Unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) certainly seem to be the flavour of the day. Media reports suggest the RAAF is seeking eight MQ-9 Reaper aircraft at a total cost of around $300m. And Australia will also acquire up to seven MQ-4C Tritons to operate with the P-8A Poseidon. The USAF currently operates three types of remotely piloted aircraft (RPA): the MQ-1 Predator, the MQ-9 Reaper (which is an improved version of the Predator) and the RQ-4 Global Hawk. UCAVs would enhance Australia’s current capabilities, and provide a number of new capabilities. But they’ll also bring additional costs and burdens.

The 2013 Defence White Paper identified Defence’s investing in people as a strategic priority, and that’ll likely continue to be an important component of the forthcoming White Paper. In adding the Reaper to Australia’s force structure, the government would do well to learn from the US Air Force’s experiences in maintaining UCAVs and other RPA, particularly the personnel problems which came to a head in January 2015. Read more

This post is adapted from the authors’ paper Australian defence: challenges for the new government, published in the latest edition of Security Challenges.

There’s a set of enduring policy principles that have guided the defence policies of both sides of Australian politics, and defence policy in Australia is effectively bipartisan. So we shouldn’t expect any surprises as the new Coalition Government comes to terms with the challenge of reducing the gap between the cost of Australia’s strategic ambitions and the funds available to achieve them. Given the size of this gap, and the prospect of enduring austerity in the defence budget, this challenge will prove formidable.

We’ve developed some policy principles to see how they might best be applied in contemporary circumstances. We think that the policy focus on the defence of Australia and operations in our immediate region continues to be inviolable, especially with the expected continued growth of the economies and military potential of the major and middle powers of the Indo-Pacific. We’ve also re-emphasised the centrality of a strategy that is maritime in focus.

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At a 6:30pm talk with reporters at the (now old) Officers Club in Guam on the 25 July 1969, President Nixon changed Australian defence policy. He announced that in future countries fighting internal threats should provide the bulk of the defending armed forces. America would provide logistic support and sell the necessary arms, but the threatened nation should now primarily rely on its own combat forces not those of America. In short, it should be self-reliant.

And so, after due allowance for consideration and inertia, Australia decided to embrace this new Guam (or Nixon) Doctrine. While Nixon’s declaration was a bit vague about combat support forces, the need to now provide the bulk of the actual combat forces for self-defence seemed plain enough. Such is the big impact of big allies. But has the Guam Doctrine passed its used by date and is the Doctrine’s concept of self-reliance still a sensible basis on which to construct modern Australian defence policies? Read more

For the first time, the most recent Defence White paper contained  multiple references to Africa, illustrating Australia’s growing interest and engagement with the continent. Australia is playing an active role in making Africa more secure and stable through participation in peacekeeping missions and counter-terrorism activities. Australia’s economic interests are focused on resources in Africa, and there are an increasing number of Australian companies and personnel operating there. The growth in Indo-Pacific maritime trade routes is apparent and Australia has a strong interest in ensuring their stability.

The inclusion of Africa in the White Paper shows that the continent is on the adgenda, and highlights the recognition amongst Australia’s leading policy makers that it needs to be given serious consideration within defence policy. This is also consistent with Australia’s position on the UN Security Council for two years, which will bring a heightened focus on Africa—a large percentage (well over 50%) of the Council’s work is on Africa.

The White Paper states that the Indian Ocean is becoming the ‘world’s busiest trade corridor’. ‘One-third of the world’s bulk cargo and around two-thirds of global oil shipments’ travel through it. It’s vitally important for Australia to keep the Indian Ocean waterways secure and stable, and this involves engaging with African states and understanding the nuances of politics and security on the African continent. Read more

Defence White Paper 2013 is well written and largely internally coherent, except for the absence of an investment plan to execute its policy and strategy objectives. It often tries making virtues out of necessities politically, particularly with convenient international schedule delays such as the troubled JSF program.

Much commentary has inevitably concentrated on its recent fiscal and current party-political contexts or, superficially, on major equipment proposals. There is really little substantial change to the major ADF capabilities originally planned in the 2003 Defence Capability Review that updated and corrected the 2000 White Paper.

More tactful and ostensibly optimistic about China than its predecessor, this paper has unfortunately dropped mention of China’s lack of strategic transparency as a cause of instability globally and regionally. It also logically continues the post-Indonesia focus of its 2009 predecessor. Read more