Tag Archive for: Donald Trump

The second year of Europe

More than four decades ago, US National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger declared 1973 to be ‘The Year of Europe.’ His aim was to highlight the need to modernise the Atlantic relationship and, more specifically, the need for America’s European allies to do more with the United States in the Middle East and against the Soviet Union in Europe.

Kissinger would be the first to admit that the Europeans did not take up his challenge. Nevertheless, we again face a year of Europe. This time, though, the impetus is coming less from a frustrated US government than from within Europe itself.

The stakes are as high as they were in 1973, if not higher. Russia shows no sign of withdrawing from Crimea or stopping its efforts to destabilise eastern Ukraine. There is genuine concern Russia might employ similar tactics against one or more of the small NATO countries on its border.

Refugees have added to Europe’s strain, as has terrorism inspired by events in the Middle East or carried out by attackers from the region. Brexit, the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union, has now formally begun; what remains to be resolved are its timing and terms, which will determine its impact on the UK’s economic and political future and on others contemplating withdrawal from the EU. Greece and a number of other countries in southern Europe continue to be burdened by high unemployment, growing debt, and a persistent gap between what governments are being asked to do and what they can afford.

But of all the challenges confronting the EU, France’s upcoming presidential election holds the most significance for Europe’s future, and perhaps for that of the world. Polls indicate that any of the four candidates could emerge as the eventual winner. What makes this uncertainty different and truly consequential is that two of the four, National Front leader Marine Le Pen and far-left leader Jean-Luc Mélenchon, support policies far outside the French and European mainstream. If either wins the second-round run-off on May 7, it could mean the end of French membership in both the EU and NATO, raising existential questions for both organisations—and for all of Europe.

Such scenarios were unimaginable until only recently. For decades, Europe has constituted the world’s most successful, stable, and predictable region, a place where history seemed to have all but ended. The goal of making the continent peaceful, whole, and free had largely been realised.

But dramatic change has come to Europe. One factor is the willingness and ability shown by Vladimir Putin’s Russia to use military force, economic coercion, and cyber manipulation to advance its agenda. But an even greater challenge to modern Europe comes from its own politicians, who increasingly question the value of the EU, the heir to the European Economic Community established in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome.

The rationale behind Europe’s six-decade-long integration process—often called the ‘European project’—was always clear. Western Europe, and above all Germany and France, had to be unified to such a point that war, which had so often characterised the continent’s past, would become unthinkable.

This has been achieved, as has considerable economic progress. But, along the way, the European project lost its hold on Europe’s citizens. The EU’s institutions became too distant, too elitist, and too strong, not taking into account the national identities to which Europeans remained attached. The ill-advised creation of a monetary union without a fiscal counterpart made matters worse. The bureaucrats had overreached.

The rise of populist, nationalist candidates on both the left and the right in France and elsewhere in Europe is the result. And even if one of the two establishment candidates prevails in France, much will remain uncertain. The immediate crisis will have passed, but the long-term challenge will remain.

It is apparent that the EU needs to be rethought. It needs to move away from “one size fits all” to something more flexible. There also needs to be a rebalancing of power away from Brussels, the seat of most EU institutions, toward the national capitals.

Governments need to do more to create the prerequisites of faster economic growth while enhancing workers’ ability to contend with the inevitable elimination of many existing jobs as a result of technological innovation. Germany, whether led by its current chancellor or her principal opponent after its general election in September, will need to take the lead here.

Europeans, appropriately enough, will mostly determine Europe’s future. But the Trump administration also has a role to play. Trump’s shortsighted support for Brexit and other exits from the EU must end; a divided, weaker, and distracted Europe will not be a good partner in NATO. It may be true that Asia is more likely than Europe to shape the history of the twenty-first century. But the lesson of the last century should not be lost: what happens in Europe can and will affect global stability and prosperity.

What I tell my non-American friends

Image courtesy of Flickr user Kelley Minars.

I frequently travel overseas, and invariably my foreign friends ask, with varying degrees of bewilderment: What in the world is going on in your country? Here is what I say.

First, do not misinterpret the 2016 election. Contrary to some commentary, the American political system has not been swept away by a wave of populism. True, we have a long history of rebelling against elites. Donald Trump tapped into a tradition associated with leaders like Andrew Jackson and William Jennings Bryan in the nineteenth century and Huey Long and George Wallace in the twentieth century.

And yet Trump lost the popular vote by nearly three million. He won the election by appealing to populist resentment in three Rust Belt states—Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin—that had previously voted Democratic. If a hundred thousand votes had been cast differently in those states, Trump would have lost the Electoral College and the presidency.

That said, Trump’s victory points to a real problem of growing social and regional inequality in the United States. J.D. Vance’s recent best-selling book Hillbilly Elegy compellingly describes the vast difference between California and Appalachia.

Research by the Princeton economists Anne Case and Angus Deaton shows that the demographic trends among lower-income whites without a college degree are worse than those for African-Americans, who historically anchored the lower extremes of inequality. In 1999, mortality rates among whites with no college were around 30% lower than those of African-Americans; by 2015, they were 30% higher.

Moreover, manufacturing employment, once a prime source of high-paying jobs for working-class whites, has fallen sharply over the last generation, to just 12% of the workforce. These previously Democratic voters were attracted by Trump’s promises to shake things up and bring back manufacturing jobs. Ironically, Trump’s efforts to repeal President Barack Obama’s health-care legislation would make their lives worse.

The second thing I tell my foreign friends is not to underestimate Trump’s communications skills. Many are offended by his tweet storms and outrageous disregard for facts. But Trump is a veteran of reality television, where he learned that the key to success is to monopolize viewers’ attention, and that the way to do that is with extreme statements, not careful regard for the truth.

Twitter helps him to set the agenda and distract his critics. What offends commentators in the media and academia does not bother his supporters. But as he turns from his permanent self-centered campaigning to trying to govern, Twitter becomes a two-edged sword that deters needed allies.

Third, I tell my friends not to expect normal behavior. Normally, a president who loses the popular vote moves to the political center to attract additional support. This is what George W. Bush did successfully in 2001. Trump, by contrasts, proclaims that he won the popular vote and, acting as though he really did, appeals to his base voters.

While Trump has made solid centrist appointments to the Departments of Defense, State, and Homeland Security, his picks for the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Health and Human Services are from the extremes of the Republican Party. His White House staff is divided between pragmatists and ideologues, and he caters to both.

Fourth, no one should underestimate US institutions. Sometimes my friends talk as though the sky is falling and ask if Trump is as dangerous a narcissist as Mussolini. I tell them not to panic. The US, for all its problems, is not Italy in 1922. Our national political elites are often polarized; but so were America’s founders.

In designing the US Constitution, the founders’ goal was not to ensure harmonious government, but to constrain political power with a system of checks and balances that made it difficult to exercise. The joke goes that the founders created a political system that made it impossible for King George to rule over us—or for anyone to ever do so. Inefficiency was placed in the service of liberty.

It is still early in the Trump presidency, and we cannot be sure what might happen after, say, a major terrorist attack. So far, however, the courts, the Congress, and the states have checked and balanced the administration, as Madison intended. And the permanent civil servants in the executive departments add ballast.

Finally, my friends ask what all of this means for American foreign policy and the liberal international order led by the US since 1945. Frankly, I don’t know, but I worry less about the rise of China than the rise of Trump.

While American leaders, including Obama, have complained about free riders, the US has long taken the lead in providing key global public goods: security, a stable international reserve currency, relatively open markets, and stewardship of the Earth’s commons. Despite the US-led international order’s problems, the world has prospered and poverty has been reduced under it. But one cannot be sure it will continue. The US will need to cooperate with China, Europe, Japan, and others to manage transnational problems.

During the 2016 campaign, Trump was the first major party candidate in 70 years to call the American alliance system into question. Since taking office in January, statements by Trump and his appointees suggest that it is likely to persist. American hard and soft power, after all, stems largely from the fact that the US has 60 allies (while China has only a few).

But the stability of the multilateral institutions that help manage the world economy and global commons is more uncertain. Trump’s budget director speaks of a hard-power budget, with funds cut from the State Department and the United Nations system. Other officials advocate replacing multilateral trade deals with ‘fair and balanced’ bilateral arrangements. And Trump is repudiating Obama’s efforts to address climate change. I tell my friends I wish I could reassure them on these issues. But I cannot.

Trump’s message to Xi: get tough on North Korea

Image courtesy of Pixabay user ndemello.

The much anticipated first meeting between presidents Donald Trump and Xi Jinping ended in smiles all around at Mar-a-Lago, Trump’s luxury private club in Florida. That’s good news for Australia. When China and the United States get along, political leaders and public servants in Canberra and capitals across the Asia–Pacific can breathe more easily.

Though Trump tweeted in advance that talks with China’s president would be ‘very difficult’, it was evident that he was determined to have a positive meeting. Gone—at least in public—was any trace of Trump’s previous combative rhetoric about China ‘raping’ America on trade or building a ‘massive military complex’ in the South China Sea. Trump was a welcoming and gracious host. Xi, in turn, was keen to demonstrate that the US–China relationship is stable. ‘We have a thousand reasons to get China-US relations right, and not one reason to spoil the China-US relationship’, he told Trump.

Undoubtedly, the upbeat coverage of the visit in the Chinese press and optimistic statements by senior Americans are significant. The world’s most consequential bilateral relationship has undergone a positive re-set after a rocky period. However, Trump’s decision to order missile strikes on Syria, which were executed while he dined with Xi in Florida, sent a stark message not only to Syria’s president Bashar al-Assad but undeniably to Xi Jinping as well.

The chemical weapons attack in Khan Sheikhoun that killed nearly a hundred civilians, including children, took place 60 hours before Xi’s plane landed in Florida. Trump could have delayed the missile strike on Syria until Xi’s 24-hour visit was over. But he chose not to, putting Xi in an awkward position. The message was clear: the United States continues to view itself as the global power with the right to take unilateral military action.

Over the past six years of atrocities in Syria, China has vetoed six United Nations Security Council resolutions specifically targeting the Assad regime. While Xi was in Florida the spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that China opposed the use of force, but stopped short of condemning unilateral American actions—as Beijing has done in the past and most probably would have done this time too had Xi not been spending the night in Florida.

Chinese state-run media outlets have only briefly reported on the US strikes on Syria and were initially entirely silent about the implications of the strikes for North Korea and its refusal to halt its nuclear program. The tabloid Huanqiu Shibao (Global Times), known for its nationalistic stances, initially tried to offer public commentary. It stated in an editorial on Saturday that Trump wanted to prove that he cannot be dismissed as a ‘businessman president’ and that ‘he can use military force when necessary’. However, the Chinese-language version of the editorial was removed without explanation from the newspaper’s website the following day. Finally, on Monday a new Chinese-language editorial was published discussing whether North Korea would become ‘the next Syria’.

Though Trump’s decision to swiftly authorise the missile strikes obviously sends a strong signal to Pyongyang, it’s equally profound for Beijing: the United States wants China to use all possible means to halt North Korea’s nuclear program. In fact, one of the only pointed statements in the otherwise bland White House briefing of the Trump–Xi meetings was Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s statement: ‘(we are) prepared to chart our own course if this is something China is just unable to coordinate with us’.

China has persistently called for multilateral talks to peacefully resolve the stand-off on the Korean peninsula and staunchly opposed use of force. As the North’s largest source of food and energy, China certainly is in a unique position to exert increased pressure on Pyongyang. But Beijing isn’t willing to let the North Korean regime collapse for several reasons, among others for fear of the millions of refugees who would likely spill over the border into China.

A unilateral decision by the United States to destroy North Korean nuclear facilities would be extremely risky. The challenges of the Korean peninsula and Syria cannot be compared. Whereas Syria could be targeted without fear of immediate retaliation, North Korea has the capability to cause severe damage to South Korea and perhaps even to Japan. North Korean artillery units deployed along the demilitarised zone could devastate Seoul, situated a mere 50 kilometres from the North Korean border. Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal and gradually growing missile force could cause catastrophic loss of life if not completely neutralised in an initial US strike.

In sum, while the optimistic mood in which Trump bade Xi farewell—with the promise to visit China soon—is good news, Xi Jinping has returned home with a clear warning: don’t underestimate Trump’s desire to get tough on North Korea.

Trump the ideologue?

 

Historians may come to see the American actor Alec Baldwin as US President Donald Trump’s most useful ally. Baldwin’s frequent and widely viewed impersonations of Trump on the comedy show ‘Saturday Night Live’ turn Trumpism into a farce, blinding the president’s political opponents to the seriousness of his ideology.

Of course, politicians are parodied all the time. But with Trump, there is already a tendency not to take his politics seriously. The form of those politics—unhinged tweet-storms, bald-faced lies, racist and misogynistic pronouncements, and blatant nepotism—is so bizarre and repugnant to the bureaucratic class that it can overshadow the substance.

Even those who seem to take Trump seriously are failing to get to the root of Trumpism. Democrats are so infuriated by his misogyny and xenophobia that they fail to understand how he connects with many of their former supporters. As for establishment Republicans, they are so keen to have a ‘Republican’ in office implementing traditional conservative policies—such as deregulation and tax cuts—that they overlook the elements of his agenda that upend their orthodoxies.

Part of the problem may be that Trump has come out on both sides of most major debates, championing a brand of politics that privileges intensity over consistency. This may cause Trump-watchers to dismiss attempts to establish an ideological foundation for Trumpism—such as Julius Krein’s new journal American Affairs—as hopelessly oxymoronic. But the fact that Trump is no ideologue does not mean he cannot be a conduit for a new ideology.

The British political establishment learned this lesson the hard way. For years, conservatives and liberals alike underestimated Thatcherism. They failed to see that behind Margaret Thatcher’s blonde hair and shrill voice was a revolutionary politics that reflected and accelerated fundamental social and economic changes.

Thatcher, like Trump, was no philosopher. But she didn’t have to be. She merely had to attract people capable of refining the ideology and policy program that would eventually bear her name. And that is precisely what she did.

Apart from those ideologues, the first to grasp the significance of Thatcher’s political project were on the far left: the magazine Marxism Today coined the term ‘Thatcherism’ in 1979. These left-wing figures saw what those in the mainstream didn’t: Thatcher’s fundamental challenge to the economic and social structures that had been widely accepted since World War II.

An editor of that magazine, Martin Jacques, who did as much as anyone at the time to provide a theoretical understanding of Thatcherism, recently explained to me why its significance was so often overlooked. ‘Political analysis at that time was very psephological and institutional,’ he said. With its focus on ‘the performance of political parties,’ he explained, it missed ‘the deeper changes across society.’

There are powerful parallels between the late 1970s and the present. Just as Thatcher recognised growing dissatisfaction with the old order and gave voice to ideas that had been languishing on the margins, Trump has acknowledged and, to some extent, vindicated the anguish and anger of a large segment of the working class who are fed up with long-established systems.

Also like Thatcher, Trump has attracted ideologues ready and willing to define Trumpism for him. Front and center is Stephen Bannon, the former executive chairman of Breitbart News, the ultra-nationalist home of the racist alt-right, who now serves as Trump’s chief strategist.

Speaking at the Conservative Political Action Conference, Bannon defined Trumpism in terms of national security and sovereignty, economic nationalism, and the ‘deconstruction of the administrative state.’ As he put it, ‘[W]e’re a nation with an economy. Not an economy just in some global marketplace with open borders.’

This reflects a fundamental conflict between Thatcherism and Trumpism: the latter aims to sweep away the neoliberal consensus of unregulated markets, privatisation, free trade, and immigration that comprised the former. But, even if the ideas are different, the tactics are the same.

To consolidate support, Thatcher would go head-to-head with carefully selected enemies—from British miners to Argentina’s president, General Leopoldo Galtieri, to the bureaucrats in Brussels. Similarly, as the Hudson Institute’s Craig Kennedy recently told me, ‘Bannon wants to radicalise the anti-Trump liberals into fighting for causes which alienate them from mainstream America.’ Every time Trump’s opponents march for women, Muslims, or sexual minorities, they fortify Trump’s core support base.

Jacques argues that the British Labour Party’s failure fully to come to terms with Thatcherism is the main reason it spent almost two decades in the political wilderness. He believes that Prime Minister Tony Blair was the first leader to recognise Thatcherism for what it was: a new ideology that upended long-held rules and assumptions. But, Jacques asserts, Blair merely adjusted to the new ideology, rather than attempting to change it.

None of this bodes well for Trump’s opponents, who are still a long way from recognising the ideological implications of his presidency. Indeed, they remain so distracted by Trump’s apparent lack of leadership skill and even mental capacity—which, to be sure, cannot compare to that displayed by Thatcher—that they have yet to grasp the depth of the divisions and neuroses that Trump has exposed.

It might be cathartic to call Trump an idiot, to laugh at his misspelled tweets and taped-up tie, but the implications of his presidency are serious. If Trump’s progressive opponents fail to engage seriously with the forces that Trump’s victory reflected and reinforced—in particular, the backlash against neoliberalism—not even impeachment will be enough to put the Trumpian genie back in its bottle.

Why Malcolm should head for Mar-a-Lago

Image courtesy of Flickr user sergio_leenen.

Two specialists on strategic and economic issues have urged Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull to plan an early visit to Mar-a-Lago, the same venue where US President Donald Trump is scheduled to hold crucial talks with his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping.

ASPI executive director Peter Jennings told the National Press Club on Wednesday the Trump-Xi summit was crucial to regional security and Australia’s economic interests and he was surprised that the Prime Minister hadn’t already made the journey. Australian Industry Group chief executive Innes Willox said the meeting was likely to be the most important for Australia of Mr Trump’s four year term and there were compelling reasons for Mr Turnbull to have a face to face meeting with him quickly. Willox argued that

‘We need to be very alert to the outcomes there because if they walk away without some agreements about trade and about a future economic relationship in which they can live with each other, I think we’re going to be in for a very rough ride over the next four years..

There’s a good story for Australia to tell. Getting close to the President and his immediate advisers is something we need to do. We don’t want to be left behind and left out of conversations at that presidential level.’

In Willox’s view, Australia has to try as much as possible to steer a middle course. Industry and business are very concerned that Australia could become collateral damage in a rapidly escalating security situation or trade war. In either case there could well be a phone call from the White House to the Lodge asking bluntly: ‘Which side are you on?’

‘That’s the nightmare scenario for Australian policy makers with the impact cascading through the economy. If Friday’s meeting goes badly I’d bet London to a brick that one of the first three phone calls the President makes is to Australia and we need to take advantage of that relationship, not just in the defence relationship but in the broader relationship.’

ASPI’s Jennings said China was increasingly willing to use economic levers to try to deliver political outcomes. It’s doing that now in an attempt to stop South Korea deploying an anti-missile system, and Australia shouldn’t naïvely imagine it couldn’t happen here. The government has to be aware that there are strategic risks in Australia becoming too dependent on its deep economic relationship with China. ‘For us to get caught or entangled in a security dispute or a trade dispute between the US and China is perhaps the worst of all worlds.’

Jennings said that Australia was heading into a period of increased risk and deep uncertainty in the Asia-Pacific, and that the Trump Presidency was contributing to that uncertainty. While every incoming administration struggled to find its feet, and to appoint the thousands of officials needed in key jobs and to set an agenda for government, he’d never seen an administration so deeply beset with problems in its first 100 days as the Trump White House.

‘This might self-correct,’ he said. ‘We have stabilising influences like General James Mattis as Secretary of Defense and Rex Tillerson as Secretary of State. They’re working hard to convince friends and allies that the US isn’t abandoning its essential stabilising role in the Asia-Pacific.’

This lack of policy clarity opens up opportunities for Australia to help shape the President’s thinking, particularly in areas in which Australia is considered a trusted partner, such as defence, regional security and intelligence

Jennings said that North Korea’s developing ballistic missiles mean that it’s in Australia’s interests to develop missile defences for its deployed forces, and the partner is the US. Behind closed doors, the Americans would press China hard to use whatever leverage it has to stop the DPRK’s nuclear and missile testing. There’s a strong American view that North Korea can’t be allowed to weaponise a nuclear warhead fitted to an intercontinental ballistic missile.

According to Jennings, the US could consider a range of pre-emption strategies to prevent missile launches and to disable what was known of the nuclear weapons infrastructure, by cyber or kinetic means. The Americans have been practising pin-point strikes against terrorist targets for decades. ‘But the risks are enormously high. What can they do to stop the regime from launching an all-out retaliatory assault on South Korea? How do they persuade the Chinese that a strike isn’t designed to bring the whole regime down?’

The starting point should be to clearly understand that the US will not tolerate a North Korea able to hit the American mainland with a nuclear weapon. Washington has concluded that Obama’s strategy of strategic patience didn’t work, that the DPRK was unlikely to be reliably deterred and that, with or without China, some action would be taken to blunt the North’s program.

‘If that sounds scary, it’s meant to. We are entering a really difficult and dangerous strategic age.’

The Strategist Six: Yoichi Funabashi

Welcome to The Strategist Six, a feature that provides a glimpse into the thinking of prominent academics, analysts, government officials, military officers, reporters and interesting individuals from around the world. The following interview has been edited and condensed for clarity.

1. You’ve watched the Japan–US relationship evolve for more than four decades. What’s your assessment of bilateral ties today, and how do you evaluate Prime Minister Abe’s management of relations with the Trump administration?

It was positive that Prime Minister Abe has twice been able to meet with Donald Trump, both as president-elect and after the inauguration, because the new administration is both unpredictable and appears set to challenge America’s role in the liberal international order. Japan has significant interests in maintaining that order, so I think it was imperative that Prime Minister Abe was able to share his strategic views with the new president, as well as seek certain reassurances on issues like Article 5 and the provision of extended deterrence. So on the strategic front, the Abe–Trump meetings have been quite helpful and productive, but on the economic and trade policy front, the US and Japan appear to have divergent views on how to tackle the trade imbalance and answer other economic questions. To that end, it remains to be seen how well the Aso­­–Pence economic dialogue can tackle these challenges.

2. With the Trans-Pacific Partnership on the scrapheap, what can countries like Japan and Australia do to ensure high-quality trade liberalisation and economic integration continues in the Asia–Pacific?

Yes, the TPP is politically dead, but I think it’ll remain a useful concept, even if it needs a different name. Japan and Australia should continue with the TPP without the US—the TPP-11—which should be used to push for higher standards of rules and norms to support regional trade liberalisation. The question is really about the role that China plays in the region’s trade affairs. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership is now the “lowest common denominator” trade deal, so I think it’s reasonable for Australia and Japan to work with other like-minded TPP signatories to have some of the TPP standards incorporated into RCEP. It could also be conducive and productive for China if it were to take advantage of the opportunity to push for structural reform in their domestic economy.

3. It’s been one year since Australia’s competitive evaluation process rejected Japan’s bid to build our future submarine fleet. As a strategic partner, how important is Australia to Japan?

To be honest, I was a bit disappointed with Australia’s decision to favor French over Japanese submarine technology, but I also think Japan was unprepared and became a competitive player too late. I don’t think it changed the fundamental strategic value Tokyo sees in Canberra. Cooperation between Japan and Australia has always been crucial to maintaining peace and security in the Asia–Pacific. Indeed, strong cooperation between the two countries is even more necessary today given the uncertainty around America’s commitment to region, our desire for stability in the South China Sea, and as we face the contingency phase of managing North Korea. In those areas, Japan and Australia are natural allies and must deepen cooperation.

Japan has been a bit uneasy with what it sees as Australia’s somewhat schizophrenic views on China, as it’s still yet to reconcile the two strands of its economic cooperation with China and strategic cooperation with the US. Of course, Australia isn’t alone in this situation. But it means it’s particularly important for Canberra and Tokyo to continue to share strategic assessments of regional developments, particularly around China’s risks and opportunities.

4. What does Japan see when it looks at Xi Jinping’s China?

Xi Jinping has completely ended China’s ‘peaceful rise’ strategy, and now poses serious threat to peace and stability in the Asia­­–Pacific. It has been a rude awakening for Japan to appreciate that China had ended that phase, and we aren’t so sure where China’s now headed. On the regional stage, China has emerged as a revisionist power and Japan is most nakedly exposed to its aggressiveness. On the global stage, China is still basically a free-rider that hasn’t decided yet to be a responsible stakeholder and rule-maker. It’s not sustainable, and I think that the moment of truth will come when China defines its role on the Korean Peninsula. This is the third crisis on the Peninsula since the 1990s, and so “business as usual” simply won’t work. I think we have to admit that strategic patience has failed completely, and I think China should be blamed for that failure. So how China will respond to this situation and how we can coordinate a policy to work with China on the DPRK will be the biggest test in my view.

5. Can Prime Minister Abe’s international agenda survive his prime ministership?

The stability of Japan’s domestic politics has allowed it to play a more meaningful role in supporting regional stability. It’s most likely that this domestic political stability will continue until 2021, when Abe will be forced to step down—despite the current scandal he faces, I think it’ll be a fleeting moment. I’m more worried about the political dynamics after Abe leaves. Traditionally whenever Japan has had a long-tenured government we’ve seen political turmoil follow. That might be the case again.

I’m particularly concerned about the possibility of right-wing populist sentiments being unleashed more visibly after Abe retires. Abe, as possibly the most conservative leader Japan’s had in the past 70 years, has been in a strong position to stave off pressure from right wingers. He’s certainly incorporated some of their political dynamics and aspirations into his politics, but policy-wise he’s proven to be much more centrist. That’s helped to stablise our domestic politics, as well as Japan’s relations with its neighbours, particularly China and South Korea, although those relations have continued to be strained. Actually, how well Japan manages its relationships with Beijing and Seoul is central. If those relationships become further strained it may cause a backlash from conservatives. Similarly, if Trump and Abe can’t manage their relationship, or if Trump turns out to be hopelessly unhelpful for Japan and the US–Japan relationship, then that could stimulate anti-US sentiment that radically changes Japan’s domestic politics.

6. Japan’s aging and shrinking population represents a significant challenge for the country. Does Japan need to seriously review its immigration policies in order spur economic growth and underwrite stability?

The Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation has argued that Japan should relax its immigration policies and welcome a very modest number of around 150,000 per annum for the next 30 years, or something similar. At this point however, the Abe government simply isn’t interested in introducing changes to the country’s immigration policies. While they have pursued a back-door policy to allow foreigners to come to Japan for 3–5 years, it sort of acts like a rotation system. That’s perhaps better than nothing, but they should be treated as more than laborers. And once we open that door to foreigners, they should be welcomed as fellow citizens. We need a plan to get there, because the Japanese economy simply won’t revitalise if we don’t adjust our immigration policies.

Countering Beijing’s manoeuvres in the South China Sea

Last month it appeared that the Chinese were again on the move in the South China Sea.

The provincial administrator of Beijing’s land claims in the region told Chinese state media that work would soon begin on  an ‘environmental monitoring station’ on Scarborough Shoal, a large reef system  just 140 nautical miles west of Subic Bay, well within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone.

Former Philippines National Security Advisor, Roilo Golez, explained that China planned to build an airfield, a radar facility, a government administrative centre, living quarters and a resort on the fragile coral atoll. The immediate reaction of Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte was to express his frustration at being powerless to stop China’s island building on Manila’s door-step. ‘We cannot stop China from doing this thing,’ Duterte said.

During the last decade the Chinese have effectively seized over 80 percent of the South China Sea, an area about the size of Western Europe from Poland’s eastern border to the English Channel. The Chinese claim almost all of the waters from Hainan in the north to Indonesia and Malaysia in the south. This area carries over half the world’s merchant shipping, it is a key military transit route, an important fishery, and its seabed holds valuable oil and gas reserves.

In five years the Chinese have built 12 militarily significant facilities in the South China Sea including three major fighter bases towards the centre of the sea, each with protected facilities for 24 fighter-bombers. The facilities apparently planned for Scarborough Shoal would extend this network to provide the Chinese with radar coverage over much of the Philippines strategic heartland, including Subic Bay naval base.

Beijing is applying Chinese domestic law to all claimed areas and it has harassed and arrested numerous foreign fishing and other vessels. Beijing appears intent on turning most of the South China Sea into something approaching an internal waterway.  China’s announcement on Scarborough Reef posed  acute  dilemmas for Manila and Washington .

The full extent of what happened next is yet to be revealed. However, the Philippines lodged a formal protest in Beijing and it appears likely that Washington also expressed strong views in private indicating that unless China changed course, the issue would sour Xi Jinping’s visit to Washington. In the face of this gathering storm, a Chinese government spokesman suddenly denied that Beijing had announced any plan to build facilities on Scarborough Shoal.

Many observers will assume that the crisis has been defused. Well, not quite. While Beijing was professing its innocence, Kyodo News in Taiwan revealed the views of officers of the Chinese South Seas Fleet reported in an internal PLA journal. These Chinese officers reportedly wrote that Beijing had secured the central leadership role in the South China Sea and other players couldn’t match its military supremacy in the region. The article argued that the PLA should brace for ‘endurance warfare’ to secure strategic advantages with patience and long-term planning. Over time, the balance of power had tilted toward China.

What should Washington and other allied capitals make of these developments? All indications are that Beijing’s goals in the South China Sea are unchanged but, as a tactical ploy, it wishes to avoid any immediate escalation of tensions. Renewed Chinese action on Scarborough Reef can be anticipated.

The White House appears to have three main options.

First, Trump could adopt a minimalist approach. He could restate the Obama administration’s interest in seeing all regional disputes resolved peacefully and in accordance with international law and turn a blind eye to the Philippines’ plight.

Even though many senior Americans are frustrated by the dysfunctionality and corruption in Manila, this option seems unlikely. Walking away from the Philippines would do enormous damage to alliance credibility globally and would run counter to the known strategic stances of key administration officials.

Second, Trump could adopt a holding position, whilst simultaneously seeking to protect Philippine sovereignty and alliance credibility. He could, for instance, convey his concern about Chinese plans to Xi Jinping. US aircraft and ships might also conduct patrols in the area in a manner similar to those ordered by President Obama early last year.

To add further weight to this option, the President could state explicitly that Washington’s treaty with the Philippines covers Scarborough Shoal and that US forces will work with the Philippines Armed Forces to maintain security for all Philippines sovereign territory. This second option would be unlikely to threaten Chinese cooperation in other spheres where Washington needs Beijing’s support, such as in restraining North Korea’s nuclear missile programs.

A third option would be for Washington to conclude that it has little choice but to respond to Beijing’s sustained expansionism and competitive behavior by developing a competitive strategy of its own. This would likely be a long-term approach that would include a range of diplomatic, information, economic, geo-strategic, immigration, legal, military and other measures. They would be tailored over time to constrain Beijing’s assertiveness, encourage responsible international behavior, and protect the core interests of the US and its allies.

Beijing’s actions are forcing the Trump administration to make tough choices. There is a great deal at stake for everyone in the Western Pacific.

ASPI suggests

Image courtesy of Flickr user SpaceX.

This week’s ASPI Suggests is blasting off in three…two…one….

SpaceX gave a new meaning to reduce, reuse, recycle this morning, as it made history by successfully launching a pre-loved Falcon 9 rocket into orbital space. If optimised, CEO Elon Musk believes that reusing rockets could lower launch costs by as much as 30%. The launch was live-streamed on SpaceX’s YouTube channel—watch it here (coverage starts at 11 mins 50 secs). Hold tight for the launch crew’s cheers and celebration. SpaceX employees have every reason to be popping the champagne—this success brings them one step closer to Musk’s larger goal of colonising Mars, a plan which rests on a reusable rocket system that would mean spaceships could be used 12–15 times across a single trip.

Here are three strong pieces that take the refugee experience from various angles. First, a look at Canada’s 12-month social experiment ‘adopting’ Syrian refugees—and what happened at ‘Month 13’. Second, a fascinating write-up on Sweden’s apathetic refugee children, who ‘seem to have lost the will to live’ after deportation plans are set in motion. And third, a wrenching story closer to home, that of a self-immolation last year on Nauru—the act and the fall-out.

Let’s take a quick and important detour to salute Bob Silvers, the maestro behind The New York Review of Books, who recently passed away aged 87. Silvers, who founded ‘the paper’ in 1963 (!), worked until days before his death and has been lovingly remembered by a heft of the Review’s contributors. One of the kindest tributes is this touching reflection in The New Yorker.

CT mind Andrew Zammit headlines this week’s fresh research picks, with a brand new paper for Westpoint’s Combating Terrorism Center. In his report, Andrew holds a magnifying glass to the evolving threat of Australian jihadism. Sticking with the Asia–Pacific, a new report from the Center for American Progress argues that the US, Japan and China should seek out areas of common interest in Southeast Asia. A fresh publication from CNAS (PDF) details the west’s evolving understanding of Chinese thoughts on military escalation and escalation management, building on findings from a ground-breaking RAND report from 2008. And finally, after extensive polling, a new release from the Pew Research Center looks at public attitudes towards cyberspace in the age of fake news and trolling.

It’s not often we find ourselves directing Strategist readers over to Teen Vogue; in fact, this might be a first. But it likely won’t be the last, given the magazine’s emerging penchant for political/policy commentary. (Remember this cracking take, ‘Donald Trump Is Gaslighting America’?) Anyway, they’re back at it again, this time with a solid 101 on Trump’s nuclear weapons policy.

Podcasts

As North Korea continues its quest to test the extent of the international community’s patience with its controversial missile tests, the Global Dispatches podcast gang recently sat down (20 mins) with Kelsey Davenport, the non-proliferation policy director at the Arms Control Association. They discussed possible policy paths that the Trump administration could take to address the hermit kingdom’s aggressive ways, and the strategic intent behind the Kim regime’s testing of specific technologies.

And while it’s not traditional Suggests fodder, we couldn’t go past the new podcast from the team behind This American Life and Serial: S-Town. The superstar producers have pulled a Netflix, with all seven episodes released simultaneously earlier this week. Expect the division between rural and metropolitan lives which so pertinently affected the 2016 presidential election to be central to this investigative thriller—and if we can’t convince you to check it out, maybe some of our friends can.

Video

For the last two decades, CSIS has hosted an annual health-check for the US–Japan alliance. For the 2017 round, an esteemed panel gathered in DC to talk about the latest report of the Mt Fuji Dialogue. It’s well worth a watch for anyone looking to get a handle on how distinguished Japanese analysts coming to terms with President Trump and how they hope to deploy some gai-atsu of their own (1 hour 56 mins).

Events

Melbourne: You’ve likely heard that Allan Gyngell, former head-honcho over at ONA, has a new book, Fear of Abandonment, coming down the line. While we’ll have a primer for you next week, you can also get along to the launch event at La Trobe Uni on 5 April, when the author will sit down for a chat with Fairfax’s Daniel Flitton. Deets here.

Canberra: Head along to the screening of a brand new, eye-opening documentary, where senior military officials and veterans detail the importance of climate change to the maintenance of global peace and security throughout the 21st century, and how it can act as a catalyst for future conflict. The Age of Consequence will screen at ANU on 5 April, and is a must-watch for anyone passionate about climate change and/or US politics.

The Strategist Six: Brad Glosserman

Welcome to The Strategist Six, a feature that provides a glimpse into the thinking of prominent academics, analysts, government officials, military officers, reporters and interesting individuals from around the world.

1. What are your impressions of what we’ve seen from the new administration in Asia, and how might their approach differ from Obama’s rebalance?

This administration doesn’t really have a strategy for Asia, nor a larger strategy for the world. There isn’t an overarching vision, there isn’t a considered reflection of America’s global role and interests. What they have is the ‘Make America Great Again’ slogan and some predilections on the part of the President about the two pillars of America’s post-war foreign policy—he appears to maintain a suspicion of alliances, and rejects the multilateralism and enlightened internationalism that has guided American policy since World War II. With that said, what we see so far from the national security and foreign policy bureaucracy is status quo: the messages that Secretary Mattis and Secretary Tillerson delivered during their trips to Asia were ones that any of their recent Defense and State Department predecessors would’ve also delivered.

2. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson recently claimed that decades of diplomacy had failed to compel Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear program. What might Tokyo want Washington to do?

Japan wants the US to maintain a deep and abiding concern about the nature of the threat North Korea poses to Japan. The Japanese believe that they’re in the crosshairs of a North Korean nuclear weapon, so they want the US to be acutely sensitive to the consequences of nuclear use and to the consequences of Japan’s decision to back the US in a future Korean contingency. I’ve often been struck how the Japanese I’ve spoken with evince no doubts about the credibility of America’s commitment to their defence. So the problem is no longer reassurance, but rather deterrence: the Japanese and South Koreans believe that somehow the North Koreans think that their possession of a nuclear device is a deterrent and therefore will miscalculate.

3. What is your assessment of Prime Minister Abe’s courtship of Donald Trump?

Genius! Prime Minister Abe has done an extraordinary job of establishing the “best way” to pursue relations with the United States under President Trump. His quick trip to Trump Tower in December demonstrated his readiness to be a partner, which he backed up with a trip to DC and his time at Mar-a-Lago. Trump’s rhetoric about allies stepping up to the plate actually corresponds with what Abe wants to see from Japan, and the creation of a larger economic framework is something the Japanese have wanted with the US for years. So, Abe’s been brilliant.

4. After Japan’s bruising experience in its bid to sell submarines to Australia, do you think Tokyo still considers Canberra to be a serious security partner, and if so, what might Japan want us to do together?

First of all, I think Japan was a little more divided about the utility, value and the wisdom of the potential submarine deal than was the Abe administration. Subsequently you heard lots of reporting from the defence industry about being somewhat uncomfortable with the prospect, so let’s be careful when we talk about how great a disappointment it was. But I think as Abe surveys the region he absolutely sees Australia as one of his best partners. You share values, interests, security architectures and security structures.

What Japan wants from Australia is continued support for Japan’s new role and outward orientation, and diplomatic support for the rule of law, norm setting, economic engagement, multilateralism, capacity building—all of which Australia already does. The difference now is that Tokyo will look to Canberra (just as Canberra should look to Tokyo and others) to entangle the US, to keep it engaged in the region in ways that might counter some of the more isolationist tendencies of the new administration.

5. This time last year, ASPI published your Special Report,Peak Japan and its Implications for Regional Security. One of your arguments was that Japan’s demographic realities and economic challenges would naturally lead it to look inwards. How is that thesis holding up 12 months on?

Well, the economy is still stumbling along; I haven’t seen the structural reforms that would suggest otherwise. And on the demographic front we’re not seeing much happening either, so I’m still happy to cling to the conclusions I came to a year ago. I recently wrote about what I see as Japan’s ‘five futures’, which builds on the Peak Japan paper by laying out the other pathways Japan could head down. But I’m not seeing anything at this moment that suggests a change in trajectory.

6. To what extent has Prime Minister Abe’s activist international policy agenda penetrated the traditional anti-militarist mindset held by many Japanese?

Actually, the most important change didn’t come from Abe; instead, it was the triple catastrophe on 11 March 2011, when SDF were out on the front lines. The US was there as well, and you saw approval ratings for both the SDF and the US–Japan alliance skyrocket. So I think that’s been the most important development in changing minds. Prime Minister Abe has done a lot but I don’t think that he’s brought about a qualitative or paradigmatic shift. Japanese thinking is impacted when they are applauded for what they contribute and when the world can look to them and say ‘thank you’. I think that has the most profound influence on reshaping the anti-militarist mindset many Japanese have.

Trump’s terror discourse makes it harder to counter violent extremism

Donald Trump’s foreign policy focus on ISIS was one of his recipes for winning the US presidential election. Even political affairs pundits whose expertise doesn’t extend to counterterrorism found a soft spot for his tough stance, understandably appalled by the surge in ISIS-directed attacks in the West. However, for those who had their hopes up for a winning ISIS strategy, President Trump could prove a disaster for Washington’s CT policy.

Terrorism and counterterrorism policy have become key political drivers in the US but the discourse now is out of touch with empirical research. US policy-makers are now arguing that the bipartisan focus on CT during the Obama era is one of the reasons that Trump could essentially surf the wave of the globally-magnified discourse on terrorism.

Trump’s success was based on his appeal to the economically disadvantaged and his ability to connect with Middle America. However, two former senior Obama administration officials, Jon Finer and Robert Malley, self-critically underscore that another contributing factor for his success was ‘a bipartisan approach to national security focused on terrorism that has distorted America’s understanding of its interests’:

‘We saw firsthand how parallel policy-making processes, one for counterterrorism and another for everything else, often made conflicting recommendations for example, over whether to strike terrorist targets in a given country or forego military action that could undermine the host government. We saw the degree to which policy arguments couched in the language of counterterrorism carried inordinate weight. As a consequence, advocates in our internal conversations cast their arguments in counterterrorism terms.’

That, coming from Obama’s own policy-makers, highlights the dangers of the “politics of fear”. The CT lens has come to overshadow most national security and foreign policy decisions, acting as a useful reminder for other countries, including Australia.

Despite the Trump presidential campaign revolving around the issue of terrorism, experts have cautiously anticipated what real policies he could implement given his unpredictability. However, since Trump’s inauguration, it’s become clear that CT is one of the key areas where he intends to walk the talk. His resolute insistence on the travel bans for several Muslim-majority countries under the aegis of national security provides clear evidence. Further corroboration is his appointment of Sebastian Gorka, a former Breitbart chairman and editor, as his national security advisor on terrorism matters.

The overall discourse on global CT policy has taken a 360-degree turn since 9/11. From Bush’s divisive ‘Global War on Terror’ language to Obama’s more measured semantics of a ‘War on al-Qaeda’ and focus on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), to now a full-on anti-Islamic discourse with Trump. His contributions have dramatically changed the global CT policy landscape.

Last year there was a sense of actual progress in the fight against ISIS given the recent territorial gains by Iraqi coalition forces together with various CVE projects for counter-messaging ISIS’s propaganda. Now CT scholars find themselves battling two discursive fronts: the meta-narrative of groups such as ISIS, and the now burgeoning white supremacist discourse of the alt-right movements. The former is now being fuelled by the latter, and the process is becoming an evil cycle. It’s not a coincidence that the next major CT conference in New York is about ‘emerging threats’.

The threat of right-wing extremism has long been present. What’s new is its normalisation and how it’s becoming “mainstream” discourse, given additional impetus by the White House. The difference lies in the fact that facts and empirical research no longer set policy agendas in the post-truth era. Notwithstanding the debate over Obama’s foreign policy credentials, his CT policy agenda was in line with the views of the leading experts in the field. Despite the unfortunately overblown bipartisan focus on CT blurring US global interests, Obama steered the much-needed global focus on the holistic approach of CVE. Even the Bush administration in late 2005 ultimately realised the Global War on Terror strategy wasn’t working, and that a root-cause-oriented approach was needed.

So what can CT-policy decision-makers and scholars do to affect the global discourse given the apparent agenda now being set by the Trump White House? They shouldn’t let CT take precedence over policy-making in other national security and foreign policy fields. We’re already witnessing this around the world as migration is conflated with terrorism. Alex P. Schmid, a leading terrorism scholar, last year published an insightful report on the issue.

Terror attacks and the fear of them can generate a lot of questions and there’s a fine balance in dealing with the political momentum in the aftermath of such an attack. With Trump the question becomes how much damage will be done by reversing what’s been achieved to date through the globally-led agenda. If the reaction to the Bush-era policies is anything to go by, we should also expect to see a backlash against Trump’s CT efforts.