Tag Archive for: Donald Trump

Trump’s meaning for America, win or lose

See Donald Trump as a symptom, not a cause.

Trump has a massive ego, the appetites of a supreme narcissist and the language of a fascist. But he has a finely tuned popular antenna that has again taken him to the gates of the White House. He is an extraordinary symptom of tectonic shifts in geopolitics and geoeconomics.

Win or lose on 5 November, Trump as a phenomenon tells us much about where the United States is heading as ‘the dysfunctional superpower’.

If he wins, Trump will have another four years to turn the popular mood into policy. In defeat, though, Trump is still a symptom that signposts the future. The trends he expresses will endure to shape the temperature and tone of US politics and foreign policy.

Trump revolutionised the Republican Party. America’s conservative party is transformed into a more rabid beast. Republican grandees shake their heads in woe and wonder. America’s trade policy is remade, even as US economic influence in Asia declines. The protectionist consensus is at its strongest in American politics since the Great Depression, nine decades ago. The economic instinct feeds an isolationist mood that will push at US strategy and alliances. The one international question that unites Washington is the new cold war with China.

Turn to a couple of Republican grandees to see how this shapes America’s future. The ‘dysfunctional superpower’ label is from Robert Gates, who served as defence secretary in both Republican and Democrat administrations (an unimaginable double in these fevered times).

Gates fears that a divided America has no long-term strategy to prevail in the struggle with Russia, China, North Korea and Iran. He judges that ‘dysfunction has made American power erratic and unreliable, practically inviting risk-prone autocrats to place dangerous bets—with potentially catastrophic effects.’

The diagnosis from Condoleezza Rice, national security adviser and secretary of state to president George W Bush, is that the ‘new four horsemen of the apocalypse—populism, nativism, isolationism, and protectionism—tend to ride together, and they are challenging the political centre.’

Rice says the US needs an internationalist president, explaining ‘what the world would be like without an active United States’. Looking beyond Cold War II, Rice sees analogies with today’s dilemmas in

the imperialism of the late nineteenth century and the zero-sum economies of the interwar period. Now, as then, revisionist powers are acquiring territory through force, and the international order is breaking down. But perhaps the most striking and worrying similarity is that today, as in the previous eras, the United States is tempted to turn inward.

Globalisation may not be dead, but the Trump symptom says it’s ailing. The US has given up on free trade. In the region that matters to Australia, the Indo-Pacific, the US has gone AWOL on trade issues since Trump withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership the day he became president in 2017.

Trump’s campaign promise this time is to boost tariffs on all US imports by 10 percent and increase tariffs on China by 60 percent. A Republican candidate who gets his history from television brandishes the beggar-thy-neighbour protectionism of the 1930s.

Asia wants the US to help achieve strategic balance, not deliver trade war. A rich new era of Asian commerce arrives, marked by the decline of US economic influence. As Asia trades with itself, China wins, trumping the US almost by default.

The ‘stark reality’ is that the US ‘will not be a partner in East Asian regionalism or show leadership on trade and global economic governance, for at least the next few presidential terms’, according to Peter Drysdale and Liam Gammon, writing in the East Asia Forum. The Democrats have offered no intellectual response to the slide into protectionism, Drysdale and Gammon observe, so Trump has defined the policy terrain:

The ‘America First’ trade policy has won a strategic victory over the past eight years, shifting the US bipartisan consensus towards the idea that globalisation was a lousy deal for Americans.

The Trump effect has pushed at Washington’s Blob in profound ways. The Blob was an Obama-era description of the settled outlook of the foreign policy establishment. Trumpism points to generational change in the Blob’s operation. This is one of the deep differences between Joe Biden and Trump.

In foreign policy, Biden has repaired alliances and delivered traditional sermons on America’s central role in the world. Yet he will be the last US president whose policy instincts are rooted in Cold War I. In contrast, one of Trump’s few consistent messages is that the US was stupid to spend all its blood and treasure overseas while allies got a free ride. ‘No more lousy deals,’ he proclaims.

The generation that is stepping into the top jobs in Washington was in high school or heading to university when Cold War I toppled with the Berlin wall in 1989. Their understandings are shaped by the 9/11 attacks, America’s longest war in Afghanistan and the Iraq morass. For 20 years, until the last American aircraft left Afghanistan in August 2021, US soldiers were at war.

Trump’s message is that the era of war and global responsibility is over. And that view will weigh on America’s course, even if Trump fails.

Former defence minister and ambassador to the US: ‘If Trump is elected, will Australia need a plan B?’

If you are leader of an Australian political party, prime minister, defence minister, foreign minister or Ambassador to the US, the opening paragraph on a speech on the Alliance will contain a reference to our ‘shared values’. These usually include democracy, the liberal international order, respect for sovereignty and commitment to peace aided by mutual military support.

Donald Trump does not share these values, neither do many of his supporters. When last in office he struggled to free himself from these precepts. He was held to them by people he appointed to office and by the Republican leadership in Congress. If elected this year he has made clear his contempt for the US Constitution, and for democracy.

Trump has made clear his admiration for authoritarian leaders, and his understanding he was hampered by supporters of these values last time. He has expressed an intention to wreak vengeance on those who have hindered or stood against him. He has a team around him he’s determined to place in positions in departments, the military and intelligence who share his contempt for loyalty to the Constitution. His first attack will be on institutions like the Justice Department and the FBI. But those other institutions will also get his and his team’s attention.

What has happened in the Congress foreshadows this. The Republican leadership in the House had been traduced and the majority have been politically emasculated. If he is elected, a Republican majority in the Senate is all but assured. The Western alliance at its core will be rattled. Those reliant on American support will be in a state of confusion. Trump will believe his support for Russia’s President Vladimir Putin has been vindicated.

It’s difficult to envisage him defending Taiwan. Those around him however and in Congress are very hostile to China and Xi Jinping. Xi will need to be cautious, despite what will appear to be an opportunity. Trump’s supporters may educate him on the critical importance of Taiwan, particularly as its semiconductors are vital to American industry.

President Biden has been particularly aware that, though powerful, the US does not have unilateral primacy in the Indo-Pacific. He believes American interests are advanced by its alliances and its friendship with powers like India, Vietnam and Indonesia which are essential in his view to balance China.

Trump’s advisors don’t share these views though their default response, no matter how unrealistic, will be to seek to restore that primacy. For them the plan to provide Australia with nuclear-powered and conventionally armed submarines (SSNs) under Pillar 1 of the AUKUS agreement with Britain and the US is an anathema if it slows American capacity before it reaches a force of over 60 SSN now slated for achievement in the late 2050s.

They recognise that SSNs and ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) are at the heart of American military power. They have little ownership of AUKUS though Republicans in majority in Congress support it. They have little ownership of it and Trump would likely see the agreement as Biden writ large.

Most US opinion polls now point to a Trump victory. The only useful thing on the horizon is that the exit polls in the primaries have indicated around 25% of Republicans would not support Trump and would either vote against him or not vote. Were that to transpire, Trump would not win.

A majority of Democrats supported Biden strongly in the primaries but consider him too old and are not particularly enamoured of his vice president. As one friend points out to me the ultimate result will be determined by whichever group of voters is the greater—those who think Biden too old, and those who think Trump too unstable. That is, it seems, a choice between which negative sentiment proves to be the greater.

If it turns out that Trump’s negatives are fewer than Biden’s, we will have a lot to think about. Trump has a proven capacity to direct Republicans in Congress. Senate Leader Mitch McConnell, resistant to Trump, has taken himself off the chess board.

The problem for Australia is that the US has not been so critical to Australia’s defence since World War II as it is now. Conversely Australia has not been so important to the US as it is now. One of the aims of the 1987 defence white paper was to have a force able to defend Australia in its area of direct military interest without burdening the US. The US would provide critical equipment and intelligence. This was effectively achieved in the 1990s.

Then we drifted. The force provided for the emergencies we confronted when we handled the Timor crisis and provided useful forces for the Middle East commitments, not just in Afghanistan. We arguably peaked in the third phase of the battles arising from the Iraq war, the struggle with ISIS when we provided for a time the second largest foreign contingent.

We played a role with the Pentagon to add to the ‘training’ and ‘assist’ mission, accompanying the Iraqi force in action. Throughout, the Royal Australian Navy played a useful role in patrolling the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea.

In the contemporary era and issues involving our direct defence, we find ourselves with a force not adequate for the task. We’ve discovered the consequences of years of underfunding.

At the time of the 1987 white paper, spending was 2.5%-3% of GDP. That was a continuation of levels set in the 1970s after being at 4% during the Vietnam War. The figures were not targets, just reporting what had become normal. In 1994, the objective was set at 2%, effectively an unwarranted peace dividend. However, this figure was seldom achieved and not at all in the new century until the last defence budget.

Though now spending at 2% is the level the US (and Trump) requires of its allies, it does not defend us. The new focus for the government in the defence review and decisions taken by the government on the new surface fleet and the SSNs put in place what appears needed. But its timetable stretches to the late 30s and 40s.

In the meantime, we depend on the US. No one should kid themselves about this. The US will be needed for a long time—and no one has a better idea that does not require unsustainable expenditures.

At the same time the US has discovered the value of Australia to its own defence needs. Pine Gap has developed massively as the capacity of the technologies it serves have increased exponentially. The two more recent joint facilities in Exmouth are important for American space activities. More significantly the northern bases developed from the 1980s and the naval facility in Western Australia are now vital for the US posture in the Western Pacific. They provide another angle on activities involving China. Deft use of them across our vast North gives them a higher survivability than many US bases elsewhere in the zone. As the US has become more important to us, we have something of a character of a Western Pacific last bastion.

Will all this be clear to Trump? Critical for us will be his response to the SSN project. This raises genuinely hard questions for the Americans. Not the deployment of SSN from Stirling but the timetable and perhaps the principle of our acquisition of US SSNs.

While Congress is favourably disposed to AUKUS and the programme there is much unease there. For Australia to acquire the boats and not deplete US numbers requires a production rate of 2.3 Virginia class boats per year. The new bloc V version of the Virginia class (which is too big for us) is required to replace the capability of four SSBNs converted for conventional missiles now being retired from service. Tonnage of submarines produced is not diminished it is increasing substantially, but the numbers to be produced are challenging.

When these 10,000 ton block V vessels end production they’ll be replaced by the SSNX which is more like the weight of the Bloc 4 variant we are acquiring. The SSNX would make a good AUKUS submarine but that is very unlikely to happen. However, when the US reaches that stage, producing  2.3 submarines per year would be easily achievable. The number of workers at construction locations in Connecticut and Newport News needs to keep increasing but some in Congress are asking for a slower pace to ease production pressure.

That would be damaging. The most knowledgeable Congressman on submarines in the US is Joe Courtney and he campaigns against anything that is not full speed. He says ‘AUKUS is in a good place right now but I don’t think we should assume it will last forever. Time and inertia are the enemy’.

The SSNs might be the least of our worries with a Trump administration. The relevant agencies may be caught up in the Trump revenge. The knock-on impact on capability and policy could be considerable. With our new plans, small finances and dependence on the US, we will be challenged. Trump will be a chaos president and we could pass from view. Plan B would be difficult to evolve, and it would be very expensive.

Former defence minister and ambassador to the US: ‘If Trump is elected, will Australia need a plan B?’

If you are leader of an Australian political party, prime minister, defence minister, foreign minister or Ambassador to the US, the opening paragraph on a speech on the Alliance will contain a reference to our ‘shared values’. These usually include democracy, the liberal international order, respect for sovereignty and commitment to peace aided by mutual military support.

Donald Trump does not share these values, neither do many of his supporters. When last in office he struggled to free himself from these precepts. He was held to them by people he appointed to office and by the Republican leadership in Congress. If elected this year he has made clear his contempt for the US Constitution, and for democracy.

Trump has made clear his admiration for authoritarian leaders, and his understanding he was hampered by supporters of these values last time. He has expressed an intention to wreak vengeance on those who have hindered or stood against him. He has a team around him he’s determined to place in positions in departments, the military and intelligence who share his contempt for loyalty to the Constitution. His first attack will be on institutions like the Justice Department and the FBI. But those other institutions will also get his and his team’s attention.

What has happened in the Congress foreshadows this. The Republican leadership in the House had been traduced and the majority have been politically emasculated. If he is elected, a Republican majority in the Senate is all but assured. The Western alliance at its core will be rattled. Those reliant on American support will be in a state of confusion. Trump will believe his support for Russia’s President Vladimir Putin has been vindicated.

It’s difficult to envisage him defending Taiwan. Those around him however and in Congress are very hostile to China and Xi Jinping. Xi will need to be cautious, despite what will appear to be an opportunity. Trump’s supporters may educate him on the critical importance of Taiwan, particularly as its semiconductors are vital to American industry.

President Biden has been particularly aware that, though powerful, the US does not have unilateral primacy in the Indo-Pacific. He believes American interests are advanced by its alliances and its friendship with powers like India, Vietnam and Indonesia which are essential in his view to balance China.

Trump’s advisors don’t share these views though their default response, no matter how unrealistic, will be to seek to restore that primacy. For them the plan to provide Australia with nuclear-powered and conventionally armed submarines (SSNs) under Pillar 1 of the AUKUS agreement with Britain and the US is an anathema if it slows American capacity before it reaches a force of over 60 SSN now slated for achievement in the late 2050s.

They recognise that SSNs and ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) are at the heart of American military power. They have little ownership of AUKUS though Republicans in majority in Congress support it. They have little ownership of it and Trump would likely see the agreement as Biden writ large.

Most US opinion polls now point to a Trump victory. The only useful thing on the horizon is that the exit polls in the primaries have indicated around 25% of Republicans would not support Trump and would either vote against him or not vote. Were that to transpire, Trump would not win.

A majority of Democrats supported Biden strongly in the primaries but consider him too old and are not particularly enamoured of his vice president. As one friend points out to me the ultimate result will be determined by whichever group of voters is the greater—those who think Biden too old, and those who think Trump too unstable. That is, it seems, a choice between which negative sentiment proves to be the greater.

If it turns out that Trump’s negatives are fewer than Biden’s, we will have a lot to think about. Trump has a proven capacity to direct Republicans in Congress. Senate Leader Mitch McConnell, resistant to Trump, has taken himself off the chess board.

The problem for Australia is that the US has not been so critical to Australia’s defence since World War II as it is now. Conversely Australia has not been so important to the US as it is now. One of the aims of the 1987 defence white paper was to have a force able to defend Australia in its area of direct military interest without burdening the US. The US would provide critical equipment and intelligence. This was effectively achieved in the 1990s.

Then we drifted. The force provided for the emergencies we confronted when we handled the Timor crisis and provided useful forces for the Middle East commitments, not just in Afghanistan. We arguably peaked in the third phase of the battles arising from the Iraq war, the struggle with ISIS when we provided for a time the second largest foreign contingent.

We played a role with the Pentagon to add to the ‘training’ and ‘assist’ mission, accompanying the Iraqi force in action. Throughout, the Royal Australian Navy played a useful role in patrolling the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea.

In the contemporary era and issues involving our direct defence, we find ourselves with a force not adequate for the task. We’ve discovered the consequences of years of underfunding.

At the time of the 1987 white paper, spending was 2.5%-3% of GDP. That was a continuation of levels set in the 1970s after being at 4% during the Vietnam War. The figures were not targets, just reporting what had become normal. In 1994, the objective was set at 2%, effectively an unwarranted peace dividend. However, this figure was seldom achieved and not at all in the new century until the last defence budget.

Though now spending at 2% is the level the US (and Trump) requires of its allies, it does not defend us. The new focus for the government in the defence review and decisions taken by the government on the new surface fleet and the SSNs put in place what appears needed. But its timetable stretches to the late 30s and 40s.

In the meantime, we depend on the US. No one should kid themselves about this. The US will be needed for a long time—and no one has a better idea that does not require unsustainable expenditures.

At the same time the US has discovered the value of Australia to its own defence needs. Pine Gap has developed massively as the capacity of the technologies it serves have increased exponentially. The two more recent joint facilities in Exmouth are important for American space activities. More significantly the northern bases developed from the 1980s and the naval facility in Western Australia are now vital for the US posture in the Western Pacific. They provide another angle on activities involving China. Deft use of them across our vast North gives them a higher survivability than many US bases elsewhere in the zone. As the US has become more important to us, we have something of a character of a Western Pacific last bastion.

Will all this be clear to Trump? Critical for us will be his response to the SSN project. This raises genuinely hard questions for the Americans. Not the deployment of SSN from Stirling but the timetable and perhaps the principle of our acquisition of US SSNs.

While Congress is favourably disposed to AUKUS and the programme there is much unease there. For Australia to acquire the boats and not deplete US numbers requires a production rate of 2.3 Virginia class boats per year. The new bloc V version of the Virginia class (which is too big for us) is required to replace the capability of four SSBNs converted for conventional missiles now being retired from service. Tonnage of submarines produced is not diminished it is increasing substantially, but the numbers to be produced are challenging.

When these 10,000 ton block V vessels end production they’ll be replaced by the SSNX which is more like the weight of the Bloc 4 variant we are acquiring. The SSNX would make a good AUKUS submarine but that is very unlikely to happen. However, when the US reaches that stage, producing  2.3 submarines per year would be easily achievable. The number of workers at construction locations in Connecticut and Newport News needs to keep increasing but some in Congress are asking for a slower pace to ease production pressure.

That would be damaging. The most knowledgeable Congressman on submarines in the US is Joe Courtney and he campaigns against anything that is not full speed. He says ‘AUKUS is in a good place right now but I don’t think we should assume it will last forever. Time and inertia are the enemy’.

The SSNs might be the least of our worries with a Trump administration. The relevant agencies may be caught up in the Trump revenge. The knock-on impact on capability and policy could be considerable. With our new plans, small finances and dependence on the US, we will be challenged. Trump will be a chaos president and we could pass from view. Plan B would be difficult to evolve, and it would be very expensive.

Australia is entitled to express its views on US politics and policies

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese will soon head to Washington DC for his first bilateral visit. He’ll arrive into a feverish political climate ahead of next year’s presidential election. As that approaches, Australia and other democracies that consider themselves friends to the United States must forgo the timid approach of refusing to comment on other countries’ political campaigns.

While the reticence is well founded and based on principles of sovereignty and avoiding foreign interference, it is not in Australia’s interests to persist with an inflexible view that US elections are a matter only for Americans.

Decisions made in Washington affect the rest of the world, both adversaries and allies. As a close and trusted ally, Australia is entitled to views on policies that affect us. To be clear, we should not look to influence the election outcome or tell Americans for whom they should vote. Rather, we should express frank views on policy ideas—whether on security, trade or the environment—that are contrary to our interests and to principles that underpin an open and stable world, even if that’s read as tacit criticism of particular candidates.

It might carry some diplomatic risk, but that is dwarfed by the prospect of dangerous foreign policy decisions being made in Washington. As John F. Kennedy said, ‘There are risks and costs to action. But they are far less than the long-range risks of comfortable inaction.’

What messages need to be delivered? Above all, do not give up American sovereignty and liberty—as some candidates risk doing by taking positions effectively drafted in Moscow and Beijing. Importantly, do not give your enemies and rivals what they want. Do not give up Ukraine and do not cripple NATO—there’s a reason that Russia hasn’t invaded a single NATO country. And definitely do not give up Taiwan against the will of the Taiwanese to the authoritarian will of Beijing and, as Germany’s Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock has simply but accurately said, the ‘Dictator’ Xi Jinping.

American independence doesn’t mean isolation. The US must maintain its international leadership among open and democratic nations and use its unrivalled power to support the international rules-based order. Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles was right when he told ASPI’s conference last month that we should all encourage the US to continue upholding the rules whose establishment it led after the horrors of World War II.

We also need to be willing to change our approach when the times change. Information and therefore debates are global. We are in a period of renewed strategic competition in which critical technologies—including in the information domain—are central.

It makes no sense for America’s friends to stay out of the debate when its adversaries are so heavily involved.

We learned with shock in 2016 that it wasn’t only American voices participating in American politics. Russia had been up to its elbows trying covertly to influence the outcome of that year’s election and undermine trust in democracy. America’s friends cannot be silent onlookers while its adversaries meddle. We will always distinguish ourselves by being open and transparent about our involvement—contrasted with Moscow’s and Beijing’s covert interference—but we cannot be absent.

Silence and inaction from the US’s friends would only allow rivals such as Moscow, Beijing, Tehran and Pyongyang to have the playing field to themselves. We would not be a good friend to Americans or serve our own national interest if we merely exclaimed our disbelief and disappointment after US election campaigns.

Therefore, we should remind Washington that it has historically been clear-eyed about the threat of foreign interference. As one of America’s founders, Alexander Hamilton, wrote so aptly in 1788 in Federalist paper 68, the ‘most deadly adversaries of republican government’ come ‘chiefly from the desire in foreign powers to gain an improper ascendant in our counsels’.

It is ironic that some Republican candidates—from a party with ideological roots in liberty and limited government—fulminate against excessive US government power and influence, only to adopt the extreme and false views of foreign governments, especially Russia’s. Hence vaccine mandates equal tyranny, and NATO provoked Moscow into its illegal war against Ukraine. That is not free will or freedom from government control—it’s being beholden to the will of foreign adversaries.

As Abraham Lincoln said, ‘We all declare for liberty; but in using the same word we do not all mean the same thing.’

It should be telling that Moscow and Beijing want Donald Trump or one of his political descendants such as Vivek Ramaswamy in power. Yes, the Trump administration put in place some strong policies constraining Beijing’s malicious behaviour, but it wasn’t led by Trump himself. It was the tenacity of the officers around him, like National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster and his deputies, Nadia Schadlow and Matt Pottinger, Defence Secretary Jim Mattis and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mark Milley. Beijing, and Moscow, want Trump without such responsible officials. And most likely that is what they would get: Trump turned savagely on most of these patriots for what he saw as their disloyalty to him.

Authoritarians recognise the benefits of a president who would abandon principle and adopt their transactional approach to foreign policy. As much as Trump fancies himself a dealmaker, international politics is different from business, and historically the Chinese Communist Party has dealt better than most. Beijing thinks Trump might be willing to give up America’s support for the status quo in Taiwan for a trade deal.

But principle matters in foreign and defence policy, which is why the objective should always be the long-term security of the nation as opposed to short-term economic prosperity. As Thomas Jefferson counselled: ‘In matters of style, swim with the current. In matters of principle, stand like a rock.’

It isn’t just Trump and the Republicans. Robert F. Kennedy Jr, a Democrat turned independent challenger to President Joe Biden, is getting almost all of his campaign policies straight out of Moscow’s playbook, claiming that the CIA killed his uncle, that 5G technology and vaccines are bad for you, and that Russia has legitimate security interests in invading Ukraine.

The concerns of allies and friends ought to have some bearing on American thinking. In Australia’s case, we have fought alongside the US in every major conflict for more than a century. We have not only the right but the obligation to speak up when our greatest ally and strategic partner falters. The same goes for the other Five Eyes nations and NATO. Just as the US is entitled to demand that NATO partners invest more responsibly in defence, those partners have the responsibility to speak truthfully to Washington.

A stronger stance also answers those critics who demand a more ‘independent’ Australian foreign policy (usually code for exiting America’s orbit). They are actually raising the wrong objection. No country in the modern world can go it alone, even superpowers, which is why China and Russia have signed their ‘no limits’ partnership. The answer is to involve ourselves more in the political debates that set US direction globally and help shape international outcomes.

Again, we should be open and overt. Our job is not to stop Trump getting elected but to ensure that, if he or one of his political successors does end up in the Oval Office, we have sent a clear signal to the US that its friends internationally—on which even a country as large and powerful as the US relies—will push back when policies and decisions destabilise the world and empower authoritarians.

The US has proudly been the land of the free and the home of the brave. Long may that be true.

Canberra’s man in Washington for ‘Trumpageddon’

When an Australian jumps out of a taxi and prepares to make a dash across New York’s 5th Avenue, the habit of a lifetime is to look the wrong way for the traffic.

Australia drives on the left; America drives on the right. It’s a simple metaphor for the many different ways of looking and moving of the two nations.

Rushing for a late-night drink in the city that never sleeps, Australia’s ambassador to the US, Joe Hockey, stopped his taxi by Central Park and dashed across the avenue, checking in the Oz direction.

That ‘near-fatal error,’ Hockey observes, was ‘like so many who think they understand America’.

Luck and quick reactions spared the ambassador an obituary about a culture-clash smash on 5th Avenue. Thus, last Wednesday, Hockey could release Diplomatic, a memoir of his time as our man in Washington from January 2016 to January 2020.

He starts with the big truth that shapes the life of any Oz representative in Washington: history has ‘made America fundamentally different from us’.

‘Many demons,’ Hockey writes, lurk ‘in the American psyche’. And that’s where the discussion of ‘inherent differences’ ends. The Hockey emphasis is on the ‘long and friendly history’ between the US and Australia:

It’s a bit like a successful marriage: we like each other a lot, we are not identical and do not always agree; however, we have shared our lives over many years. We are loyal to each other and we really enjoy each other’s company.

Hear the voice of the happy warrior who is Joe Hockey. Even after 19 years as a federal MP, culminating as treasurer from 2013 to 2015, Hockey departed Canberra with few enemies. His broad smile served him well in politics as it did in diplomacy. In both games, half a deal usually beats a duel.

Hockey went to Washington because his dream to become prime minister was dead. His luck deserted him in the series of political car crashes that marked the Liberal Party death struggle between Tony Abbott and Malcolm Turnbull.

The chapter headed ‘Goodbye, Canberra’ has a subhead reference to ‘politics at its worst’, and the smile dims as he lets fly: ‘Within our [Abbott] government, there were too many who were more focused on polls than policy. The sickness of populism afflicts the weak. That didn’t stop them from engaging in duplicity and deceit.’

Ah, politics is a treacherous trade played for the highest stakes. Who knew? Lucky only volunteers enter.

The happy warrior notes that for 17 of his 19 years in the pit he was fortunate to be in the front line (on the government or opposition front bench) and, despite the nastiness, he enjoyed it immensely.

From Washington, Hockey did most of his work with Canberra on a secure phone, talking to the prime minister, ministers and department heads. Others in Australia’s embassy wrote the ‘cables’ that are a central expression of the existence of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (acting as circulatory system and thinking process).

Hockey’s Canberra understandings (‘the sharpest knives always come from your own side’) explain that phone preference—‘given my past life as a politician, if I wrote any cables, I couldn’t rely on all the people reading them not to share them with the media’. A well-directed leak can sink you. As Hockey notes, Britain’s ambassador to the US had to resign in 2019 after a London leak of his cables claiming that President Donald Trump ‘radiates insecurity’ and describing the White House as ‘clumsy and inept’.

Hitting Washington at the start of 2016 for the final year of Barack Obama’s administration, Hockey witnessed the close but not familiar relationship between President Obama and Prime Minister Turnbull: ‘Both men had a healthy love of detailed intellectual discourse—especially their own. Like two history professors discussing dialectical materialism, their conversation was eye-watering but hardly warm.’

Then comes the chapter headed simply ‘Trumpageddon’. On the Hockey telling, he read the signs of the presidential campaign and started building bridges to Trump, while Canberra was in denial till the votes came in.

Hockey says Trump ‘was one of the most authentic political candidates I had ever seen’, even though he was ‘confronting, rude and naive’. When he later spent time with the president, even on the golf course, The Donald was constantly questioning, churning through ideas and trying out lines:

Most political leaders are narcissists. They not only need to be the centre of attention, they often think they are the smartest people in the room. They also have fantastic egos. They believe they can charm the leg off a billiard table with their quick wit and nice smile. Enter Donald Trump.

Hockey describes a White House that lacked leadership and leaked like a sieve, with everyone competing for Trump’s attention and approval. The leaking meant the Washington Post quickly got the transcript of the president’s notorious phone conversation with Turnbull on 28 January 2017, a week after the inauguration.

Turnbull needed Trump to commit to the deal struck with Obama for the US to accept refugees Australia had exiled to Nauru and Manus Island. Trump berated Turnbull over a ‘dumb deal’ and the ‘worst deal ever’.

When Hockey answered the phone and spoke with Turnbull ‘straight after the conversation, he was shaken. His voice was quivering and he was clearly upset.’

Hockey says the Trump–Turnbull call was ‘disastrous’. The ambassador put on his politician’s helmet and marched into the White House to argue the dangers of a ‘massive deterioration in the alliance’. The public crisis—‘the madness that followed the leaked phone call’—offered a chance to lock in the deal. The strong foundations of the alliance, Hockey says, ‘can’t be undermined by the whims of a leader’.

Thinking like a politician, Hockey launched a campaign with a strong story: ‘100 years of Mateship’, marking the two countries’ shared military history. ‘Australia is the only country in the world to fight side by side with the United States in every major conflict’ since the Battle of Hamel on the Western Front in 1918.

Mateship is a complicated concept for Australia, and the campaign got plenty of criticism in Oz for being blokey or subservient. For America, though, mateship struck a chord and Hockey says it became a ‘successful touchstone’. Certainly, mateship seemed to work with The Donald. ‘After the disastrous first phone call,’ Hockey writes, ‘Australia went on to have a series of political and economic wins during the Trump presidency.’

Hockey exalts that the mates theme was embraced by President Joe Biden in his address marking the 70th anniversary of the ANZUS alliance: ‘Through the years, Australians and Americans have built an unsurpassed partnership and an easy mateship grounded on shared values and shared vision.’

The Hockey prediction is that Biden will not run for a second term as president. And he links that with a prediction that Trump, too, is unlikely to run: ‘Apart from his age [Trump will be 78 in 2024], and the likelihood the Democrats will seek to legally bar him from running, I don’t think he could bear the prospect of losing again.’

With questions in the air about both Trump and Biden, Hockey judges, ‘America hasn’t been in such a precarious position for a long time.’

The worst presidential foreign policy blunders under Clinton, Bush, Obama and Trump

A common intellectual parlour game is to rank American presidents in order of greatness. Abraham Lincoln, George Washington, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Theodore Roosevelt have long reigned supreme in the top four slots in C-SPAN’s survey of presidential historians. Switching angles and timeframe, although few question the US decision to exit Afghanistan, few defend how it was done. The calamitous domestic political consequences will be matched by lasting damage to the US’s global reputation and interests. This prompts the question: what were the single worst blunders by recent presidents?

Answers will vary from one analyst to the next depending on the criteria used and will be vigorously contested. As a professor with some real-world experience, using long-term consequences for the world as the chief measure, my choices would be the Kosovo intervention for Bill Clinton, the Iraq War for George W. Bush, Barack Obama’s drone policy, and Donald Trump’s decision to exit the Iran nuclear deal.

The peaceful manner in which the Cold War ended, with the defeated power acquiescing to the terms of its defeat, assenting to the new order and seeking accommodation and integration with the victors, is rare in history. Liberated from the yoke of totalitarian communism, Russians welcomed the prospect of good relations with the West. That goodwill was spurned and lost, and suspicions of Western intent and good faith were rekindled instead with the unilateral NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999. It marked the moment when Russia turned from a potential NATO partner into an implacable adversary once again.

A badly weakened Russia, America’s only nuclear-weapons peer with a considerable potential for mischief, learned the lesson, bided its time and patiently worked its way back into being a spoiler in Europe and the Middle East. Assurances that NATO wouldn’t expand even ‘one inch eastward’ were betrayed in Kosovo and again in Ukraine in 2014. The West repeatedly rubbed Russia’s nose in the dirt of its historic Cold War defeat, dismissive of its interests and complaints. Yet now Western leaders act surprised that Russia carries a grievance and reacts like any great power would when strategic rivals engineer hostile takeovers in its front garden.

Even Westerners supportive of the Kosovo intervention were sharply divided over the Iraq War. The consensus now ranks it among the worst foreign policy mistakes in US history. The invasion mutated into occupation, insurgency and civil war that took a grim toll, with 4,500 US soldiers killed and a total cost of US$3.5 trillion. The US expended the most blood and treasure, but the biggest strategic victor was Iran. The war both fuelled the fire of jihadism and distracted attention from the war on terror. It painfully demonstrated the limits of hard power and greatly eroded US soft power.

My Obama selection is more abstract but no less real for that. He greatly expanded the policy of drone strikes without addressing what legal regime governs the new tools of warfare. Does targeted killing represent an extraterritorial extension of the normative authority of the state to cover gaps in the existing legal order, or is it a covert attempt to breach the limits of the legal competence of a state over conduct in foreign jurisdictions?

Drone dependency grew owing to its convenience. Drones have greater endurance, cost less, reduce the risk to US soldiers to zero, kill fewer innocent civilians and can be flown for long hours over treacherous, inhospitable terrain and vast distances. It was seductively faster, less complicated and more expedient to eliminate enemy terrorists than to capture, arrest and try them.

Several studies by the New America Foundation, the Bureau of Investigative Journalism and US news agencies CNN and McClatchy concluded that only a tiny minority of those killed in the strikes were high-value militant leaders. Most were low-level followers and innocent civilians. An exhaustive study by the law schools of Stanford and New York universities concluded that the strikes had traumatised and terrorised an entire population and violated the requirements of distinction, proportionality, humanity and military necessity under international humanitarian law.

Yet the evidence that drone strikes made America safer overall was ambiguous, for they created martyrs and acted as a recruiting motor for jihad by expanding the pool of angry and twisted young men. They undermined respect for the rule of law and international legal protection and set dangerous precedents even as lethal drone technologies were being developed by several countries. Might Beijing use them some day against domestic violent protests—which China denounces as terrorism? Against Tibetan activists holding meetings in Nepal? What if China eliminated the Dalai Lama in a drone strike?

Only time will tell if Trump made the right call in affirming the will and measures to check the expansion of China as a malign great power, or if he pushed the US into the Thucydides trap of a catastrophic war with China. From the long list of his error-strewn foreign policy decisions, my choice of the worst is the decision to exit from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action that had contained Iran’s suspected nuclear weapon program. The robust dismantlement, transparency and inspections regime had drastically cut back sensitive nuclear materials, activities, facilities and associated infrastructure; and opened up Iran to unprecedented international inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which to the end continued to certify Iran’s compliance with the deal.

By jettisoning the JCPOA and imposing tough new sanctions on Iran and secondary sanctions on anyone dealing with Iran in prohibited items, Trump freed Tehran of the plan’s restrictions. In successive decisions since then, Tehran has increased the uranium stockpile, limited inspections, acquired the more advanced IR-6 centrifuges, and increased the quantity and purity of its enriched uranium to 20% instead of the 3.67% limit under the JCPOA. So much for getting a better deal through ‘maximum pressure’.

Having earlier broken unilateral assurances to Russia on NATO’s geographical limits, the breach of a six-country international agreement unanimously endorsed by the UN Security Council further underlined US untrustworthiness. This damaged America’s credibility with its major European allies, China and Russia. And it undermined efforts to reach an agreement on North Korea’s denuclearisation, as Pyongyang understandably demands major and irreversible US concessions upfront and ironclad guarantees downstream.

Editors’ picks for 2020: ‘Australia’s electoral system isn’t immune to US-style conspiracy theories’

Originally published 24 November 2020.

Three weeks after Americans went to the polls, the morass of conspiracy theories and disinformation surrounding the election and its results continues to grow. Although the US is half a world away, Australians don’t have the luxury of watching this maelstrom as uninterested observers.

The conspiracy information ecosystem is highly international, and here in Australia conspiracy groups are often dominated by narratives and content emerging from the US. As the conspiratorial tidal wave swamps America, ripples are already reaching Australia—and are likely to have implications for our own elections in 2022.

Since around mid-March, Australians have witnessed incredible growth in the spread of conspiracy theories. While this content has spread largely online, conspiracy-fuelled anti-lockdown protests and arrests around the country, particularly in Melbourne, have demonstrated its ability to translate into unrest and conflict in the offline world.

Many of these conspiracy theories originate in the US. Even the most cursory glance through the major Australian conspiracy groups turns up a plethora of content related to US politics. Both the QAnon and sovereign citizen conspiracy theories that have played a prominent role in Australian anti-lockdown protests started in the US and have since spread around the world.

Screenshot of pro-Trump content shared in Australian conspiracy Facebook group targeting Victorian Premier Daniel Andrews.

Support for President Donald Trump in defiance of his election loss has even manifested itself in the form of skywriting over Sydney touting false claims of voter fraud. There was also a small pro-Trump protest in Sydney, which organisers reportedly claimed was not linked to Falun Gong, despite the simultaneous Falun Gong rally being held metres away and the copies of the Epoch Times being handed out to the pro-Trump protesters. According to the New York Times and others, Falun Gong and the Epoch Times have helped to promote a range of pro-Trump conspiracy theories.

Variants of the conspiracy theory that the US voting system was hacked by the CIA, which have been directly and repeatedly promoted by Trump himself, have also expanded to include Australia. US conspiracy theorists have claimed that the CIA used the same technique to manipulate elections in other countries around the world, including Australia.

Screenshot of YouTube video promoting the conspiracy theory that countries outside the US have also had elections hacked by the CIA.

All of this goes to show that while Australians may not be the intended targets of the conspiracy theories swirling about the US election, some of it amplified by the current president and his team, Australians are nonetheless being swept up and carried along on the tide of disinformation.

Australian policymakers and political leaders alike should be paying attention. In much the same way that the confluence of conspiracies between the US and Australia means that triggering events such as bushfires spark the same conspiracy theories, we should assume that the conspiratorial storm lashing the US’s electoral process will have implications for our own elections in 2022.

These conspiracy theories will undoubtedly manifest in different ways. Differences between Australian and American voting systems, such as Australia’s use of paper ballots and pencils, will make some conspiracy theories such as hacked voting machines or SharpieGate difficult to maintain, even for those with only a loose attachment to reality. The thing about conspiracy theories is that they are almost infinitely malleable, however. They will adapt to the Australian context.

We may, for example, see claims that computers into which vote counts have been entered have been hacked, or that mail-in votes have been ‘stolen’. We will almost certainly see conspiracy theories about George Soros, a favourite bogeyman of many fringe right-wing figures, as some sort of sinister hidden hand behind the Australian Greens, activist group GetUp! and potentially the Australian Labor Party.

We should probably anticipate that the growing nexus between the fringe right-wing and fringe anti–Chinese Communist Party actors—perhaps best exemplified by the alliance between Steve Bannon and Guo Wengui—will lead to particular individuals or groups being falsely accused of being agents of Chinese influence or somehow under the sway of the CCP, or that the election has been ‘hacked by China’. Such fabricated allegations and smear tactics may muddy the waters, making it more difficult for security agencies to investigate any real efforts at interference.

It’s unlikely that the tenor of the conversation in Australia’s elections will reach the fever pitch of the current US debate, in which one poll found 52% of Republican voters incorrectly believe that Trump is the rightful winner of the election. A major contributor to this widespread disinformation is the complete abdication of responsibility by the Trump administration and many Republican leaders to state clearly and unequivocally that Joe Biden has won the election.

You’d hope Australian politicians from all parties would not be so profoundly negligent, or prove to have such a weak commitment to democratic values and processes. However, there are some worrying signs. Some high-profile Australian public figures have appeared to give credence to Trump’s baseless claims of electoral fraud.

At least publicly, the government has been slow to respond or to stop even its own MPs from spreading conspiracy theories. On 21 November, for example, George Christensen posted a video to his Facebook page on the groundless, technologically incoherent conspiracy theory targeting the Dominion Voting system.

Screenshot of Facebook post on George Christensen’s official Facebook page.

Conspiracy theories are corrosive. They erode trust and confidence, in this case in some of the most crucial systems and institutions which uphold democratic societies. At this very moment, we are witnessing the damage which failing to address this problem when it was smaller and (somewhat) more manageable is doing to the US. The polarisation, mistrust and political gridlock which will arise as a direct result from conspiracy theories and disinformation spread during this election will harm the US both domestically and on the international stage, and it will take many years to rebuild the faith of millions of Americans in the basic democratic processes of their nation.

This is not a road Australia wants to go down. There are steps we can take now to help us avoid it. This includes building trust in the electoral system through awareness campaigns to educate the public on the voting process, how their votes are counted and what steps are being taken to ensure systems are secure.

Perhaps most importantly, however, it means speaking out swiftly, strongly and publicly against purveyors of conspiracy theories and disinformation about elections—regardless of who they are, or which party they belong to.

Australia’s electoral system isn’t immune to US-style conspiracy theories

Three weeks after Americans went to the polls, the morass of conspiracy theories and disinformation surrounding the election and its results continues to grow. Although the US is half a world away, Australians don’t have the luxury of watching this maelstrom as uninterested observers.

The conspiracy information ecosystem is highly international, and here in Australia conspiracy groups are often dominated by narratives and content emerging from the US. As the conspiratorial tidal wave swamps America, ripples are already reaching Australia—and are likely to have implications for our own elections in 2022.

Since around mid-March, Australians have witnessed incredible growth in the spread of conspiracy theories. While this content has spread largely online, conspiracy-fuelled anti-lockdown protests and arrests around the country, particularly in Melbourne, have demonstrated its ability to translate into unrest and conflict in the offline world.

Many of these conspiracy theories originate in the US. Even the most cursory glance through the major Australian conspiracy groups turns up a plethora of content related to US politics. Both the QAnon and sovereign citizen conspiracy theories that have played a prominent role in Australian anti-lockdown protests started in the US and have since spread around the world.

Screenshot of pro-Trump content shared in Australian conspiracy Facebook group targeting Victorian Premier Daniel Andrews.

Support for President Donald Trump in defiance of his election loss has even manifested itself in the form of skywriting over Sydney touting false claims of voter fraud. There was also a small pro-Trump protest in Sydney, which organisers reportedly claimed was not linked to Falun Gong, despite the simultaneous Falun Gong rally being held metres away and the copies of the Epoch Times being handed out to the pro-Trump protesters. According to the New York Times and others, Falun Gong and the Epoch Times have helped to promote a range of pro-Trump conspiracy theories.

Variants of the conspiracy theory that the US voting system was hacked by the CIA, which have been directly and repeatedly promoted by Trump himself, have also expanded to include Australia. US conspiracy theorists have claimed that the CIA used the same technique to manipulate elections in other countries around the world, including Australia.

Screenshot of YouTube video promoting the conspiracy theory that countries outside the US have also had elections hacked by the CIA.

All of this goes to show that while Australians may not be the intended targets of the conspiracy theories swirling about the US election, some of it amplified by the current president and his team, Australians are nonetheless being swept up and carried along on the tide of disinformation.

Australian policymakers and political leaders alike should be paying attention. In much the same way that the confluence of conspiracies between the US and Australia means that triggering events such as bushfires spark the same conspiracy theories, we should assume that the conspiratorial storm lashing the US’s electoral process will have implications for our own elections in 2022.

These conspiracy theories will undoubtedly manifest in different ways. Differences between Australian and American voting systems, such as Australia’s use of paper ballots and pencils, will make some conspiracy theories such as hacked voting machines or SharpieGate difficult to maintain, even for those with only a loose attachment to reality. The thing about conspiracy theories is that they are almost infinitely malleable, however. They will adapt to the Australian context.

We may, for example, see claims that computers into which vote counts have been entered have been hacked, or that mail-in votes have been ‘stolen’. We will almost certainly see conspiracy theories about George Soros, a favourite bogeyman of many fringe right-wing figures, as some sort of sinister hidden hand behind the Australian Greens, activist group GetUp! and potentially the Australian Labor Party.

We should probably anticipate that the growing nexus between the fringe right-wing and fringe anti–Chinese Communist Party actors—perhaps best exemplified by the alliance between Steve Bannon and Guo Wengui—will lead to particular individuals or groups being falsely accused of being agents of Chinese influence or somehow under the sway of the CCP, or that the election has been ‘hacked by China’. Such fabricated allegations and smear tactics may muddy the waters, making it more difficult for security agencies to investigate any real efforts at interference.

It’s unlikely that the tenor of the conversation in Australia’s elections will reach the fever pitch of the current US debate, in which one poll found 52% of Republican voters incorrectly believe that Trump is the rightful winner of the election. A major contributor to this widespread disinformation is the complete abdication of responsibility by the Trump administration and many Republican leaders to state clearly and unequivocally that Joe Biden has won the election.

You’d hope Australian politicians from all parties would not be so profoundly negligent, or prove to have such a weak commitment to democratic values and processes. However, there are some worrying signs. Some high-profile Australian public figures have appeared to give credence to Trump’s baseless claims of electoral fraud.

At least publicly, the government has been slow to respond or to stop even its own MPs from spreading conspiracy theories. On 21 November, for example, George Christensen posted a video to his Facebook page on the groundless, technologically incoherent conspiracy theory targeting the Dominion Voting system.

Screenshot of Facebook post on George Christensen’s official Facebook page.

Conspiracy theories are corrosive. They erode trust and confidence, in this case in some of the most crucial systems and institutions which uphold democratic societies. At this very moment, we are witnessing the damage which failing to address this problem when it was smaller and (somewhat) more manageable is doing to the US. The polarisation, mistrust and political gridlock which will arise as a direct result from conspiracy theories and disinformation spread during this election will harm the US both domestically and on the international stage, and it will take many years to rebuild the faith of millions of Americans in the basic democratic processes of their nation.

This is not a road Australia wants to go down. There are steps we can take now to help us avoid it. This includes building trust in the electoral system through awareness campaigns to educate the public on the voting process, how their votes are counted and what steps are being taken to ensure systems are secure.

Perhaps most importantly, however, it means speaking out swiftly, strongly and publicly against purveyors of conspiracy theories and disinformation about elections—regardless of who they are, or which party they belong to.

Trump’s perilous approach to Afghanistan

The US presidential transition has generated much uncertainty not only for the American public, but also for many of America’s allies and adversaries around the world. Affected most acutely are the countries whose futures hinge on the outcome of what President Donald Trump might or might not do during the remainder of his presidency. Afghanistan is one of those states.

Trump has been eager to end America’s two-decade-long military involvement in Afghanistan before his term of office expires. His administration signed a peace agreement with America’s erstwhile enemy, the Taliban, in February. The deal essentially provided for withdrawal of US and allied forces from Afghanistan within 14 months, in return for a Taliban pledge that they would not allow Afghan soil to be used for hostile actions against the US and its allies. The deal also provisioned for the release of 5,000 Taliban prisoners from Afghan jails in exchange for 1,000 Afghan soldiers held captive by the Taliban.

Washington hailed the agreement as a pathway to an ‘inter-Afghan dialogue’ involving the Taliban and an Afghan government-led delegation for a lasting political settlement of the long-running conflict.

The agreement, however, is badly flawed. It was primarily designed to enable Trump to rapidly reduce American troops from 14,000 to 4,500. Yet, it didn’t commit the Taliban to a ceasefire or to curtail their operations against Afghan forces. Nor did it oblige the militia to engage in a genuine inter-Afghan dialogue. Similarly, it failed to take note of the fact that the Taliban had limited territorial control, mostly outside the main urban centres, and that the militia was still embedded with al-Qaeda, as has since been confirmed by US intelligence sources and the United Nations. Meanwhile, al-Qaeda and the Khorasan branch of Islamic State (which has claimed numerous deadly operations), not to mention many criminal gangs, have remained active across Afghanistan.

Although after months of delay the so-called inter-Afghan dialogue started in Doha on 2 September, no progress has been made so far. The two sides have become bogged down on procedural matters. The Taliban negotiators, who are intimately linked to Pakistan or, more specifically, its all-powerful military intelligence, have insisted on their peace agreement with the US as the basis for any discussion.

Their counterpart, led by the Afghan government, which was not a party to the US–Taliban peace deal, has deflected this with counterproposals. The emboldened Taliban have nonetheless maintained the mirage of a dialogue, while dramatically escalating their operations on the ground, inflicting an unacceptable and intolerable toll on Afghan forces and civilians, and expanding their territorial control.

The Afghan security situation has gone from bad to worse since the signing of the US–Taliban deal, and the Afghan government has, as usual, remained feeble and kleptocratic. Trump—despite warnings against further troop reduction by many high-ranking Republicans and military heavyweights, as well as NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg—has just ordered the exit of a further 2,000 US troops from Afghanistan. He has contended that the presence of a very small American force and the US intelligence network will enable the US to maintain its anti-terrorism operations in Afghanistan, irrespective of who governs the country and how it is governed.

Afghanistan has never been as vulnerable to more violence, bloodshed, insecurity, ethno-political and cultural divisions, widespread corruption and therefore a potential Taliban victory since the start of the US and NATO allied intervention in the country in 2001. All the US and international community investment in the country, made in blood and money, is now at serious risk.

President-elect Joe Biden has not been in favour of the continuation of America’s longest and most costly war either. But he is in agreement with many American political and military figures and seasoned analysts that the withdrawal should be a responsible one. In other words, he has favoured a pull-out in a manner that minimises the chances of a victory by the Taliban and their supporters, requiring the US and its allies to go back into Afghanistan to deal with new challenges, as they did in the case of Iraq in the event of the emergence of IS.

The suffering and traumatised Afghan people have longed for peace for four decades—since the April 1978 pro-Soviet coup in Kabul, followed by the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979—1989), the turbulent rule of the Western-backed mujahideen or Islamic resistance groups (1992–1996), the draconian theocracy of the Taliban and al-Qaeda (1996–2001), and finally the US-led intervention.

Yet, as the situation stands, the prospects for a return of peace, stability and security remain elusive for the Afghans and their region. Trump did not start the Afghan war, but the way in which he is disentangling the US from it may well prove to be very counterproductive.

Policy, Guns and Money: US election, economic coercion and women in peacekeeping

The Strategist’s national security editor, Anastasia Kapetas, speaks to Peter Hartcher, political editor and international editor at the Sydney Morning Herald, about the US election and the developments since, including President Donald Trump’s refusal to concede, the dismissal of Defense Secretary Mark Esper, and the disinformation that continues to spread across social media.

ASPI’s Michael Shoebridge speaks with David Uren, non-resident fellow with the United States Studies Centre, about his latest ASPI report, Economic coercion: boycotts and sanctions—preferred weapons of war. They discuss the tool of economic sanctions, the ways they are used by the US, and the challenges they can create for businesses, including Australian companies.

Lisa Sharland, head of ASPI’s international program, talks with Deborah Warren-Smith, manager of the Elsie Initiative Fund, to mark the 20th anniversary of the United Nations’ women, peace and security agenda. They discuss the work that the fund is doing to increase the participation of uniformed women in UN peacekeeping operations.

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