply chain vulnerabilities were a ‘central aspect of the cyber threat’, stressing that over-reliance on foreign factories ‘provides broad opportunities for foreign actors to subvert US supply chains’. More than a decade later, this warning is more relevant than ever. Yet little progress has been made to secure critical infrastructure components that remain vulnerable to supply chain threats.

In Australia, the challenge is even more pressing. As a nation that relies heavily on imports for essential goods, from consumer electronics to military hardware, the potential for supply chain interdiction looms large, especially given that much of this equipment is manufactured in China.

Some action has been taken in the software sector, including by Australia and other countries prohibiting the involvement of Chinese suppliers in 5G networks due to concerns about disruption of critical telecommunications infrastructure. But securing one sector or one piece of software must be replicated in all sensitive areas and across both software and hardware.

Electronic devices such as routers, phones and even cars could be compromised at any stage in their journey from the manufacturer to the end user. Interdiction attacks, where hardware is tampered with during transport, are not difficult to execute, especially along complex shipping routes.

The consequences of such breaches extend beyond malfunctioning devices. Compromised electronics can open the door to espionage, sabotage and cyber-attacks, with potentially catastrophic implications for national security. If malicious actors, especially those backed by states, tamper with hardware on a large scale, they could gain access to sensitive data, disrupt critical infrastructure or even disable essential services.

Given these growing threats, Australia must take urgent action to safeguard its supply chains. One critical step is reducing dependence on Chinese manufacturing by investing in local production. For years, Australia has relied on foreign factories, particularly in China, for vital goods. While this reliance has driven down costs, it has exposed the country to risks of foreign tampering. Diversifying supply chains and building capabilities domestically and with close friends will reduce China’s leverage and improve Australia and the regions’ security.

But domestic production alone won’t solve the problem. Australia must also implement more rigorous inspection and testing protocols for imported goods. Currently, shipments pass through multiple jurisdictions, leaving opportunities for tampering along the way. Such advanced technologies as blockchain-based tracking systems can ensure shipments remain untampered with during transport, while hardware integrity testing can catch compromised devices before they reach critical infrastructure.

While no single measure will eliminate the risk of supply chain attacks, a combination of strategies can significantly reduce the danger. This will include strengthening domestic manufacturing, enhancing import inspection protocols, collaborating with trusted allies and adopting cutting-edge security technologies. The threat posed by compromised supply chains, particularly from China, is real. These vulnerabilities only become more urgent as the geopolitical situation becomes more volatile.

The recent events in Lebanon shouldn’t be seen only as distant and against a terrorist organisation but rather a stark reminder of what can happen when supply chains are compromised. For Australia, the stakes are too high to ignore. By taking proactive steps now to secure our supply chains from potential threats the country can protect our critical infrastructure, safeguard our national security, and ensure our future remains in our own hands, not China’s.

On 9 August in South Lebanon, a routine patrol of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was attacked by civilians. In the course of the incident, their vehicles were set on fire and their weapons and equipment seized. The event was exceptional: UNIFIL rarely encounters this level of violence from the local population. But there’s more to the story than random civilian violence.

In an age in which obtaining local cooperation for foreign militaries is viewed as a useful, if not essential, part of a successful peacekeeping operation, the case of the UNIFIL mission and the hunt for Hezbollah’s weapons provide useful insights into the limits of civil–military cooperation (CIMIC).

Since the six-week war between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006, the UNIFIL force based in South Lebanon has been tasked with overseeing the implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1701, which has three main objectives: maintaining security on the Blue Line between Lebanon and Israel (a line of withdrawal that constitutes the current border); reintroducing the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to South Lebanon; and clearing South Lebanon of weapons other than those of the Lebanese government.

While the first two tasks have been well managed by the force, it is the third that tests the limits of UNIFIL’s comprehensive CIMIC program. The mission, composed of around 40 nationalities, conducts many CIMIC activities at both mission and battalion levels. For example, it provides free medical and dental care; emergency hospital treatment; funding for infrastructure; classes in yoga, English, cooking and computer skills; and schemes to aid the local economy, such as training in organic agriculture and training for medical staff.

Civilian relations with UNIFIL are good. The local population appreciates the material and technical benefits the mission provides and values the highly responsive nature of the force. The Blue Line is generally respected by locals, and the UNIFIL–LAF relationship is described by both parties as highly productive and congenial.

But when it comes to searching for Hezbollah arms, UNIFIL is caught in the crosshairs of a domestic and international political conflict that it is unable to resolve. The international community would like UNIFIL to fully execute all of its objectives and rid the area of Hezbollah. At the local level, however, many civilians don’t want Hezbollah to give up its weapons. They believe that only Hezbollah can guarantee their security, not UNIFIL, and not the LAF, which, while respected, is regarded as underequipped. As one local councilman I interviewed put it, ‘It’s not that we don’t want our national army to defend us from Israel, but, until now, only Hezbollah has managed to do that for us.’

The debate over Hezbollah’s weapons is also a national one. The Lebanese government is split on the issue. One side, known as the March 14 movement, insists that Hezbollah’s military wing must disband and hand its weapons over to the LAF. Hezbollah argues that the LAF doesn’t have the military training and expertise to present a credible deterrent to Israel.

Hezbollah also suspects that the March 14 movement would use its own weapons against it to destroy the group. That suspicion isn’t entirely unreasonable: WikiLeaks documents revealed that during the 2006 war, elements within the movement were discreetly advising the Israelis where to hit Hezbollah the hardest. Hezbol­lah also argues that the movement is soft on Israel and can’t be trusted to use the LAF against Israel to ensure that Lebanese sovereignty is respected. In other words, Hezbollah argues that it can’t be confident that the state would put its weapons to good use if it were to hand them over.

For UNIFIL, patrolling and searching for unauthorised weapons is a delicate task. Although the LAF is broadly supportive of the mission, it also has to accept that Hezbollah is a legitimate elected part of the Lebanese government, and in fact the dominant faction, to which the LAF ultimately has to answer. Hezbollah’s leader, Hasan Nasrallah, refuses to separate the group’s military wing from its political wing.

UNIFIL’s inability to search private property in South Lebanon, where weapons are believed to be kept, isn’t just due to local support for the group and the risk of blowback in the form of attacks on patrolling troops. As the strategic partner of the LAF, UNIFIL needs to maintain good relations, but the LAF is also sensitive about its relations with the local population, especially in the south where it didn’t patrol until 2006.

Not only does the LAF have to consider its political masters in Beirut, but it’s also reluctant to search property without first obtaining a court order. This issue dates back to the civil war when the LAF was criticised for commandeering private property illegally. Concern for its own status and legitimacy in Lebanon renders the LAF unwilling or unable to conduct raids on civilian property.

The delicate balance of deterrence and cooperation required in peacekeeping is a unique one. But, ultimately, UNIFIL through its CIMIC and civil affairs activity in South Lebanon has established local credibility, but not local legitimacy. The local population hasn’t internalised the goals of the mission sufficiently to actively assist UNIFIL in searching for and destroying Hezbollah’s weapons. What’s been generated by CIMIC instead is a contingent and conditional relationship with the local population based on material self-interest.

That’s not a bad thing in and of itself, and this relationship enables UNIFIL to patrol in relative safety and prevent escalations on the Blue Line, which ultimately helps maintain peace and security in South Lebanon. But the limits of CIMIC are clearly revealed in this case, and raise the question of whether it’s ever really possible for a foreign force to obtain local legitimacy when there’s no national consensus over who the bad guys really are.