I explained yesterday how the Chinese have thoroughly digested the Anglosphere’s Rules of the Road, and have steered themselves to prosperity in the process. The Anglosphere Ways of War are equally well understood. Indeed, China is embracing one of the central laws of the Elders of Greenwich: the top dog has to put to sea. The British adopted the naval strategy pioneered by the Dutch and then sailed out to build a global empire. The US took over the sea strategy and still presides as the maritime mega-power. If the Obama pivot is to mean anything long term in Asia, it will be based on the US delivering as the off-shore naval balancer in the region, in the same way as the Britain did for Europe.

Mead argues that the emergence of a multipolar international system in Asia is an extraordinary opportunity for the US and its maritime system:

The interests of the key Asian powers appear to be aligned with those of the US and of the liberal capitalist order; American interests are never more secure than when multiple pillars support the system… The offshore balancing power that is interested in an open global trading system poses less threat and offers more opportunity to more partners than traditional land powers can usually match. Read more

The Japanese government released its annual Defense White Paper (DWP) on Tuesday. In comparison with last year’s version it displays a harsher attitude towards China, indicating that Japan’s defence policy could shift further in coming years. Some shifts are already underway, such as increasing the Self-Defense Force’s (SDF) amphibious capability to defend its offshore islands in the face of China’s increased maritime assertiveness.

Japan’s 2013 assessment of its strategic environment is pessimistic. While the previous version ‘observed’ security developments such as China’s ongoing military modernisation, the 2013 DWP starts by stating that ‘Japan’s security environment is encompassed by…destabilizing factors, some of which are becoming increasingly tangible, acute and serious.’ Unlike last year, the document also contains a subchapter on the ‘Security Environment in the Vicinity of Japan’; demonstrating Japan’s growing concerns about direct threats to its national territory and integrity. Apart from North Korea’s and (to a lesser extent) Russia’s strategic behaviour, the chapter is particularly strong on China as a security threat. It notes that ‘in the waters and airspace around Japan, [China] has engaged in dangerous acts that could give rise to a contingency situation, such as Chinese vessel’s direction of its fire-control radar at a JMSDF destroyer.’ It goes on to argue that ‘[c]oupled with the lack of transparency in its military and security affairs these moves are a matter of concern for Japan.’ Read more

It’s no secret that in the early days of the US pivot’s announcement, there was a split between Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa’s initial caution about US troop presence in Darwin and the President’s more measured response. With more of the pivot revealed since late 2011, it’s worth looking at how Indonesia’s reaction towards it has crystallised—not just towards the military dimension of the pivot but also other elements relating to multilateral engagement, economics and trade, and democracy.

Indonesia continues to be uncertain about what the military elements of the pivot mean for its security. In one sense, there are more opportunities for defence cooperation with both the US and Australia, including military education exchange programs and joint exercises. However, there still remains some hesitation about the presence of Marines close to Indonesia’s shores. As noted by Vice Presidential advisor Dewi Fortuna Anwar, historical suspicions about US interference in Indonesia continue to cast the deployment to Darwin in a negative light.

Yet the more pressing strategic point for Indonesia is the effect of the military rebalance on China. If it was to result in strategic escalation between the US and China and a destabilisation of the region, that wouldn’t be in Indonesia’s interest. Indonesia isn’t a claimant to territories in the South China Sea, although there’s an overlap between the Indonesian claims for the EEZ around the Natuna Islands and China’s maritime claims. As a result, it’s watching with interest the outcomes of China’s interactions with other ASEAN states. As Columbia University’s Ann Marie Murphy pointed out at last week’s ANU–CSIS Jakarta–Weatherhead East Asia Institute conference in Jakarta, ‘Intersections of Power, Politics and Conflict in Asia’, the Philippines effectively lost the Scarborough Shoal after its confrontation with China in December. While the Philippines had hoped the US would come to its aid under the Mutual Defense Treaty, a deal was brokered instead that resulted in Philippines Navy withdrawing but China occupying the area. Indonesia has fewer options to invoke US assistance than the Philippines, and with a navy in dire need of an upgrade, it’s in its interests to keep military confrontations in the region to a minimum. Read more

As the curtain comes down on this series of posts surveying the Asian strategic landscape, the final scene sets us up a lot more drama to come. Southeast Asia’s great fear is that it faces much more of the same pain in the future as it has had for the last five years from China over the South China Sea. ASEAN would love to get the offer Beijing is making Washington of a new strategic relationship. But in view for ASEAN, unfortunately, is the same-old-same-old, applied with renewed vigour by the new leadership team in China.

Indeed, if the legal challenge the Philippines is mounting to China’s territorial claims goes well for Manila, ASEAN might face an even more excruciating version of what it has suffered in the past couple of years. In that case the recent status quo might look more like a plateau of pain that’s about to be surpassed by even more pain. Read more

If Australia’s 2009 Defence White Paper was a red rag to China, then the 2013 White Paper looks more like the white flag of surrender. Trust a journalist to thrust that wonderful juxtaposition of colour and contrasting choice at the Defence Minister, Stephen Smith. Take a bow William Choong, formerly hacking for The Straits Times, now wonking for IISS.

The only other question at Shangri La that came close was the Reuters hack who asked the US Defense Secretary, ‘Does North Korea have a right to exist’? If only Asia’s leaders could come up with answers as sharp as the best questions.

The red-rag-versus-white-flag image expresses in sharp terms the tensions and choices tearing at Australia and the rest of Asia in trying to answer the big questions posed by China. On that red rag claim, see John Garnaut’s view that the 2009 White Paper ‘exploded like a bomb beneath the China relationship’and his judgement that after Canberra’s frank assessment of Chinese military growth, ‘bilateral relations plunged to the lowest point since the Tiananmen massacres of 1989’. Read more