Tag Archive for: Donald Trump

Back to the Middle East, but at what cost?

They say timing is everything. This week I’ve been devouring the United States Studies Centre’s excellent new report, Averting crisis: American strategy, military spending and collective defence in the Indo-Pacific. It makes a convincing argument that in the face of an overwhelming threat posed by a rising and assertive China, the US is ill-prepared to meet the prospect of prolonged strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific.

Part of the reason for this ‘crisis of strategic insolvency’ is operational and resource overstretch. Two decades of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in the Middle East, combined with insufficient defence funding, has led to an ageing and atrophying US military. Now, with tensions running high between the US and Iran, there’s a risk that, rather than getting out of its Middle East commitments and focusing on capability development and operational readiness for a possible conflict with China in the Indo-Pacific, the US could be sucked into another Middle East quagmire that could be far more costly and lengthy than either Iraq or Afghanistan.

As a key US ally, Australia faces tough choices in prioritising its capability development and operational deployment decisions. So, the announcement by the Morrison government that Australia will send military assets and personnel to the Persian Gulf region to ensure freedom of navigation and protect vital shipping lanes, alongside the US and other allies, is important to consider in the broader context of our need to shift our operational priorities to focus on the Indo-Pacific.

The new deployment is not huge in scale or scope. Australia’s contribution will occur under Operation Manitou, which is the current name for the Australian government’s longstanding support for maritime security, stability and prosperity in the Middle East. The program has been going on, in one form or another, since before the 1991 Gulf War.

This new Australian deployment will be limited in scale and duration. It will consist of a single RAAF P-8 Poseidon maritime surveillance aircraft with a crew of 10 for a month before the end of this year; a RAN frigate with 177 crew for six months in early 2020; and a contingent of ADF personnel to be based in Bahrain to help coordinate with allies.

The government’s stated rationale for this decision is two-fold: safeguarding oil and gas supplies and preserving the rules-based international order. The concern is that any disruption to commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz by Iran, or its partners, could imperil Australia’s access to critical energy resources. In making the announcement, the prime minister noted that, ‘Fifteen to 16 per cent of crude oil and 25 to 30 per cent of refined oil destined for Australia transits through the Strait of Hormuz. So it’s a potential threat to our economy.’

Had the Morrison government, or, for that matter, previous governments, taken energy security seriously, the risks to Australia would not have been so great. The reality is that we’re woefully underprepared for a disruption to fuel supplies. Successive governments, both Coalition and Labor, have consistently ignored their international obligations to have at least a 90-day supply of fuel—we currently have just 28 days.

Now, with the risk of an interruption to commercial shipping and thus potentially to our energy supplies, the government has to act. Ensuring the uninterrupted flow of vital energy and fuel resources through the Strait of Hormuz demands Australia step up to that task rather than rely on others to carry the burden.

Related to the issue of energy security is the importance of maintaining our alliance with the US. With the prime minister heading off to Washington next month for meetings with President Donald Trump and other key figures in his administration, the strength of the alliance is uppermost in the minds of policy thinkers.

There are many ways we can achieve that goal. Following the recent AUSMIN dialogue, the government saw fit to silence any discussion of basing US medium-range missiles in northern Australia. This was in spite of the obvious benefits that Australia’s vast north offers for basing mobile launchers compared with Guam or Okinawa. Although the 4,000-kilometre-range ballistic missile currently under development by the US can’t reach China from Australia, a recent report from the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments noted that it could reach Chinese bases in the South China Sea if it were based in the Northern Territory.

For now, we have made the commitment to deploy additional forces to the Persian Gulf. And that sends a strong signal to Washington that we are not a ‘free-loader’ and we will share the burden with our most important ally in pursuit of common interests.

That’s all well and good. But if things go badly in the Middle East, and shots are fired, drawing the US and others into prolonged conflict against Iran, Australia would likely be drawn in as well.

The scope and duration of ADF deployments could then rapidly expand, which would consume our resources and attention, diverting us away from the most important challenge, which is, of course, China. It’s the very essence of the problem that the USSC report highlights.

Democracies in danger

By abruptly revoking the special, constitutionally protected status of Jammu and Kashmir, India has become the latest major democracy to act against a minority community for short-term political popularity. Kashmir will henceforth be ruled more directly from the government in New Delhi, and Hindu nationalists are thrilled. Carefully maintained constitutional arrangements are in tatters.

Meanwhile, in the United Kingdom, Prime Minister Boris Johnson has committed to leaving the European Union with or without a ‘backstop’ protecting the border arrangements between British-ruled Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. His hardline position ignores the concerns of Northern Irish constituents entirely. It is geared toward rallying his pro-Brexit English base, even if that means threatening the fragile peace and prosperity in Ireland.

In another of the world’s great democracies, President Donald Trump has upended America’s relationship with Mexico and other Central American neighbours and rallied his base by repeatedly demonising Hispanics. The US Hispanic community is now paying a harsh price for such rhetoric, as evidenced by the massacre in El Paso, Texas, this month.

The shredding of longstanding protections for minority communities is part of a wider trend in democracies around the world. Three worrying features stand out. First, politicians are imperilling the ‘public square’, and the ability of citizens to argue, demonstrate and debate without the threat of violence. Political leaders are deepening social divisions by pitting an ‘us’ against a ‘them’ that includes foreigners, neighbours, immigrants, minorities, the press, ‘experts’, and ‘the elite’.

In India, rights groups have accused Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party of creating a ‘climate of impunity’ for angry mobs. In America, many believe Trump is doing the same, pointing, for example, to his racist tweets targeting four Democratic congresswomen of colour. During the Brexit referendum campaign in the UK, Facebook users were targeted with posts suggesting that staying in the EU would leave Britain vulnerable to receiving 76 million Turkish immigrants. One leave campaign ad showed a surly foreign man elbowing a tearful elderly white woman out of a hospital queue. A recent survey suggests that there has been a disturbing increase in racially motivated abuse, discrimination and attacks against ethnic-minority Britons.

Second, having won power through democratic elections, these leaders are seeking to weaken independent institutions and checks on executive power. For example, Trump invoked national-emergency powers to secure funding for his wall on the US border with Mexico. Johnson refuses to rule out suspending parliament in order to deliver Brexit, while his chief adviser, Dominic Cummings, describes Britain’s permanent civil service as an ‘idea for the history books’. In India, a fellow BJP member has accused Modi’s government of ‘decimating’ India’s constitutional institutions, including the supreme court, the national investigative agency, the central bank and the electoral commission.

Abusing emergency powers or executive orders, sidelining parliament and government agencies, and weakening judicial independence and the ‘referees’ that ensure political leaders play by the rules make it more likely that government decisions will not balance the interests of all citizens. These attacks on the independence of institutions leave minorities particularly vulnerable.

Finally, there is a risk that political power in the world’s democracies is becoming more personalised. Patronage, personal influence and favours are being used to create loyalty to the leader, and those who fall out of favour are being bullied from office or arbitrarily fired. Political leaders are also making ever-bolder attempts to cow the media and business community into silence, or to co-opt them by offering special privileges.

Indeed, nine officials have resigned or been dismissed from Trump’s cabinet since 2017, and the president regularly uses Twitter (and even presidential pardons) to reward loyalty or to bully those who fall into disfavour. In the UK, Brexiteers’ attacks on the UK civil servant who was leading the negotiations with the EU became so aggressive that they elicited a highly unusual public statement from the acting cabinet secretary (telling those responsible that they should be ‘ashamed of themselves’). When Johnson became prime minister, 17 ministers were ‘purged’ and new members of the government were required to pledge support for his goal of leaving the EU at the end of October.

The personalisation of power replaces formal and fair processes with discretionary decisions and favours. It erodes the democratic principle that all citizens—including the head of state—are subject to the rule of law, and that politicians exercise delegated power, not a personal fiat.

Many voters have expressed outrage at the actions of Modi, Johnson and Trump. But many other democracies are in trouble, too. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte and Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro all stand accused of unconstitutional behaviour. Nonetheless, each man continues to fan divisions, weaken independent institutions and ignore open conflicts of interest, in many cases involving family members.

Shaming such leaders is unlikely to change their ways. They are all practised in blithely dismissing mistakes and shrugging off incendiary past statements, conflicts of interest, corruption allegations, lying and deception, and improper dealings.

Rather than relying on outrage, democrats around the world need to apply with rigour the rules that prevent the personalisation of power, while defending the institutions that protect individuals and minorities. Public officials shouldn’t be allowed to use their office to insulate themselves from accountability—through grants of immunity or presidential pardons to benefit friends and family members—or to hide evidence of their illegal behaviour. We all must insist on clear and inviolable standards of transparency regarding the private interests of those in public office.

India, the UK and America are each ‘model’ democracies: India is the largest, Britain has the ‘Westminster model’ and America has an extraordinary constitution. In each of these great democracies, minorities are under attack, as are the conventions that restrain executive power. Citizens in each country need to understand that if they don’t defend the institutions that protect minorities today, they themselves may come under attack tomorrow.

America needs to talk about China

Of all the changes in US foreign policy that President Donald Trump’s administration has made, the most consequential is the adoption of a confrontational stance towards China. Replacing a decades-old policy of engagement, Trump’s approach has not only resulted in an economic cold war between the world’s two largest economies; it has also raised the spectre of armed conflict in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait.

Within the first year of his presidency, Trump labelled China a strategic ‘competitor’ and ‘rival power’. But it’s not just Trump: for the US national security establishment and leading Republican members of Congress—as well as some Democrats—China represents the most serious long-term threat to America’s global pre-eminence and vital interests.

Geopolitics has been the primary cause of the rapid deterioration of US–China relations over the past two years, and Trump’s trade war must be viewed in this context. US tariffs may be focused on undermining China’s long-term economic potential, but the underlying motivation is to weaken China as a strategic rival.

This should be clear from the fact that, despite Trump’s economic justifications—protection of US businesses’ intellectual property and correction of the huge bilateral trade imbalance—his tariffs are likely to do serious harm to the US economy, as they unravel an economic relationship built over four decades. In substance, if not in name, America’s China policy has become entirely adversarial.

This shift has alarmed some of America’s most experienced China scholars and former policymakers. In an open letter, nearly 100 of them—including both Republicans and Democrats, and many vocal critics of Chinese policies and behaviour—recently called on Trump not to treat China as an enemy.

The American public seems largely to agree. There is, to be sure, widespread antipathy towards China throughout the United States: according to the Pew Research Center’s most recent survey on the matter (conducted in August 2018), only 38% of Americans view China favorably, while 47% view it unfavorably. But only 29% of respondents cited China’s military might as a cause for concern. A much larger share— 58%—are worried about its economic prowess. This suggests that, in the eyes of most Americans, the primary objective of relations with China should be to protect their livelihoods, not to initiate a geopolitical confrontation.

Yet a geopolitical confrontation seems to be precisely what the Trump administration is engineering—possibly at the expense of many Americans’ livelihoods. This disconnect reflects the extent to which the shift in America’s China policy has occurred out of the public’s view and without open debate.

Such a debate is urgently needed. Though the trade war has been dominating headlines since it began, much of the American public is unaware of the extent of the transformation in US policy towards China, which exposes their country to an open-ended conflict with what will soon be the world’s largest economy and its leading emerging power.

In a democracy, a government cannot pursue a long-term struggle with a powerful geopolitical adversary without sustained political support from an informed public. Special attention should be paid to young people (who, according to Pew, have a significantly more favourable view of China than their elders do), because they will bear the brunt of the costs of the unfolding Sino-American cold war.

For such a debate to be credible, the Trump administration will need to answer crucial questions about its China policy. First and foremost, what is the policy’s ultimate objective? Possible answers include modification of certain Chinese behaviours or policies, containment of Chinese economic or military might, or outright regime change.

The Trump administration would then have to explain how it intends to achieve its stated objective. Is ‘economic decoupling’, favoured by the China hawks in Trump’s orbit, an effective or feasible strategy? The authors of the open letter argue that US efforts to decouple China from the global economy ‘will damage [America’s] international role and reputation, and undermine the economic interests of all nations’. And could other countries—even traditional US allies—be convinced to support those efforts? Would the US be willing (or able) to go it alone?

Whichever policy it chooses, the Trump administration must be able to justify it. Last October, Vice President Mike Pence effectively declared ‘cold war’ on China in a blistering speech that contained a litany of accusations, including interference in US politics and oppression of its own people. What Pence—and the rest of the Trump administration—didn’t offer was a reasoned justification for America’s treatment of China as an existential threat.

The final question that must be asked concerns multilateral cooperation. To confront shared challenges—some of which, like climate change and nuclear proliferation, actually are existential threats—the world needs such cooperation more than ever. Can the US embrace a policy of confrontation towards China without precluding collaboration on issues where it is required?

The signatories of the open letter—as well as a slew of renowned economists, politicians and thinkers—have presented an informed and thoughtful statement of their collective views on China. The Trump administration must illuminate its own vision and goals to the people it is supposed to represent.

Should China help secure the Strait of Hormuz?

US President Donald Trump’s recent tweet on the Strait of Hormuz, in which he said that Asian countries ‘should be protecting their own ships’ prompts some serious questions—setting aside some customary Trumpian bravado and factual inaccuracy.

Since the US is set to become a net energy exporter, and has moved decisively away from energy dependence on the Middle East, should China be encouraged to take up the slack as a maritime security provider in the Strait of Hormuz, through which one-fifth of the world’s petroleum is still shipped?

How likely is it that strategic tensions in the Persian Gulf could precipitate a naval changing of the guard there, if an overstretched US Navy willingly hands the baton to the number-one importer of seaborne oil through the strait—China—which already boasts a bigger fleet?

However outlandish this scenario appears, a potential Chinese naval role in the Gulf is worth considering on its strategic and geo-economic merits.

China is the largest importer through the bottleneck strait in absolute terms, but its dependence on oil imports through the Gulf is nothing like the 91% Trump claimed. China’s overall dependence on Gulf oil is closer to 44%.

For Japan and South Korea, their relative reliance on Gulf petroleum, at around 88% and 82%, respectively, is significantly higher. As US allies, Washington is bound to approach them first on naval burden-sharing in the Middle East. Surprisingly, given that a Japanese tanker was recently targeted, Tokyo has announced that it has no plans to send its naval vessels to the Strait of Hormuz, according to Japan’s defence minister. India sources around 63% of its oil from the Middle East, but was quick off the mark in deploying two warships to the Gulf.

China certainly possesses the means to contribute naval forces to buttress security for shipping in the Gulf. This would be a natural outgrowth of the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s involvement in counterpiracy in the Gulf of Aden since 2007. The PLAN has the surface forces available and ample operational experience at escort work. It has supporting infrastructure in place, given the relative proximity to the PLA base in Djibouti.

A regular deployment of PLAN frigates to the Strait of Hormuz is easy to argue for from the standpoint of China’s national interest, given its dependence on seaborne oil imports from the Gulf. It’s also consistent with the normative notion that blue water navies tend to contribute to the international public good once they acquire a self-interested stake in accessing the global maritime commons. As the PLAN acquires more multinational exposure and extraterritorial experience, so the argument goes, its behaviour and outlook will start to converge with that of other ocean-going navies.

If the public good argument appears overly hopeful to sceptics of Beijing’s global citizenship credentials, there’s a more Machiavellian rationale for mooting a PLAN presence in the Gulf. That is to say the sooner Beijing gets pulled into that stickiest of naval gyres, the better it will be for states that are currently facing China’s undivided strategic attention in the western Pacific.

Some will regard an open invitation for China’s navy to police the world’s most geopolitically important chokepoint as akin to inviting the fox into the chicken coop. Once confident in the role, Beijing could be tempted to use its naval power coercively and selectively to pressure its Asian neighbours, including Taiwan and Japan, which remain chronically dependent on Gulf oil. After all, Hormuz is a true chokepoint, unlike the Malacca strait.

On balance, China should be welcomed as a naval contributor to Gulf security. Yet that’s unlikely to happen for the foreseeable future, for three reasons.

First, China is likely to perceive any threat to its own shipping as a red herring in a strategic spat between Iran and the US, and by extension US allies. Beijing will focus instead on maintaining close political relations with Tehran, seeking private assurances that Chinese tankers will not be targeted. It has no desire to be drawn directly into a Gulf maritime security role that bears the additional risks of being pulled into proxy conflicts between Saudi Arabia and Iran. And who could blame it?

Second, apart from diplomatic ship visits, there’s little evidence to suggest that the PLAN has much operational interest in the Gulf. Its focus has been firmly on the Red Sea. Beijing will seek to continue free riding off other security providers in the Gulf for as long as possible.

Third, China’s Gulf oil dependence is not only proportionally much lower than that of Japan, Korea and India. China has also made conscious efforts to reduce its exposure to supply disruptions in the Gulf. It has already surged oil imports from Iran, before the expiry of US sanctions waivers.

More purposefully, China has built up a strategic oil reserve which may already exceed 500 million barrels. It has further maximised land-based sources, from Central Asia and Russia, currently China’s primary supplier (accounting for around 16% of its oil imports). Finally, if push really came to shove, China has the option to invest in coal-to-oil technology, ensuring that the PLA would never go short of fuel even under blockade conditions.

As that familiar gurgling sound of the Gulf sucking in naval assets reverberates in Delhi, Seoul, Tokyo and Canberra, my bet is Beijing will be content to sit this one out. Ironically, strategic competitors have the advantage on allies and partners when it comes to free riding.

What’s behind Abe’s change of heart on a Japan–North Korea summit?

Kim Jong-un’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Vladivostok in late April demonstrated conclusively that the North Korean leader has no intention of retreating from the international stage after February’s ill-fated summit with US President Donald Trump in Hanoi. Over the past 12 months, Kim has held at least one leadership summit with each of the region’s major powers—with the notable exception of Japan.

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe claimed as recently as March 2018 that ‘talks for the sake of talks are meaningless’ when it comes to North Korea. But in a stark reversal, Tokyo has dropped its preconditions for a summit with Kim, a shift that reflects the uncertain yet sustained openness to dialogue that’s arisen in the region. Abe now says that the two leaders need to meet in person to ‘break the current mutual mistrust’.

Several unresolved issues between Pyongyang and Tokyo have contributed to the two leaders’ reluctance to meet in recent years. On the Japanese side, chief among these is the controversial abduction issue. Resolving the case of the Japanese citizens kidnapped by North Korea in the 1970s and 1980s has long been championed as a foreign policy priority by Abe. Japan was also angered in 2017 by North Korea’s repeated shooting of short- and medium-range missiles around and over Japanese territory.

Tokyo has failed to endear itself to Pyongyang by continuing to be a staunch advocate of ‘maximum pressure’—and by playing a leading role in monitoring North Korea’s illicit ship-to-ship transfers. Since early 2018, North Korea’s state-run media outlets have regularly denounced Japan, even as their criticism of other major powers has at times become less strident.

The last round of bilateral negotiations between Japan and North Korea commenced in 2002 and fell apart in early 2016 when Pyongyang embarked on a new round of nuclear and missile tests. Tokyo has since attempted to get the abduction issue onto the agendas of both US–North Korea summits, but that approach has failed to lead to observable diplomatic progress.

Recognising that its own unique national interests are stake, Tokyo has slowly begun signalling a softer approach in an attempt to create the conditions for its own bilateral summit with Pyongyang. Notably, the Abe administration dropped the term ‘maximum pressure’ from its most recent annual foreign policy report, known as the ‘diplomatic bluebook’. It also, for the first time in more than a decade, declined to submit an annual motion to the UN condemning North Korean human rights abuses.

While the fundamentals in the relationship between North Korea and Japan haven’t changed, there are two key factors behind Abe’s decision to drop conditions for meeting Kim. The first is Tokyo’s and Washington’s diverging interests on North Korean issues. During the ‘fire and fury’ days of 2017, Abe and Trump met frequently, reaffirming their shared hardline approach to dealing with North Korea. After the president’s shift to diplomacy with Kim in 2018, the Abe administration publicly supported dialogue with Pyongyang but also warned against trusting North Korea, holding firm to its policy of maintaining maximum pressure.

In the year since the Singapore summit, however, it’s become clear that the US hasn’t been an effective spokesperson for Japan. By all accounts, Trump has avoided discussions of human rights topics in his meetings with the North Korean leader, making it difficult for Tokyo to effectively deal with the abduction issue through its US ally. During the recent Abe–Trump summit in Japan, Trump met with the families of some of the abductees, and Abe informed the press that the president had told him he would ‘spare no effort’ to help resolve the matter. Despite those assurances, there’s been a growing appreciation in Tokyo that the diplomatic support of the US won’t be anywhere near enough, on its own, to produce a breakthrough.

Nor has much progress been made on halting the development of North Korea’s nuclear or missile programs. Washington remains more focused on addressing its own vulnerabilities to Pyongyang’s long-range missiles than on dealing with the short- and medium-range missiles that currently threaten Japanese territory. Tokyo has likely calculated that Trump is determined to strike a deal with Kim and will once again cast Tokyo’s interests aside.

The other factor is related to internal politics in Japan. The timing of the latest move towards a summit with North Korea is advantageous for Abe. With parliamentary elections expected at least once in the next few months, Abe could use foreign policy issues to bolster his party’s position. And he has certainly built up enough capital as a hardliner over the past nine years to give himself space to propose an unconditional meeting with the North Korean leader without risking being depicted as weak by his domestic opponents.

Unfortunately for Abe, the decision to hold a summit isn’t his alone, and it’s quite possible that Kim will continue to decline Tokyo’s entreaties to meet. Kim would arguably accrue some additional prestige and status by ‘completing the set’ of summits with Northeast Asia’s leaders, but he may decide that he has more to gain by continuing to portray Japan as the natural enemy of the North Korean people. After all, Japan can’t offer anything to North Korea it can’t get from China, Russia, South Korea or the United States.

The massive financial benefits and diplomatic recognition that Pyongyang might hope for in return for resolving the abduction issue are unlikely to be forthcoming from Tokyo unless progress is made on curtailing North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic-missile programs. Moreover, a summit with the Japanese leader would almost certainly lead to additional international coverage of the abductee issue—a particularly regrettable part of the Kim dynasty’s legacy. Even a successful resolution of the matter could well provoke more anger towards Pyongyang in Japan and across the world than it does bonhomie. As long as Kim maintains his relationship with Trump and moves towards economic cooperation with China, Russia and South Korea, Kim is in a position to decline involvement from Japan.

Ultimately, now that the leaders of China, the US, South Korea and Russia have all met with Kim and advocated dialogue, and there have been no serious plans to revive multilateral diplomacy à la the long-defunct six-party talks, it has become increasingly difficult for Japan to make its voice heard on peninsula issues. Unless Kim breaks from his current stance, it appears that this isolation could continue for some time.

Trump’s trade war with China isn’t a civilisational conflict

Late last month at a security forum in Washington DC, Kiron Skinner, director of policy planning for the US Department of State, described today’s US–China conflict as ‘a fight with a really different civilization and a different ideology, and the United States hasn’t had that before’. As a trial balloon, this apparent attempt to define the Trump administration’s confrontation with China didn’t fly.

By framing the creeping cold war between the US and China as a clash of civilisations, Skinner—whose position was once held by luminaries such as George Kennan, Paul Nitze, Richard N. Haass and Anne-Marie Slaughter—was being neither original nor accurate. The political scientist Samuel P. Huntington developed the concept more than a quarter-century ago, and the Chinese Communist Party itself is an ideologically bankrupt entity.

Worse, Skinner’s full remarks were freighted with racial overtones. Unlike America’s competition with the Soviet Union, which she described as ‘a fight within the Western family’, the rivalry with China supposedly represents ‘the first time that we will have a great power competitor that is not Caucasian’. Never mind that the US fought Japan in World War II.

One hopes Skinner’s talk of a clash between Caucasian and non-Caucasian civilisations was just a slip of the tongue. Those who would intentionally traffic in such ideas must know that they could lead not just to the economic or military defeat of one side, but to the destruction of an entire society. How policymakers frame the US–China conflict will have far-reaching implications, and the US must demonstrate that its policies are motivated by a higher moral purpose if they are to gain wider international support.

Most commentators see the US–China conflict as a struggle between an incumbent power and its most plausible challenger. The two countries appear to be falling into the proverbial ‘Thucydides trap’, a self-fulfilling prophecy in which a hegemon’s fear of being supplanted leads it to act in such a way as to precipitate a war for global dominance.

And yet, even if today’s conflict is being driven by a zero-sum quest for power, that should not be the US’s sole consideration. Given the threat of civilisational collapse posed by climate change, the Trump administration’s focus only on US interests appears selfish and irresponsible to the rest of the world.

The fact is that most of the world—including a sizeable share of Americans—has no interest in being plunged into another cold war just to preserve US hegemony. If the US government wants to garner international support for countering Chinese power and influence, it must make a more compelling case.

This shouldn’t be all that difficult, given that the rise of China under a one-party dictatorship threatens not just American hegemony but the rules-based international order. Rather than framing the conflict as a race war, then, the US should focus on the Chinese threat to global institutions, which, by extension, is a threat to many other countries’ growth and stability.

Whatever its flaws, the US-led international order offers far more benefits to other countries than any conceivable alternative system could. Indeed, during the Cold War with the Soviet Union, the US enjoyed widespread international support precisely because it was leading a defence of that order. And since the end of that conflict, most of the world has either welcomed or accepted American hegemony, on the tacit understanding that the US would continue to uphold the liberal framework.

Sadly, that condition no longer holds. The Trump administration has unabashedly championed an ‘America first’ foreign policy agenda, alienating traditional allies and alarming the rest of the world for the sake of narrow political objectives. It’s no exaggeration to say that President Donald Trump’s misguided policies pose as great a threat to the liberal order as China does.

The Trump administration may continue to believe that US power on its own is enough to vanquish China. But going it alone will prove costly, and the chances of success would be much higher if the US were to marshal the support of its friends and allies.

The latest failure to reach a trade deal suggests that the US–China cold war is escalating to the next stage. Sooner or later, the Trump administration will realise that it actually needs the support of its allies to prevail against the Chinese. When that day comes, it would do well to abandon talk of civilisational conflict and racial rivalry, and instead offer a morally justifiable case for confronting China. The US is the traditional defender of the liberal order; it needs to start acting like it.

The Strategist Six: Gideon Rachman

Welcome to ‘The Strategist Six’, a feature that provides a glimpse into the thinking of prominent academics, government officials, military officers, reporters and interesting individuals from around the world.

1. British Prime Minister Theresa May has now lost a range of symbolic and substantive parliamentary votes on Brexit. At the same time, Europe is sticking to the line that it won’t reopen the text of the withdrawal deal. Do the prime minister’s challenges today stem mainly from Westminster or Brussels?

It’s a combination of the two and the interaction between the two. For a long period the prime minister was focused on getting a deal from Brussels and maybe wasn’t able to concentrate on what Tory MPs would find acceptable. That approach ran into problems and now she’s trying to find some mid-way point. Although she denies it, her policy is about running down the clock and then facing the Tories with the prospect that they could lose Brexit altogether if they don’t accept something very close to the deal that they previously rejected. I think it might well work—we’ll find out in the next month or so.

2. With the various options for ‘how to Brexit’ having been given a good public airing, do you think that the British people should be given an opportunity not only to reconfirm their desire to leave the EU, but also to nominate how the country forges ahead with that intention?

Remainers tend to be the ones who want a second referendum. I voted ‘remain’ and part of me wants a second referendum, because I don’t think it has worked out the way it was sold. In fact the ‘leave’ campaign was quite deliberate in being very unspecific about what Brexit would actually look like; they basically said, ‘It’ll be fine.’ Over the last two years the British people have discovered that a lot of the claims made for Brexit were wishful thinking at best. But I’m genuinely divided. While I’ve written that we should take May’s deal, I find that whenever that deal comes close to fruition I feel depressed because I don’t actually want to leave the EU. So, intellectually, I’m in one place; emotionally, I’m in another.

I personally don’t have a problem with a second referendum, and I think it’s likely that Britain would vote to stay this time—certainly opinion polls for the last few months have shown a narrow ‘remain’ majority. But I don’t say it with much joy or confidence, because I think it would be a highly divisive move and would play into the narrative of the leavers, who have always said, ‘This is an elite conspiracy which shows remainers aren’t interested in what the people have to say.’

So if you were to turn around and reverse Brexit—even by perfectly legitimate democratic means—there’s a risk of political disillusionment tipping into something that’s quite corrosive for British democracy. Leaving the EU will really be damaging both for the British economy and for Britain’s clout in the world. But equally, it’s not obvious that endangering the UK’s traditional political stability in favour of staying inside the EU is the right trade-off.

3. In the long term, is the goal of a ‘global Britain’ made more or less likely by Brexit?

I think it’s a pretty empty slogan. Britain is already global in the sense that it’s a global trading economy with international interests and with—perhaps as a legacy of empire—an unusually wide network stretching all the way to Australia and the Pacific. I think the slogan meant to convey that Britain had become locked into a European mentality and set of markets, and that we should reorient ourselves to the dynamic, emerging markets of the world—particularly those in Asia. The trouble is that it’s a false choice. I don’t think that being a member of the EU prevents the UK from taking advantage of such opportunities. Arguably it makes it easier: the EU has just signed a big trade deal with Japan, and it also has a deal with South Korea. Britain as a global hub is much more attractive inside the EU than outside of it, so the danger is that Brexit makes us less global, not more.

4. You wrote recently that the ‘era of populists’ could last decades if nationalist governments deliver tangible results. Two years in, how successful has US President Donald Trump been in ensuring that those who elected him feel he has improved their lives and arrested their sense of relative American decline?

It depends on who you speak to. America at the moment is so divided along partisan lines that nobody is really shifting their position, sort of like Brexit. So Trump’s supporters, unless they’re directly affected by an event, be it a factory closure or whatever, will tend to say, ‘Yeah, he’s going well.’ His opponents don’t see it that way.

There hasn’t yet been that defining event that will fix in people’s minds whether Trump is seen as a success or a failure. Jimmy Carter’s failure to respond effectively to the occupation of the US embassy in Iran, combined with the second oil shock and Carter’s own demeanour, created the sense that his was a failed presidency—even though he lost quite narrowly in the end. For Ronald Reagan, there was the resurgence of the American economy, the invasion of Grenada oddly enough, and a few other things that created momentum and led to his being seen as a success. But Trump isn’t yet fixed in people’s minds as a success or failure, and maybe it won’t happen anymore because America is so divided. Barack Obama’s supporters see him as the greatest president ever, while his opponents still detest him.

5. What is your view of Chinese President Xi Jinping—his premiership, his agenda, his authority, his grip on power?

Pretty negative, to be honest. I think he’s been very bad news for China. You don’t have to embrace the naive idea that China should move instantly to one person, one vote and a full liberal democracy; I have some sympathy for the argument that you have to play that carefully. But Xi is moving China backwards in the sense that the cult of personality is very retrograde. It is infantilising for what are very sophisticated people. This isn’t the Cultural Revolution generation who were cut off from the outside world; these are people who are well educated and know the world yet have to follow this line.

I don’t claim to know China very well, but I have been going every now and then for quite a while. It seems to me that the scope for debate—what intellectuals are prepared to talk about in public or in private—has narrowed. People are scared now in a way that they weren’t five years ago. In fact, I remember five years ago going out for dinner in Beijing with a bunch of professors from the top Chinese universities who were prepared to have a very lively discussion in a restaurant about whether China should aspire to be a democracy. I just don’t think they would do that anymore.

My impression is that there’s a climate of fear now under Xi, and it’s not just about politics but it’s also about business because of the anti-corruption drive. Now, obviously the system was deeply corrupt, but the sense now that anybody’s vulnerable is destabilising. It’s very worrying for China and for the world.

6. Are you pessimistic or optimistic about the state of global affairs in 2019?

I’m not terribly optimistic and the reasons are fairly clear. If you’re of a ‘liberal’ disposition both in economics and in politics, we had a very good 30 years from 1978—the opening of China, and Thatcher and Reagan reinvigorating the West. That was followed by democratisation, which is commonly and understandably associated with the fall of the Berlin Wall. Things were going in the right direction.

We also saw state control of the economy going out of fashion and it seemed there was a formula that worked and was going global—a combination of political and economic freedoms advancing. But, significantly, 1989 was the year not only of the Berlin Wall but also of Tiananmen Square, where China didn’t take the same route yet it has since been successful beyond anyone’s imagining, despite being a one-party state.

Then the Western system had its own seismic economic shock in 2008 from which we never fully recovered, and in the aftermath we’ve had a rise of illiberal politics, which Donald Trump exemplifies in the West. But it’s not just Trump. If you look across Europe, the AfD is the official opposition in the German parliament, Brexit is here in the UK, France has the gilet jaunes, Spain is threatening to break up, democracy is under threat in Poland and Hungary, Russia has gone backwards to become a menacing player in the international system. And strongman politics is back in fashion, not just in China but even in India, the Philippines and Brazil, and along with it a rise in economic nationalism, which is potentially dangerous.

So no, I don’t think it’s a particularly great period. The question is how long it will last. The other thing that makes me anxious is actually the environment. The sense that we’ve failed on climate change, that the goals aren’t realistic or probably enough in themselves. And with things like species extinction and so on—I see you had one in Australia very recently—it’s very alarming.

The only thing I would say, though, is that one can misread these things. I was actually talking to my mother about it recently—when I was born in ’63 she had a strong sense that I had come into a world gone wrong because the Cuban missile crisis happened just a year before, everyone was terrified of nuclear Armageddon around the corner and things looked very dangerous. And yet, I’ve lived in a very blessed era of peace, prosperity, steadily expanding freedom and reduction of poverty around the world. So you can have a snapshot of a time and think, ‘Oh well, it’s obviously terrible.’ But we may be wrong. I hope so!

Failure in Hanoi? Don’t sweat the small stuff

Over recent days, commentators have been parsing the meaning of the breakdown of the US–DPRK summit last Friday. Most of the speculation turns upon the question of who wins and who loses from the busted flush in Hanoi. Should we be grateful that President Donald Trump chose to walk rather than tie the US to a bad outcome? Does Kim Jong-un regret overbidding his hand? Are both leaders now bitter, resentful and reluctant to invest further time and political capital in each other? Is the hope of North Korean denuclearisation dead? If so, what does that mean for other, more unsettling, options? Is Japan the real regional winner from the summit’s collapse?

Those are all serious questions, but we should start by understanding what the Trump–Kim summits really are. They’re not like the summits of yesteryear, when heads of government of great powers arrived—usually at the end of a gruelling climb by each side’s Sherpas—to celebrate the conquest of another diplomatic Everest. The format has been adapted here to serve a specific purpose: to allow direct discussion between a superpower and a rogue regime on an issue of great importance to both, but one wrapped in layers of complexity. Add in the fact that two capricious leaders are simultaneously the architects of the process and its lead actors, and it’s hardly surprising that the summits faced some daunting challenges.

The issue is not simply the denuclearisation of North Korea. Critics are perfectly right that denuclearisation isn’t likely to be a near-term outcome of the summits. Indeed, it might not even be a long-term outcome. The core objective of the summits is a double-barrelled one: to rein in Pyongyang’s nuclear capabilities, and to ‘normalise’—perhaps that should read ‘make more normal’—North Korea. Both barrels make individual sense. A North Korean nuclear program that remains essentially corralled at the level it was between, say, 2006 and 2016, is much less of a threat to the world than one which builds on the astonishing achievements of 2017. And a more normalised North Korea is one which is likely to be seen both as a credible interlocutor and a better fit for its regional neighbours.

What happened in 2017 that was so unacceptable? Simple. Pyongyang successfully tested both a thermonuclear device and two different models of an intercontinental ballistic missile. In doing so, Kim made North Korea’s nuclear program globally unacceptable and not just a regional pain in the ass. Those tests do not mean that Pyongyang has today the capability to target the continental US with nuclear weapons. The ICBMs have only ever been tested on highly lofted trajectories—unlike the North’s intermediate-range missiles, which have actually been tested to range.

Over at 38 North, Michael Elleman argues that Pyongyang can only have a reliable ICBM capability by sustained testing. Based on the history of ICBM development in the US, the USSR and China, North Korea will probably require 10 to 20 tests of each different missile variant to have a reliable system. Currently, the Hwasong-14 has been tested twice and the Hwasong-15 only once. Designing a warhead is an interactive process. Yes, the regime has shown the ability to build an advanced two-stage warhead. Once North Korea is confident it has a reliable missile, though, it will have a proper understanding of the stresses the warhead needs to survive to detonate at the other end.

So, Pyongyang doesn’t yet boast proven ICBM capabilities. It might never do so, since it seems the ‘fire and fury’ moment has exercised some cautionary discipline upon the North Korean strategic mind.

But here’s the thing: it’s also exercised a similar discipline upon the American strategic mind. And that discipline has been the key driver of the broader summit process. The Singapore and Hanoi summits now sit at the heart of American attempts to bring North Korea into the current century. The end point of the summit process is not merely a constrained nuclear North Korea; it’s a North Korea which has the economic vitality and security confidence to allow it to relegate its nuclear capabilities to the background.

Whether Trump himself has any such goal in mind is one of Donald Rumsfeld’s ‘unknown unknowns’. Those with long memories will argue that such strategic good sense scarcely seemed to be the motivating factor behind Trump’s sudden agreement to the Singapore summit. Still, it would be nice to believe that he has the patience and foresight to work towards that end. It’s also possible that he might plump instead for short-term benefits, like signing a peace treaty or saving money by ending US military commitments to South Korea.

But remember what Joel Wit observed in 2016: President Barack Obama’s policy of ‘strategic patience’ had left US foreign policy towards North Korea ‘trapped in no-man’s land’. Washington was in bad need of a policy that would let it get back into the game in Northeast Asia.

We don’t believe Trump understood that he would be meeting Kim once a year for the remainder of his presidency. But he probably will be—because the stakes are so high, and there are few alternative pathways. The Americans want badly to halt and roll back North Korea’s long-range missile developments, and to stop the further production of fissile material. But key to doing so is Trump always having a broader agenda than nuclear weapons—while not giving up on steps that reduce, and eventually end, North Korea’s capacity to threaten the US and its allies in North Asia. That’s part of the normalisation process. And normalisation never happens overnight.

We’re all feeling our way across the river here, folks. Some summits will go better than others. Don’t sweat the small stuff.

The Strategist Six: Karin von Hippel

Welcome to ‘The Strategist Six’, a feature that provides a glimpse into the thinking of prominent academics, government officials, military officers, reporters and interesting individuals from around the world.

1. As an American and German in London, what surprised you the most about Brexit?

Well, I was surprised that Brexit happened in the first place! But I was also surprised by the election of Donald Trump—I think many of us who follow these events missed, or at least underestimated, the populist movements. We’re now trying to interpret them and understand where things might go, but I’m not sure the received wisdom about populism is correct. Unfortunately, we’re still going in the wrong direction in terms of resolving the enormous divisions in societies; people aren’t talking to each other.

2. How healthy is the special relationship between the US and the UK today?

There are different layers of the US–UK relationship: there’s the relationship between President Trump and Prime Minister Theresa May, which is not great. At the working level, though, there are strong, committed relationships, whether it’s in intelligence sharing or between parliamentarians and congressional members or between officials in the Foreign Office or the State Department. Those relationships are very strong, but the senior level is fraying and fragmented. It’s worrying.

Trump isn’t treating traditional US partners such as the UK well, in the same way that he also isn’t supporting NATO appropriately in his public pronouncements. I recently attended the Munich Security Conference, where a number of NATO countries were concerned about rumours that the US was going to put unhelpful pressure on them to reach their 2% commitments. That can only serve the interests of Russia, and won’t help to preserve and strengthen NATO. But the other thing that was interesting about Munich was that over 60 congressional members were there to emphasise bipartisan support for the Atlantic alliance and the European Union, while Vice President Mike Pence and Trump were sending very different messages. This was the largest US congressional delegation in the 55-year history of the Munich Security Conference

3. In light of the Shamima Begum case, what should the UK do about Britons who now seek to return home after fighting for or supporting ISIL?

There are laws governing what the country needs to do and the ways it should manage these cases. For dual nationals the government can—in exceptional circumstances—revoke their British passport, though at the same time, they can’t be left stateless. If they return on their own accord, the government will have to figure out whether it prosecutes or whether to enlist them in one of the programs to try to deradicalise them. But they’re not going to go out of their way to facilitate their return—as we’ve heard from senior government officials, they are not going to put lives at risk by sending anyone to Syria to collect people like Shamima Begum. However, once ISIL is defeated in that last remaining enclave in Syria, you will have hundreds of family members or ISIL fighters who are going to try to return to the UK or want to return to Europe, so it’s an emerging challenge and it could be a significant challenge for law enforcement here and in other countries.

4. Looking around the globe at various hot spots, pressure points and leadership styles, what is most concerning to you?

I don’t think today’s challenges are that different in scope and scale from past challenges, but it’s a far more dangerous world because the US is not providing the leadership it used to provide. You see some world leaders talking publicly about not relying on America anymore, and asserting they will do more on their own—Angela Merkel has probably been the most vocal, but the Canadians have also made similar comments. You’re seeing this fragmentation because the US is no longer the global standard-bearer of the rules-based international order. There are a number of challenges, whether it’s Russian interference in US and European elections, the attempted murder of Sergei Skripal, Chinese hacking, the catastrophic Syrian civil war or the conflict in Yemen. All need committed leadership, and the US is not leading in the way that it has traditionally done. So, it’s now about what like-minded countries or multilaterals like the UN or the EU can do to provide that leadership.

5. What are the major challenges or opportunities facing think tanks like RUSI [the Royal United Services Institute] today?

With all of the security challenges we’re facing right now I think it’s important to have fresh ideas and to convene smart, creative people—those with very different perspectives, from the public sector, private sector and scholarly worlds—to consider a range of practical responses. Sometimes we host such meetings privately and other times we do them as public events. It’s important to provide evidence-based research and practical suggestions for dealing with today’s challenges, and then disseminate the ideas through the variety of means that are available, be it via social media or in newspapers or on our website. But I think it’s incumbent upon all of us to provide workable, practical ideas, not pie-in-the-sky proposals.

6. In RUSI’s In Context podcast, you conclude by asking your guests what they would say to young people who aspire to work in international affairs. What advice would you give?

People tend to have two different approaches to their career. Some know from day one what they want to be when they grow up and they chart their path very carefully. Most of the rest of us don’t really have that kind of foresight or we don’t necessarily know what we want to do. Careers are changing so much now that it’s potentially smarter to not have such a clear idea because maybe that career might not exist by the time you get to the right age.

My advice is that you should find good mentors and work for those you really respect and think you can learn from. It’s also about trying to figure out what you’re good at and getting better at things you’re not good at. But I believe in playing to your strengths, as ideally the teams you work in have a mixture of people with different strengths, all bringing something unique to the table.

Do we need another defence white paper, and what should it say?

This essay is from ASPIs election special, Agenda for change 2019: Strategic choices for the next government, released today. The report contains 30 short essays by leading thinkers covering key strategic, defence and security challenges, and offers short- and long-term policy recommendations as well as outside-the-box ideas that break the traditional rules.

Defence white papers are the big cats of the policy savannah—magnificent predatory creatures that eat all the resources flung at them. Right now, the February 2016 defence white paper is sleeping under a thornbush, still digesting its decade-long lunch of $195 billion in equipment acquisitions. Would it even be wise for the next government to prod Leo back to life? Hell hath no fury like a fat lion forced to jump through more policy hoops. As difficult and demanding as white paper production can be, my view is that it’s time to start the process all over again, this time with a fresh set of assumptions about necessary spending levels and a hard eye towards unpleasant emerging strategic realities.

The challenge

The 2009 defence white paper tried to set a five-year cycle for white papers. That never happened, because governments set their own timetables, usually tied to the electoral clock. However, the speeding up of global strategic change suggests that the time is right to start a new cycle. If a white paper is begun in the second half of 2019, we’re unlikely to see the finished product before the beginning of 2021. There are challenges aplenty. Here are my top five.

  1. The focus in 2016 was on designing the future force for the late 2030s and setting the industrial scene to produce key platforms locally. The only thing more important than the future ADF is the current one. A major focus for the next white paper must be on optimising the ADF for coalition warfare in the near future. There’s an emerging consensus among what passes for the Australian strategic community that the risk of short-term conflict in the Indo-Pacific is growing.
  2. The next white paper needs to find a convincing way to talk honestly but diplomatically about the biggest potential risk to the Indo-Pacific, which is an aggressive and nationalistic China. The last three white papers circled around this buoy with varying success. White papers shouldn’t create bilateral tensions, but they should tell the truth in the interests of explaining policy to Australians.
  3. Having fulfilled the promise to spend around 2% of gross national product on defence, the next government needs to ask the difficult question: is that figure anywhere near enough to address a deteriorating strategic environment? My assessment is that strategic shocks will jolt a future government into spending more. True, there’s no science underpinning the 2% figure, other than that it ticks a NATO benchmark of spending adequacy. But 2% hardly makes us Sparta. An ADF half the size of a Melbourne Cricket Ground crowd with a small number of admittedly high-quality capabilities looks meagre compared to the regional giants. In truth, we’ve ridden on Uncle Sam’s strategic coat-tails—an approach that’s starting to look distinctly threadbare.
  4. After China, Donald Trump is surely the next most concerning strategic factor. Woe betide the alliance if Trump’s acid tongue lashes Australia in the way it has Canada and NATO allies. Our next defence white paper must make the case for the alliance as persuasive in the Oval Office as it is in Canberra. This should be treated as an essential bipartisan exercise.
  5. The white paper’s regional priorities should, in rough order, be the Pacific, Japan, Indonesia and India. The 2016 white paper talked a big game in terms of Australia deepening engagement and providing strategic leadership. While there’s been commendable progress in re-establishing Australia’s position with the Pacific island states, the next white paper must put more flesh on the bones of regional engagement. We need imagination here, not incrementalism, but imagination usually costs significant sums of money.

Quick wins

Australian defence ministers typically speak at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, which this year will be held from 31 May to 2 June. While this will require a quick turnaround after the election, a solid ministerial statement at Shangri-La will be an important opportunity for the government to set out some early policy markers.

The defence minister should commission early a classified study into the current strengths and capability deficiencies of the ADF. The minister should ask what quick steps should be taken to lift operational effectiveness against the risk of regional contingencies in the short term. This is an essential platform from which to start new policy work.

Towards the end of 2019, an AUSMIN meeting will take place, bringing to Australia the US secretaries of Defence and State along with senior military commanders. Few AUSMINs have been as important as this one will be because it will set the tone for alliance cooperation for the remainder of Trump’s time in office. This AUSMIN can’t simply tick off a pale list of shared interests; it must set the agenda for new alliance cooperation in relation to China, new technology, space, cybersecurity and a host of emerging problems. As always, Australia can play the lead in writing the alliance ‘to do’ list, because we spend more time thinking about the US than it spends thinking about us. Even with Trump in the White House, the alliance is ours to lose—or to reinvigorate.

The hard yards

White papers are all about numbers, specifically linking (believable) dollars to (believable) capability, but as far as the future force is concerned the hard work was done in 2016. Except for developing a stronger stand-off strike capability, I don’t see a compelling case to revisit the main outlines of future force structure. What, then, are the genuinely hard problems for 2019? Rapidly lifting capability and ADF hitting power in the short term; building that genuine strategic partnership with Indonesia; balancing ADF jointness with integrated coalition capabilities; integrating new technology with older platforms; and growing the military and civilian defence workforce.

Defence has systems in place, designed in part for the 2016 white paper, that mean the organisation is as well positioned as it’s ever been to produce disciplined strategic assessments and sensible costed capability options. A more aligned and cooperative intergovernmental approach on equipment acquisition is also in place. This means that the Canberra system will be able to support the next government’s call for a white paper. We can only hope that government itself will participate in a disciplined and orderly way through careful and frequent consideration in the National Security Committee of Cabinet. Government must own the final product, after all.