Tag Archive for: Counterterrorism

Australia’s security architecture must evolve, not regress

The Independent Intelligence Review, publicly released last Friday, was inoffensive and largely supported the intelligence community status quo. But it was also largely quiet on the challenges facing the broader national security community in an increasingly dangerous world, in which traditional intelligence is just one tool of statecraft and national power.

After the January discovery of a caravan laden with explosives in Dural, Sydney, confusion emerged around what federal and state governments knew and when. The review was completed before the caravan was discovered, and the plot was likely beyond the review’s scope. However, government responses to the event should prompt a discussion about Australia’s national security architecture.

Australia faces an unprecedented convergence of threats. We are confronted simultaneously by the rise of aggressive authoritarian powers, global conflict, persistent and evolving terrorism, foreign interference and the normalisation of cyber warfare.

Luck will not protect us; we need structure and certainty. Australia saw these threats early and began to modernise its security architecture in 2017, including the establishment of the Home Affairs portfolio.

But the government has gradually reversed some elements of the consolidation, returning various security responsibilities to the Attorney-General’s portfolio, including for the Australian Federal Police and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation. This reversion to an outdated model risks leaving the system ill-equipped to confront the challenges of the 21st century.

Debate on Home Affairs seems fixated on the leadership style of its former head, Michael Pezzullo. Leadership is crucial, but obsession with individual style over substance, distracts from both strategic thinking and the fundamental issue of resurrecting a system that had structural inadequacies and was demonstrably unfit for purpose. We are not simply revisiting a past model; we are resurrecting a failed one.

The Attorney-General’s portfolio, in its traditional guise, was designed for a simpler, less dangerous era. Domestic threats were minimal and tended to come one by one—for example, after the end of the Cold War, security focus shifted from espionage to the emerging threat of Islamist terrorism. The Attorney-General’s oversight was appropriate, as it focused primarily on the legal framework while security agencies executed operations.

However, the proliferation and intersection of modern threats have overwhelmed this antiquated model.

When confronted with asylum-seeker boat arrivals, global terrorism, China and hybrid threats including cyber, the previous system—notwithstanding highly talented people—struggled as the Attorney-General’s portfolio held both the legal and security responsibilities. Having public servants working on legal considerations and intelligence officers doing operations is no longer adequate.

The system’s limitations were evident well before the 2017 restructure. In 2011, prime minister Julia Gillard moved cybersecurity from the Attorney-General’s purview into her own department. Similarly, the 2012 review of illegal boat arrival policy was managed within the prime minister’s department, reflecting that the framework was not up to the task. And as a result of a review after the 2014 Martin Place terrorist attack, the Abbott government created a Counterterrorism Coordinator within the prime minister’s portfolio.

The rise of the Islamic State terrorist group in 2014 exposed policy deficits. While terror laws rightly fell under the Attorney-General’s remit, the broader policy response demanded a more strategic perspective and decisive approach. Changes were needed, partly because laws were so out of date.

But it was China’s rise that finally revealed the urgent need for a dedicated focus on national security policy. The 2016 review into foreign interference was a direct consequence of Australia’s evolving threat landscape.

Few of our closest partners’ chief law officers also function as security ministers. Typically, a dedicated security minister focuses on threat assessment and policy development, while the Attorney-General ensures that all actions are lawful.

Australia’s Home Affairs model strengthened the legal checks and balances by separating security policy and operational functions from the legal oversight function. It ensured that a single minister could not simultaneously identify a threat, determine the appropriate response and authorise the necessary actions without independent scrutiny. The previous system essentially allowed a single minister to mark their own homework.

Dividing security responsibilities between the Attorney-General and Home Affairs portfolios limits the effectiveness of both departments.

If this gradual dilution portends a future abolition of Home Affairs altogether, that would be a mistake. As the Dural caravan controversy unfolded, no one seemed able to agree on what was an appropriate amount of information-sharing between police and security agencies, and state and federal governments. This underscores the need for clarity that Home Affairs is responsible for setting, coordinating and implementing national security policy.

Home Affairs was created because the threat environment was evolving and, within our national security architecture, foreign and defence policy were covered but the third aspect of national security—domestic security—was lacking. So, what security evolution has justified its regression? The Attorney-General’s department has not shown itself to be more capable than Home Affairs in terrorism, cybersecurity or foreign interference.

Home Affairs—to the government’s credit—led the world by banning DeepSeek from government devices. Could we count on such decisive action if lawyers were doing all the work and then reviewing it themselves? Would you allow your lawyer to run your business, rather than provide essential legal counsel?

Technology amplifies threats and is advancing much faster than new laws can be written. Terrorists use encrypted apps to plot attacks and social media to attract recruits. China spreads propaganda through social media and has already begun using cyber intrusions to prepare to conduct sabotage operations in future conflict.

Australia must not only reinstate the separation between the security minister and the attorney-general; it must evolve further to confront 21st-century threats. This should include establishing a National Security Council or Secretariat, like those of many of our partner nations, including Quad countries. This body should be led by a national security adviser who provides strategic coherence and policy coordination.

To navigate the increasingly complex and dangerous global security landscape, we need to evolve, not regress.

Australian politics needs clearer national security boundaries

We need to establish clearer political boundaries around national security to avoid politicising ongoing security issues and to better manage secondary effects.

The Australian Federal Police (AFP) revealed on 10 March that the Dural caravan laden with explosives and an antisemitic note naming Jewish community targets, discovered 19 January, was a hoax orchestrated by criminal actors.

Political debates around national security have focused on the caravan since its discovery. The AFP’s revelation voided much of the rampant speculation, perfectly demonstrating the need to establish better political boundaries.

The AFP confirmed the caravan was essentially a ‘criminal con job’—an ‘elaborate scheme contrived by organised criminals, domestically and from offshore.’

The AFP believe that those responsible were trying to ‘change their criminal status’, likely attempting to leverage information about the plot in exchange for reduced sentences. In short, criminals sought to exploit security fears for personal gain. While police are clear that, for various reasons, there was never a real terrorist or mass casualty threat—there was no detonator, for example—it is important to acknowledge that the plot was convincing and created real safety concerns for Jewish Australian communities.

Despite a lack of formal designation, the caravan was initially presented as a terrorist plot, including by NSW Premier Chris Minns and Prime Minister Anthony Albanese. It followed months of hate crimes and December’s designated terrorist attack against the Adass Israel Synagogue in Melbourne.

However, this quick political designation and ensuing discussions likely heightened community fears and enhanced criminal actors’ ability to exploit them.  The caravan was discussed repeatedly in federal and state parliaments and the media despite the ongoing police investigation, often alongside criticism of governmental responses to rising antisemitism.

Silence in the face of national security threats is a problem, and government messaging around the Dural caravan and other incidents has been lacking. But loud inaccuracies can be as bad or worse—particularly if they create secondary psychological effects that criminals are trying to exploit, such as public fear.

Clearer government statements would have better informed the public and managed fears. Delays in messaging also leave further room for misinformation. But the political handling of the Dural case is also defined by a heavily partisan approach and politicking at the expense of accuracy. Clearer messaging in the first instance is needed, but so are mechanisms to reduce the misinformation window of opportunity.

Partisan discussion of the Dural caravan was clear in Parliament. In February, Liberal member of parliament Julian Leeser, while discussing a motion to condemn antisemitism, said that the plot was evidence that Australia faces a ‘domestic terrorism crisis’ and criticised the government for failing to adequately support the Jewish community.

That same day, opposition foreign affairs spokesperson David Coleman raised the caravan while specifically criticising Albanese:

 … extraordinarily, a caravan packed with explosives, apparently targeting Jewish addresses, and a prime minister who was in the dark—oblivious. This is an extraordinary failure by a weak prime minister, and it is marking our national character.

Days later, Jason Wood, another Liberal MP, listed a series of antisemitic attacks, calling Dural ‘the big one’ before echoing Coleman’s sentiment:

the prime minister should have been very strong on this right from the very start, instead of trying to walk on two sides of the road at the same time.

While firmer leadership was needed, we now know there were complex factors to consider. Investigators suspected early in the process that the plot was a hoax. The operation was not straightforward, and there actually were a few sides of the road to walk—often the case with such investigations.

Opposition Leader Peter Dutton raised the caravan matter with the media on multiple occasions, repeatedly criticising Albanese’s handling of the case. Speaking to the ABC, Dutton criticised Albanese for not being immediately briefed on the caravan incident, which he labelled ‘potentially the biggest terrorist attack in our country’s history’, and said the prime minister’s actions constituted ‘an absolute abrogation of his responsibility’. He also speculated that NSW Police may have had concerns the prime minister’s office would leak the information and that this may have been the reason Albanese wasn’t briefed.

In contrast, when pressed for particulars, the prime minister often noted that the Dural caravan was subject to ongoing investigation.

This discourse had flow-on effects. The caravan was repeatedly cited in debate relating to the Criminal Code Amendment (Hate Crime) Bill. Critics of the government were pushing for mandatory minimum sentences—an objective they eventually achieved.

Due to the incident’s recency, greater consideration should have been given to the investigation process. Misrepresentation of the incident was not intentional, but it was speculative and premature, affecting the integrity of debate and legislation.

Media should hold politicians to account. Law enforcement can better support this by more quickly and more directly making information available to reporters, even if limited only to reminders that investigations are ongoing, details are classified or claims are unsubstantiated. Importantly, this aligns with national security objectives by managing secondary effects and preventing social division.

From home to horror: the association between domestic violence and terrorism

Domestic violence is an under-recognised early indicator of terrorism. It is not a reliable solitary indicator, but when observed alongside risk factors, it can prompt authorities to take a closer look at a potential terrorist.

So far as can be demonstrated so far by data, the connection is correlative, not causative: the two behaviours overlap. But knowing this is still valuable. Recognising the link could enhance public safety and national security.

Research from the UK’s Project Starlight shines a light on this issue. In 2019, an analysis of 3045 individuals referred to the Prevent program—designed to prevent extremism—revealed that more than a third had a link to domestic abuse, either as victims, perpetrators, or witnesses. This figure is far above the general population’s 5.7 percent rate of domestic abuse.

Alarmingly, many of those referred were victims or witnesses of domestic violence, not perpetrators.

Studies in Pakistan have also found that individuals who experienced domestic abuse were more likely to gravitate toward extremist ideologies. The study looked at 562 young people aged 16 to 25 and found a clear link between growing up with domestic violence and later supporting extremist beliefs.

So, we should think of domestic violence as a risk factor in someone’s conversion to violent extremism, just as doctors know that some things point to a risk of disease even though medical research hasn’t yet found out why.

Two examples, among many that could be cited, illustrate the association. Omar Mateen, who carried out the 2016 Pulse nightclub shooting in Orlando, had a history of domestic violence. His violent behaviour toward his ex-wife included physical and verbal abuse. Likewise, Khalid Masood, who was responsible for the  2017 Westminster attack in London, had a record of abusive behaviour toward his partners.

Though the data does not show a causative relationship, we can reasonably theorise on the drivers. Research shows that domestic violence and radicalisation are both promoted by a deep need for control and identity—things extremist groups readily exploit. Survivors of domestic abuse, especially those who experienced trauma in childhood, often find these needs unmet in their lives. By searching for belonging and purpose, they become targets for groups that promise power, community and meaning. Recognising this is the first step towards intervening.

Central to both domestic violence and terrorism is moral disengagement—the process by which perpetrators view their harmful actions as necessary or justified. Whether it’s in the home or through terrorist acts, violence is rationalised as a legitimate tool to exert power and control.

In Australia, positive steps are being taken to address each issue. Though they are not coordinated with each other, they happen to align. The National Plan to End Violence Against Women and Children (2022-2032) addresses domestic violence and gender-based violence, with an understanding of the complex social and psychological drivers at play. The plan is a vital first step in reducing violence and promoting the wellbeing of all Australians. Similarly, the Living Safe Together initiative aims to prevent violent extremism and provides support for individuals at risk of radicalisation.

While these efforts remain separate, they share strikingly similar goals. Both recognise the underlying trauma and vulnerability that can fuel violent behaviour—whether in the form of domestic abuse or extremism. Early intervention, community support and collaborative efforts between social services and national security agencies are core elements of both programs.

Australia should pursue a more coordinated approach—one that treats the prevention of domestic violence and radicalisation as complementary goals. Law enforcement, social services and national security agencies should collaborate to identify early warning signs of vulnerability and intervene before individuals are drawn into extremist ideologies.

 

This article has been corrected to say that research shows domestic violence and radicalisation are promoted by a need for control and identity. It has also been corrected to say that separate policies addressing domestic violence and risks of radicalisation are not coordinated with each other.

Australia’s new CT and CVE strategy: light on policy and specifics

Australia has a new counterterrorism (CT) and counter-violent extremism (CVE) strategy—but it’s light on counterterrorism and lacking in strategy. While it introduces two new CVE measures, it presents itself more as a communicative document than a real strategy or action plan.

Titled ‘A Safer Australia – Australia’s Counter-terrorism and Violent Extremism Strategy 2025’, it was quietly released on 17 January, two years after then home affairs minister Clare O’Neil vowed to revise and update the strategy of 2022. Yet there is little to show for two years of development.

As of August 2024, Australia’s national terrorist threat level is ‘probable’—higher than when the previous strategy was released. The document also arrives amid a spate of antisemitic incidents in Sydney and Melbourne and increasing political pressure on government to respond. Clearly, the title of ‘A Safer Australia’ does not reflect our current security climate.

The strategy will improve Australia’s early-intervention capacity. But it is a CVE strategy, not a CT strategy: it is focused on community intervention programs, not Australia’s capability to pre-empt or respond to terrorist acts. The document does not provide new CT policy, resourcing or strategic direction. A comprehensive strategy should address both.

Even on CVE it is light on policy ideas and specifics, supporting criticisms that the department has lacked in-house capability to lead on CT policy since the Australian Federal Police and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation were moved outside it.

The strategy begins with a sober assessment of the threat landscape and focuses on countering rising youth violent extremism, as well as highlighting changes to the character of terrorism. But these challenges—including hybrid ideologies and youth radicalisation—were discussed in 2024 by ASIO Director-General Mike Burgess in greater and more engaging detail.

It aims to prevent CVE at a community level through two main initiatives. Firstly, the government intends to nearly double funding to state and territory partners for CVE intervention programs, which they lead, and commit to ongoing funding. Secondly, it will establish a national version of the successful NSW Step Together program, a confidential, non-police community support service that parents can contact if they are concerned their child is radicalising. The government will also better include young people in developing CVE policy.

These will not address the drivers of youth extremism, including real and perceived grievances. The strategy also highlights the challenge of online spaces and radicalisation but commits only to closer collaboration with technology companies and partners. It overlooks structural factors contributing to the rise of violent extremism. More funding and a federal helpline are positives but are small offerings after two years of delay.

Instead of policy innovation, the strategy repeatedly refers to existing measures and ‘improving partnerships and collaboration’ with various stakeholders. It rarely provides examples of how it will do this.

For instance, when announcing the strategy, Home Affairs Minister Tony Burke highlighted an ongoing commitment to engaging Southeast Asian partners—an important measure that already exists. The strategy introduces no mechanisms for engagement or deepening relationships. Instead, it references the 2022 ASEAN-Australia Counter-Terrorism Dialogue.

For CT, the strategy is seemingly more focused on communications than action, saying in its executive summary: ‘The Strategy is for all Australians to develop a greater understanding of the evolving threat and what Australian governments are doing to respond to those challenges.’

Transparency and communication with the public are important, but they are not a strategy. Furthermore, the government is hardly promoting transparency by releasing the document with little notice on a Friday in mid-January.

Instead of foreshadowing new initiatives, the document commits to improved bureaucracy and internal functions, recommending improved internal assessment pathways and better consultation. Its action plan calls for yet another government review into existing frameworks. After a considerable wait for this strategy, it calls for more waiting.

Instead of new initiatives, it explicitly defends the status quo, saying ‘our current system for preventing and responding to terrorism is mature and works effectively.’

Certainly, Australia’s national security professionals at the coalface have an excellent record. But such confidence in the system contradicts reporting from September 2024 of a breakdown in collaboration between the federal government and the states and territories over the National Counter-Terrorism Plan—describing the situation as an unprecedented ‘clusterf—k’.

A key issue highlighted was the Home Affairs limited capacity to deliver counterterrorism policy, with migration absorbing significant time and resources. Similar issues were raised by ASPI’s Justin Bassi and John Coyne in August, with the division of counterterrorism responsibility between Home Affairs and the Attorney-General’s Department splitting expertise.

A real CT and CVE strategy requires new policy, more specifics and clear objectives. An increasingly difficult operational environment demands innovative policy backed by expertise. Terrorism is evolving and the threat it poses is increasing. Policy and resourcing need to be commensurate with this challenge.

We must understand why youth are radicalised. It’s not just manipulation

Youth radicalisation and its connection to political violence and terrorism is an urgent concern. Despite consistent warnings from intelligence and law enforcement agencies in Australia and globally, public discussion around this issue often falls short. We need to understand why it persists and how to disrupt it before it escalates.

Australian Security Intelligence Organisation said on 6 December that about 20 percent of its priority counterterrorism cases involved minors. Since 2017, ASIO and the AFP has investigated 35 young Australians for violent extremism, some as young as 12.

Young adults are also a risk factor, as illustrated this month by the apparently ideologically motivated killing of a healthcare CEO in the US. To address their radicalisation, policymakers must grapple with agency: radicalised people are not just vulnerable and manipulated; political violence can be their response to both real and perceived grievances.

A Five Eyes report issued this month highlights disturbing case studies of youth involvement in violent extremism across Australia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand and the United States. These case studies offer valuable insights but focus on social media. While digital environments are important, we risk overshadowing the deeper psychological, societal and cultural factors that underlie youth radicalisation.

We must determine what differentiates those merely exposed to extremist content and those who are radicalised by it. Online interactions may exacerbate radicalisation but are not the sole factor.

Multi-faceted vulnerabilities are part of the answer. For example, individuals who feel alienated, unsupported or marginalised may find a sense of belonging or purpose in extremist ideologies. Understanding complex factors, and their role in the cycle of radicalisation, is necessary to disrupt the cycle.

We must focus on understanding why certain individuals, particularly young people, are drawn to extremist ideologies in the first place. This includes understanding the uncomfortable issue of youth agency in radicalisation.

Agency is absent from the Five Eyes report and much of public discussion. We cannot view radicalised young people only as vulnerable victims. We must consider their conscious participation as an attempt to resolve real or perceived grievances. While agency is tricky to assess in the case of radicalised minors, it is particularly relevant in assessing cases of adult young persons, aged 18 to 25. This demographic is more likely to be politically aware and may be motivated to violent extremism due to a radical ideology or political grievance.

The 4 December killing of UnitedHealthcare CEO Brian Thompson in New York highlights this issue. The lead suspect, a 26-year-old man, allegedly carried a three-page manifesto criticising corporate America and had engaged with violent extremist literature critiquing wealth inequality. While he was active online, he does not neatly fit the mould of a socially isolated or mentally unwell offender. Nor is it clear whether a specific online group radicalised him.

But the killer’s identity is not the most important issue. After the murder, many young people were quick to understand, even praise, the violence online and vilify the healthcare industry. The lack of universal condemnation of the killing is disturbing—but also reveals political dissatisfaction. Agency is critical to understanding this killing: it was likely motivated by personal and political grievances stemming from social and economic insecurity, either real or perceived, which unfortunately resonate with many young people—including Australians.

Addressing broader causes of youth radicalisation will require a shift in policy. Resolving vulnerabilities will take a whole-of-society strategy that goes beyond the traditional roles of law enforcement and intelligence agencies and engages other sectors, such as education, mental health services and community groups.

Early intervention is key to pre-empting radicalisation. This necessitates better understanding of vulnerabilities that fuel radicalisation, and creation of a supportive environment that offers young people help before they turn to violent ideologies.

Research into the psychological, social and environmental factors that make young people susceptible to extremism is crucial. This research must inform policies and interventions to support and guide at-risk youth. Early interventions, such as mental health support, programs to prevent social isolation and initiatives to foster stronger community connections, can protect against radicalisation. This approach requires a shift in focus from reactive law enforcement to proactive support.

Schools and families must be empowered to play a more proactive role in identifying and supporting at-risk youth. We must show schools and families how to recognise early signs of radicalisation and intervene. This will require identification of specific vulnerability factors and making strategies and support available before issues escalate.

The above solutions will address vulnerabilities. To address agency, the government must also better engage young people, understand their grievances and implement policy in response. Disenfranchised young people contribute to a range of social risk factors, including increased criminality, growth in extremist political movements, and even violent extremism.

We must also continue to recognise the legal distinction between radicalisation and violent extremism. Extremist political views may repel repellent many, but they are legal in democratic societies. We must prevent violence, not free expression, and preserve our democratic values and freedoms.

The government must shift towards a whole-of-society approach addressing vulnerabilities and agency, as well exacerbating factors such as social media, to effectively implement policies to fight youth radicalisation.

To pre-empt extremist violence, we need real-time social media data sharing

Law enforcement and social media platforms must implement real-time data sharing to stop online extremism before it leads to violence. Using appropriate safeguards, we can achieve this without raising concerns about creating a surveillance state.

Social media companies have vast behavioural data, but their reluctance to share it with authorities means we’re left scrambling after an attack occurs. The resulting delay facilitates radicalisation and puts lives at risk. Rather than reacting to attacks, we should aim to prevent harm through a coordinated, data-driven approach. The current system is failing. Speed matters. Privacy concerns are valid, but when the stakes are this high, we need to ask: how many more lives are we willing to risk?

Extremist groups exploit unregulated online spaces to recruit, radicalise and incite violence. By the time we detect it, it’s often too late. We’ve seen the deadly consequences: shootings, terrorism and violence facilitated through social media. Social media companies like to claim they are neutral platforms, but they control the algorithms that amplify content, creating an environment where radical ideas can thrive.

Take the Christchurch mosque shootings in 2019 for example. The shooter posted his manifesto on Facebook and 8chan (an online message-board) before killing 51 people. Although Facebook moved quickly to remove his manifesto, the content spread to thousands. But his interactions with extremist groups and violent posts could have been flagged long before the attack. If they had then been shared immediately with law enforcement, authorities could have detected his extremist behaviour early and intervened.

Social media platforms must be more proactive in identifying extremist content and sharing it with authorities immediately. Delayed intervention leaves room for radicalisation. This is compounded by algorithms that prioritise content likely to generate engagement—likes, shares and comments. Extreme content, which often elicits strong emotional reactions, is amplified. Conspiracy theories, such as QAnon, spread widely on online platforms, drawing users deeper into radical echo chambers.

This isn’t about mass surveillance—it’s about content moderation. This approach should build on existing moderation systems. Authorities should only be alerted when certain thresholds of suspicious activity are crossed, much as financial institutions report suspicious transactions. For example, if activity suggests a user is being recruited by a terrorist group, or if the user shares plans for violence, social media companies should have the ability—and in fact the responsibility—to flag this behaviour to authorities.

Of course, automated content detection can result in misjudgements. This is where human content moderators within social media companies could play a role: once an automated system flags potentially harmful activity, it could trigger a review by an employee who would assess whether the flagged behaviour meets a threshold for real-time sharing with law enforcement. If the content is likely to incite violence or indicate a credible threat, the moderator could initiate real-time data sharing with authorities for possible intervention.

This verification process could be among the safeguards in place to ensure that only high-risk, potentially harmful activities are flagged, protecting the privacy of those who don’t present a threat and preventing concerns arising about the government creating a surveillance state. Shared data would follow appropriate legal channels, ensuring transparency and accountability.

The costs of implementing real-time data-sharing systems are manageable. Social media platforms already use automated systems for content moderation, which could be adapted to flag extremist behaviour without imposing significant human resource costs. Shared financial responsibility between social media companies and law enforcement could also help. Law enforcement agencies could receive funding to process flagged data, while tech companies would have to pay for technology needed to detect extremist activity. We can manage implementation costs and focus resources where they’re most needed by prioritising high-risk platforms and upscaling the system over time.

A limitation is that Australia could not impose this mechanism on platform operators that had no presence in the country. But the larger platforms’ operators, such as Meta, X and Snap, do.

Our current reactive approach isn’t working. We need real-time data sharing between tech companies and law enforcement to intercept threats before they escalate. Lives are at stake, and we can’t afford to wait for the next tragedy.

How gender factors affect work to counter violent extremism

To improve its programs for countering violent extremism (CVE), the Australian government must better understand the gendered characteristics of extremism. And it needs to apply that knowledge to enhance the existing practices of CVE professionals who work with radicalised men.

While it is well established that a significant proportion of violent extremists are men, the underlying gendered factors driving male radicalisation remain poorly understood. This hampers the government’s ability to craft effective strategies in CVE.

Historically, CVE efforts have concentrated on individual risk assessments and community surveillance.  While this is important work, by overlooking the critical role of gender in radicalisation processes we are potentially missing ways to improve the effectiveness of CVE. Yet, gender-sensitising CVE efforts is no easy task.

In our 2021 research we interviewed Australian CVE practitioners, exploring how conventional understandings of masculinity—particularly hegemonic masculinity, which normalises men’s dominance over women and puts high value on traits like strength and control—played a pivotal role in shaping the self-identities and views of men susceptible to extremist ideologies. Many of their clients aligned themselves with notions of masculinity that endorse violence and superiority, especially when they perceived these ideals as being under threat.

Our research reveals new insights about the influence of gender in CVE intervention. CVE practitioners, often on the frontline of deradicalisation, spend much time building relationships with such men. Through discussions with a diverse range of Australian practitioners, we uncovered a complex interplay between masculine identity and the effectiveness of interventions. We discovered that the process of deradicalisation was deeply influenced by the client’s views on gender roles as well as the gender dynamics between practitioner and client.

Many practitioners reported that male clients expressed rigid views on gender roles, which could affect their behaviour and responses to treatment. These views had to be carefully negotiated. For instance, one practitioner noted that a client struggled with feelings of inadequacy regarding his masculinity, making interactions with traditional authority figures—such as police officers—particularly challenging.

Interestingly, several practitioners observed that male clients with misogynistic views often engaged more positively with female practitioners than with their male counterparts. This challenges the stereotype that strong traditionalist beliefs would preclude men from seeking advice and mentorship from women.

The interpersonal relationships developed in CVE settings are crucial staging grounds for different ways of defining and developing masculinity. Here, masculine identities are enacted and shaped by both clients and practitioners, often reflecting broader societal norms and expectations. While some practitioners use traits associated with hegemonic masculinity to build trust and rapport, this approach risks reinforcing the very stereotypes that contribute to radicalisation.

We believe such insights are vital for refining CVE practices. There is an urgent need for practitioners to reflect critically on whether they are challenging harmful gender stereotypes or inadvertently perpetuating them.

The complexity of CVE work necessitates a nuanced approach that accounts for the multifaceted nature of gendered power dynamics. Practitioners must consider gender dynamics not only between men and women but also among men, women, boys and girls. This level of introspection is essential, as it encourages practitioners to question their assumptions and adapt their strategies accordingly.

To make CVE initiatives more effective, the government must urge practitioners to engage with diverse theories and understandings of gender and masculinity. Once they recognise that gender identities are socially and culturally constructed, they may have a more comprehensive understanding of how these identities influence the behaviours and interactions of young men. Then they can foster a reflective practice that interrogates gender norms, and create more inclusive and effective interventions that truly address the roots of radicalisation.

To this end, training and professional development should focus on gender sensitivity and awareness, so that practitioners are equipped with the tools to navigate these complex dynamics. By creating spaces for dialogue about masculinity and radicalisation, the government can empower practitioners to share experiences and strategies, fostering a collaborative approach to CVE.

As the field of CVE evolves, it is crucial for practitioners to incorporate gender analysis into their work. This involves not only recognising diverse expressions of masculinity but also understanding how these expressions can affect relationships with clients. They can develop strategies that both deradicalise individuals and dismantle the harmful stereotypes that contribute to violent extremism.

Ultimately, a comprehensive approach to CVE that embraces a nuanced understanding of gender dynamics will help build more resilient communities that are better equipped to prevent various forms of radicalisation in the first place.

Australia must play to its strengths to confront terrorism threat

The recent lifting of the terrorism threat level from possible to probable is a reminder how vulnerable Australia remains to a serious terror incident.   

Yet for the most part, Australians remain unaware of how close we have come to disaster and how near the threat of terrorism attack remains. In 2017, Australia came within a whisker of a catastrophic terror attack when Islamic State operatives sought to smuggle a bomb aboard an Etihad flight. Had they been successful, the resulting carnage would have claimed the lives of the 400 passengers aboard the flight. In 2009, a group of men planned to attack one of our military bases and kill as many of our soldiers as possible.  

These near misses remind us that Australia carries significant terrorism risk. That we have so far managed to minimise that risk is down to four factors: gun control, comprehensive and unprecedented security agency powers, a higher level of social cohesion and our understanding that our efforts go beyond our own borders. 

There have been six terror attacks in Australia involving knives in the past decade. In a more permissive environment, these attacks would have no doubt been carried out with guns, resulting in significantly greater death and destruction. To be sure, Australia has not entirely escaped the scourge of gun violence. In 2015, an Islamic State terrorist shot dead NSW Police employee Curtis Cheng outside the Parramatta Police Centre. And organised criminals have shown remarkable persistence in their efforts to obtain firearms, as the spate of gun violence in Western Sydney attests. 

But since the reform of our gun laws almost 30 years ago, it has been extremely difficult for criminals and would-be terrorists to source a firearm in Australia. And it is virtually impossible to obtain the automatic or high-powered weapons that have caused carnage overseas, for example during the Bataclan theatre shootings in Paris in 2015. This is a great credit to the courage of the Howard Government but also to law abiding gun owners who stopped guns getting into the grey and black markets.   

As the terrorism threat evolved over the last decade, the government responded by placing extraordinary powers in the hands of the Australian Federal Police, ASIO and other security agencies.  New laws generated little political friction and enjoyed the support of both major parties. Very few security establishments in democratic countries have the tools available to them that ours do.  These laws have allowed authorities to intervene at the earliest stages of terrorist planning, saving countless lives. Supporting this is the higher degree of confidence the Australian public has in their agencies than we see elsewhere.   

Australia has also managed migration better than many similar countries. And the resulting social integration has limited the opportunities for extremists to radicalise larger populations. Given the size of our immigration program, we are ahead in any international comparison for the ongoing strength of our society. The recent riots in the UK show you what it looks like when things don’t work as well. 

That said, our immigration system has still enabled the entry of small numbers of people who hold radical views that are violently contrary to our liberal values, and these extremist views have been able to incubate in pockets of our communities. The best intelligence about radicalised members of a community needs to come from that community itself, which is why our police and intelligence agencies work closely with these communities and their leaders. Australia has traditionally taken a forward defence approach to its counter-terrorism efforts. This reflects the fact that both the drivers and the perpetrators of terrorism often lie far from our shores. More Australians have been killed in terror attacks in Indonesia than in the rest of the world combined, so keeping us safe is more than a domestic concern. 

This is particularly evident in our own region, where we have played a significant role in helping our neighbours. It is vital that the focus of the past two decades on countering international terrorism continues, because it helps secure Australians’ safety when they are offshore and also helps our neighbours to mitigate domestic terrorism threats. Therefore, notwithstanding successes in recent years to degrade terrorist groups such as ISIS, it is incumbent on the government to continue resourcing our agencies to undertake this international work.  

Global events disrupt our social harmony and magnify our differences. The shock resurgence of public antisemitism shows how quickly civilized norms can unravel. Our police and security agencies enjoy high levels of public respect but this can be quickly challenged if any group in society feels that policing is uneven across different communities. Internationally there are cases where minority communities feel overpoliced. But then sometimes the pendulum can be perceived as swinging the other way. In Britain, for instance, a feeling has sometimes developed that police have a ‘two tiered’ approach, with critics saying that political correctness has led them to excessive trepidation with migrant communities, ultimately eroding broader confidence in law enforcement. In the US, the security establishment is perceived by some people to have been co-opted and owned by political parties. 

Our agencies, thankfully, have been largely successful in maintaining an even-handed perception. It is imperative that they continue to avoid the political fray.   

We must continue to prize our social cohesion, but not through censorship or at the expense of speaking plainly about problems. We need to acknowledge the potential for terrorism without promoting panic and sowing distrust between communities. 

 The world remains a dangerous place.  Our laws always need to be a work in progress and should be monitored and updated if holes become apparent or events expose weaknesses.   

We have rightly been focused in the past few years on the shocking invasion of Ukraine and the potential for conflict with China. But the terror threat remains alive and we must continue to play to our strengths to keep Australia safe. 

Worrying trends highlight need for vigilance against homegrown terrorism

Despite intense efforts to counter violent extremism over the past two decades, the threat of domestic terrorism still endangers Australians. Australia’s national terrorism threat level is set at ‘possible’, and the focus has shifted from primarily transnational jihadists to violent homegrown ideologues with a range of motivations. As violent extremism evolves, Australia must adapt its strategy to confront this persistent challenge and protect social cohesion and national security.

Australia is a diverse society with over 100 distinct religions, 300 languages and a substantial recent migrant population. It also has one of the world’s highest rates of internet usage, with 84% of its population online and 62% actively engaged in social media. Online platforms often host misinformation, including extremist propaganda that deepens social divides. Meanwhile, factors like counterterrorism policies, community engagement and international cooperation aim to mitigate violent extremism.

However, this landscape is complicated by variables beyond Australia’s control, such as global crises like the Covid-19 pandemic and world events like the Israel–Hamas conflict. The interactions of these variables impact the frequency of domestic terrorist attacks, casualty tolls, arrest rates and the radicalisation of youth in Australia.

Victoria Police officially recognised 11 terrorist attacks across Australia between 2005 and 2021, but the Global Terrorism Database acknowledged an additional 39 attacks for a combined total of 50. Most of these incidents targeted private properties and religious institutions, resulting in 14 fatalities and 33 reported injuries. The frequency of attacks surged between 2014 and 2016 before subsiding in 2019, but there has been a renewed increase in terrorist incidents since 2021.

Between 2014 and 2019, 257 Australians faced charges related to terrorism offences. Victoria Police reported that between 2005 and 2022, 53 individuals were arrested in the state for terrorism offences. Around 8o% of them were aged between 15 and 30, and all but two were male.

Similarly, data from New South Wales Police from 2002 to 2020 shows that 48 individuals were arrested for terrorism offences in the state, 73% of whom were aged 10 to 30. Again, all but two were male. In both states, most arrests occurred between 2014 and 2019.

Between 2014 and 2018, approximately 10% of domestic terrorism convictions in Australia were of minors, and in 2021, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation reported a surge in terrorism investigations involving minors—from 2% to 15%—and they now make up half of ASIO’s highest-priority cases.

Mission Australia’s 2022 youth survey revealed a decline in youth mental health. Fewer than half of respondents expressed positivity about the future and 28.8% said they had experienced high psychological distress. Nearly three-quarters of those surveyed said that Covid-19 had a negative impact on their education, and 53.7% identified the pandemic as adversely affecting their mental health. These were both increases on the previous year’s findings and these factors are likely to continue exacerbating the rate of youth radicalisation.

Still, terrorism has had a relatively small impact in Australia compared with other Western countries. Australia ranks 69th in the 2023 Global Terrorism Index, which uses incidents, fatalities and injuries to assess threat levels, with lower numbers suggesting the success of counterterrorism measures and strategies. However, these figures can be misleading due to selective reporting, as evidenced by the disparity between Victoria Police’s and the Global Terrorism Database’s statistics. They also can’t account for the intentions and capabilities of terrorist groups, and don’t accurately reflect recruitment and radicalisation trends. This is why ASIO’s director-general has emphasised that assessing the threat of terrorism and extremist violence must go beyond ‘body count’.

Arrest numbers are better at capturing the pace of recruitment and radicalisation. The surge in arrests between 2014 and 2019 can show the influence of Islamic State, while the decline after 2019 can be attributed to the restrictions imposed during Covid-19 lockdowns. The rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas in Palestine could create a similar surge.

Islamic State propaganda had a significant impact in Australia, especially among teenagers, as evidenced by domestic terrorism convictions and high-priority cases involving minors. Terrorist groups exploit online environments to target vulnerable youth, who are susceptible to radicalisation for developmental and social reasons. An adolescent’s flexible identity formation, combined with socioeconomic circumstances, targeted online interactions and a feeling of political exclusion, makes them a prime potential victim of radicalisation.

The Covid-19 pandemic exacerbated these vulnerabilities. ASIO noted a rise in issue-motivated extremism and anti-authority ideologies that it links with Covid-19 grievances and conspiracy theories spread on social media. The number of minors attracted to extremism is increasing, and offenders are most likely to have been radicalised in their formative years.

Australia may be tempted to perceive its management of domestic terrorism as a success due to its low incidence of attacks and casualties. But recent youth radicalisation trends should trigger alarm bells. This type of threat isn’t easily extinguishable, and complacency will only lead to disaster. Terrorists are adapting to avoid detection and promote their ideology, and future attacks in Australia will likely involve lone actors conducting low-cost operations with little planning and simple weapons, making them difficult to predict and prevent.

The prevalence of youth radicalisation is escalating the potential for violence in Australia over the next 20 years. Australia is a robust democracy and the government must uphold individuals’ rights to express their beliefs openly, but it must also remain vigilant against incitements to violence. The actions of violent extremists threaten public safety and challenge Australia’s fundamental principles, values and interests. It is imperative for Australia to avoid complacency, which means it must revise its counterterrorism strategy to respond to these evolving trends. Only by adapting to this shifting landscape can it guarantee the safety and prosperity of all its citizens.

ASIO chief highlights evolving terror threat to Australia

In his 2023 annual threat assessment address, the head of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, Mike Burgess, characterised Australia’s security environment as complex, challenging and changing. Burgess made it unequivocally clear that while threats to life are a priority for ASIO, espionage and foreign interference are now the agency’s principal security concern. But even though the threat of domestic terrorism wasn’t the headline issue, that doesn’t mean it hasn’t evolved over the past year.

Today’s terror threat environment demonstrates a clear pattern of dispersal and diffusion of actors and groups beyond the more straightforward categories of the past 20 years. Given the adaptive nature of terrorism and the broadening list of motivations for politically and ideologically motivated violence, the global ‘war on terror’ may never end. However, it is abundantly clear that Australia is enjoying success from its counterterrorism policies.

In September 2014, ASIO assessed the national terrorism threat as ‘high’. The agency’s director-general at the time, David Irvine, faced growing evidence that despite the efforts of ASIO, the Australian Federal Police and border officials, the domestic terrorism threat was growing in terms of the capability and intent of would-be attackers. More specifically, they had credible intelligence indicating that individuals or groups had the intent and capability to conduct a terrorist attack in Australia.

Internationally, the defeat of the Islamic State terror group in most areas it occupied has likely weakened the attraction of its extremist ideology and propaganda. Al-Qaeda has withdrawn to conflict zones with weak governance, and its propaganda, too, has failed to maintain its appeal to potential recruits.

Last November, for the first time in more than eight years, ASIO lowered the national terrorism threat level from ‘probable’ to ‘possible’. This change was in response to ASIO’s assessment that while Australia remains a potential terrorist target, fewer extremists intend to attack onshore than in 2014. In short, although Australia faces a broader set of possible motivations, and faster journeys to radicalisation for terrorists, ASIO’s terrorism caseload has moderated in recent years. However, Burgess reminded us this year that the terrorism threat in some parts of the world remains and is growing in others.

The murders of two police officers and a civilian in the Queensland town of Wieambilla just weeks after the downgrading of the terror alert level illustrates how terror attacks can occur, and will likely continue to occur, even when the threat level is ‘possible’.

The 2023 threat assessment reinforced that the national terrorism threat advisory level would remain at ‘possible’. This assessment is, of course, good news for all Australians. To be clear, Australia still faces a terrorist threat—in a numerical sense, there’s a 50-50 chance of an attack occurring. We must therefore be cautious to refrain from underplaying the law enforcement and intelligence work that must continue to keep our communities safe.

The threat assessment and Burgess’s address highlight the challenges of public discourse using the current terrorism lexicon of left- or ring-wing political alignment. Concerningly, he argued that there ‘is a cohort of individuals motivated by a toxic cocktail of conspiracies, grievances and anti-authority beliefs’.

Most academics agree that a universal definition of right-wing extremism is unattainable at this stage. But that consensus isn’t stopping some from characterising a range of ideological groups, from ‘incels’ to white supremacists, as right-wing extremists. Grouping such diverse ideologies under one banner is unhelpful.

In his speech, Burgess addressed the difference between extremist views and violent extremism. He laid bare the challenge of disentangling individuals and groups with extremist beliefs from those that would undertake violent acts.

Social media has created the kind of anonymity that has emboldened the expression of extremist views and perspectives that would never be publicly shared in the real world. Some have used it to legitimise hate speech as simply personal expression. Easy access to encryption and the dark web has created global echo chambers for the most committed and active extremists. Extremists share views and knowledge within these spaces, sometimes encouraging real-world violence.

Over recent years, government policies have increasingly focused police and intelligence efforts on earlier and earlier disruption of potential threats. This forces both to deal more often with analysing and assessing extremist beliefs, which ultimately could be counterproductive to overall counterterrorism outcomes and possibly social cohesion. Early disruption of extremists is increasingly muddying the distinction between extremism and violent extremism. While there’s a clear link between the two, not all extremists are or will become terrorists.

Governments’ use of police and intelligence agencies to counter extremist narratives and ideologies could be turned against them by extremist propagandists who present those efforts as examples of harassment. Policing extremist belief systems also runs the risk of effectively positioning police, intelligence agencies and courts as quasi-thought-censors. Law enforcement and ASIO should be focused on countering terrorism, not extremist thinking. Police and intelligence agencies should be able to refer intelligence on at-risk individuals to some new form of non-security entity for management when they don’t meet an agreed violent threat threshold.

To reduce the broader impact of extremism on Australian social cohesion requires efforts to counter extremist narratives by removing the cloak of respectability it has often achieved in social media over recent years.