The recent lifting of the terrorism threat level from possible to probable is a reminder how vulnerable Australia remains to a serious terror incident.   

Yet for the most part, Australians remain unaware of how close we have come to disaster and how near the threat of terrorism attack remains. In 2017, Australia came within a whisker of a catastrophic terror attack when Islamic State operatives sought to smuggle a bomb aboard an Etihad flight. Had they been successful, the resulting carnage would have claimed the lives of the 400 passengers aboard the flight. In 2009, a group of men planned to attack one of our military bases and kill as many of our soldiers as possible.  

These near misses remind us that Australia carries significant terrorism risk. That we have so far managed to minimise that risk is down to four factors: gun control, comprehensive and unprecedented security agency powers, a higher level of social cohesion and our understanding that our efforts go beyond our own borders. 

There have been six terror attacks in Australia involving knives in the past decade. In a more permissive environment, these attacks would have no doubt been carried out with guns, resulting in significantly greater death and destruction. To be sure, Australia has not entirely escaped the scourge of gun violence. In 2015, an Islamic State terrorist shot dead NSW Police employee Curtis Cheng outside the Parramatta Police Centre. And organised criminals have shown remarkable persistence in their efforts to obtain firearms, as the spate of gun violence in Western Sydney attests. 

But since the reform of our gun laws almost 30 years ago, it has been extremely difficult for criminals and would-be terrorists to source a firearm in Australia. And it is virtually impossible to obtain the automatic or high-powered weapons that have caused carnage overseas, for example during the Bataclan theatre shootings in Paris in 2015. This is a great credit to the courage of the Howard Government but also to law abiding gun owners who stopped guns getting into the grey and black markets.   

As the terrorism threat evolved over the last decade, the government responded by placing extraordinary powers in the hands of the Australian Federal Police, ASIO and other security agencies.  New laws generated little political friction and enjoyed the support of both major parties. Very few security establishments in democratic countries have the tools available to them that ours do.  These laws have allowed authorities to intervene at the earliest stages of terrorist planning, saving countless lives. Supporting this is the higher degree of confidence the Australian public has in their agencies than we see elsewhere.   

Australia has also managed migration better than many similar countries. And the resulting social integration has limited the opportunities for extremists to radicalise larger populations. Given the size of our immigration program, we are ahead in any international comparison for the ongoing strength of our society. The recent riots in the UK show you what it looks like when things don’t work as well. 

That said, our immigration system has still enabled the entry of small numbers of people who hold radical views that are violently contrary to our liberal values, and these extremist views have been able to incubate in pockets of our communities. The best intelligence about radicalised members of a community needs to come from that community itself, which is why our police and intelligence agencies work closely with these communities and their leaders. Australia has traditionally taken a forward defence approach to its counter-terrorism efforts. This reflects the fact that both the drivers and the perpetrators of terrorism often lie far from our shores. More Australians have been killed in terror attacks in Indonesia than in the rest of the world combined, so keeping us safe is more than a domestic concern. 

This is particularly evident in our own region, where we have played a significant role in helping our neighbours. It is vital that the focus of the past two decades on countering international terrorism continues, because it helps secure Australians’ safety when they are offshore and also helps our neighbours to mitigate domestic terrorism threats. Therefore, notwithstanding successes in recent years to degrade terrorist groups such as ISIS, it is incumbent on the government to continue resourcing our agencies to undertake this international work.  

Global events disrupt our social harmony and magnify our differences. The shock resurgence of public antisemitism shows how quickly civilized norms can unravel. Our police and security agencies enjoy high levels of public respect but this can be quickly challenged if any group in society feels that policing is uneven across different communities. Internationally there are cases where minority communities feel overpoliced. But then sometimes the pendulum can be perceived as swinging the other way. In Britain, for instance, a feeling has sometimes developed that police have a ‘two tiered’ approach, with critics saying that political correctness has led them to excessive trepidation with migrant communities, ultimately eroding broader confidence in law enforcement. In the US, the security establishment is perceived by some people to have been co-opted and owned by political parties. 

Our agencies, thankfully, have been largely successful in maintaining an even-handed perception. It is imperative that they continue to avoid the political fray.   

We must continue to prize our social cohesion, but not through censorship or at the expense of speaking plainly about problems. We need to acknowledge the potential for terrorism without promoting panic and sowing distrust between communities. 

 The world remains a dangerous place.  Our laws always need to be a work in progress and should be monitored and updated if holes become apparent or events expose weaknesses.   

We have rightly been focused in the past few years on the shocking invasion of Ukraine and the potential for conflict with China. But the terror threat remains alive and we must continue to play to our strengths to keep Australia safe. 

In his 2023 annual threat assessment address, the head of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, Mike Burgess, characterised Australia’s security environment as complex, challenging and changing. Burgess made it unequivocally clear that while threats to life are a priority for ASIO, espionage and foreign interference are now the agency’s principal security concern. But even though the threat of domestic terrorism wasn’t the headline issue, that doesn’t mean it hasn’t evolved over the past year.

Today’s terror threat environment demonstrates a clear pattern of dispersal and diffusion of actors and groups beyond the more straightforward categories of the past 20 years. Given the adaptive nature of terrorism and the broadening list of motivations for politically and ideologically motivated violence, the global ‘war on terror’ may never end. However, it is abundantly clear that Australia is enjoying success from its counterterrorism policies.

In September 2014, ASIO assessed the national terrorism threat as ‘high’. The agency’s director-general at the time, David Irvine, faced growing evidence that despite the efforts of ASIO, the Australian Federal Police and border officials, the domestic terrorism threat was growing in terms of the capability and intent of would-be attackers. More specifically, they had credible intelligence indicating that individuals or groups had the intent and capability to conduct a terrorist attack in Australia.

Internationally, the defeat of the Islamic State terror group in most areas it occupied has likely weakened the attraction of its extremist ideology and propaganda. Al-Qaeda has withdrawn to conflict zones with weak governance, and its propaganda, too, has failed to maintain its appeal to potential recruits.

Last November, for the first time in more than eight years, ASIO lowered the national terrorism threat level from ‘probable’ to ‘possible’. This change was in response to ASIO’s assessment that while Australia remains a potential terrorist target, fewer extremists intend to attack onshore than in 2014. In short, although Australia faces a broader set of possible motivations, and faster journeys to radicalisation for terrorists, ASIO’s terrorism caseload has moderated in recent years. However, Burgess reminded us this year that the terrorism threat in some parts of the world remains and is growing in others.

The murders of two police officers and a civilian in the Queensland town of Wieambilla just weeks after the downgrading of the terror alert level illustrates how terror attacks can occur, and will likely continue to occur, even when the threat level is ‘possible’.

The 2023 threat assessment reinforced that the national terrorism threat advisory level would remain at ‘possible’. This assessment is, of course, good news for all Australians. To be clear, Australia still faces a terrorist threat—in a numerical sense, there’s a 50-50 chance of an attack occurring. We must therefore be cautious to refrain from underplaying the law enforcement and intelligence work that must continue to keep our communities safe.

The threat assessment and Burgess’s address highlight the challenges of public discourse using the current terrorism lexicon of left- or ring-wing political alignment. Concerningly, he argued that there ‘is a cohort of individuals motivated by a toxic cocktail of conspiracies, grievances and anti-authority beliefs’.

Most academics agree that a universal definition of right-wing extremism is unattainable at this stage. But that consensus isn’t stopping some from characterising a range of ideological groups, from ‘incels’ to white supremacists, as right-wing extremists. Grouping such diverse ideologies under one banner is unhelpful.

In his speech, Burgess addressed the difference between extremist views and violent extremism. He laid bare the challenge of disentangling individuals and groups with extremist beliefs from those that would undertake violent acts.

Social media has created the kind of anonymity that has emboldened the expression of extremist views and perspectives that would never be publicly shared in the real world. Some have used it to legitimise hate speech as simply personal expression. Easy access to encryption and the dark web has created global echo chambers for the most committed and active extremists. Extremists share views and knowledge within these spaces, sometimes encouraging real-world violence.

Over recent years, government policies have increasingly focused police and intelligence efforts on earlier and earlier disruption of potential threats. This forces both to deal more often with analysing and assessing extremist beliefs, which ultimately could be counterproductive to overall counterterrorism outcomes and possibly social cohesion. Early disruption of extremists is increasingly muddying the distinction between extremism and violent extremism. While there’s a clear link between the two, not all extremists are or will become terrorists.

Governments’ use of police and intelligence agencies to counter extremist narratives and ideologies could be turned against them by extremist propagandists who present those efforts as examples of harassment. Policing extremist belief systems also runs the risk of effectively positioning police, intelligence agencies and courts as quasi-thought-censors. Law enforcement and ASIO should be focused on countering terrorism, not extremist thinking. Police and intelligence agencies should be able to refer intelligence on at-risk individuals to some new form of non-security entity for management when they don’t meet an agreed violent threat threshold.

To reduce the broader impact of extremism on Australian social cohesion requires efforts to counter extremist narratives by removing the cloak of respectability it has often achieved in social media over recent years.

On 2 February, ASPI released Agenda for change 2022: shaping a different future for our nation to promote public debate and understanding on issues of strategic importance to Australia. The key message in Agenda for change 2022 is that we need to embrace uncertainty, engage with complexity and break down the silos. Our economic prosperity, national resilience and security depend upon it.

In the lead-up to every federal election, ASPI looks at the big challenges facing Australia and what’s needed to address them. In her chapter in Agenda for change 2022, ‘Counterterrorism as an anti-hero’s journey—defending democracy needs a more “frictious” script’, counterterrorism expert Katja Theodorakis advocates for a more problem-driven, iterative approach to countering terrorism that takes into account democratic friction as a core element.

The premise of this chapter is that a ‘strategic response to countering terrorism and extremism needs to reflect engagement with contestations of its core principles rather than prescriptive references to democracy’s merits’.

Theodorakis explores the tensions underpinning liberalism, including the inability to reconcile conflicts between values and interest, highlighting that ‘negotiating the frictions about what constitute the boundaries of the acceptable is an unavoidable part of democratic practice’.

Under the heading ‘Strengthening our resilience’, Theodorakis notes that Australia’s counterterrorism strategy advocates a preventive approach, with a declared whole-of-society focus to preventing and countering violent extremism. Yet, when restricted to ‘at-risk’ individuals from selected subsections of society, the effects of such an approach are divisive.

The response that developed after 11 September 2001 is a ‘heroes versus villains’ script that will not serve us well in the future, says Theodorakis. She notes that ‘not all heroes and villains wear distinguishable capes’ and that it is democracy, not just security, that’s under threat—from an illustrious cast of villains.

To move forward, Theodorakis suggests viewing counterterrorism more as an anti-hero’s journey featuring ‘a well-intentioned but imperfect, flawed lead character’. The big idea here is recognition of the inherent dilemmas and complexities of countering terrorism and extremism in a democratic society—which requires making a clearer distinction between security and societal outcomes. This means an adaptive response that reflects a broadening of previously recognised dynamics of ideological extremism to include the coalescing of old and new dynamics, manifested in the form of anti-democracy discourse and anti-government activism.

The riots at the US Capitol on 6 January 2021 are provided as one example of why building resilience should focus on the wider socio-political and cultural environment and not just zero in on so-called at-risk communities.

Despite Australia having passed close to 100 counterterrorism laws, including the Foreign Fighters Act, and enacted temporary exclusion orders, control and preventative detention orders and mandatory metadata retention, it remains to be seen to what extent the recognition of a more multifaceted threat translates into consistent political action across the spectrum. The author points out that those tools have been or could be used to prevent far-right terrorism (there were two disrupted plots in 2016 and 2020 and one cancelled passport).

Careful analysis and assessment are always warranted to avoid viewing a diverse spectrum as one monolithic threat, Theodorakis says. An example provided is that Australians fighting for far-right militias in the Ukrainian conflict—described by the Soufan Center as an ‘emerging epicenter’ for white supremacist extremists—have not been charged under the Foreign Fighters Act or been subject to temporary exclusion orders. Here, ultimately the powers lie with the home affairs minister.

Theodorakis warns:

We can’t fall back on the conceptual comfort of a ‘single enemy’ whose extremism is rooted in a clear difference from our way of life. As problematic and divisive as some of the post-9/11 era’s political logic was, the problem sets thrown up or accelerated by the Covid-19 pandemic defy reductionist categorisations even more. Challenges today are more systemic, amorphous and endemic—a much more uncomfortable, politically difficult reality.’

She also says we need to decouple our security-focused counterterrorism response from our approach to countering extremism.

Proposed is a separate ‘counter-extremism strategy based on broader civic education and awareness of what constitutes anti-democratic discourse that violates basic egalitarian principles and human rights; mechanisms of dehumanisation; and clear definitions of what constitutes hate speech and hate crimes.’

A key message in this chapter is the need to recognise the inherent dilemmas in countering terrorism and extremism, reimagine the problem set and broaden our strategy to go beyond the goal of security and keeping citizens safe.

This post is an edited extract from ASPI’s Counterterrorism yearbook 2021. A full PDF of the yearbook, which includes notes and sources for each chapter, is available on ASPI’s website.

The risk of terrorism, like the risk of most criminal activities, can be evaluated as a combination of opportunity, capability and intent. Legislative measures that allow for the arrest, detention and incarceration of people who are found to be planning an attack and laws that make it illegal to travel to certain conflict zones to join terrorist groups address opportunity. Targeting terrorism financing, recruitment and training addresses capability.

But in a contemporary, low-tech terrorist environment—where a terrorist attack can be carried out by a single person with a simple weapon such as a knife, gun or vehicle with little or no planning, no financial investment and no special training— opportunity and capability are much more difficult to detect and prevent.

Indeed, the greatest dilemma for modern counterterrorism is intent. In a world where intent evolves in the dark spaces of the internet, where individuals draw inspiration from YouTube videos, social media posts and anonymous chatrooms, we desperately need a comprehensive approach to counterterrorism that incorporates prevention and early intervention strategies.

One of the most compelling reasons to assess threat and capability continuously is that terrorists and criminals always find new ways to do harm. Just as terrorism has pervaded our lives in ways that turn everyday items into weapons and everyday activities into platforms for recruitment and influence, we must also meet the new challenges of security by turning our expertise to the internet and information and communications technology.

Already, in response to law enforcement’s increasing awareness of terrorists’ use of social media, and measures to mitigate any continued threat, terrorists and criminal groups have migrated to the dark web and encryption services, where they can operate in obscurity.

Terrorists have been using the ‘darknet’ in the same way as they have been using the surface web—to recruit, radicalise and influence, as well as to finance and coordinate attacks. Since 2015, there has been a significant increase in the use of Telegram (an encrypted instant messaging platform) by terrorist actors. Telegram has become the preferred online platform for Islamic State supporters to distribute propaganda, coordinate and communicate, replacing social media applications such as Twitter and Facebook. Telegram was used to coordinate attacks inspired or directed by IS in Paris (2015), Brussels (2016), Berlin (2016) and Istanbul (2017).

In 2017, a crackdown on popular darknet markets AlphaBay and Hansa was a response to serious concerns about the use of those platforms to facilitate communication between terrorist actors. That followed the take-down of the Silk Road in 2013 and another operation in 2014 that seized around half a dozen darknet sites. Each time, the darknet has bounced back. The latest crackdown drove cybercriminals to migrate to messaging apps such as WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger and Telegram in order to trade stolen credit cards, account information, malware and drugs.

We’re also seeing a more coordinated integration of cybercrime and terrorism. In January 2015, evidence emerged of a terror cell using bitcoin to fund operations. In another instance, an Indonesia-based group collected bitcoin donations on the darknet and hacked a trading website using a stolen identity. The group collected around US$600,000 via a series of cybercrimes. In Australia, recent high-profile breaches of anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorism-financing (AML/CTF) provisions by two major banks and casino operators have shone light on systemic gaps in our legislative framework. The Commonwealth Bank of Australia was recently found to be in breach of AML/CTF laws in 52,700 instances and was fined $700 million for failing to report multiple deposits made for money-laundering purposes through its ATMs. In September, Westpac was fined $1.3 billion for breaching AML/CTF laws 23 million times.

In the past, cyber terrorism has been a contested concept, with no agreed-upon definition. It’s now generally accepted that cyber terrorism involves the use of computers to create a severe disruption to critical infrastructure, causing death or the spreading of fear. But the use of digital and online technologies to enable terrorism, whether by providing a platform to inspire, recruit, communicate and coordinate or to raise illegal funds, has not really been considered in that definition.

The interface of cybercrime and terrorism gives us a more practical way to conceptualise cyber terrorism in the modern context, and a more concrete target for focusing our efforts. To that end, I suggest a definition of cyber terrorism as ‘the use of cyberspace to enable, inspire, influence or direct a terrorist attack or to raise funds to facilitate such attacks’.

This approach to cyber terrorism would allow law enforcement practitioners and legislators to target online activities used in support of terrorism. For this reason, Australia needs to ensure that our AML/CTF laws are up to the task of preventing criminal syndicates and terrorist actors from exploiting our financial systems.

Australia also needs more trained experts in early detection, with more resources devoted to monitoring online behaviours that precede violent action. University courses that equip graduates with the understanding and skills to tackle cyber-enabled criminal activity of all types (including terrorism) need to be more widely available.

It’s imperative that our future law enforcement practitioners have a strong understanding of how the internet, in all its pervasiveness, has become a tool for opportunists who seek to exploit it for criminal purposes. Our future counterterrorism preparedness depends on it.

The involvement of young people in violent extremism isn’t a 21st-century phenomenon. The Nazi party in Germany founded the Hitler Youth organisations in the early 1920s to indoctrinate juveniles, and the Irish Republican Army discovered the value of recruiting juveniles or ‘cleanskins’ during the 1980s and 1990s war of attrition in Ulster.

The 21st century has brought a new level of concern about the number of young people now engaging in violent extremism. The Radicalisation Awareness Network reported in 2018 that young people make up the highest percentage of individuals joining violent extremist groups worldwide. This phenomenon also occurs in Australia.

In 2018, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation indicated that, due particularly to the persistent use of online propaganda and the presence of young people detained in the youth justice system, the number of young people involved in terrorism-related offences may continue to rise.

More than 10% of all people convicted for terrorism offences since 2014 in Australia were under the age of 18 at the time they offended, and a further 25% were aged between 18 and 25 years. With such involvement of young people in violent extremist groups and in terrorist acts, the importance of youth-targeted approaches to preventing and countering violent extremism can’t be overstated.

While there’s no one specific pathway or profile for a young person’s radicalisation to extremist violence, there are a number of factors that contribute significantly, including the search for identity, sense of self or belonging, the ideological appeal or ‘sell’ of the group, the prospect of fame or recognition, and the influence of or indoctrination by family or peers.

Identifying young people who may be at risk of radicalisation to violent extremism involves looking for indicators similar to those among young people who may be engaging in gang-related or substance-use behaviour and includes identifying and recognising early signs when they withdraw from usual social or familial contexts and isolate themselves from their peers or community.

The digital age and the prevalence of social media in the daily lives of young people mean they’re more easily and frequently exposed to and able to access radical and extremist narratives and the messages of terrorist organisations, which have developed sophisticated online and social media recruitment campaigns. Campaigns specifically targeting young people, including through the use of domains and social phenomena such as online gaming, chatrooms or memes, have been increasingly exploited by far-right and Islamist extremist groups.

However, while most young people spend a lot of time online, and a large proportion of them have accessed or been exposed to radical or extremist material, most aren’t influenced to radicalise to violent extremism. Extremist messages seen online can reinforce existing negative views about other social or cultural groups and contribute to radical views, but current research suggests that exposure to online extremist content is unlikely to be a causal factor on its own in the development of violent extremist beliefs. The existence of this material and the continued proliferation of both the content and the number of platforms hosting the content does, however, normalise and justify extremist narratives.

Since 2001, the terrorism threat has evolved significantly. There’s been a significant shift from large-scale and complex attacks to low-level, rudimentary attacks, resulting in far lower capability requirements and more ability for young people to engage in violent extremist acts. There’s also been some recognition that holding extremist beliefs can lead to acting violently, which has prompted a policy shift to introduce measures to counter violent extremism.

Australia hasn’t been immune to the global terrorism threat. Our young people are, perhaps not surprisingly, increasingly engaged in the global extremist and terrorist phenomena. We face a unique challenge in Australia: our young people are geographically isolated from much of the conflict but remain connected through their technical and internet abilities. They’re also directly affected by some of the harshest counterterrorism legislation in the world and the complexities of a multicultural society that embraces religious and political freedom of expression.

In order to identify and respond to early indicators and divert young people from violent extremism, policymakers and those working with young people in the government and non-government sectors need to focus on engaging with them by recognising their strengths and interests, encouraging their engagement in positive social and community activities, linking them to appropriate mentors, challenging ‘us and them’ narratives, and maintaining their connection to their families and friends. It’s important that individual young people or groups aren’t singled out, publicly or in their communities and social networks, as ‘at risk’, as that may reinforce feelings of alienation or a lack of belonging.

This work can succeed through:

• empowering young people to participate in the development and implementation of youth-specific interventions and programs
• allowing them to develop independent thinking, research and leadership skills
• building and fostering their capacity for critical thinking
• engaging in early intervention and diversion conversation with them
• delivering training and awareness-raising sessions to staff working with young people to help them understand and identify different ideologies
• understanding when and how to report indicators that a young person may be radicalised to violent extremism.

It’s also important that young people are engaged in conversations and programs that assist them to develop their identity and a stronger sense of self. Programs that focus on helping them to identify their values, set and maintain clear boundaries, problem-solve and practise mindfulness will help them develop a sense of who they are.

While young people’s involvement in violent extremism is of particular concern, they are especially amenable to being diverted away from engaging in violent extremism if their latent radicalisation is identified and responded to early, with appropriate and respectful interventions.

This post was adapted from the author’s chapter in ASPI’s Counterterrorism yearbook 2020. The full text of the yearbook, which includes notes and sources for each chapter, is available on ASPI’s website.