The biggest question facing Asia is becoming even starker because leaders are giving such different answers. The leaders of the US, China and Japan have just illustrated the conundrum that Rod Lyon outlined in his piece on Asia’s fraying order. Simply stated, the biggest question is: who rules? Or, in slightly expanded form, it asks: what is the Asian security system and how will it run?

Mind you, Asia is lucky that it has graduated to the point where this is the major security quandary it faces. In recent memory, the problems were even bigger: will the new nations of Asia form and unite? Can Asia modernise and deliver a better life for its people? Read more

In my last post, I considered the operational and technical challenges of Australia acquiring F-35B STOVL Joint Strike Fighters and operating them from the Canberra class LHDs. In an ideal budget environment, were the decision to acquire the F-35B in the 2015 Defence White Paper to be made, the Abbott Government would also acquire two or three dedicated aviation support vessels to support them, and leave the LHDs purely for undertaking amphibious operations. But as the May 2014 budget has made clear, Australia doesn’t live within an ‘ideal budgetary environment’ and it seems unlikely additional ships will be forthcoming. If Australia does acquire the F-35B, they’ll have to operate from the LHDs (with all the technical and operational challenges that that would involve) or from forward land-bases as part of an expeditionary operation. Read more

Rod Lyon recently argued that an interesting feature of geostrategic competition in Asia is the search for ‘game-changers’ in military technology. Regional governments’ search for such ‘force-multiplier-level enhancements’ is one source of the present moment’s strategic uncertainty. Another is the uncertainty surrounding the strategic trajectory of a number of pivotal actors in the Asia-Pacific. A major part of that story relates to China: what kind of place in the sun would the Chinese leadership be happy with? But there’s plenty of uncertainty to go around, and it’s often fuelled by domestic political forces.

Throughout its history, the United States has shown considerable capacity to alter its international persona. Beginning as 13 unassuming colonies, it marched across the American continent and out into the Western Pacific, overturning the pre-Columbian and European political orders. Then, quite abruptly, it altered course and settled into a pattern of shrewd selective engagement with the international system (sometimes mistakenly called isolationism). Upon being dragged into WWII, the US again changed orientations, becoming the global architect of Western security arrangements and the designer of Bretton Woods—becoming, essentially, a manager of world affairs and dispenser of public goods.   Read more

‘We build too many walls and not enough bridges’ – Sir Isaac Newton

Having spent the last week in Beijing meeting with a range of think tanks, government officials and academics, I was struck by the importance our hosts placed upon the relationship with Australia.  The concept used most frequently by the Chinese in relation to Australia was as ‘the bridge’ between China and the US. The Chinese clearly perceive an important role for Australia in evolving great power relationships, as well as viewing Australia as a nation with a strong regional role.  Important as it is to be cautious about Chinese intent—and Australia has previously been reluctant to be cast in the role of a bridge—such positive sentiments should offer opportunities for future cooperation.

Obviously, recent cooperation on the search for missing flight MH-370 has assisted in building ties between the two nations. There was also an advantage to arriving in the wake of Prime Minister Abbott’s visit to China, which had focused predominantly on strengthening economic and security ties, and which had included proposals for closer cooperation in countering cyber-security threats and encouraging more frequent defence exchanges.  That visit had clearly left a positive impression upon the Beijing policy community. Read more

As Tony Abbott wings his way to Northeast Asia, up to 130 ADF personnel are already there, participating in a major US-led amphibious exercise off the South Korean coastline. That number comes from a mid-March Stars and Stripes piece that referred to the Exercise SsangYong (double dragon) as ‘unprecedented’ and as ‘the peninsula’s largest joint amphibious landing drill.’ That’s no small thing for Australia to be part of.

But it’s a more recent Wall Street Journal article that has put a specific and challenging spin on Australia’s involvement (which it must be said is dwarfed by the nearly 10,000 US and several thousand Korean personnel). Depicting this large exercise as an attempt to reassure Washington’s allies about America’s commitment as the regional distribution of power is changing, Yuka Hayashi also had this to say: ‘The U.S. has also expanded joint-exercise programs with Japan as well as Australia, regional allies that are building their own amphibious forces to counter Beijing’s.’ Read more