Tag Archive for: China

Abandonment, entrapment, and the future of US conventional extended deterrence in East Asia (part I)

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In a recent contribution to The Strategist, Rod Lyon argues convincingly that Australia needs to engage its US ally over the future credibility of its nuclear extended deterrence posture in Asia. It doesn’t stop there. Indeed, the current stand-off between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands is a timely reminder that US conventional extended deterrence also needs refinement, particularly in East Asia.

Traditionally, US conventional deterrence for its East Asian allies has relied on ‘direct defence’, i.e. deterrence by denial through the unmatched ability to defeat any conventional attack against its forward deployed forces and/or allied territory. Up to now that’s been a credible strategy. But today China has embarked on a long-term trajectory to contest US naval supremacy in the ‘first island chain’, which includes Taiwan and parts of the seas surrounding Japan. While the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) still has lots of catching up to do, the gap is slowly closing. Already, American fixed targets (bases) in Japan and South Korea are in striking range of China’s growing missile arsenals. The PLA is also developing systems to pose a threat to high-value moving targets (US carrier strike groups). The aim is to make it too costly for the United States to intervene in a future regional crisis between China and its neighbours.

This development has important ramifications for the American deterrent posture. Read more

The dragon in our backyard: the strategic consequences of China’s increased presence in the South Pacific

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US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton’s decision to attend the Pacific Islands Forum meeting in the Cook Islands this week signals the growing strategic importance of the South Pacific. Clinton’s attendance may also be a response to China’s increasing presence in the region. The consequences of China’s advance in our immediate neighbourhood are most significant for Australia, which is facing a situation where it may, for the first time in more than 70 years, find itself with a power with interests not necessary aligned to its own in its backyard.

China has been active in the South Pacific for four decades, mostly driven by its competition with Taiwan for diplomatic recognition. Although a truce (of sorts) has held for the last few years, China and Taiwan have engaged in ‘chequebook diplomacy’ to win the favour of South Pacific states. While this competition remains important, China now appears to have strategic interests in demonstrating its ability to project global power via its increasing influence in the region. And, regardless of their small size, each independent South Pacific state has a vote in international organisations, which China can seek to persuade them to use in pursuit of its interests.

China’s efforts to penetrate the South Pacific were given a boost after Australia and New Zealand’s attempt to isolate the Fijian regime after the 2006 coup. The Fijian regime responded by adopting an explicit ‘look north’ policy and sought a closer relationship with China, which other regional states have followed. After Australia and New Zealand supported Fiji’s suspension from the Pacific Islands Forum, the Fijian regime focused its attention on the Melanesian Spearhead Group, from which Australia and New Zealand are excluded. China seized this opportunity to gain influence, sponsoring the creation of the Group’s Secretariat, and building its headquarters in Vanuatu. Read more

To shun or to embrace? Australia–US relations and China’s rise (part II)

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Minister Smith and General LiangIn my first post, I argued while there are very good historical reasons Australia should stay close to the United States, there are a number of factors for Defence White Paper writers to consider. Here, I’ll tease out those factors Australia should take into account in deciding whether to further embrace or to shun additional US overtures for security engagement in an attempt to placate a rising China.

Firstly, China has some valid strategic concerns. It has resource insecurity and needs to import masses of energy and raw materials to sustain its economy. It also needs to keep open its sea lines of communication. This makes it vulnerable to competing pressures—not unlike the way Japan was vulnerable to American embargoes in the early 1940s. It isn’t unreasonable that China would want to have a greater sense of security and a confidence that it wouldn’t be subject to blackmail on the open seas.

China also has some understandable historical grudges. In considering the Opium Wars of the 19th century, we look back in horror at what the West, particularly Britain, was prepared to do to China to get its economic way there. Then, in the first half of the 20th century, what Japan did to China was also horrific. As a result of these legitimate long-held-grievances we’re looking collectively to China to not take it out on us. The concern is that, in light of its memories and longer term view, China might not have the appetite for a polite and restrained accommodation with its neighbours as its power grows and its military capabilities are enhanced. Recent events at the ASEAN meetings in Cambodia and at sea (at the Senkaku Islands, Scarborough Shoals and Paracel Islands, as well as the incident involving the USNS Impeccable in 2009), coupled with China’s aggressive cyber posture, reinforce this concern. Read more

To shun or to embrace? Australia–US relations and China’s rise (part I)

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There’s a conundrum facing the writers of the Defence White Paper 2013. On one hand, Australia’s geography places it at the southern end of East Asia and its economy places it in a strong trading relationship with the North East Asian economies, particularly China. These factors have seen Australia become increasingly linked to the region. On the other hand, Australia’s cultural predisposition and security ties are Western orientated, particularly to the United States. The question to be asked, therefore, is: are Australia’s national interests best served by pressing into the United States or by pulling away to accommodate China’s rise? This two-part post seeks to address this question.

Australia has been living for almost seventy years under the Pax Americana—that is, the rules based order that the United States sponsored after World War II. The United States sponsored the IMF, World Bank, United Nations and a global order from which many have benefitted immensely.

There is also a strong predisposition in Australia towards the United States. The very idea of ‘America’ has always been attractive to many Australians ever since the Great White Fleet visited in 1907. The idea of a liberal, democratic, free-market and rules-based order is what the United States has seemed to epitomise. America is a remarkable country and it is one that is easy to criticise, and it is often in the breach of the rules that we consider its actions. Americans themselves are very critical of their failings and readily point them out to each other and to the world. But it is hard to imagine any country, with all its failings, having a more positive influence on world order than the United States. Read more