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Big data in China and the battle for privacy

Big data in China and the battle for privacy

Introduction

If data is the new oil, China is oil super-rich. Data is the essential ingredient for artificial intelligence (AI) and is underpinning a wide-ranging revolution.

China’s massive population, lack of privacy protections, controlled tech sector and authoritarian system of governance give it a huge edge in collecting the data needed for that revolution (Figure 1). But the Chinese state and Chinese businesses are also using this wealth of data to pursue state and business goals without the constraints present in other jurisdictions. A lack of privacy protections and rule-of-law protections leaves Chinese citizens at the whim of sophisticated, and often state-controlled, data-driven technologies.

Private companies are not only sharing users’ personal data with the authorities in compliance with China’s regulatory environment such as the most recent Cybersecurity Law but many of those companies—including the industry leaders—are building their business model predominantly around the needs of the state.

The success of these technologies in enabling potential mass surveillance and exerting a chilling effect on individuals deserves more attention.

Figure 1: Top 20 internet populations, by country

This paper examines Chinese state policy on big data industries and analyses the laws and regulations on data collection that companies in China are required to comply with. It also looks at how those rules may affect foreign companies eyeing the China market. Case studies are included to demonstrate the ongoing tensions between big data applications and privacy. The paper concludes by outlining the implications and lessons for other countries.

An ambitious big data vision supported by China’s internet companies

China’s State Council has laid out an ambitious road map outlining its AI vision, which includes creating a US$150 billion industry and becoming the world leader in AI by 2030.1 Enormous state financial backing aside, a controlled tech industry,2 huge data availability and relatively scant privacy protections mean that China is well placed to become a global AI leader; or, to be more accurate, a leader in the development of big-data-driven technologies. 

China’s online ecosystem is unique compared to Western equivalents. Unlike their Silicon Valley competitors, Chinese technology and internet companies typically design their products to include not just one, but various types of services. Tencent’s WeChat, for example, China’s most popular mobile chat application, is more than an instant messaging app: it’s an all-in-one superapp. A billion active WeChat users now use it to chat with their friends and families, communicate with supervisors and
work colleagues, play games, hail taxis, make online purchases and conduct financial investments.3 WeChat is now even used to handle sensitive government paperwork, such as visa applications, and could soon be used for entry into Hong Kong.4

Tencent vowed—openly and ambitiously—to become the fundamental platform for the Chinese internet: a platform ‘as vital as the water and electricity resources in daily life’.5 Alibaba’s Alipay, China’s Paypal-like e-payment service, has incorporated social functions through which it encourages users to share location data, personal information and purchasing habits with others. Combined with China’s real-name registration system,6 these consolidated functions enable the government and industry
to effortlessly profile individual users. In addition, even when an individual’s information has been anonymised, their identity can still be re-identified by any interested parties if they have access to two or more sets of data to find the same user in both. In other countries, such identification would attract public concern, but research indicates that there’s a lack of awareness and a willingness to trade off privacy for lower cost services among Chinese consumers.7 For example, research that compared global consumers’ views on sharing personal information online found that consumers in China had a more lackadaisical attitude towards privacy protection than consumers in most Western countries.8

Big data analytics offers invaluable insights to inform the use and delivery of public goods, including increased public safety, law enforcement, resource allocation, urban planning9 and healthcare systems.10 But how data is collected and used affects a country’s digital ecosystem and its citizens’ social and political participation. How China’s regulatory environment handles these interactions is analysed in the following section.

Big data and public security

China is placing huge bets on big data, and a range of policies have been introduced over the past two years to flesh out the government’s vision. On October 18 2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping promoted the integration of the internet, big data and AI with the real-world economy in his 19th Party Congress report.11 But China’s interest in big data can be dated to as early as the early 2010s. In July 2012, the State Council specifically mentioned the importance of ‘strengthening the development of basic software—especially those that are able to handle large volumes of data’—in a policy document in its 12th Five-Year Plan . The current administration has beefed up the conceptualisation of China’s big data vision.

Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, for example, proposed the concept of ‘Internet Plus’ (互联网+),12 calling for the integration of mobile internet, cloud computing, big data and the ‘internet of things’ with modern manufacturing in his March 2015 Government Work Report.13

In the months following Li’s report, China’s central government released a number of top-down designs and guidelines on big data policies (Table 1). By the end of 2016, various government bureaucracies 14 and more than 20 provincial and municipal governments issued their own regulations and development plans for big data industries.15 Unsurprisingly, most of these government initiatives and policies have a special interest in developing and supporting big data technologies that can be applied to the security sector. Security experts argue that contribution to the emerging social credit system is likely as part of these related initiatives.16 Statistics from 2016 show that most of the government’s domestic government investment in big data industries has gone to public security projects.17

Table 1: Major big data policies issued by the Chinese Government

TitleIssuerDate issuedMain takeaways
Made in China 2025 《中国制造2025》, onlineState CouncilMay 2015Lays out a road map for the transformation and upgrade of China’s traditional and emerging manufacturing industry, with a focus on big data, cloud computing, the internet of things and related smart technologies. (a)
Action Outline for
Promoting the
Development of Big Data
《促进大数据发展行动纲
要》, online
State CouncilAugust 2015Provides a top-down action framework for promoting big data. Details yearly goals such as establishing a platform for sharing data between government departments by the end of 2017, a unified platform for government data before the end of 2018, and nurturing a group of 500 companies in the industry, including 10 leading global enterprises focused on big data application, services and manufacturing by the end of 2020. It is widely perceived to be a programmatic document guiding the long-term development of China’s big data industries.
Outline of the 13th Five-Year Plan for the National Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China 《中华人民共和国经济和 社会发展第十三个五年规 划纲要》, online.National People’s CongressMarch 2016Identifies big data as a ‘fundamental strategic resource’ (基础性战略资源). Pushes for further sharing of data resources and applications. Lists big data applications as one of the eight major informatisation projects. It’s the first time China incorporated big data into state-centric strategy plans. (b)
The National Scientific and Technological Innovation Planning for the 13th Five Years 《’十三五’国家创新规划》, online.State CouncilJuly 2016Prioritises big-data-driven breakthroughs in AI technologies.
Development Plan for Big Data Industries (2016–2020) 《大数据产业发展规划 2016-2020年)》, online.Ministry of Industry and Information TechnologyDecember 2016Sets an overarching goal for China’s big data industries: by 2020, related industry revenue should exceed 1 trillion RMB, with a compound annual growth rate of 30%.

a) 徐永华,陈怀宇, 陈亦恺, Anthony Marshall, 何志强,夏宇飞, 温占鹏,张龙,孙春华, ‘中国制造业走向2025 构建以数据洞察为驱动的新价值网络’,IBM商业价值研究院, 中国电子信息产业发展研究院, 13 October 2015 online.

b) 林巧婷, ‘我国首次提出推行国家大数据战略’ 中央政府门户网站, 3 November 2015 online.

In the outline of the 13th Five-Year Plan, big data applications were listed as one of the eight major ‘informatisation’ projects. Informatisation (信息化)—the process by which the political, social and economic interactions in a society have become networked and digitised—cannot be overstated when analysing China’s big data vision, especially in the public security sector. Over the past two decades, the Ministry of Public Security has taken an adaptive approach to this trend. It has made continuous efforts18 to harness the advances of information and communications technologies for security operations—a process called ‘public security informatisation’ (公安信息化). At its core, public security informatisation relates to shifting police work from reactive to pre-emptive through the use of data collection and synthesis. “Security” is a broad concept when applied by the Chinese state and is sufficiently broad to enable the control and censoring of public debate in ways that may affect the power or standing of the ruling Chinese Communist Party.

A few statistics help put these concepts and policies in context. Across China, there’s a network of approximately 176 million surveillance cameras—expected to grow to 626 million by 202019—that monitor China’s 1.4 billion citizens. Powered by big-data-driven facial recognition technology, these cameras are able to identify a person’s name, identification card number, gender, clothing and more. Meanwhile, Chinese police have reportedly been collecting DNA samples, fingerprints, iris scans, and blood types of all residents, using questionable methods, in places such as Xinjiang.20

Backed by an oceanic amount of data and advanced analytic technologies, Chinese public security forces are emerging as a powerful and dominant intelligence and security sector.21 The interest from the public security forces in using big data to support government systems for faster and more extensive surveillance and social control largely explains the rapid rise of China’s big data industries.22

Private companies are not only sharing users’ personal data with the authorities in compliance with China’s Cybersecurity Law,23 the National Intelligence Law24 and other relevant internet management regulations, but many of them—including the industry leaders25—are building their business model predominantly around the needs of the state.

Diminishing rights: China’s data laws and regulations

On the other end of the spectrum of the all-encompassing, data-driven analytic technologies are citizens’ de facto diminishing rights to privacy and growing challenges of protecting individuals’ data security. In contrast to the wide scope of central- and local-level policy initiatives and government-backed projects on big data collection and use, there’s no uniform law or a national authority to ensure or coordinate data protection in China. Privacy advocates have been striving to have a national privacy protection law passed since 2003.26 Fifteen years later, the National People’s Congress, China’s highest legislative body, still has not included such uniform law in its agenda.27

A number of articles in China’s recent Cybersecurity Law pertain to data collection and privacy protection. However, they take a state-centric approach, expanding the government’s direct involvement in companies’ operations. Missing in this approach is any support for an independent privacy watchdog or support for independent civil society organisations. For now, regulations on data protection remain largely domain-specific, such as those relating to telecommunications and online banking, which are issued by different ministries or local governments (Table 2 summarises the main relevant regulations in China).

Table 2: Chinese laws, regulations and guidelines on data collection

TitleIssuerDate issuedRelevance
Information Security Technology: Guidelines for Personal Information Protection Within Public and Commercial Services Information Systems 《信息安全技术公共及商用服务信息系统个人信息保护指南》, online.General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine & Standardisation Administration of ChinaNov 2012Establishes basic principles for personal data collection, processing and transfers, including the principles of ‘parity of authority and responsibility’, ‘minimum necessary and not excessive’ and ‘consent of the individual’. Remains non-compulsory for companies
Decision on Strengthening Information Protection on Networks 《关于加强网络信息保护的 规定》, online.Standing Committee of the National People’s CongressDec 2012Specifies that the state protects ‘electronic information by which individual citizens can be identified and which involves the individual privacy of citizens’.
Provisions on Protecting the Personal Information of Telecommunications and Internet Users 电信和互联网用户个人信息保护规定, online.Ministry of Industry and Information TechnologyJuly 2013Regulates how telecommunications and internet service providers may collect and use users’ personal data.
Regulation on the Administration of Credit Investigation Industry 征信业管理条例, online.State CouncilJan 2013Encompasses China’s grand plan of building a ‘social credit system’. Regulates the collection, storage and processing of personal information by credit investigation enterprises. Article 14 points out that ‘credit investigation institutions are prohibited from collecting information about the religious belief, genes, fingerprints, blood type, disease or medical history of individuals, as well as other individual information the collection of which is prohibited by laws or administrative regulations.’
Amendment (IX) to the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China 刑法修正案(九), online.Standing Committee of the National People’s CongressAug 2015Criminalises the sale or provision of citizens’ personal data, with a penalty of up to seven years imprisonment.
Cybersecurity Law 网络安全法, online.Standing Committee of the National People’s CongressNov 2016Article 76 (5) defines ‘personal information’ in legal documents for the first time. ‘Personal information’ refers to all kinds of information, recorded electronically or through other means, that can determine the identity of natural persons independently or in combination with other information, including, but not limited to, a natural person’s name, date of birth, identification number, personal biometric information, address and telephone number.
E-commerce Law (draft) 电子商务法 (草案)Under review by Standing Committee of the National People’s CongressMay be passed in 2018Regulates data collection by e-commerce operators
Interim Security Review Measures for Network Products and Services 《网络产品和服务安全审查办法(试行)》, online.Cyberspace Administration of ChinaMay 2017Specifies that a cybersecurity review will include reviewing risks that product or service suppliers illegally collect, store, process or use user-related information while providing products or services.
Information Security Technology: Personal Information Security Specification 《信息安全技术 个人信息安全规范》, online.General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine & Standardisation Administration of ChinaDec 2017 (took effect in May 2018)Clarifies the definition of ‘personal sensitive information’, which includes information on one’s wealth, biometrics, personal identity, online identity identifiers and so on. Remains non-compulsory for companies

The lack of a legal framework on privacy protection has led to open disputes over who has access to user data. One of the most high-profile cases is the dispute between Tencent, China’s first internet giant to enter the elite US$500 billion tech club,28 and Huawei, the Chinese telecom equipment and smartphone maker. Huawei was seeking to collect user data from Tencent’s WeChat, China’s most popular chat app, installed on its Honor Magic phone. The data would help Huawei advance its AI projects. Tencent was quick to object, claiming it would violate user privacy and demanded that the Chinese Government intervene.29 Huawei argued that users have the right to choose whether and with whom their data is shared. The government suggested the two companies ‘follow relevant laws and regulations’,30 but existing regulations fail to specify who can collect and process user data.31 It’s still unclear how the two settled the dispute—or even whether they’ve settled it.32

Huawei and Tencent aren’t the first Chinese tech giants to rub shoulders other over access to data. In June 2017, Alibaba’s logistics arm, Cainiao, and China’s biggest private courier, SF Express, were in a month-long stand-off over access to consumer data. The fight was eventually resolved with the State Post Bureau’s intervention.33 Cainiao and SF Express both cited noble-sounding reasons, such as ‘data security’ and ‘user privacy’, for refusing to share data with each other, but the dispute was really about protecting their commercial interests and determining who had access to merchant and shopper data on China’s US$910 billion online retail market.34 In the case of Huawei versus Tencent, it’s about who may get to dominate the AI race with the help of massive amounts of data, including users’ chat logs. Due to a void in the current legal framework, it’s likely that disputes between companies over user data access will continue.

Lack of transparency and accountability

Most of the regulations are aimed at holding companies and individuals—rather than government bodies—accountable for data collection and protection. By contrast, government authorities now have access to more sensitive personal data than ever (through either court orders or surveillance). In addition, law enforcers are requiring companies to ensure a longer period of data retention and zero exemptions from real-name registration policies.

In June 2016, for example, China’s Cyberspace Administration issued the Provisions on the Administration of Mobile Internet Applications Information Services (移动互联网应用程序服务管理规定),35 which require, among other things, that:

  • app providers and app stores cooperate with government oversight and inspection
  • app providers keep records of users’ activities for 60 days
  • app providers ensure that new app users register with their real names by verifying users’ mobile phone numbers, other identifying information, or both.

In September 2016, Chinese authorities issued new regulations stating explicitly that user logs, messages and comments on social media platforms such as WeChat Moments—a feature that resembles Facebook’s timeline feed—can be collected and used as ‘electronic data’ to investigate legal cases.36 Cases of WeChat users being arrested for ‘insulting police’37 or ‘threatening to blow up a government building’38 on Moments indicate that the feature may be subject to monitoring by the authorities or the company.

Observers have raised concerns over authorities’ use of big-data-driven and AI-enabled technologies such as facial recognition and voice recognition, which may lead to an all-seeing police state. iFlytek, a Chinese information technology company designated by the Ministry of Science and Technology to lead the country’s speech recognition development, has partnered with the Ministry of Public Security to develop a joint research lab. According to a report by the company, it has also partnered
with local telecommunication companies in eastern Anhui Province to establish a surveillance system that ‘notifies public security departments as soon as a suspicious voice is detected’.39 In the highly restricted Xinjiang region, local authorities are reportedly collecting highly sensitive personal information, including DNA samples, fingerprints and iris scans.40

A case that demonstrates ongoing tensions between big data applications and privacy concerns in China is the building of a national social credit system 社会信用体系 (SCS), which is the subject of a forthcoming ICPC policy brief by Samantha Hoffman. The SCS, currently planned for a full launch by 2020, aims to aggregate data on the country’s 1.4 billion citizens and assign each person a credit rating based on their socioeconomic status and online behaviour.41 So far, there’s little detail on exactly
how the system will unfold. Some companies and local governments have created their own systems (such as Tencent’s Tencent Credit,42 Alibaba’s Sesame Credit43 and many other social credit products developed by smaller players).44 While a final reward and punishment mechanism remains uncertain, existing reports show some consistent themes. For example, based on their social credit score and behaviours that affect one’s credit, a citizen’s access to aeroplane or express train travel will be denied and their privileges, such as faster visa approval and easier access to apartment rentals, will be restricted if the person has a bad social credit score.

The justifications for this scheme include the idea that it’s a remedy for the deficit of trust in society.45 Southern Metropolis Daily, a Guangzhou-based liberal-leaning newspaper, surveyed 700 people on their attitudes towards China’s social credit system in 2014.46 It found that even though 40% of the respondents expressed privacy concerns, 80% were in support of this national program because ‘it helps build a society of trust’ and ‘provides a safer and more reliable environment for business’. Yet, the complete lack of transparency and clarity on data protection raise the alarming prospect of big-data-enabled mass surveillance in China and other authoritarian states.

Both Alibaba47 and Tencent48 have rolled out their own versions of social credit systems, which offer a holistic assessment of character based on vaguely defined categories and non-transparent algorithms.49 According to material collected by researchers at the University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab, the chief credit data scientist of Alibaba’s Ant Financial, Yu Wujie, has said, ‘If you regularly donate to charity, your credit score will be higher, but it won’t tell you how many payments you need to make every month … but [development] in this direction [is undertaken with] the hope that everyone will donate.’50 Tencent has revealed little about its credit system thus far, but the company already has access to a huge amount of users’ social data, including chat logs, via WeChat, QQ and many of its gaming products.

Due to the lack of data protection laws, few, including state regulators, have an understanding of what kinds of data a private company can access and use.51 It’s also unclear whether online comments and activities deemed undesirable by the government would negatively affect a person’s creditworthiness. The scheme is wide open to abuse by government authorities, including in tracking dissidents and exerting chilling effects on ordinary citizens.52

International implications

The tensions between privacy protection and data collection will be felt not only in China. In recent years, companies and governments in both authoritarian and democratic countries have vowed to develop big-data-based surveillance technologies and tighten internet management in the name of public and national security.53

At the international level, cross-border transfers of personal information, courtesy of the increasingly interdependent global economy in the age of big data, have become a pressing issue for private and state actors. Following the enactment of the Cybersecurity Law, which sets data localisation requirements, China has released administrative documents and guidelines detailing the conditions companies need to meet for data export (Table 3).

Table 3: Regulations on cross-border data transfer or data export

TitleIssuerDate issuedRelevance
Cybersecurity Law 网络安全法, online.Standing Committee of the National People’s CongressNov 2016Article 37: Personal information and important data collected and generated by critical information infrastructure operators in China must be stored domestically. For information and data that is transferred overseas due to business requirements, a security assessment will be conducted in accordance with measures jointly defined by China’s cyberspace administration bodies and the relevant departments under the State Council. Related provisions of other laws and administrative regulations shall apply.
Circular of the State Internet Information Office on the Public Consultation on the Measures for the Assessment of Personal Information and Important Data Exit Security (Draft for Soliciting Opinions) 《个人信息和重要数据出境 安全评估办法(征求意见稿)》, online.Cyberspace Administration of ChinaApr 2017Extends the scope of outbound data security assessment. While the Cybersecurity Law requires security evaluations to be conducted on critical information infrastructure operators (关键信息基础设施运营者), the measures stipulate that all network operators (网络运营者) must go through the check. Establishes the basic framework for outbound data security assessment, including its processes, responsible parties and main focuses.
Information Security Technology: Guidelines for Data Cross-Border Transfer, online. Security Assessment (second draft), online. 《信息安全技术 数据出境安 全评估指南 (第二稿)》National Information Security Standardisation Technical CommitteeAug 2017Clarifies the definition of data cross-border transfer, which is ‘the one-time or continuous activity in which a network operator provides personal information and important data collected and generated by network or other means in the course of operations within the territory of China to overseas institutions, organisations or individuals by means of directly providing or conducting business, providing services or products, etc.’ Further breaks down the conditions for initiating security self-assessment, government assessment and their processes. Details what is ‘important data’ and ‘personal data’. Non-compulsory for companies.

Under these regulations, foreign companies will have to either invest in new data servers in China that may be subject to monitoring by the government or incur new costs to partner with a local server provider, such as Tencent or Alibaba. Apple’s recent decision to migrate its China iCloud data to Guizhou Big Data and Amazon’s sell-off of its China cloud assets to its local Chinese partner are just two examples of how China’s tightening rules on data retention and transfers may affect foreign companies. By requiring data localisation, the Chinese Government is bringing data under Chinese jurisdiction and making it easier to access user data and penalise companies and individuals seen as violating China’s vaguely defined internet laws and regulations.

Meanwhile, Chinese-manufactured tech devices and applications that have taken over large portions of overseas markets are raising questions about data security. The Australian Defence Department has recently banned staff and serving personnel from downloading WeChat, China’s most popular social media app, onto their work phones.54 The heads of six top US intelligence agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency, told the Senate Intelligence Committee in February that they would not advise Americans to use products or services from Chinese telecommunications companies Huawei and ZTE. In April 2018, the tension escalated into a seven-year ban imposed by the US Commerce Department, prohibiting American companies from selling parts and software to ZTE, although at the time of publishing it’s unclear whether this ban will be enforced or overturned.55 In December 2017, the Ministry of Defence in India issued a new order to the Indian armed forces requiring officers and all security personnel to remove more than 42 Chinese apps, including Weibo, WeChat and UC Browser, which were classified as ‘spyware’.

Conclusion

This paper highlights the conflict between the fast-developing big data technologies and citizens’ diminishing rights to privacy and data security in China. A review of major Chinese big-data-related policy initiatives shows that many of those policies reflect special interest from Chinese authorities, its public security forces in particular, in potentially using data-driven analytic technologies for more effective and extensive surveillance and social control.

Compared to the growing number of regulations and national plans that support the research and development of big data technologies, there’s a lack of data protection laws and guidelines to hold relevant parties, especially the government, accountable for the collection and use of personal data. The ambivalent legal framework of data security and privacy protection, which enables state use of collected data, has led to multiple incidences of commercial disputes over access to users’ data. It’s likely we’ll see more such cases in the future.

Addressing these conflicts and advocating for the protection of users’ rights to privacy in China—where the state dominates every sector of society and suppresses civil society—is not easy. The Chinese state’s approach is a reminder to users, both in China and elsewhere, of the importance of protecting personal privacy and online security.

Using China as a case study also offers a number of takeaways for policymakers in other countries. International developments, such as ongoing privacy issues with Facebook data, show that tension between governments, businesses and users in the age of big data is not unique to any country. To that end, the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation has set a good example for containing companies’ exploitation of personal data.

There’s a trend, in China and elsewhere, for governments to use the excuse of ‘protecting user privacy’ to justify a more powerful state and more state involvement in private companies’ and organisations’ operations. Civil society groups, whenever and wherever possible, should assume a stronger role in addressing these challenges and raising awareness . A US-based study released in April 2018, for example, highlighted consumer misconceptions about privacy while using popular browsers, including that they would ‘prevent geo-location, advertisements, viruses, and tracking by both the websites visited and the network provider’.56 Further work and support are needed to equip users with sufficient knowledge to understand how data-related technologies work and what those technologies mean to them in everyday life.

The attractiveness of the Chinese state’s surveillance and social control systems to other authoritarian states means we may see other states adopt them, unless the negative aspects of these approaches are made more transparent. The consequences of reduced personal freedom combined with greater state control of societies and individuals are disturbing for advocates of the vitality and strength of open societies. Beyond these concerns, the strategic consequences of the tight integration of the
Chinese tech sector with the Chinese state is an area for further analysis.


Important disclaimer

This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in relation to the subject matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering any form of professional or other advice or services. No person should rely on the contents of this publication without first obtaining advice from a qualified professional person.

© The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited 2018

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  1. 中华人民共和国国务院, ‘国务院关于印发 新一代人工智能发展规划的通知’, 国务院, 8 July 2017, online. ↩︎
  2. China has permitted only some foreign direct investment through Chinese entities with partial or full foreign ownership in many tech sectors. See more detailed analysis by Paul Edelberg, ‘Is China Really Opening Its Doors to Foreign Investment?’, China Business Review, 8 November 2017, online and Jianwen Huang, ‘China’, The Foreign Investment Regulation Review – Edition 5, October 2017, online. ↩︎
  3. Yang Ruan, Cheek, Social media in China: what Canadians need to know; Nicole Jao, ‘WeChat now has over 1 billion active monthly users worldwide’, Technode, 5 March 2018, online. ↩︎
  4. Mason Hinsdale, ‘Tencent wants to make WeChat a digital travel ID’, Jing Travel, 6 June 2018, online. ↩︎
  5. 马化腾, ‘互联网像水和电一样成为‘传统行业’, Digitaling.com, 12 August 2014, online. ↩︎
  6. Catherine Shu, ‘China attempts to reinforce real‑name registration for internet users’, Techcrunch.com, 1 June 2016, online. ↩︎
  7. Hui Zhao, Haoxin Dong, ‘Research on personal privacy protection of China in the era of big data’, Open Journal of Social Sciences, 19 June 2017, 5:139–145, online. ↩︎
  8. Boston Consulting Group, Data privacy by the numbers, March 2014, online. ↩︎
  9. Linda Poon, ‘Finally, Uber releases data to help cities with transit planning’, CityLab.com, 11 January 2017, online. ↩︎
  10. Linda Lew, ‘How Tencent’s medical ecosystem is shaping the future of China’s healthcare’, Technode.com, 11 February 2018, online ↩︎

Weibo diplomacy and censorship in China

Sina Weibo

Since its inception in 2009, Sina Weibo – China’s souped-up version of Twitter – has provided a rare foothold for foreign governments in the PRC’s tightly-controlled media environment.

Yet while the PRC is allowed free reign to push its messages in Western media and social media platforms, Beijing’s censors have been hampering the legitimate digital diplomacy efforts of foreign embassies.

This ASPI ICPC report provides an in-depth look at the increasingly sophisticated censorship methods being used on foreign embassies on Weibo and provides a series of recommendations for foreign governments, including Australia, to address these policy challenges.

What’s the problem?

As the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-led state extends its reach into other nations, it’s actively limiting the ability of other countries to do the same in the People’s Republic of China. Seeing itself in an ideological confrontation with ‘the West’,1 the CCP under Xi Jinping is determined to ensure ideological conformity in its own information space.

A key battleground is Weibo, the Chinese micro-blogging service most closely analogous to Twitter. Since Weibo’s inception, embassies have maintained a presence on it—a rare foothold for foreign governments in China’s tightly controlled information space.

While some governments, particularly those of Western countries, have occasionally spoken outside the CCP’s frame of acceptable public discourse, most do not. As Weibo continues to introduce new and subtle methods of direct censorship, foreign embassies are both self-censoring their messaging and failing to speak up when their content is being censored.

In Australia’s case, this lack of transparency and cycle of self-censorship sits oddly with the description of Australia as ‘a determined advocate of liberal institutions, universal values and human rights’ in the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper.2

What’s the solution?

To not be seen as agreeing to the CCP’s ideological agenda, like-minded governments, in coordination with each other, should commit to publishing transparency reports to reveal the extent to which their legitimate online public diplomacy efforts are being curtailed in China.

Foreign governments should establish and publish clear terms of use for their social media accounts in China so that they don’t fall into the trap of self-censoring their policy messages and advocacy. They should use uncensored social media platforms such as Twitter—which, despite being blocked in China, still has an estimated 10 million active users in the country.3

Embassies could cross-post all of their content there so that audiences are both aware of any incidences of censorship and have alternative avenues to access their full content. The Australian Government should establish Weibo accounts for the positions of Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.

‘Orwellian nonsense’

In early May 2018, the US Embassy in China put Weibo censors in a delicate bind when it issued a provocative slapdown of Beijing’s censorship overreach.

‘President Donald J Trump ran against political correctness in the United States’, read the White House statement, which had been translated into Mandarin.4 ‘He will stand up for Americans resisting efforts by the Chinese Communist Party to impose Chinese political correctness on American companies and citizens.’

The statement was put out in response to the Chinese Civil Aviation Administration’s call on 36 foreign airlines, asking them to come into line with Beijing’s preferred terms of reference for Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau as ‘Chinese territories’.

The statement continued: ‘This is Orwellian nonsense and part of a growing trend by the Chinese Communist Party to impose its political views on American citizens and private companies.’ It went further still: ‘China’s internal Internet repression is world-famous. China’s efforts to export its censorship and political correctness to Americans and the rest of the free world will be resisted.’

The post, most likely penned by White House press secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders, was a deliberate poke in the eye for Beijing and it promptly caused a firestorm on the platform.

In the short history of Weibo diplomacy, sometimes referred to as ‘Weiplomacy’, it was the most direct challenge to China’s censorship regime yet. Having shone a mirror on their own activities, Sina Weibo’s censors were put on the spot.

‘Only folks with strong connections (like you) can avoid getting censored’ read the most upvoted comment in the hour immediately after the post went out (Figure 1). ‘I can imagine the censorship department scratching their heads over this,’ read another comment.5

Notably, Hu Xijin, the chief editor of Global Times, the nationalist newspaper owned by the CCP, took to his own Weibo account to call on ‘Weibo management’ to refrain from intervening.6

Instead, in the ensuing few hours, Sina Weibo’s censors used every tool at their disposal short of deleting the post to ensure that the missive had as little impact as possible. Not only was the sharing function for the post switched off, but the comments section under the post was carefully manicured to remove liberal voices and replace them with CCP-approved sentiment (Figure 2).

Figure 1: The comments section under the US Embassy post less than an hour after it was published included users directly challenging the censorship regime.

Translation

  • Only folks with strong connections (like you) can avoid getting censored. [2,656 Likes]
  • I’m also against political correctness or imposing your ideology on others but respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other countries should not be mixed up with ideology. [2,077 Likes]
  • If we were exercising extreme oppression on the domestic Internet, do you think you’d still be talking shit here? [1,277 Likes]
  • Hahahahaha seeing in my living years the US opposing China’s political correctness.. [1,027 Likes]
  • How does our press freedom rank in the world again, one hundred and something right? [634 Likes]
  • I sincerely hope the Indians can claim back their land and establish their own country, while Hawaii could become an independent country. [814 Likes]
  • If you don’t want to do business here, then f&#% off. If you do want to do business here, respect our laws. [497 Likes]
  • [I] support President Trump’s thinking, the world belongs to the people, not a certain party. [378 Likes]
  • Leave your name here before the post gets deleted. [321 Likes]

Figure 2: The comments section under the US Embassy post (now seen in mobile view) around 2 hours after it was published and after censors removed posts that didn’t toe the party line.

Translation

  • If you don’t want to do business here, then f&#% off. If you do want to do business here, respect our laws. [110,000 Likes] 
  • When China and the US established diplomatic relations in 1972, Nixon openly accepted China’s political correctness during his trip here. Are you now denying the establishment of diplomatic relations? [7,854 Likes]
  • Independence for Hawaii
    Independence for Alaska
    Independence for California
    Independence for Texas
    Independence for New Mexico [7,108 Likes]
  • 1. This is not political correctness, this is the one-China principle.
  • 2. Please abide by the terms of the Sino-US joint communique, if you choose to unilaterally go against them, it will be seen as a violation of the agreement. [6,560 Likes]

The incident was an object lesson in how sophisticated the PRC censorship apparatus has become and how precisely it can be deployed. It may be ‘Orwellian nonsense’, but it does largely work. While some Western media reports 7 took care to note that more varied opinions were expressed by Weibo users under the post before the censors swooped in, most reports didn’t.8

What remained after the censors had done their work was nothing more than a Potemkin post, with the comments under it carefully selected to give the impression of a uniformly nationalistic online Chinese public. Such an impression has led previous scholarship on ‘Weiplomacy’ to conclude that the power of Weibo to further the goals of public diplomacy might have been overestimated.9

But a closer examination of the comment section under the post revealed a plethora of viewpoints that the censors failed to expunge. Even though the censors had cherrypicked CCP-approved comments to feature as the most upvoted comments, many of the comments under those comments weren’t toeing the party line (Figure 3). Peeling back the curtain on the Potemkin post reveals the raucous marketplace of ideas that still exists on Weibo, if one takes the time to seek it out.

Figure 3: The comments under the cherrypicked nationalist comments reveal sentiment from opposing ideological clusters.

Translation

  • If you don’t want to do business here, then f&#% off. If you do want to do business here, respect our laws. [12,076 Likes]
  • ‘Little pink’ maggots [a derogatory term for young nationalists] are really disgusting [4,879 Likes]
  • So ZTE deserved to be prosecuted in the US because it didn’t obey their laws. [3,319 Likes]
  • ‘War Wolves’ [a reference to patriotic hit Chinese film Wolf Warrior] always think the rest of the world couldn’t survive without China. [3,302 Likes]
  • Saying it like this is a bit extreme. China and the US affect each other mutually. Chinese airlines need to fly to the US and US airlines need to fly to China. It’s not possible for only one side to depend on the other for business. [3,091 Likes]
  • [The commenter] is obviously a slave but one who talks with the tone of a master. [1,970 Likes]

Weibo and foreign governments: a history of censorship and self-censorship

Three years after the UK Embassy became the first foreign embassy to open an account on Sina Weibo, Jonas Parello-Plesner warned that diplomats should be wary of creeping self-censorship.

‘Embassies shouldn’t accept self-censorship by only posting innocuous tweet[s] that can pass through the censors,’ Parello-Plesner wrote in The Diplomat in 2012.10 ‘Instead they should give the full spectrum of views including on values—even if it means more deleted postings.’

In the intervening years, some foreign embassies took up the challenge, showing a willingness to push the envelope even at the risk of having their content censored. At times, the envelope pushing has been inspired. Doing this required them to be quite creative, because being predictable means being easily blocked.

On 30 May 2012, the US Embassy tapped into Michael Jackson’s popularity in China to give a boost to a politically sensitive interview with then ambassador Gary Locke.11

‘Michael Jackson has an album called Thriller, one of the best selling records in the history of music. The story we’re telling today is also a Thriller. Click to read,’ read the post, which also included a picture of the famous album (Figure 4).

The link led to a Newsweek interview titled ‘Ambassador to China Gary Locke talks Chen, Drama in China’,12 which included details about the attempt by former Chongqing police chief Wang Lijun to get political asylum from the US, as well as the dramatic story of activist Chen Guangcheng’s successful bid for political asylum.

Figure 4: The censored 2012 Weibo post from the US Embassy, which used Michael Jackson’s celebrity as a smokescreen for a politically sensitive interview with then ambassador Gary Locke. The post was archived on FreeWeibo.com.

In 2014, the UK Embassy posted a 2013 human rights report to Weibo using ‘Martian’, a coded language based on Chinese characters (Figure 5).13

Figure 5: The 2014 Weibo post from the UK Embassy, which used coded language in an attempt to evade censorship.

If the post had gone out using standard Chinese, keywords deemed sensitive by the party-state, such as ‘human rights’, would have been flagged automatically. But by using the ‘Martian’ coded language, the longevity of the post was prolonged before the censors became aware of it.14

In other instances, embassies have posted ‘sensitive’ content on Weibo in order to address what they have perceived as unfair treatment by China’s state-controlled media.

On 3 August 2011, the Canadian Embassy was censored for the first time after it posted about Chinese fugitive Lai Changxing. The post included a full federal court decision that resulted in his deportation to China. It included mentions of Liu Xiaobo and Falun Gong and was deleted almost immediately.15

At other times, foreign embassies have tested the boundaries of what is deemed acceptable discourse by Beijing’s censors. In 2016, the US consulate in Shanghai sent out a Weibo post asking for virtual private network (VPN) supplier recommendations. The post was deleted within an hour of its appearance.16

On 1 February 2017, the British Embassy posted an EU statement calling for the investigation of allegations of torture of detained human rights lawyers.17 According to Citizen Lab, Weibo users weren’t able to forward or comment on the post.18 The post was subsequently deleted. And on 3 June 2014, a day before the 25th anniversary of the massacre at Tiananmen Square, the Canadian Embassy posted a photo of Ambassador Guy Saint-Jacques posing with his wife at the site (Figure 6). The low comments-to-shares ratio on the provocative post would suggest some form of censorship, with comments either being deleted or not allowed at all.

Figure 6: Canadian Ambassador and his wife at Tiananmen Square, 2014

The text reads:

  • ‘On June 1, ambassador Guy Saint-Jacques and wife Sylvie Cameron took a tour around the Chairman Mao Memorial on their bikes. A visit to the place they once saw reminded of various past events associated with the square, including the once more cordial and relaxed atmosphere there.’
  • Despite being shared 917 times, the post only displays a few comments—a telltale sign that censors had throttled engagement with it.
  • One share of the post added the comment: ‘There are only a few comments on this post, and you can’t see any of the shares of it.’

At times, the act of censorship happens not because an embassy has made a decision to push the envelope, but because it’s made a diplomatic faux pas. On 26 March 2014, the Russian Embassy Weibo account made what Foreign Policy called a ‘large digital diplomacy gaffe’ when it made mention of the Tiananmen incident. The embassy argued that ‘Russia’s current situation’, following Western sanctions after Russia’s annexation of Crimea, ‘somewhat resembles what China suffered after the Tiananmen incident.19

More recently, however, the instances of blatant censorship—in which posts and even the accounts themselves are deleted—appear to have dropped off. Instead, as this report shows, the invisible hand of Beijing’s censors is, for the most part, eschewing heavy-handed censorship for more surreptitious forms. At the same time, it appears that foreign embassies on Weibo are pulling their punches and accepting ‘the sliding slope of red lines and self-censorship inside the Chinese system’ that Parello-Plesner warned about.20 The combination results in the suppression of ideas that are different from the CCP’s ‘correct line’.

Websites FreeWeibo and Weiboscope have been extremely useful for uncovering examples of blatant censorship, including deletions of posts and keyword blocking. However, less obvious forms of censorship are more difficult to detect. Some of those methods include disabling the comments section under posts and switching off their sharing functionality.

The disabling of comments has been one of many levers that Sina Weibo’s censors have been able to pull from as early as 2012, when, rather heavy-handedly, all comments on all posts were switched off after rumours of a coup spread on the platform.21

Similar forms of surreptitious censorship include ‘shadow-banning’, in which users are under the impression that their posts are being seen when in fact they’re being hidden from other users. The practice is known to be used, if only anecdotally, on Sina Weibo, but has been proven to be in use on China’s dominant chat application, WeChat. 22

These stealthier forms of censorship are less noticeable to the user and therefore less likely to provoke any unwanted backlash.23 As Lawrence Lessig observed in 1999, it’s the underlying code that determines ‘whether access to information is general or whether information is zoned’.24 Or to rework the old aphorism, ‘If a message is posted on social media, but the algorithm doesn’t prioritise it, does it really make a sound?’

How censorship on Weibo works

An analysis of three months’ worth of Weibo posts between November 2017 and January 2018 from the top 10 foreign embassies in China (measured by follower numbers) found 51 instances of censored posts, mostly on the US Embassy account (Figure 7).25

Figure 7: Three months of Weibo posts from November 2017 to January 2018 resulted in 51 instances of censorship.

The US Embassy account had 28 instances of censorship in total, and a variety of methods were used to reduce or erase the impact of its posts. Those methods ranged from the blunt to the subtle:

  • Six posts were deleted—some immediately, some weeks after the fact.
  • Fifteen posts had their comments sections disabled immediately.
  • Three posts had comments sections disabled immediately and then re-enabled weeks later.
  • Two posts had their comments sections allowed, then disabled and hidden at some later stage.
  • In two posts, Weibo notified users that comments were being accepted but asked that they wait patiently for a ‘server synchronisation’. The user comments never made it through.

A range of censorship methods were used on US Embassy posts, ranging from the blunt to the subtle (Figure 8).

Figure 8: Censorship methods used on the US Embassy Weibo account

In a blatant act of censorship, a post sent out by the US Embassy on 7 November 2017 showing the first leg of President Trump’s Asian tour, in Japan, was immediately deleted. The deleted post—captured and archived by FreeWeibo.com 26—was also tweeted from the US Embassy Twitter account,27 helping to make its absence on Weibo more noticeable (Figure 9).

Figure 9: The US Embassy tweet, the Weibo equivalent of which was deleted by Chinese censors.

TranslationPresident Trump and First Lady Melania Trump were welcomed by the Emperor and Queen of Japan on the second day of their Japan visit. They also met with the families of North Korean abductees. President Trump held bilateral talks with Abe, and met with Japanese and American business leaders, while the First Lady had a joyous meeting with some Japanese primary school students. #POTUSinAsia

Two days later, on 9 November 2017—the second day of President Trump’s first state visit to the PRC—a post sent out by the US Embassy linking to a transcript of a press briefing by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson (Figure 10)28 had its comments section immediately disabled.

The post contained a statement from Secretary Tillerson that presented President Trump and President Xi as being on a joint ticket in regard to denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula, and quickly became that week’s most shared post from the embassy, with 523 shares and 441 ‘Likes’.

Figure 10: The tweet about Rex Tillerson, the Weibo equivalent of which was deleted by Chinese censors.

Translation: President Trump and President Xi confirmed their determination in realising the complete, verifiable and ever lasting denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula. President Trump and President Xi won’t accept a North Korea that is armed with nuclear weapons. We thank China’s cooperation. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson at Beijing Press Conference. Read the brief.

On 17 November, another post quoted a different part of Secretary Tillerson’s earlier press briefing:

The key topic of discussion was our continued joint effort to increase pressure on North Korea, to convince them to abandon their nuclear and missile program. President Trump and President Xi affirmed their commitment to achieve a complete, verifiable, and permanent denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. President Trump and President Xi will not accept a nuclear-armed North Korea.

On 24 November, another post quoted President Trump from his joint press conference with President Xi two weeks earlier: 29

All responsible nations must join together to stop arming and financing, and even trading with the murderous North Korean regime. Together we have in our power to finally liberate this region and the world from this very serious nuclear menace. But it will require collective action, collective strength, and collective devotion to winning the peace.

And on 30 November 2017, a US Embassy Weibo post announced a call between President Trump and President Xi after Pyongyang tested a missile reportedly capable of reaching the US mainland (Figure 11).30 A copy of the post remains on the US mission’s Twitter account.31

Figure 11: The tweet about Trump’s phone call with Xi, the Weibo equivalent of which was deleted by Chinese censors on Weibo.

Translation: President Trump spoke with President Xi to discuss North Korea’s latest missile test. President Trump stressed America’s determination to defend itself and its allies from the growing threat posed by the North Korean regime. November 29, 2017, the White House President Trump and President Xi call briefing.

Six months after these four posts were published, they no longer exist. It’s unclear when exactly the censors deleted them. This method of delayed censorship avoids detection on FreeWeibo.com, where there are no records of the posts being censored. With the North Korea nuclear crisis still a live issue, the deletions suggest that Beijing is trying to regain control of the narrative inside its own information space.

On 27 December 2017, the US Embassy was censored again after it sent out a post linking to a US– German embassy joint statement about the sentencing of activist Wu Gan and his lawyer, Xie Yang:

We see lawyers and defenders of rights as aiding the strengthening of the Chinese society via developing governance by law. Click the link here to view the recent cases.

The post was captured on FreeWeibo.com after being censored on Weibo.32

Aside from these six instances of deleted posts, all other instances of censorship captured in this report involved the disabling of the comments section under posts. This softer, less noticeable form of censorship is what’s more generally applied to posts from foreign embassies, resulting in suspiciously low levels of reported engagement from users. Engagement levels are artificially deflated when comments are disabled.

In a response to a list of questions asked by ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre (ICPC), three governments—the US, Australian and Japanese—confirmed that their embassies in Beijing never disable the comment sections under their Weibo posts.33

‘We don’t delete our own posts,’ a US Embassy spokesperson told ASPI ICPC via email. ‘The US Embassy faces regular and routine blocking of social media posts in China.’ 34

‘We don’t disable the comments section ourselves,’ a Japanese Embassy spokesperson told an ASPI ICPC researcher over the phone. ‘When comments are closed for posts it’s always done by Sina. They will always disable comments for posts mentioning the names of Chinese political leaders, for example.’

In fact, in the data covered in this report, 75% of the time censorship appears to have been meted out because a top Chinese official (living or dead) was mentioned by name or was in a photo in the post.

The sensitivity around senior Chinese officials isn’t surprising. In his 2013 book, Blocked on Weibo, Jason Q Ng found that the largest share of blocked words he discovered through his research were names of people, mostly CCP members.

‘[P]rotection from criticism on Weibo seems to be a perk for rising up the ranks—while dissidents and people caught up in scandals or crimes make up the rest of the names,’ Ng wrote.35

A post by the Cuban Embassy on 25 January 2018 mentions Song Tao (宋涛) , the head of the CCP’s International Department. The post described Song as ‘Secretary Xi Jinping’s Special Envoy’, which was probably the reason for the censorship that followed (Figure 12).

Figure 12: A Cuban Embassy post runs into trouble

Translation of error message: Sorry, you cannot proceed with your attempt as the content contains information that has violated relevant laws and regulations or Weibo community guidelines.

Even when posts mentioning Xi Jinping are positive, they still attract the attention of censors. In October 2017, former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd posted a photo of himself ‘studying’ Xi’s report to the 19th CPC National Congress (Figure 13). ‘China has entered a new age,’ he wrote. According to Rudd, comments under the post were disabled by Weibo. 36

Figure 13: Comments were disabled after Kevin Rudd posted on Weibo

A Sina spokesperson confirmed to ASPI’s ICPC that government-affiliated Weibo accounts with a blue verified badge have the ability to disable the comment sections on their own posts.37 However, in the dataset collected for this report, only one instance of a foreign embassy disabling its own comments was found, on the South Korean embassy’s Weibo account (Figure 14).

Figure 14: The error message reads ‘Due to this user’s settings, you’re unable to comment.’ The South Korean embassy did not respond to ASPI ICPC’s enquiries.

Occasionally, there are exceptions to the censorship rules. An uncensored post from Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau sent on 6 December 2017 included Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s name in the text, as well as Li’s image in a photo.38 

The outsized success of a selfie taken by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and posted to Weibo in July 2015 is another exception to the rule (Figure 15). 39 The virality of the post was due not only to the rare inclusion of a top Chinese leader, but also due to the content, in which Modi wishes Li a happy birthday. Premier Li’s exact birthday hadn’t been publicly disclosed before.40

Figure 15: Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang post a selfie

In a rare case during the 2017 G20 summit in Germany, any mention of Russian President Vladimir Putin was blocked on Weibo, according to the Financial Times.41

The move was interpreted by the paper as ‘giving Russia’s president an immunity from public criticism usually reserved for China’s Communist Party elite.’ In that instance, any mention of Putin on the accounts of Weibo users with more than 1,000 followers triggered the message: ‘This post does not allow commenting.’

Out of 51 instances of suspected censorship over the three-month study period, only 13 were posts that didn’t mention any top Chinese leaders.

One particularly notable instance of censorship was of a 13 November 2017 post from the US Embassy Weibo account, which included a video of President Donald Trump emphasising the US as a country whose ‘home’ is ‘on the Pacific’ (Figure 16).

Figure 16: Comments are disabled on US Embassy’s post of President Trump speaking about the US and the Pacific.

Translation of error message: Sorry, you cannot proceed with your attempt as the content contains information that has violated relevant laws and regulations or Weibo community guidelines.

Other, more personal, attempts at cross-cultural communication were also hamstrung by the censors. On the final day of President Trump’s state visit to the PRC, a video of Trump’s 6-year-old granddaughter Arabella Kushner that Trump had personally shown President Xi and his wife Peng Liyuan was published on the US Embassy account and immediately had the comments section on it disabled (Figure 17).

Figure 17: Screenshot of the US embassy’s post of Arabella Kushner singing in Chinese. Comments on the post were immediately disabled.

On the same day, a Weibo post written in the first person by President Trump at the end of his state visit to the PRC appeared:

I’m now leaving China for Vietnam for the APEC meeting #APEC2017#. First Lady Melania will stay here to visit the zoo, and of course, the Great Wall of China. Then she will go to Alaska to greet our amazing troops.

The post prompted some users to ask in comments whether Trump had taken over control of the US Embassy account.

After 39 comments were made, any subsequent attempt to comment resulted in an error message reading: ‘Posted successfully. Please be patient about 1–2 minutes delay due to server synchronization, thank you’ (Figure 18).

Figure 18: The Trump post at the end of his China visit.

Translation of error message: Posted successfully. Please be patient about 1–2 minutes delay due to server synchronization, thank you.

Two other posts by the US Embassy probably drew the ire of Weibo’s censors by providing an opportunity for Chinese netizens to draw comparisons between conditions in the US and China.

One such post answered a question posed to the US Embassy Weibo account about whether American officials were provided with special food supplies (Figure 19).42 Chinese news reports in 2011 revealed that Chinese Government officials have exclusive suppliers of organic food.43 Given that the post didn’t include any sensitive words that might cross a censorship fault line, it managed to garner at least 88 comments before commenting was disabled by the censors.

Figure 19: One of only 13 censored posts that didn’t refer to a senior Chinese leader, this post seemed to invite a comparison of US officials to Chinese officials, and comments were disabled.

Weibo accounts run by the US Government have been suspended and even completely deleted in the past. The US Shanghai consulate’s Weibo account was shut down on 14 July 2012, while the US Embassy account was suspended briefly on 5 May 2016, according to China Digital Times, which is a website following social and political developments in China and run by the University of California.44

At times, it’s less clear why a decision to disable comments was made. When the US Embassy posted that it wouldn’t be able to continue posting to Weibo and WeChat during a government shutdown on 22 January 2018, the post went viral (Figure 20).45 It was the second most shared of all posts gathered during the three-month reporting period for this report.

Figure 20: A post by the US Embassy, explaining that it wouldn’t be posting during a government shutdown, was picked up by the Chinese media.

Translation: Due to an unresolved issue with funding, the US embassy’s social media account will cease its regular updates. While the funding issue remains unresolved, all regular and emergency consular, citizen and immigration services will continue as usual. Those seeking visa or citizen services who have secured an appointment in advance should attend as scheduled. In the exception of emergency security and safety information, the embassy website will not continue its regular updates before full resumption of operations.

However, after the post garnered 1,893 comments, further comments were disabled, despite the Global Times’ gleeful reporting on the incident.46

For China’s overzealous censors, even posts that could be used to show the apparent weaknesses of liberal democracies, such as the US Embassy’s government shutdown post, need to be censored—presumably for fear that discussion of the US Government will prompt users to draw comparisons to their own government. Clearly, the censors, of which Sina Weibo employs an estimated 13,000,47 are highly sensitive to any content that falls outside the boundaries of acceptable CCP-approved discourse.

It follows that a country such as Australia, which claims to be ‘a determined advocate of liberal institutions, universal values and human rights’,48 should expect such advocacy to attract the attention of China’s censors. If it didn’t, something would be odd. However, the Australian Embassy Weibo account doesn’t appear to be attracting much CCP censorship. In the three months of data collected for this report, the embassy’s Weibo account was censored only three times, all for mentioning Xi Jinping. Whether this lack of censorship reflects savvy account management, the CCP’s disinterest in the embassy Weibo account or self-censorship by the Australian Government is the important question.

Rising nationalism

Rising Chinese nationalism online has been allowed to foment amid recent social media campaigns against companies such as South Korean conglomerate Lotte Group, German carmaker Daimler’s Mercedes-Benz brand and Marriott International. The campaigns have received support from both state-run media and the Chinese Government.49

On 17 November 2017, an innocuous post by the German Embassy explaining the meaning of the German word Lückenbüßer (stopgap)50, became a place for nationalists to congregate and protest after pro-Tibetan independence flags were sighted at a soccer match in Germany involving Chinese players (Figure 21).

Figure 21: The German Embassy Weibo post and angry responses from nationalists.

Translation: Luther invented the word Lückenbüßer while translating the Old Testament. The word is about holes and cracks needing to be mended in the Holy Wall in Jerusalem. This is the origin of the word. Today, it refers to a person who acts as a replacement for the one missing from the original plan, although the plan does
not work out in the end. No one wants to be a measure of expediency, but we often cannot do without one. During a period of transition when changes are about to happen, or when a final choice has yet to be made, it usually connects the world together.

Translation of comments:

  • You want freedom of speech? Sure! Next time you Germans want to come to China for any games, we will bombard with swastika flags and photos of Hitler, and salute and chant the name of Hilter throughout, and belt out Nazi songs! Then you’d be happy, be content! A nation that cannot retain its roots is really pathetic, of course, they will treat the territorial integrity of other nations as bullshit!
  • You deserve terrorist attacks in Europe, it’s all your own making!
  • Can we perform Nazi rituals and bear Nazi flags when the German team comes to China?
  • Since some people purposely provoked aggression with flags for Tibetan independence during a China–Germany soccer match, while you brushed it aside with the excuse of freedom of speech, I think it would not be an issue to paste around your embassy all with flags of east Germany!
  • What is freedom of speech? If the separation of China can be counted as freedom of speech, then we sincerely hope that you would again divide Germany into two countries.

The prevalence of such deep nationalism, both real and manufactured, has prompted some, like Adelaide University scholar Ying Jiang, in her pioneering research into ‘Weiplomacy’ efforts, to suggest that the power of Weibo to further the goals of public diplomacy might have been overestimated.51 It’s easy to see how that could be the case. While liberal voices face extra scrutiny from the censors, nationalist voices are allowed to flourish. Even foreigners on Weibo have been tapping into Chinese nationalism as a fast track to viral fame on the platform.

David Gulasi, a China-based Australian English teacher, attracted attention on the platform with funny videos, but saw it skyrocket when he started aping nationalistic views. State media outlet Xinhua has noted that videos uploaded by Gulasi include one in which he ‘professed his love for China and denounced foreigners who did not share his passion for the country’.52

In 2016, when thousands of China-based trolls attacked Australian Olympic swimmer Mack Horton and his supporters after Horton called his Chinese rival Sun Yang a ‘drug cheat’, Gulasi joined in on Weibo (Figure 22).53

Figure 22: Joining a Chinese nationalist pile-on on Australian Olympian Mack Horton helped David Gulasi achieve viral fame on Weibo.

In another video, Gulasi complains about the slow pace of life in Australia and tells his audience he has come to China to pursue his ‘Chinese Dream’ 54 —a populist slogan introduced by Xi Jinping in 2013. Astoundingly, Gulasi was chosen by the Australian Embassy to feature in its 45 Years, 45 Stories campaign to commemorate the 45th anniversary of Australia–China diplomatic relations.55

Foreign embassies and even national leaders such as India’s Narendra Modi have had their Weibo accounts deluged with angry nationalistic messages.56 But in an increasingly censored and controlled online media environment, foreign embassy accounts can also be a channel for netizens to protest about their own government.

In early February 2018, the comments section on posts sent out by multiple foreign embassies, including the US, Japanese and UK embassies, as well as the United Nations, spontaneously became a space for Weibo users to protest the China Securities Regulatory Commission and its head, Liu Shiyu (Figure 23).57

Figure 23: A screenshot of the US embassy Weibo account from 9 February 2018. The screenshot was censored on Weibo but retrieved by FreeWeibo.com, a censorship monitoring site. Source: 科学自然 ‘科学自然:激动的中国股民涌到美国驻…’, FreeWeibo.com, 10 February 2018, online

Translation:

  • Since the China Securities Regulatory Commission Weibo has banned hundreds of millions of investors from protesting, all we can do is voice our fury here and strongly demand Liu Shiyu to step down.
  • Please have your American reporters go to the CSRC to interview Liu Shiyu, [and ask him] why is the Chinese stock market so unable to take a hit?
  • As our official platform has been censored, I just want to borrow this space to call for Liu Shiyu to step down. The stock market has crashed five times in two years, slaughtering hundreds of millions of investors
  • ‘641’ (a homonym for Liu Shiyu) must step down immediately, you’ve already seriously hurt hundreds of millions of families.

In April 2018, Weibo reversed a ban on content ‘related to’ homosexuality after an unusually fierce backlash from internet users.58

Both incidents reveal the diversity of views and ideological groupings that continue to exist online in China despite the party-state’s efforts to promote nationalism. Research by the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) demonstrates how those widely differing views coexist on Chinese social media, even after extensive efforts by the CCP to repress liberal voices on the platform.59

Its research shows that ,while party-state propaganda plays a dominant role, a number of other distinct ideological clusters exist on Chinese social media sites such as Sina Weibo. Among the groupings they identify are ‘Market Lovers’, ‘Democratizers’, ‘Humanists’ and ‘US Lovers’.

Furthermore, a survey conducted by MERICS for the report shows that Chinese nationalism isn’t necessarily anti-Western. While 62% of respondents in the online survey said China should be more assertive internationally, 75% also supported the ‘spread of Western values’. As the paper points out, ‘the CCP’s strategy of denouncing so-called Western values has repeatedly backfired when netizens pointed out the lack of better Chinese alternatives.’ Western embassies’ public diplomacy efforts seem to have some fertile ground, despite the censorship.

Israel, the Weibo stand-out

The ICPC’s analysis of three months of posts from the top 10 foreign embassies on Weibo shows that a failure to cut through can’t be blamed only on censorship. Many foreign embassies simply aren’t putting enough resources into ensuring that their content is engaging enough to succeed in a highly competitive online media environment, or creative enough to not be easily spotted by censors.

The Israeli Embassy is a stand-out exception: it has a highly successful content strategy that has proved highly popular on the platform.
In her own research into ‘Weiplomacy’ efforts, Adelaide University scholar Ying Jiang captured 2015 data from the top 10 embassies on Weibo, and Israel didn’t make the list. Just a year later, research by Manya Koetse, editor-in-chief of the Chinese social trend tracking website What’s on Weibo, showed that the Israeli Embassy had come out of nowhere to take the top spot (Table 1).

Table 1: The top 10 foreign embassies on Weibo, 2015 to 2017

(Table-1)

Sources:
a) Ying Jiang, ‘Weibo as a public diplomacy platform’, Social Media and e-Diplomacy in China, 10 August 2017, online.
b) Manya Koetse, ‘Digital diplomacy: these foreign embassies are most (un)popular on Weibo’, What’s On Weibo, 20 December 2016, online.
c) Data collected by Fergus Ryan, December 2017.

Of course, a successful digital public diplomacy effort on Weibo should not only be judged by how many posts are censored; it should also be pragmatic. Above all, any digital diplomacy, or ‘e-diplomacy’, effort is fundamentally about the use of the internet and new information and communications technologies to help achieve diplomatic objectives.60

Drawing on data from late 2017, this report has Israel maintaining its lead at number 1 (despite losing followers), while the US and Canada continue to vie for second and third place. The UK has recovered from its loss of two places to regain the number 6 slot, while Australia has managed to re-enter the top 10.

However, follower counts can be a somewhat crude metric, as they can be easily gamed.

A 2014 investigation by The Globe and Mail found that large chunks of those followers were fake. According to the online tool used by the paper, 45.8% of the US Embassy’s followers, 39.9% of the UK’s and 51.2% of Japan’s were real. Only 12.9% of the Canadian Embassy’s 1.1 million followers were determined to be real.61

Another more meaningful metric is to examine the number of shares, likes and comments that each post gets on average to arrive at an idea of how ‘influential’ each embassy is (Figure 24).

Figure 24: Top 10 foreign embassies, by shares and likes per post

Using these engagement metrics, the Japanese, UK, US, Israeli and Canadian embassies are the top 5 leading the pack. 

Central to the success of the top 5 accounts is a tendency to not just promote the image of their own countries, but to engage with and leverage Chinese culture, particularly pop culture. Weibo’s audience skews young (88% of Weibo users are under 33 years of age) and, after its most vocal liberal voices were purged, is now largely dominated by entertainment.62

If the aim of foreign embassies on Weibo is to enhance soft power and to shift public opinion around to supporting their foreign policy positions, the Israeli Embassy Weibo account is exemplary. Shimi Azar, who worked as social media manager at the embassy from late 2014 to early 2016, says the country received a lot of exposure through state visits by Israel’s leaders to China.

‘The first visit of Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu to China in 2013 and the visit of the late president Shimon Peres in 2014 created a big buzz in the media,’ Azar told the Global Times.

‘So the embassy took advantage of this buzz and created a Sina Weibo account for Shimon Peres, which was very successful and soon attracted half a million followers.’63

But the outsized success of the Israeli Embassy Weibo account also occurred in the context of a number of deadly terrorist attacks by jihadist-inspired separatist groups in Xinjiang Province.64 As Peter Cai noted in 2014, the majority of comments under an Israeli Embassy Weibo post that likened Hamas to the Islamic State terrorist group were supportive of Israeli attacks on Hamas.

‘Israel, you must control the population in Gaza, otherwise it’s impossible for you to win. You should ditch your humanitarian principles and the only hope for you is to fight evil with evil,’ read one representative comment under the post.

Chinese netizen support for Israeli foreign policy, which goes against the official Beijing position, is still ongoing. Nine sentences sent out by the Israeli Embassy following US President Trump’s decision to recognise Jerusalem as the capital of Israel was the most shared piece of embassy content (the item was shared 2,298 times) in the three-month period covered in this report (Figure 25).65

Figure 25: The most shared piece of embassy content—on the US recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital

The post, which outlines the official Israeli view of the history of Jerusalem, was positively received by Weibo users. ‘The world will rest assured and the people will be satisfied when Jerusalem is given to you,’ reads the most liked comment underneath the post.

‘Put the boot into the cancer of humanity’, the second most liked comment reads—a sentiment typical of a growing anti-Muslim sentiment online that has gone unchecked by Beijing’s censors. Islamophobia has been given a wide berth online in China as authorities continue to crack down in its restive region of Xinjiang. Frequent anti-Muslim comments under many Israeli embassy posts suggest that there’s a perception in their audience that the Israeli Embassy Weibo account is itself anti-Muslim.

A lack of coordination and transparency

But the efficacy of even the most well-resourced and strategic use of Chinese social media platforms such as Weibo is ultimately limited by the party-state. On his second official visit to China in December 2017, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau sought to parlay his image as a ‘Weibo addict’ into a public diplomacy coup when he made his first stop a visit to Sina Weibo headquarters in Beijing.

Promotional material released before Trudeau’s visit to Weibo claimed the Q&A with the Canadian Prime Minister would be broadcast live, via video stream onto Weibo (Figure 16). But instead of seeing a live-stream of the proceedings, Weibo users at first saw only a delayed 36-second clip of the PM. It was only hours later that more of his appearance was made available.66 As the Canadian Government intended the event to be live-streamed, a reasonable conclusion is that the abrupt cancellation was due to Weibo censors.

Figure 26: A Sina Weibo poster advertising Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s video live-stream from Sina Weibo HQ. The poster refers to Trudeau as a ‘Weibo addict’.

Chinese officials, when questioned about the practice of censoring the comments section on foreign embassy Weibo accounts, pass the buck back to Sina Weibo. An exchange between a foreign journalist and an official at a recent Foreign Ministry press conference provides an illustrative example:

Q: Some Chinese investors were angry about the decline in the domestic stock market last week, and they used the US Embassy’s Weibo account to vent, posting comments to that account. On Saturday, we saw these comments have been blocked. Can you tell us your understanding as to what happened there? Does China see that the US is doing anything incorrect in this matter?

A: You might as well ask the US Embassy in China, whose staff is responsible for the maintenance of their own account.

Follow-up: It appears from our report that they did not take actions to block anything. That may have been the Weibo that blocked them.

A: I have not heard about what you mentioned. As I understand, you need to ask them if there are problems with their Weibo account. If the problem cannot be solved, they may contact relevant competent authorities. 67

Conclusion and policy recommendations

It’s estimated that Beijing spends US$10 billion a year on external propaganda, an order of magnitude higher than the US, which spent US$666 million on public diplomacy in 2014.68 Content from Chinese state media has featured in major Western outlets such as The Sydney Morning Herald, The Washington Post, the UK’s Daily Telegraph and Le Figaro as well as on the social media platforms Twitter and Facebook.

The reverse would be unthinkable in the PRC’s tightly controlled media environment. This is despite the fact that the PRC backed a landmark resolution in July 2012 at the UN Human Rights Council, which affirmed that ‘the same rights that people have offline must also be protected online, in particular freedom of expression, which is applicable regardless of frontiers and through any media of one’s choice.’69

Insisting that the PRC uphold the rights of its citizens to engage freely with the legitimate online public diplomacy efforts of foreign embassies isn’t a boutique concern. It’s a parallel issue to seeking reciprocity from the Chinese state for numerous other things, such as intellectual property regimes and market access. The PRC’s online censorship regime cloisters its netizens in an information environment that’s cut off from the rest of the world and primed with a nationalistic ideology. The more the Chinese party-state controls the media to promote its own narrative, the more it limits its own options for how it can resolve international conflicts.70

While CCP statements at the UN are reassuring, the trendlines for censorship in China are moving in the opposite direction. Under Xi’s rule, China has increasingly tightened its grip on the internet, concerned about the erosion of its ideology and policy by a vibrant online culture and the spectre of so-called ‘hostile foreign forces’. As this paper shows, Beijing’s censors aim to use almost imperceptible amounts of censorship to throttle discussion on Weibo that they deem falls outside the frame of discourse acceptable to the CCP party-state. For foreign governments, the temptation to self-censor is increasing.

Foreign governments should demand that Beijing refrain from censoring their legitimate and overt digital diplomacy efforts. Short of that, and probably more powerful for the netizen community, like-minded governments, in coordination with each other, should commit to publishing transparency reports, both to reveal the level of censorship that they’re receiving on Weibo and to demonstrate their commitment to presenting Western political norms and values to Chinese civil society. This can be very influential public diplomacy. It’s important that embassy Weibo accounts speak to China’s diverse netizen groups. Publishing a transparency report about CCP censorship will also inform those groups of their own government’s actions.

The continued meaningful presence of foreign embassy accounts—which occasionally speak outside the bounds of the CCP’s frame of acceptable discourse—will demonstrate those countries’ commitment to presenting Western political norms and values to Chinese civil society.

These accounts can also help reduce misunderstandings between foreign governments and the population of one of the world’s most powerful countries.
Changes need to be made to the way governments engage online in China. Those changes need to include preventive measures to stop governments falling into a cycle of self-censorship. This paper makes the following recommendations:

  1. Governments need to become more assertive and more creative in their messaging on Chinese social media platforms. Of course, some content should be tailored for local audiences. But foreign governments must ensure that they’re communicating the same policy and political messages to the Chinese public as they are to other publics around the world. They are likely to be censored for this.
  2. Foreign governments should use uncensored social media platforms such as Twitter—which, despite being blocked in China, still has an estimated 10 million active users in the country 71 — to cross-post all of their content. That way, incidences of censorship will be transparent and available to global audiences. Cross-posting content elsewhere also gives Chinese netizens an alternative avenue to access and engage with uncensored content. The US Embassy’s Twitter account—which as 738,000 followers—provides other countries with a good model.72
  3. When governments have their official content censored on Chinese online platforms, they should raise this censorship directly with their Chinese Government counterparts. Those countries 73 which allow the Chinese Communist Party an open media and cyber environment to communicate all of its official messages should request reciprocity.
  4. The Australian Government needs more avenues to engage the Chinese public and to put different messages forward. Dedicated official accounts for the positions of Prime Minister and Foreign Minister should be established immediately.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Amber Ziye Wang for her help researching this paper. He’d also like to thank Richard McGregor, Peter Cai and Alex Joske for their comments, which greatly improved the final product. He’s also immensely grateful to my colleagues at ASPI, Danielle Cave, Fergus Hanson and Michael Shoebridge, for their crucial assistance.


ASPI International Cyber Policy Centre

The ASPI International Cyber Policy Centre’s mission is to shape debate, policy and understanding on cyber issues, informed by original research and close consultation with government, business and civil society.

It seeks to improve debate, policy and understanding on cyber issues by:

  1. conducting applied, original empirical research
  2. linking government, business and civil society
  3. leading debates and influencing policy in Australia and the Asia–Pacific.

We thank all of those who contribute to the ICPC with their time, intellect and passion for the subject matter. The work of the ICPC would be impossible without the financial support of our various sponsors.

Important disclaimer

This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in relation to the subject matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering any form of professional or other advice or services. No person should rely on the contents of this publication without first obtaining advice from a qualified professional person.

© The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited 2018

This publication is subject to copyright. Except as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part of it may in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, microcopying, photocopying, recording or otherwise) be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted without prior written permission. Enquiries should be addressed to the publishers.

  1. Mareike Ohlberg, Boosting the party voice: China’s quest for global ideological dominance, Mercator Institute for China Studies, 2016, online. ↩︎
  2. Australian Government, 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, 2017, online. ↩︎
  3. Jon Russell, ‘Twitter estimates that it has 10 million users in China’, TechCrunch, 5 July 2016, online. ↩︎
  4. US Embassy, Weibo post, 7 May 2018, online. ↩︎
  5. Jiayun Feng, ‘US Embassy bashes Chinese “political correctness” on Weibo, sending the Chinese internet into a frenzy’, SupChina, 7 May 2018, online. ↩︎
  6. Hu Xijin (胡锡进), Weibo post, 7 May 2018. ↩︎
  7. Jiayun Feng, ‘US Embassy bashes Chinese “political correctness” on Weibo, sending the Chinese internet into a frenzy’. ↩︎
  8. Sidney Leng, Jane Li, ‘US, China in fresh row as Beijing tells foreign airlines they will be punished for failing to respect territorial claims, report says’ South China Morning Post, 7 May 2018, online. ↩︎
  9. Ying Jiang, ‘Weibo as a public diplomacy platform’, Social Media and e-Diplomacy in China, 10 August 2017, online. ↩︎

Australia’s management of strategic risk in the new era.

Australia’s strategic outlook is deteriorating and, for the first time since World War II, we face an increased prospect of threat from a major power.

This means that a major change in Australia’s approach to the management of strategic risk is needed.

Assessing the South China Sea award

The Philippines had a major, if unenforceable, win against China in the 12 July South China Sea Arbitration under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. But the implications go beyond the bilateral dispute between China and the Philippines and it carries great legal weight as an authoritative ruling by an international judicial body.

Bearing in mind that the award is legally binding only on the parties to the arbitration, there’s the question of what might this assertion mean for third countries who may opt to exercise navigational rights based on the Tribunal’s rulings on the status and maritime entitlements of features in the Spratlys.

The South China Sea award has produced a diverse range of opinions on ASPI’s blog The Strategist. This Strategic Insights assembles a selection of those articles.

Authors: Sam Bateman, Allan Behm, Anthony Bergin, Jay L Batongbacal, William Choong, Helen Clark, Malcolm Davis, Peter Jennings, Amelia Long, Donald Rothwell & Feng Zhang.

Chinese investment in the Port of Darwin: A strategic risk for Australia?

Few strategic issues have galvanised public attention in Australia as the decision by the Northern Territory Government to lease key facilities in the Port of Darwin to a Chinese company, Landbridge. This Strategic Insights brings together items published on our blog The Strategist as well as articles by ASPI staff published in other media outlets such as The Australian and The Australian Financial Review. The authors are Paul Barnes, Sam Bateman, Allan Behm, Phoebe Benich, Anthony Bergin, Patrick Cronin, Neil James, Peter Jennings, Geoff Wade, and Feng Zhang. Our aim is to bring this material into an accessible format, in part, to assist the deliberations of the Senate Economic References Committee which, over January and February 2016, is conducting an inquiry into the foreign investment review framework including with reference to the Port of Darwin lease.

The Port of Darwin lease highlights an urgent need to review how Australia takes account of its national security interests in making decisions about foreign investment.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: An Australian response

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is the first multinational security body outside the US orbit to emerge since the Cold War’s end. This Policy Analysis outlines the SCO’s origins and development, analyses the group’s internal dynamics and offers an Australian policy response.

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Great changes unseen in 100 years—but not the ones Xi is thinking of

In October 2017, Xi Jinping declared that the world is experiencing ‘great changes unseen in a hundred years’. He often uses this signature phrase, the century-ago events being the tumultuous ones at the end of World War I, which saw the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, the crumbling of European empires and the emergence of the United States as a great power, manifested through its decisive intervention in the war. In the century that followed, the US dominated the international system, defeating threats to its primacy from Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan and the Soviet Union.

For Xi, world history is currently undergoing a similarly momentous shift. As he sees it, the decline of the United States, its political ‘dysfunction’, the changing structure of world power and the rise of China are all irreversible and intertwined trends that can be explained by the laws of the Marxist theory of history.  His worldview is superbly analysed in Kevin Rudd’s new book, On Xi Jinping: How Xi’s Marxist nationalism is shaping China and the world, which should be read by specialists, the public and incoming Trump officials alike.

Xi believes that the tide of history is flowing in China’s direction and that a new world order can be fashioned with China at its centre, due to the ‘rise of the East, and the decline of the West’. This will be a new epoch. This is not to say that China will seek world domination as the Soviet Union did during the Cold War. Rather, it will seek to refashion globalisation and multilateralism such that they serve its interests and the interests of those who align themselves with China.

Xi is wrong. His theory of history is flawed. His thesis that the West is in decline is optimistic ideation, not informed analysis.  His ideological and analytical rigidity prevents him from seeing the trap that he is setting for China in relation to the economic underpinnings of its power.

China cannot prevail economically over the aggregate weight of the US, Europe, Japan, India, Britain, Australia, Canada, South Korea and others, if they work together. This will be especially so as they increasingly deflect the ongoing surge of heavily subsidised Chinese exports of manufactured goods, components and materials. Creating manufacturing overcapacity has been a deliberate strategy to concentrate industrial power in China.  It has stunted the development of a services-based economy in China, distorted global trade, hollowed out Western industrial bases and disrupted industrialisation of the Global South.

China’s hold on global manufacturing could be broken if US partners leverage Donald Trump’s proposed tariffs by imposing similar tariffs and other forms of market access restrictions and by countering Chinese subsidies, dumping and predatory pricing strategies. Trump’s tariffs will work best if they are coordinated with friends so China cannot circumvent them by flooding other markets. This will require enhancing supply chain tracking so that China can’t get around these trade shields through third-country workarounds.

Through a concerted strategy of industrial, investment and financial coordination, global trade could be re-balanced such that China could be economically pressured into divesting its overcapacity into the above-named countries. Some would also go to less developed countries, such as Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Argentina, Mexico and Turkey. By sitting on the runway of global manufacturing, China is blocking the development of such countries from taking off. The US could reshore higher value and nationally critical manufacturing while helping to spread lower value manufacturing across more economies.

The US and likeminded countries should also ensure that China does not get easy access to, or steal, the critical new technologies that will boost and sustain higher productivity, such as AI, robotics and quantum computing. US financial power, including the global status of the US dollar and US treasuries, further challenges China.

China’s internal situation is perilous, due to population decline, structural economic problems (such as its massive debt overhang and the stifling of the dynamism of its own private sector) and its dependence on imported energy, resources and food. China will more likely collapse than it will ascend to global primacy.

For the US, seeing off the China challenge, including by way of trade warfare, is a pre-requisite for greatness in the second American century.  If it can pull off such a strategy, it will re-industrialise its economy and reconfigure the structure of global trade so that others also benefit, at China’s expense.  There are great changes underway, unseen in a hundred years—but they are not the ones that Xi Jinping thinks are occurring.

Three concessions after three weeks: Prabowo leans China’s way

Indonesia’s new president, Prabowo Subianto, needed only three weeks in office to make three big concessions to China.

In a joint statement with President Xi Jinping in Beijing on 9 November, Prabowo acknowledged Chinese maritime claims that Indonesia had long rejected. Despite leading the most populous Muslim-majority country, he affirmed China’s right to deal with Xinjiang as it pleased. He also endorsed China’s vague vision of the geopolitical order, something that Indonesia has long been wary of.

Indonesia has long rejected China’s nearby territorial assertions in the South China Sea, arguing that they have no basis under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. A 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling against China, which declared its claims illegitimate, became the basis for Indonesia’s campaign against the nine-dash line.

That hasn’t deterred China. Rejecting the ruling, Beijing has persisted in seeking recognition of its claims, particularly from Southeast Asian nations. For years, Indonesia’s diplomats have challenged Beijing, but now the Prabowo-Xi joint statement has sparked fears that this may change.

It said the two nations had ‘reached important common understanding on joint development in areas of overlapping claims.’ The key point is that Indonesia thereby acknowledged China’s claim, giving them some legitimacy. The statement further mentioned an agreement to ‘establish an Inter-governmental Joint Steering Committee to explore and advance relevant cooperation’, indicating mutual interest in jointly exploiting resources in the sea.

The Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs later released a statement clarifying that Indonesia still did not recognise China’s nine-dash line. That won’t stop Beijing from using the joint statement as expressing Indonesia’s capitulation.

This has implications for Indonesia’s broader interests in the South China Sea disputes, including how Indonesia has framed itself as a non-claimant in the disputed waters.

As for Xinjiang, the joint statement affirmed it was an issue of ‘internal affairs of China’ and said that Indonesia ‘firmly supports China’s efforts to maintain development and stability in Xinjiang.’

While Indonesia has always recognised Beijing’s sovereignty over Xinjiang, the province has not previously been directly mentioned in a joint statement by the two countries. This contrasts with Jakarta’s solidarity with the Muslim world in opposing Israel’s war against Hamas in Gaza.

The joint statement seemed to present some new enthusiasm from Indonesia for China’s Global Security Initiative and Global Civilization Initiative, two of three major Chinese initiatives, the third being the Global Development Initiative, that present a Chinese vision of the international order. Indonesia has been willing to support the Global Development Initiative because of potential economic benefits. But it has been reluctant to endorse the other two initiatives due to their vagueness and a concern that doing so may undermine its non-aligned position in world affairs.

Overall, the joint statement reads as a turn towards China, particularly by diminishing the long-term efforts of Indonesian diplomats to preserve the sanctity of international maritime law. Not only does it harm Indonesia’s ability to counter to Chinese claims; it also affects the recently resolved maritime boundary dispute with Vietnam.

The shift is all the more demeaning for Indonesia because it closely followed a series of Chinese coast guard intrusions in late October, the same week Prabowo assumed the presidency.

It had always been apparent that the new Indonesian president, despite his strongman image and past criticism of his predecessor’s approach to the South China Sea, would deal with China cordially. Indonesia has security concerns about Chinese maritime claims, but Prabowo’s concessions was probably economically motivated. This motivation will continue to dominate, since Prabowo is aiming to achieve 8 percent annual economic growth. Indeed, the Beijing visit came with considerable pledges for economic cooperation on green energy and tech, amounting to US$10 billion.

But economic gain does not need to come at the cost of sovereignty. Past Indonesian administrations were able to get economic benefits from China and even the Soviet Union without sacrificing sovereignty.

The joint statement reflects poorly on Indonesia’s new non-career foreign minister, Sugiono. It was likely agreed upon without consulting senior foreign affairs officials. They have worked tirelessly to fight the proposition that China and Indonesia have overlapping claims in the South China Sea and to prevent Indonesia from embracing China’s vision of the international order and its narratives on Xinjiang. If they were consulted, then they were likely overruled.

These developments reflect the diminished role in foreign policymaking of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under Prabowo’s leadership—a risk that we have identified in the past. Traditionally, the ministry has acted as a check on the ability of any single president to unilaterally direct Indonesia’s foreign policy away from its principle of non-alignment.

With the foreign minister now seemingly an extension of Prabowo, but the foreign affairs ministry likely to keep defending long-standing positions, the country’s foreign policy may start to look inconsistent.

Downsides of China’s port investments go beyond immediate security risks

Chinese companies own or operate at least one port on every continent except Antarctica. These investments present more than immediate security concerns; they position China to fully exploit the economic potential of ports at the expense of other countries.

And with Chinese companies controlling development of a port, the government in Beijing can interfere in physical development of the facility, perhaps to ensure that navally useful infrastructure isn’t built.

The former and current Australian governments have been criticized for acquiescing in the Chinese company Landbridge owning a 99-year lease on Darwin Port, the commercial operation in Darwin Harbour. Criticism has focused on security concerns, such as the Chinese government possibly arranging to use the facility for military surveillance or for sabotaging it in times of tension.

But the ordinary civilian activity of a Chinese company controlling the development of ports can have negative consequences for the host nation and others. As is seen in many industries, one Chinese business will often prefer to work with another, with the result that China has maximum exposure to potential profits.

We saw a step towards this last month in relation to Darwin Port, the commercial operation in Darwin Harbour. As the ABC reported, Port of Darwin signed a memorandum with the Port of Shenzhen for ‘friendly cooperation’. The aim is to increase trade links between the ports, which would have to mean Chinese companies, such as shipping lines, deepening economic involvement in Darwin Port.

Situated in southern China, the Port of Shenzhen is one of the busiest and fastest-growing in the world.

Interestingly, this agreement was not announced in Australia, and after the ABC reported it there was no public discussion of new links to China by the commercial port in one of Australia’s most strategically important harbours.

The Council on Foreign Relations has been tracking China’s growing maritime influence through investments in strategic overseas ports and has reported that while China has limited overseas naval bases, it has emerged as a leading commercial power with considerable economic influence over international sea lanes and commercial ports. China’s shipping routes and service networks span major countries and regions worldwide, backed by 70 bilateral and regional shipping agreements with 66 nations.

In October 2023, the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet finalised a review into the circumstances of the Darwin Port lease, finding that a robust regulatory system would manage risks to critical infrastructure, that existing monitoring mechanisms were sufficient, and, as a result, that the government did not need to cancel or vary the lease.

But the review appears not to have addressed the problem that decisions about development of Darwin Port are now in non-Australian hands. In particular, Australia does not seem to have considered that the Chinese government now exerts influence over capital investment at Darwin Port.

Warships use civilian wharves and other port facilities as well as naval bases, especially during conflict, just as military aircraft can fly from civilian airfields. Some port facilities suit naval ships and their missions better than others.

The Chinese government can exert influence on a Chinese company operating abroad and even take coercive action against Australian companies, as experienced by the Lynas Corporation in Western Australia. If the Chinese armed forces take an interest in a foreign port’s capacity to support naval operations, they can certainly send a message to its Chinese owner about what improvements should not be made there, even profitable improvements.

The 2024 National Defence Strategy and associated spending plan, the Integrated Investment Program, did not expressly mention the Darwin Port, but the importance of logistics facilities in Darwin was implied by funding allocated for enhancing theatre logistics and improving fuel holdings, storage, and distribution in northern Australia.

As China continues to deepen its geoeconomic footprint, addressing the potential risks associated with foreign control over critical infrastructure becomes increasingly important. Transparent communication and proactive policy decisions are crucial to preventing national assets from becoming leverage points in broader regional power dynamics.

A task for Trump: stop China in the South China Sea

For more than a decade, China has been using an increasingly aggressive hybrid-warfare strategy to increase its power and influence in the strategically important South China Sea. Countering it will be one of the defining challenges for US president-elect Donald Trump’s incoming administration.

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Chinese dream of global preeminence depends significantly on achieving dominance in the South China Sea and ending America’s primacy in the Indo-Pacific region, an emerging global economic and geopolitical hub. And China has not hesitated to use coercive tactics in service of these objectives.

In recent years, boats belonging to countries whose territorial claims China disregards, such as the Philippines and Vietnam, have faced blockades, ramming, water-cannon attacks, and even bladed-weapon assaults by Chinese vessels. Offshore energy operations endure frequent harassment. Simply fishing in waters that China calls its own can expose a person to a Chinese attack with iron pipes. Such violent confrontations have heightened regional tensions and undermined stability in a crucial corridor linking the Pacific and Indian Ocean.

One might have expected the United States to take action to rein in China’s behavior, especially given its mutual defense treaty with the Philippines. And yet, three successive presidents—Barack Obama, Trump, and Joe Biden—have failed to offer anything beyond statements of support and symbolic action. In 2012, Obama allowed China’s brazen seizure of the disputed Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines to go unpunished.

This was hardly the first time the US had failed to live up to its defense commitments to the Philippines. In 1995, the Philippines requested US help to block Chinese forces from capturing Mischief Reef, just 129 nautical miles from the Philippine island of Palawan. US President Bill Clinton, smarting over the termination three years earlier of America’s right to maintain military bases in the Philippines, refused. Mischief Reef is now an important Chinese military base.

The more China has got away with, the bolder it has become. Following the capture of the Scarborough Shoal, Xi embarked on a land-reclamation frenzy, creating 1300 hectares of land in the South China Sea, including seven artificial islands that now serve as forward operating bases. China has built 27 military outposts on disputed islands, which now bristle with short-range missiles, reconnaissance gear, radar systems and laser and jamming equipment. Its larger islands also feature aircraft hangars, runways and deep-water harbors. By unilaterally redrawing South China Sea’s geopolitical map, China is ensuring that it is uniquely positioned to project power in the region.

Even as China has gradually eroded the Philippines’ security, including Philippine control of areas within its exclusive economic zone, the US has continued to underscore its ‘ironclad’ defense commitment to its ally. Late last year, the Biden administration affirmed that any armed third-party attack against the Philippine military, coast guard, aircraft or public vessels ‘anywhere in the South China Sea’ is covered by the US–Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty. Yet China remains unpunished—and undeterred.

What explains this yawning gap between rhetoric and action? First and foremost, the US fears escalation, especially when its resources and attention are being consumed by the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. Moreover, the US prefers not to weigh in on sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea, where it has no territorial claims of its own. It has not even taken a position on the sovereignty of the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands, which China also claims.

The US has, however, made clear that its security treaty with Japan covers those islands and cautioned against ‘any unilateral action that seeks to undermine Japan’s administration.’ It should do the same for the Philippines, stating unequivocally that its treaty commitment to the country covers any efforts to compel a change in areas currently under Philippine administrative control, including Second Thomas Shoal, which China has been attempting to besiege.

In support of this stance, the US could cite the 2016 ruling by an international arbitration tribunal that China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea have no legal basis and that Chinese actions within the Philippine exclusive economic zone violated the Philippines’ sovereignty. But China’s open contempt for that ruling should dispel any hope that the South China Sea’s future will be decided by international law, which is why the US must be prepared to back up such a statement with action.

If the US does stand up for its treaty ally, it can take advantage of the nine Philippine naval and air bases to which it has gained access within the last decade, two of which are located just across from Taiwan and southern China. If it does not, China will continue to solidify its dominance over the South China Sea, thereby cornering the region’s rich energy and fishery resources and gaining the ability to disrupt supply chains and punish countries for acts it deems unfriendly.

China will not stop at the South China Sea. Under Xi’s leadership, China has used a similar combination of deception, bullying, coercion and surprise to expand its territorial control elsewhere, from the East China Sea to the Himalayas, sparing not even the tiny country of Bhutan. As with any bully, the only way to stop China is to confront it with a credible challenger. The US must be that challenger, and it should start by defending the Philippines.

The push and pull of the India–Australia relationship

Australia’s new relationship with India has push-pull poles—the pull of the Indian diaspora in Australia and the push that China applies to the Indo-Pacific.

The diaspora is the personal dimension that pulls India and Australia together. China is the geopolitical push that shapes the four-year old India-Australia comprehensive strategic relationship.

Between the push-pull poles stretches the great pool of shared prosperity in trade and investment, education, science and technology, and clean energy.

This push, pull and prosperity defined much in Canberra’s India talkfest in Parliament House last week: the back-to-back meetings of the Australia-India Foreign Ministers’ Framework Dialogue and the second Raisina Down Under dialogue, a multilateral conference that aims to address geostrategic challenges in the Indo-Pacific. Here was first track and second track dialogue running so close as to overlap.

At the press conference after the foreign ministers’ dialogue, Australia’s Penny Wong said it was the 19th time she’d met her Indian counterpart, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar. When they came together on the Raisina stage the next day, Wong counted meeting number 20. She observed that among the world’s foreign ministers, ‘Jai is the person with whom I have met most and that says something about our friendship, it says something about my regard for him, and the wisdom and insight he always brings to our discussions.’

Personal chemistry always helps diplomacy, but interests drive. Interests have driven Australia and India to converge in this renewed relationship, far removed from their distant and often negative dealings in the 20th century and the early years of this century.

Wong said her constant contact with Jaishankar reflected the importance of what is being created: ‘We share a region and we share a future. We see India as just so important in terms of securing the region we both want and the world we both want.’

Wong said the diaspora of 1 million Australians with Indian heritage is ‘the beating heart of the relationship’. Jaishankar agreed that the diaspora is a key to the India-Australia bond, just as it is in India’s dealings with the United States: ‘The model is the manner in which our US relationship transformed. I do think it’s a change that can be corelated with the growth of the diaspora in the US.’

Jaishankar said the rapport with Australia showed ‘a relationship whose potential was waiting to be realised’. Among the four Quad members (Australia, India, Japan and the United States), he said, the bilateral dynamic that has changed the most for India is with Australia. ‘The relationship is on a roll,’ Jaishankar said, and ‘the more we do, the more the possibilities open up.’

India’s upbeat language on Australia contrasted the discussion about what China’s push is doing to the region.

The sharpest account offered to the Raisina dialogue was from Andrew Shearer, director-general of Australia’s Office of National Intelligence. Shearer said Prime Minister Anthony Albanese refers to him as the ‘bad news guy’, and he delivered such news. Geostrategic competition, Shearer said, would drive a ‘generational, structural contest in the Indo-Pacific’. Rivalry over critical technologies would be the ‘centre of gravity’ or ‘commanding heights’. Looking at China, Russia, Iran and North Korea, Shearer offered a ‘very strong view that we have underestimated the strategic impact of this emerging axis’.

Jaishankar’s language on China was that of a minister looking to ‘find ways to discuss how to normalise the relationship’. Since the deadly clash between Indian and Chinese troops on the Himalayan border in 2020, he said, the relationship had been ‘cut back’ and ‘very profoundly affected.’

On 21 October, India announced an agreement with China on ‘disengagement and resolution’ of border issues. A few days later, China’s Xi Jinping and India’s Narendra Modi sealed the deal with a handshake on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Russia, the first formal bilateral between the two leaders in five years.

In Canberra, Jaishankar observed that the deal with China is a ‘positive development’. The next challenge, he said, was de-escalation of forces, with more negotiation by foreign ministers and national security advisors. At the Raisina dialogue, Jaishankar put the border issue into its broadest context: ‘It’s really in a way quite a challenge, because you have the two most populous countries, both of whom are rising in a broadly parallel time frame.’

With an eye on Donald Trump resuming the presidency in January, the Canberra talks emphasised what Wong called ‘the great importance in the Quad’.

Jaishankar said India had seen steady progress in its relationship with the US over the last five presidencies, including the previous Trump presidency. The second version of the Quad had been under Trump in 2017, Jaishankar said, and that should help its prospects with the new administration. India is confident, and Jaishankar said that its ‘relationship with the United States will only grow’.

In dealing with the Indo-Pacific impacts of the first Trump presidency, Australia did much in tandem with Japan. Canberra will again work with Tokyo, but this time New Delhi will add a new dimension to the Trump wrangling and whispering.

International trade is dividing between blocs. Australia could be in the middle

Australia risks being caught in no man’s land as the world divides into rival economic blocs in what the International Monetary Fund describes as a new cold war.

Trade has been falling everywhere since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but it has been falling twice as fast between the blocs of nations centred on the United States and China as it has between nations within those blocs.

The IMF’s latest World Economic Outlook shows that trade between the rival blocs of nations is falling faster than was the case between the US and Soviet blocs in the late 1940s.

The US presidential election victory of Donald Trump, who has vowed to impose steep increases in tariffs on China and its proxies, will deepen the cleavage in both global trade and foreign direct investment.

IMF Deputy Managing Director Gita Gopinath has warned, ‘Policymakers need to get ready to navigate a more volatile world whose key features are increasingly being shaped by fragmentation and conflict.’

Australia’s political leaders, like most of their regional counterparts, reject the notion that they face a choice between the two superpowers and instead emphasise opportunities that await in commerce with counterparts across the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

However, Australia’s dependence on China as its principal market and supplier is both an economic and geopolitical fact.

The tension in Australia’s position is shown by the different attitudes towards trade, where the government has sought to rebuild Chinese exports, and foreign investment, where national security concerns are now paramount.

Where Australia sits in a division of the world between rival blocs is not clear. An IMF analysis of the impact of global fragmentation on commodity markets earlier this year assigned Australia to the ‘China-Russia’ bloc, rather than the ‘US-Europe’ bloc.

The IMF estimates that trade between blocs aligned with either the United States and China has fallen 5 percent since 2022, or twice the 2.5 percent decline of trade among nations within those blocs.  A similar dynamic is evident in foreign direct investment.

US and Chinese companies have been shifting supply chains away from each other.  One result has been a surge in the trade of what the IMF terms ‘connector countries’ such as Vietnam and Mexico. Trump has said he will impose punitive tariffs on imports that attempt to evade his restrictions on China by being routed through third countries.

A study by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, exploring the impact of a hypothetical 10 percent fall in trade between advanced and emerging nations, found that Australia and South Korea would be the most severely affected, facing falls in GDP as much as 1.4 percent.

It is not simply a matter of geopolitical forces upsetting otherwise mutually profitable trading arrangements. Depending on other nations for traded goods and services can carry intrinsic geopolitical implications. The OECD comments:

Up until recently, interdependence was generally seen in a positive light, principally involving mutually beneficial commercial exchanges, allowing better specialisation and bringing higher productivity and access to a wider pool of capabilities and ideas. However, recent global events disrupting international markets and supply chains have increased concerns about the supply chain resilience and the risks that might be transmitted through international trade linkages.

Global production of products has become increasingly concentrated, and it tends to be increasingly clustered around some countries and regions, notably China and Asia. This is not only due to natural or organic economic factors, such as natural endowments, comparative advantage, economies of scale, or global value chain fragmentation, but also policies.

There is a growing interest in identifying commercial links that could cause high economic or societal damage in case of unexpected disruptions, or those that could be used as a tool of coercion or might create national security risks or weigh on countries’ sovereignty.

Countries are dependent on a trading partner when it accounts for a large share of exports or imports of a particular product or service and there are few alternative suppliers or markets.

When China blocked Australian coal imports, mining companies could divert their exports to other markets. But there was no such remedy for lobster producers, because China accounted for 90 percent of Australia’s exports and a large share of global imports.

The OECD says that many products that appear on lists of ‘critical’ or ‘strategic’ goods are not particularly concentrated. Strategic sectors where OECD countries do have high dependence on China include manufacturing refractory and ceramic products, tools for cutting stone (essential for quarries), pharmaceuticals, lifting and handling equipment and electronic components.

An important conclusion from the OECD study is that China is much more dependent on advanced countries than vice versa. ‘Trade dependencies of OECD economies on China also need to be put in the context of China’s dependencies on OECD economies, which appear even larger.’

While the tensions may become more acute, both US and Chinese blocs retain strong vested interests in each other.

Trump vs China, round two

In August 2019, amid an escalating trade war with China, then-US president Donald Trump fired off a series of tweets directing US companies to ‘immediately start looking for … alternative[s] to China’ and shift their manufacturing back to the United States. The demand sent stock markets into a tailspin and alarmed US businesses with exposure to China.

While Trump ultimately softened his stance, the threat underscored a disturbing reality that the world must face now that he is returning to the White House: the president has the power to sever ties with the world’s second-largest economy and can do so on a whim.

With Trump’s resounding victory over Kamala Harris, the spectre of his impulsive, heavy-handed approach to diplomacy looms large. If his past actions are any indication, corporate America might soon be bracing for another round of erratic, high-stakes manoeuvres—or worse—against China.

The US constitution delegates authority over foreign relations to both the president and congress, a structure designed to temper executive discretion with legislative oversight. But this balance has shifted dramatically in recent decades. Foreign policy is now overwhelmingly concentrated in the executive branch and goes largely unchecked, a trend that political scientists attribute to a rise in partisanship and a decline in congressional expertise. With both parties favouring a hardline approach toward China, Trump will have even more freedom to lash out at the country.

Meanwhile, national security has proven to be remarkably pliable, extending far beyond traditional concerns such as homeland defense and cybersecurity. It now covers everything from cross-border data flows and supply chain vulnerabilities to protecting industries deemed too critical to be dominated by foreign competitors.

This broadened definition has enabled presidential actions that would have been unimaginable only a decade ago. Consider some of the measures taken by Trump and his successor, Joe Biden: sanctioning Huawei and ZTE; banning TikTok; blocking Chinese investment in a dating app; launching the controversial China Initiative, which disproportionately targeted Chinese scientists working in the US; imposing a semiconductor embargo on China; restricting US investment in Chinese artificial intelligence and quantum computers; and, most recently, slapping 100 percent tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles and batteries.

Many of these aggressive policies should be implemented only in emergencies. But what constitutes an emergency has also expanded considerably and now includes curbing China’s rise. And when Trump takes office in 2025, the executive branch’s capacity and willingness to declare an emergency and impose extraordinary measures under the banner of national security could increase substantially.

While US courts have the authority to check presidential powers—as they did in blocking Trump’s attempts to ban TikTok and WeChat—they have limited oversight of foreign policy. On matters of national security in particular, federal courts have historically been very deferential—even more so when congress and the president are aligned. The recent passage of the TikTok legislation illustrates how congress can quickly restore executive power after a judicial ruling constrains it. As a result, TikTok and other Chinese companies are constantly contending with renewed hostility from the executive, like an endless game of whac-a-mole.

Ironically, this concentration of power in the US presidency mirrors the Chinese governance model that US leaders criticise so sharply. As I show in my book, High Wire: How China regulates Big Tech and governs its economy, the consolidation of political power in China over the past decade has often led to dramatic policy swings that undermine investor confidence and dampen entrepreneurship. The Chinese government’s recent missteps—from mismanaging the Covid-19 pandemic to crackdowns on the tech and property sectors and now a sluggish response to mounting deflation risks—should serve as a cautionary tale.

The US is likewise beginning to feel the unintended consequences of its own hostile approach toward China. The China Initiative has led to an exodus of talented Chinese scientists, many of whom have returned home. Meanwhile, the effectiveness of tough US sanctions and export controls is waning. Huawei, which initially struggled under these measures, has grown stronger of late, invigorated by state support and a firm resolve to achieve self-sufficiency. In its efforts to contain China, the US risks creating a more resilient rival—one strengthened by the very pressures meant to suppress it.

But instead of reassessing the efficacy of its hardline tactics, US agencies are doubling down on sanctions and restrictions. Even the notorious China Initiative, despite being ‘discontinued’, persists in a barely concealed form.

So far, much of the discussion about the Sino-American rivalry has framed China’s rise as the primary catalyst for US policy shifts. But this misses a crucial point: the conflict can also be traced back to a democratic deficit in US foreign policymaking. If the US takes increasingly extreme measures to contain China, as it likely will during Trump’s second administration, it risks widening that deficit—and becoming defined by what it opposes.

Hardly an inducement: tourism from China gets up Palau’s nose

China might want to think again about its use of tourism as a means of influencing Palau. The people of the little Western Pacific country believe they’d be better off without swarms of tourists from China on their islands, causing environmental damage and spending their money mostly with Chinese businesses.

Other ill-effects include upward pressure on prices and the locking up of land in China-linked real estate investments, Palauan officials and people involved in tourism said in interviews.

In a leaked letter this year, the president of the country of 18,000 people, Surangel Whipps Jr, told an unidentified US senator that China had offered to ‘fill every hotel room’ and build as many more as Palau wanted.

To Palauans, that sounds more like a threat than a promise. A senior official sums up the general assessment of tourism from China: ‘The negative impacts [are] more than the value of the tourism itself.’

China has already put Palau through a cycle of what it thought was economic inducement and punishment. Last decade, it ramped up tourism numbers to the country but then knocked them down again by revoking Palau’s status as an approved destination, punishing it for continued diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. Arrivals from China peaked at 90,000 in 2015 and slumped to 28,000 in 2019, before the Covid-19 pandemic crushed tourism globally.

Now tourism from China is rising again: 8000 visitors from the country arrived in the five months to May.

There is a sense in Palau that it is just the beginning of resurgence. Businesses and investors connected with China have begun refurbishing Chinese restaurants and hotels in anticipation of a new surge in visitors. In what looked like a deliberate reminder of China’s economic importance ahead of Palauan general elections on 5 November, direct flights from Hong Kong resumed just five weeks ago.

When Americans, Australians and people from most other countries travel to Palau, they stay in Palauan-owned hotels, eat at Palauan restaurants, hire Palauan tour guides and contribute to the Palauan economy.

When tourists from China come, ‘they have these charter flights coming in, where a Chinese company owns a hotel in Palau, owns a tour company in Palau, owns the airplane that’s bringing them into Palau, so all this money that is being made from these tours is not trickling down to the local economy,’ says a former Palauan tour guide who, like other people interviewed for this report, asked not to be named.

One of the interviewees adds, ‘Chinese tour companies bought out entire hotels,’ leading managers to cancel reservations for other tourists. That ‘destroyed the market overnight’ for tourism from elsewhere.

This person also says that when tourists began arriving last decade, Chinese companies began acquiring long leases on prime real estate. (Foreigners can’t buy land outright.)

The senior Palauan official says, ‘One of their methods is they’ll lease property for 99 years and they don’t do anything to it, so they’re basically stalling development for Palau. That’s one of their tactics’ to gain economic and political influence. The result is diminished opportunity for locals to build businesses on suitable land.

Palauans have seen tourism drive inflation and expect that a renewed surge in arrivals from China will do the same again. ‘This kind of mass tourism will tend to push up the price of mass produce and local resources…,’ says the senior official. The price of giant coconut crabs, for example, was US$7 per pound before last decade’s tourism surge, the official says. Now it is US$60 per pound.

While tourists from any country will always include some who care little for protecting the natural environment, Palauans have found that the problem is unusually serious with groups from China.

The former tour guide recalls damage that tourists from China caused to one beautiful attraction, Jellyfish Lake. Some stole protected jellyfish from the lake to eat in their hotel rooms, using drawers as cutting boards. Hotels were forced to replace furniture and remove utensils that could be used for cooking.

Palauans often hear of tourists from China stealing animals from native habitats and bribing guides to look the other way. One interviewee describes instances of people from China taking giant clams for consumption directly from a reef. Another says tourists paid fishermen to bring them turtles, clams, shark fins and even dugongs, all of which are protected.

Then there’s infrastructure and business disruption. During the initial surge ‘they [came] in such big numbers, it overwhelms our sewer systems,’ the former tour guide said. ‘It overwhelms our stores. It overwhelms our tour services.’

Palau’s government has been trying hard to diversify tourism sources. Two weeks ago, Palau signed a deal with Japan for direct flights from Tokyo in 2025. Three days later, Australian airline Qantas agreed to take over direct flights from Brisbane from Air Nauru, aiming to increase frequency.

Palau’s people will welcome that.

Beijing has presumably imagined they would instead welcome another wave of tourism from China. But the behaviour of many of its tourists, the disruption caused by their arrival surges, and the cornering of their spending by operators and hotels connected to China—all these have only helped to galvanise Palauans against Beijing.

Don’t give a free pass to Beijing for its aggressive behaviour

The whole point of the post-World War II system of international rules and norms was that large countries, great powers, could not just do whatever they wanted.

The post-War order is meant to provide a check on the untrammelled power of the powerful, whether through military invasions or more subtle ways of bending the will of other countries—methods such as interference, coercion and malicious cyber intrusions.

Yet when asked recently how Australia would address China’s influence in the Pacific, Foreign Minister Penny Wong said, ‘China’s doing what great powers do, and great powers try to lift their influence and expand their influence in the region that they wish.’

To be sure, foreign policy is tough. Every country in the region and many beyond it are trying to navigate this most tricky of relationships—a great power flexing its muscle aggressively but with whom we are all deeply economically entwined. Yet that does not mean we should minimise or excuse China’s behaviour when it bulldozes rules and norms so carefully established to maintain stability and security.

This is not a case of picking one’s battles. China is waging its hybrid warfare on all fronts and setting precedents through our silence—Beijing’s overreaction to a statement on human rights by an Australian official in the UN in the past fortnight shows that Beijing hasn’t budged an inch in the past two years.

It is a calculated strategy to make Australia pull any punches at a higher level on something like human rights abuses in Xinjiang. This isn’t stabilisation—it’s Beijing saying that Australia will toe the line or else.

By limiting all but the most unavoidable criticisms of China to statements delivered by officials rather than ministers, Australia has been offering Beijing a compromise. Instead of taking that as a win, China continues to bite back hard. Fortunately this should serve only to highlight that no such compromises should be made.

The type of influence China exercises is not something we can accept as simply ‘what great powers do’. It launched a cyber attack on the Pacific Islands Forum, spreads online disinformation in the Pacific to undermine democracies and weaken Pacific partnerships, sought security agreements that lack public transparency, and undertaken various other malicious activities—such as hybrid and grey zone operations.

And that’s just in the Pacific—China is carrying out this malicious activity globally, not to mention being the main supporter enabling Russia’s war on Ukraine.

Of course, other significant powers seek influence, but responsible nations don’t behave like this. The United States for instance, as the longstanding international superpower, has built enormous global influence. But—notwithstanding its share of mistakes—it has done so overwhelmingly by cultivating alliances and genuine partnerships based on shared values and a common desire to improve conditions in the world and to the benefit of the citizens of their partner nations.

Think about it: the US has dozens of genuine friends around the world. China doesn’t have friends; it has subordinates, captive debtors, vassals.

We should remember that the trend in international politics has been to curb the kind of crass and predatory political behaviour we see from Beijing. Until about a century back, colonialism and conquests of other states were considered normal. But ideas of what constitutes acceptable international behaviour have changed dramatically, as seen through the development of international institutions, laws and norms. They don’t always work, but the international community should strive to do better, not revert to letting great powers engage in behaviour reminiscent of an earlier age.

The climate of peace and commerce that has resulted from multinational cooperation has benefited few countries as much as China with its stellar growth over recent decades. There have been continuous efforts in recent times by Indo-Pacific powers to strengthen the rules-based order and prevent it from eroding, including through the use of international law to adjudicate disputes, as the Philippines did in 2016 when it used international arbitration to resolve its dispute with China—which Beijing went on to ignore.

China’s behaviour has been completely at odds to this trend. Its worldview is based on dividing the international community into big and small powers—in which small powers should know their place in the international hierarchy. This world view does not permit peaceful settlement of disputes. Instead, the strong push their way through. Such a view should be opposed and called out, not rationalised.

Wong went on to say that the Pacific is now the field for a ‘permanent contest’. That much is true, but we cannot regard it through a false equivalence. The work that Australia does as a partner of choice, and the support we get from friends including the US, are worlds apart from the malign influence that China seeks to wield.

It is possible that at some stage, China will become so strong, and the relative balance of power so skewed, that others will not be able to push back. At that stage, countries in the region would have to find some other modus vivendi with China. But as long as they are able to, it is perfectly natural for them to push back.

Indeed, what would be unnatural would be for countries in the region to simply throw up their hands and accept Chinese hegemony. In international politics, aggressive behaviour must be countered, not explained away.

Trick or treat? China comes a-knocking at Indonesia’s front door

China is testing Prabowo Subianto’s new administration, with three successive incursions by China Coast Guard vessels into Indonesia’s exclusive maritime jurisdiction—the first occurring on the new president’s inaugural day in office.

Jakarta urgently needs to recalibrate its South China Sea diplomacy and to revisit its basic assumptions about China. China’s move south should also be a wake-up call to Canberra that its pursuit of supposed bilateral ‘stabilisation’ with Beijing is irrelevant to China’s strategic intentions.

These incursions are more than a test of Prabowo’s mettle. They are hard evidence that the economics-first, neutrality-based approach of Prabowo’s predecessor, Joko Widodo, fundamentally failed to temper China’s maritime expansionism in the southernmost reaches of the South China Sea. China is making it crystal clear to Prabowo that it still claims ownership over all waters and seabed resources within the dashed-line claim, including part of Indonesia’s continental shelf and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) around the Natuna Islands.

This is despite Jakarta’s longstanding official position that it has no jurisdictional dispute with China, given the legally baseless nature of the Chinese ambit claim. However, under Prabowo, Indonesia’s maritime authorities appear to be implementing greater transparency about China’s activities near the Natuna Islands, quickly releasing video and audio of the Chinese Coast Guard’s challenges to Indonesian vessels in the area.

If Jakarta thought it had obtained a diplomatic modus vivendi with Beijing despite their differences in the South China Sea, China’s leadership clearly has other ideas. One prominent Indonesian analyst has argued that Philippines-China relations deteriorated because Manila’s diplomacy was out of kilter with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) holistic and non-confrontational approach towards Beijing. In fact, China’s incursions near the Natuna Islands should prompt Jakarta to question its own diplomatic settings towards China, ASEAN and the South China Sea. By failing to support the Philippines diplomatically, the previous Indonesian administration only emboldened China’s divide-and-conquer tactics, now seen on Indonesia’s maritime doorstep.

Under Widodo, Jakarta prioritised economic benefits in its relations with Beijing, contributing to China becoming Indonesia’s largest source of inward investment. Indonesia remained party to the intractable negotiations between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations for a code of conduct in the South China Sea. But it did not invest real energy behind the effort, with the result that the process has drifted aimlessly from one ASEAN chairmanship to another, weakening the organisation’s collective resolve.

Indonesia must now belatedly put its full weight behind those negotiations, either to secure a meaningful outcome or terminate the talks if Beijing continues to stall. Jakarta should meanwhile muster diplomatic support within Southeast Asia for the Philippines, a fellow ASEAN founder member facing a clear external threat, as Indonesia did for Thailand in the 1980s. Southeast Asia’s collective security must come ahead of any single member’s economic benefit, in conformity with ASEAN’s foundational spirit and diplomatic purpose.

China has unfortunately received the message that Southeast Asia can easily be splintered by working bilaterally and exploiting its greater leverage relative to any one of the countries. Malaysia’s supplicatory position towards China under Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has only fanned Beijing’s confidence that it can divide-and-rule ASEAN with ease.

One of China’s follow-up objectives is to persuade Indonesia that it should ‘properly handle maritime issues’, contingent on broader factors in their relationship. Jakarta should be alert to China’s bad-faith intentions, including offers of dialogue, and double down instead on the code-of-conduct negotiations. In doing so, it would return to its traditional leading-from-behind role within ASEAN.

Indonesia must vocally support the Philippines and Vietnam whenever they face Chinese aggression in the South China Sea. Jakarta should prioritise efforts to reach an EEZ boundary agreement with Vietnam, building on Indonesia’s successful maritime boundary delimitation with the Philippines. This will make it harder for Beijing to exploit differences among the Southeast Asian littoral states. Prabowo’s decision to send military assets to assist the Philippines as part of a four-nation ASEAN disaster relief mission was a commendable signal of solidarity and good will.

China may justifiably feel that Southeast Asia is tipping its way overall, and that the Philippines appears isolated within ASEAN. But poking Indonesia is never an advisable strategy. By overbearingly doing so, China reveals its hubris.

Prabowo may be a mercurial figure, but he’s unlikely to be a pushover. An axis of cooperation among Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam could still obstruct Beijing’s path towards dominance in the South China Sea. But Jakarta must draw its own clear-eyed conclusions about China’s strategic intent from first principles.

Australia should take note. Beijing’s direct challenge to Indonesia’s maritime sovereign rights, despite years of favourable treatment by Widodo, calls into question the meaning of what Canberra is calling ‘stabilisation’ with China.

Beijing’s strategic behaviour continues to be deeply inimical to Australia’s security within the immediate region. China is steadily marching south, while Australia’s government seemingly obsesses over lobsters and wine exports.

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