Tag Archive for: China

ASPI suggests

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The Associated Press has launched a strong interactive site, Ramadi in Ruins, which allows visitors to chart the devastation of the Iraqi city after it was captured by the Islamic State in May 2015 before being won back earlier this year. In a similar vein, The Atlantic has a great photo essay of modern London streetscapes implanted with historical records to show the damage wrought by Nazi bombing during The Blitz, which ended 75 years ago this week.

China watchers, two useful features have landed recently. First, from The National Interest, is an essay on how China (under President Xi Jinping) sees the world. Second, The New Yorker explores Mao’s Cultural Revolution, fifty years on:

‘China today is in the midst of another political fever, in the form of an anti-corruption crackdown and a harsh stifling of dissenting views. But it should not be mistaken for a replay of the Cultural Revolution. Even with thousands under arrest, the scale of suffering is of a different order, and shorthand comparisons run the risk of relieving the Cultural Revolution of its full horror.’

The longform profile of Obama’s foreign policy communications advisor, Ben Rhodes, presented on this page last week has whipped up quite a frenzy among Beltway wonks, hacks and pundits. Vox has an explainer of the tale so far; over at The Atlantic, Jeffrey Goldberg pokes holes in the profile’s ‘retailing’ of the Iran deal; and this piece from New York magazine lays blame at the feet of both the journalist and his subject.

Fans of US television series The Americans will be spellbound to read the show’s plot come to life in a feature over at The Guardian: ‘The day we discovered our parents were Russian spies’. Highly recommended reading—and if you haven’t seen the show, it’s well worth a binge.

A change of pace comes in the form of this potent piece from the NYRB about Scottish philosopher David Hume, who:

‘…has become something of a hero to academic philosophers. In 2009, he won first place in a large international poll of professors and graduate students who were asked to name the dead thinker with whom they most identified. The runners-up in this peculiar race were Aristotle and Kant. Hume beat them by a comfortable margin. Socrates only just made the top twenty.’

The New York Times’ diplomatic correspondent (and one-time Strategist Six subject), Jane Perlez, recently profiled Admiral Harry B. Harris Jr., Commander of US Pacific Command in Hawaii. Harris has been one of the most outspoken voices in the US military when it comes to Beijing’s actions in the South China Sea, first trying out his ‘great wall of sand’ line at an ASPI dinner last year.

The Warrior Canine Connection was established to help wounded US veterans heal through spending time with service dogs. Luckily for the rest of us, the organisation is aware of the mass-appeal of puppies, and has setup a live-stream nursery camera so that anyone can tune in to watch the new 11-strong litter feed, play and snooze. (Yes, it’s as good as it sounds.)

Podcast

King’s College London recently hosted their annual War Studies lecture, delivered by Professor Jennifer Welsh, Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General for the Responsibility to Protect. Professor Welsh lectured on The Individualisation of War (1h 16m).

Videos

The Mariinsky Theatre Orchestra of Russia was in Palmyra last week to hold a concert at the site’s second-century Roman amphitheatre. As a piece of diplomacy it was all bum notes, but there’s no denying the spectacular optics. The full performance is available online (54 mins), and here’s a peek into how it all went down.

‘Breaking ISIL’s Brand’ was the focus of the latest Schieffer Series event hosted by DC-based CSIS. The panel comprised of US under secretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs Richard Stengel, Farah Pandith of the Council on Foreign Relations, and the NYT’s David Sanger (55 mins).

Events

The ANU has this week kicked off an event series that will run all the way up until the 2 July federal election. Panel discussions will be hosted on a range of hot-button election issues, including science and innovation, health, social policy, climate change, tax and security and foreign affairs.

What does Rodrigo Duterte mean for South China Sea tensions?

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4752601354_5fcca5dc55_zRodrigo Duterte’s victory in the Philippines’ Presidential elections has introduced new uncertainty into Asia’s security outlook.

The populist strongman from Davao, which is the largest city in Mindanao, is nicknamed ‘The Punisher’ and ‘Duterte Harry’ for his alleged involvement in extrajudicial killings of around 1,000 criminals in that city during the late 1990s. Duterte secured 38.49% of the presidential vote, ahead of 23.46% and 21.66% for his rivals Manuel Roxas and Grace Poe, respectively. He won on a populist message that he’ll clean up the corruption and criminality that plagues the Philippines and prevents its rapid GDP growth of 6.7%—the fourth fastest economic growth rate in the world—from benefiting the majority of its people.

Duterte’s record in Davao, and his rhetoric used during the campaign of ‘death squads as a political platform’, raise concerns that progress towards democratisation following the fall of the Marcos regime in 1986 could be rapidly undone, and that a new period of authoritarianism (PDF) and human rights abuses may emerge.

Duterte’s foreign policy rhetoric suggests that under his Presidency, the Philippines could suddenly shift its position on the South China Sea crisis in a manner that would generate uncertainty, and  weaken ASEAN’s ability to develop a common position against an assertive China. The Philippines will be the chair of ASEAN in 2017, and so Duterte’s position on the growing crisis in the South China Sea really matters. The problem is that his rhetoric is confused—on one hand he suggests a willingness to engage China bilaterally over the crisis in exchange for Chinese economic investment, on the other he proposes a multilateral roundtable discussion that China would oppose. And then there is loose talk of confronting China at Scarborough Shoal on a jet ski—the maritime equivalent of a shirtfront!

The shifting policy position of the President-elect is likely to reinforce the risk of miscalculation on both sides of the dispute and generate further provocations. The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague is currently assessing a crucial legal case presented by the Philippines against China on the issue of disputed territories in the South China Sea. Its finding is likely to be handed down in June, and could favour the Philippines. China is vowing that it will ignore the PCA’s finding, and in doing so, weaken legal norms such as UNCLOS. Duterte has indicated he’s not a strong supporter of international legal solutions to disputes stating: ‘I have a similar position as China’s. I don’t believe in solving the conflict through an international tribunal’. His stance could embolden China to be more assertive. Under Duterte, the dynamics of this crisis look set to change in China’s favour.

A Duterte government is also likely to pose challenges for the Philippines’ key external partners—the United States, Japan and Australia. Australia is already uneasy with the prospect of dealing with Duterte, given his inappropriate comments about the tragic murder of an Australian missionary. Duterte has threatened to sever relations with Australia as a result of criticism by Australian diplomats over his comments related to the rape. Australia may be uncomfortable in seeking closer relations if Duterte continues the practice of extrajudicial killings and reverses progress towards democracy.

Australia must also consider the broader implications for our defence diplomacy with the Philippines under Duterte. The 2016 Defence White Paper notes the importance of the Philippines given its strategic location, and its approach to maritime security, counterterrorism and other aspects of regional security (5.58). If Duterte begins to shift the Philippines defence posture to one that’s more accommodating of China in the South China Sea, perhaps through bilateral arrangements, or by side-stepping the outcome of the PCA, he would undermine efforts to strengthen the rules-based international order that fundamentally says ‘might does not make right’, and which is a key assumption underpinning Australian defence policy. That would lead to an erosion of ASEAN unity, and China would directly benefit from the probable fallout for the Philippines relations with Japan and the US. The US has just undertaken a third Freedom of Navigation operation, near Fiery Cross Reef, and moved to loosen restrictions on arms sales to Vietnam. It comes as Chinese survey vessels have been sighted near Scarborough Shoal—a mere 225 km from Manila—a move that suggests Beijing may determine to militarise the disputed island in the near future.

An unpredictable populist President in Manila could quickly undo a key component of regional counter-balancing against Beijing. The South China Sea crisis has just got a lot more complex.

Modi’s drive to connect India with the world

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As Narendra Modi shifts Indian foreign policy from looking to acting—from passive to active—he’s also counting on an infrastructure push to better connect India at home and with its region. India’s connectivity drive includes projects to build domestic roads, railways, bridges and ports, and to build economic corridors to the benefit of its neighbours and neighbourhood. Modi’s efforts come with a range of complications, from sourcing the right human capital and finding the funds, through to managing strategic imperatives which are always complex and often competing. To jump over these hurdles, New Delhi’s actively exploring infrastructure opportunities with partners both old and new.

While connectivity across India’s sub-continental landmass has developed over the years, the country has long ignored the development of its waterways, ports and border areas. Connectivity between India’s main cities, north-eastern border areas and its Andaman and Nicobar Islands (ANI) remains woefully underdeveloped. A lack of interest, the distance from India’s central regions, comparatively tougher terrain and vast cultural chasms have all contributed to India’s negligence. But while the previous government saw little incentive to improve connectivity in and between these regions, Modi sees enormous opportunities—and is acting to realise the benefits.

Strong intra-India connections to its north-eastern states would open the door to greater interaction with Southeast Asia, boosting people to people ties, tourism and trade. The trilateral highway connecting India with Myanmar, Thailand and the rest of Southeast Asia addresses this gap. India is also slowly but steadily developing networks in the ANI, known as India’s ‘unsinkable carrier’ in the Bay of Bengal. The government now has a plan in place to transform the islands into a ‘maritime hub’, complete with shipping and port infrastructure.

India’s connectivity drive in the northeast and the ANI is complicated by a range of strategic factors. China claims the Indian border state of Arunachal Pradesh in the northeast, a territorial dispute which led to the 1962 Sino-Indian war. Such a contested environment has long stymied investment. The ANI is of great strategic importance to India: it’s at the doorstep of Myanmar, Malaysia and Indonesia, and is home to India’s only tri-command service. India’s continuous continental defence mindset meant the ANI’s strategic potential was unrealised.

New Delhi understands that connectivity won’t happen without capital. While India has been keen to cash in on opportunities like the AIIB, it’s been reluctant to open its disputed border regions up to Chinese investment or even presence. That’s where India’s blossoming friendship with Japan is coming to the fore.

Modi has welcomed Japan’s eagerness to invest in infrastructure projects in the northeast. Japan continues to participate in tenders to improve India’s railways. Upon signing a $15 billion deal to build the high-speed Mumbai–Ahmedabad railway, Modi claimed that, ‘No friend will matter more in realizing India’s economic dreams than Japan’. Further, the two countries recently announced joint infrastructure projects in the ANI. Japanese corporates are on board, too, recently ranking India the ‘most favoured destination for investment’. While Japan’s infrastructure drive is no match for China’s One Belt One Road initiative, strategic trust counts for a lot—India has more of it with Japan than exists in the Sino-Indian relationship.

India’s infrastructure drive also extends to maritime connectivity and port development, but here too India’s concerns about China come to bear. New Delhi is suspicious of the strategic implications of China’s Maritime Silk Road, which brings Beijing closer toward India’s maritime boundary at a time when New Delhi’s eager to play a greater security role in the region. Even though Modi is keen to foster better economic ties with Beijing, New Delhi is well aware of the increasing strategic competition in the Indian Ocean region.

But Modi is looking beyond Beijing. During his address to the inaugural Maritime India summit in April this year, Modi emphasised India’s maritime heritage and the importance of strengthening the nation’s maritime capabilities and infrastructure. He concluded his enthusiastic speech with a call for greater engagement: ‘This is the right time to come to India; it is even better to come through the sea route.’ Modi wants new partners who can invest in India’s maritime sector, focusing on ship building and boosting existing port capacities.

In pursuing active connectivity diplomacy, Modi is hoping to extend India’s success in collaborating with new and old international partners—relationships that he hopes to expand regionally over the coming years. Modi wants India to play a responsible and credible leadership role in the sub-continent and beyond. Connectivity projects in the region may well become a critical part of India’s soft power diplomacy.

The Indian Prime Minister’s new outlook, be it through the domestic or regional connectivity sphere or through the maritime domain, demands greater international engagement from a country which has functioned more or less in isolation for far too long. Delhi’s engagement at the global level is seen by some to be a shift in India’s non-alignment policy. While that’s true to a point, in reality the shift only represents the fresh outlook that’s necessary for India to play a more active role in shaping the region’s security architecture. Strategic engagement isn’t the same as strategic alignment, and New Delhi must be able to draw this distinction as it steps up connectivity collaboration with partners around the globe over the coming years.

Asia’s troubled water

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Asia’s water woes are worsening. Already the world’s driest continent in per capita terms, Asia now faces a severe drought that has parched a vast region extending from southern Vietnam to central India. This has exacerbated political tensions, because it has highlighted the impact of China’s dam-building policy on the environment and on water flows to the dozen countries located downstream.

Today’s drought in parts of Southeast and South Asia is the worst in decades. Among the hardest-hit areas are Vietnam’s Mekong Delta (a rice bowl of Asia) and central highlands; 27 of Thailand’s 76 provinces; parts of Cambodia; Myanmar’s largest cities, Yangon and Mandalay; and areas of India that are home to over a quarter of the country’s massive population.

Droughts may not knock down buildings, but they carry high social and economic costs. Millions of Asians now confront severe water shortages, and some have been forced to relocate. Myanmar, Thailand, and Cambodia have had to scale back traditional water festivals marking their New Year. The High Court of Bombay moved the world’s biggest and wealthiest cricket tournament, the Indian Premier League, out of the state of Maharashtra. In one Maharashtra county, the local authorities, fearing violence, temporarily banned gatherings of more than five people around water storage and supply facilities.

Meanwhile, the mounting drought-related losses in some of the world’s top rice-producing countries—Thailand, Vietnam, and India—threaten to roil the world’s already tight rice market. Barely 7% of global rice output is traded internationally, because much of it is consumed where it is produced—in Asia.

Rice losses have been particularly significant in Thailand and Vietnam, which account for half of all rice exports and almost three-quarters of this decade’s projected export growth. Some 230,000 hectares of paddy rice cultivation has been destroyed just in Vietnam’s Mekong Delta, where depleted river flows have led to saltwater intrusion from the South China Sea, rendering nearly 10% of the rice farms potentially infertile.

This drought may be unprecedented, but it is not an anomaly. On the contrary, environmental challenges in Asia, such as ecosystem degradation, groundwater depletion, the contamination of water resources, the El Niño tropical weather pattern, and the effects of global warming are causing droughts to become increasingly frequent—and increasingly severe.

Even without droughts, Asia would be facing formidable water constraints. The annual amount of available fresh water per capita in the region (2,816 cubic meters) already is less than half the global average (6,079 cubic meters). As the region pursues rapid economic development, characterised by massive increases in resource consumption and serious environmental damage, its water constraints are tightening further. The challenge is compounded by Asians’ changing dietary preferences, particularly higher consumption of meat, the production of which is notoriously water-intensive.

While Asia’s resource-hungry economies can secure fossil fuels and mineral ores from distant lands, they cannot import water, which is prohibitively expensive to transport. So they have been overexploiting local resources instead—a practice that has spurred an environmental crisis, advancing regional climate change and intensifying natural disasters like droughts.

As a result, Asia, which accounts for 72% of the world’s total irrigated acreage, now faces a dilemma: It must grow enough food to meet rising demand, while reducing the amount of water that goes toward irrigation. Unless Asia resolves it, economic development will be imperiled, with major consequences for the entire global economy.

Yet the continent’s water crisis is only worsening. According to a recent MIT study, there is a ‘high risk’ that Asia’s water stress could worsen to water scarcity by 2050. Water-sharing disputes between countries or provinces already are increasingly frequent, owing to the proliferation of dam projects that can adversely affect downstream flows—an approach that represents a continuing preference for supply-side approaches over smart water management.

The main culprit in this regard is China, which has heavily dammed the Mekong, Southeast Asia’s lifeline. In the current lean season, which will last until the monsoon rains arrive in June, the lower Mekong is, according to a recent United Nations report, running at ‘its lowest level since records began nearly 100 years ago’.

China is now trying to play savior, by releasing an unspecified quantity of water from one of its six upstream mega-dams to ‘accommodate the concerns’ of drought-stricken countries. China’s rulers have touted the move as underscoring the effectiveness of upstream ‘water facilities’ in addressing droughts and containing floods.

Of course, in reality, all of this simply highlights the newfound reliance of downriver countries on Chinese goodwill—a dependence that is set to deepen as China builds 14 more dams on the Mekong. The environmental impact of these projects is sure to exacerbate further the ecological challenges, including drought, already facing Asia.

This competitive approach is putting Asia on a dangerous path, which can lead only to more environmental degradation, slower economic development, and even water wars. It is time to change course and embark on the path of rules-based cooperation, based on water-sharing accords, the free flow of hydrological data, and dispute-settlement mechanisms.

Asian countries must work together to ensure greater efficiency in water consumption, increase the use of recycled and desalinated water, and promote innovative solutions that advance conservation and adaptation efforts. To this end, governments must phase out state subsidies that have encouraged profligate water use, such as in agriculture, and focus on building new market mechanisms and effective public-private partnerships.

None of this will be possible without China’s cooperation. Indeed, if China does not abandon its current approach—from its ‘water grab’ in the Mekong and other international rivers to its ‘territorial grab’ in the South China Sea—the prospects for a rules-based order in Asia could perish forever.

ASPI suggests

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Edited image courtesy of Flickr user Patrick Rasenberg

In the spirit of President Frank Underwood, whelcome back to another wheek of ASPI suggests.

The Pulitzer Committee did us a great service this week in doling out the 2016 prizes. Some prime picks include the Associated Press’ work on labour exploitation in the Southeast Asian fishing industry; some incredible New York Times photography capturing Europe’s refugee crisis; and a searing feature in The New Yorker on the troubling earthquake hazard that lays dormant in northwestern America. And if you’re in NYC and happen to stumble upon a ticket to Hamilton—the breakaway, sold-out and now Pulitzer-winning musical on the US’s first Treasury Secretary, Alexander Hamilton—well, good luck to ya!

Here are two different but related pieces on the theme of hacking. First, a sharp essay from Harper’s on efforts to build an email client that’s impervious to government surveillance. And second, from Bloomberg comes a gripping read on hacking elections, as told by the man who rigged political contests in Latin America for a decade.

After their hugely successful Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative microsite, CSIS has this week launched a new effort to bring together the latest research, commentary, graphics and data on the Middle Kingdom. Bookmark it now, because the ChinaPower microsite will quickly become a go-to for answers and analysis around China’s rise and the economic, technological and military might that goes along with it. One of the new site’s first projects has been to explore China’s Liaoning aircraft carrier in 3D and offer comparative analytics on the PLA-N’s solo carrier versus its international counterparts.

The Atlantic Council’s Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security delivered some thought-provoking new research this week looking at the health of NATO. The full report, ‘Alliance at Risk: Strengthening European Defense in an Age of Turbulence and Competition’, is available here.

Readers will remember the havoc wreaked last week as several Russian Sukhoi Su-24 aircraft buzzed the USS Donald Cook in the Baltic Sea. This week, Russia’s mixing things up a little with Sukhoi Su-34 aircraft, which were used to bomb their own country. No, nothing to do with Ukrainian or Chechen border disputes—rather, the jets were used to drop precision-guided explosives onto the Sukhona River to break up thick ice. Watch videos of the aircraft and the aftermath here.

US political fanatics (West Wing obsessives still included) had been waiting with bated breath for this week’s New York primary, and the results weren’t at all surprising. With Hillary and The Donald taking out their respective parties’ top spots, there’s been plenty of uneasy chatter about the closing gap between the Trump and Cruz campaigns. The New Yorker offers some thoughts on what Sanders’ supporters should take away from their experience in the Big Apple, while The New York Times checks out the steep costs of the Clinton campaign, and the ‘billion dollar onslaught’ that she’ll face from Republicans should she win the Democratic nomination. For different hypothetical angles on the presidential race, The Economist takes an in-depth look at the potential economic challenges that Clinton administration might face; and, not to be outdone, check out this piece on The New York Review of Books which looks at what Russia stands to gain from a Trump presidency.

China’s inaugural National Security Education Day took place on 15 April. The new ‘holiday’ is designed to help Chinese citizens understand the importance of safeguarding state secrets, and led to the promulgation of some pretty unique propaganda about foreigners practicing espionage in China. The Chinese Ministry of State Security released a series of short videos that quickly went viral depicting Western superheroes and pop culture figures as unemployed foreign spies, while a 16-page comic named Dangerous Love warns of  the dangers of sharing state secrets with your handsome, foreign boyfriend. For some background reading on cartoon depictions of spooks in China, check out this longer read from Quartz.

Podcast

The Loopcast recently sat down with Nic Jenzen-Jones, head of Armament Research Services, to talk about how illegal arms trading is facilitated by social media. It’s a fascinating chat (34 mins). Also check out this piece on the subject over at The New York Times.

Videos

The UK’s Minister of State, the Hon Hugo Swire, was in Washington this week to give a rundown on the Britain’s Asia policy, with particular reference to strategic security issues. With Obama landing in the UK today to meet with David Cameron on the state of the transatlantic alliance in the face of the Brexit, the Minister’s speech is a useful glimpse into the centrality, or otherwise, of Asia for British policymakers. The speech and moderated discussion is over at YouTube (43 mins). (On the topic of what the Brexit would spell for the UK–US special relationship, see this smackdown from Brookings president Strobe Talbott.)

The Atlantic Council hosted a panel of entrepreneurs and business leaders to explore how America’s tech community can  assist the government’s response to complex and vexed national security challenges (1 hour 42 mins).

Events

Canberra: Join Rory Medcalf, Ashley Townshend and Euan Graham for what’s sure to be a fascinating discussion about how China’s shifting approach to confidence-building measures in the South China Sea is increasing its ability to challenge the regional rules-based order. Mark your calendars for 29 April, and register here.

Sydney: There’s never been a more exciting time to be watching US politics, a fact which is certainly not wasted on the United States Studies Centre. We recommend checking out this 4 May discussion on how America’s grassroots are transforming US politics and elections.

Brexit and the balance of power

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Image courtesy of Flickr user El Bingle

Britain joined what became the European Union in 1973. This year, on 23 June, it will hold a referendum on whether to leave. Should it?

Current polls show a closely divided electorate. Prime Minister David Cameron claims that the concessions he has won from Britain’s EU partners should lay to rest popular concerns about a loss of sovereignty to Brussels and an influx of foreign workers from Eastern Europe. But Cameron’s Conservative Party and his own cabinet are deeply divided, while London’s populist mayor, Boris Johnson, has joined the supporters of British exit.

The question of the costs and benefits of British membership in the EU divides the British press as well. Many mass-circulation publications support ‘Brexit,’ whereas the financial press supports continued membership. The Economist, for example, points out that some 45% of British exports go to other EU countries, and that the atmosphere for negotiating a post-Brexit trade deal would likely be frosty.

Moreover, the EU has made clear to non-members such as Norway and Switzerland that they can have full access to the single market only if they accept most of its rules, including the free movement of people, and contribute to the EU budget. In other words, a Britain outside the Union would gain little in terms of ‘sovereignty’; on the contrary, it would lose its vote and influence over the terms of its participation in the single market. Meanwhile, rival financial centers such as Paris and Frankfurt would seize the chance to establish rules that would help them win back business from London.

Another complication is political: the rise of nationalism in Scotland and the effect of Brexit on the survival of the United Kingdom. In 2014, Scotland voted in its own referendum to remain in the UK; but the nationalists won almost all of Scotland’s seats in the general election eight months later. With Scottish opinion much more pro-European than in England, many believe that Brexit would lead to another referendum on independence. Cameron could be remembered as the prime minister who helped break up the UK (and possibly Europe).

In the United States, President Barack Obama’s administration has stated clearly its belief that Britain and Europe are both stronger together. Illusions of a special relationship with the US replacing the influence of Europe are mistaken. But the British people will weigh whether to support Brexit, and an American hand on the scale could be counter-productive.

At the same time, in the words of Douglas Alexander, the former Labour shadow foreign secretary, ‘since the end of World War II, America has been the system operator of international order built on a strong, stable Transatlantic Alliance supported by the twin pillars of NATO and the EU. If Britain leaves the EU, America’s closest ally would be marginalized….and the whole European project at risk of unraveling at precisely the time new economic and security threats confront the West.’ It is no wonder that Vladimir Putin’s Kremlin would welcome Brexit and meddles in European countries’ domestic politics to try to weaken the EU.

The geopolitical consequences of Brexit might not appear immediately. The EU might even temporarily pull together. But there would be damage to Europe’s sense of mission and its soft power of attraction. Ensuring financial stability and managing immigration would be much more difficult as well.

In addition to a revival of Scottish separatism, Britain’s inward turn in recent years could accelerate. And over the longer run, the effects on the global balance of power and the liberal international order—in which Britain has a strong national interest—would be negative.

When it acts as an entity, Europe is the largest economy in the world, and its population of nearly 500 million is considerably larger than America’s 325 million. It has the world’s largest market, represents 17% of world trade, and dispenses half of the world’s foreign assistance. It also has 27 universities ranked in the top 100 worldwide, and its creative industries contribute about 7% to its GDP. American per capita income is higher, but in terms of human capital, technology, and exports, Europe is very much an economic peer.

In terms of military expenditure, Europe is second only to the US, accounting for 15% of the world total, compared to 12% for China and 5% for Russia. Of course, that number is somewhat misleading, given Europe’s lack of military integration. France and Britain are the two major sources of European expeditionary power.

European and US resources are mutually reinforcing. Direct investment in both directions is higher than with Asia, and US–European trade is more balanced than US trade with Asia. At the cultural level, Americans and Europeans share the values of democracy and human rights more with each other than with any other world regions.

Faced with a rising China, a declining but risk-inclined Russia, and the prospect of prolonged turmoil in the Middle East, close transatlantic cooperation will be crucial to maintaining a liberal international order over the long term. Recognizing that Brexit, by weakening both Europe and Britain, would make a disorderly international system more likely, should tip the balance in favor of maintaining the status quo.

The frozen continent: what’s news?

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Image courtesy of Wikimedia

Apart from the pictures of our Antarctic icebreaker Aurora Australis having run aground near Mawson Station, Antarctica’s been out of the news in the last few months.

But there’s been some interesting Antarctic developments. Our latest Defence White Paper states that Defence will provide niche support for our polar operations, including Air Force heavy air lift to support our Antarctic stations. That’s a game-changer for our polar logistic and science program. Such military support doesn’t violate the ‘peaceful purposes’ provision in Article 1 of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty and allows us to project our southern national interests through the ADF.

But the ADF’s role here isn’t as large as that which is played by New Zealand’s Defence Force. Antarctica’s been one of NZDF’s specialist areas of operation since 1965. Last month a Boeing 757 belonging to the NZ Air Force returned to Christchurch with the last 22 personnel who’ve been based in Antarctica for two months under Operation Antarctica. The operation involves up to 220 NZDF personnel deploying during the summer season from October to February.

In a positive move Australia and the UK signed an agreement in December on shared Antarctic priorities from 2015–2020 (PDF). New Zealand has signed a similar agreement (PDF).

Those agreements were part of a recent grand tour of the UK navy icebreaker, the HMS Protector, around the Southern Ocean. It was the first such visit by a UK Antarctic vessel for many decades and a serious flag flying venture. HMS Protector departed Hobart in early December with Australian fisheries officers on board. The patrol demonstrated Britain’s desire for a ‘UK presence across the entire Antarctic continent’, the Royal Navy said.

Australia works closely with the UK on most issues in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean, a point that our agreement recognises. Such documents aren’t confined to the Commonwealth: we’ve got different scale agreements with a number of countries, ranging from exchange of letters through to memoranda of understanding. Countries include New Zealand, the UK, Russia, Argentina, the US, France, China and others. They’re expressions of intent and good will with no binding obligations. But they serve a useful purpose in sharing costs, prioritising activities and ensuring that an Antarctic operator gets support when they need it.

As far as living marine resources in the Southern Ocean are concerned, there’s been several positive developments. Last month, Spanish police arrested six people suspected of running an operation that illegally fished over 3,500 tons of toothfish, a protected species, in Antarctic waters. Another 16 people have been put under investigation as part of the operation carried out jointly with Interpol. The ring is estimated to have made a profit of over $11.3 million per season from the illegal fishing operation.

In February, the internationally-wanted toothfish poaching vessel, Kunlun, was detained in Senegal. The Kunlun is believed to have links to a Spanish crime syndicate, and had previously falsified its registry, claiming Indonesia as its flag state, which allowed the vessel to be detained on formalities regarding its certification and flag status. In March, authorities in Indonesia sunk the last of the “Bandit 6” toothfish poaching vessels, the Viking, in Pangandaran, West Java. 

On a local note, Austral Fisheries, a West Australian seafood company that catches toothfish and icefish in Australia’s sub-Antarctic waters, was recently certified as the first carbon neutral fisheries business in the world.

In terms of other nations’ activities in Antarctica, several developments are worth noting. China’s State Oceanic Administration said in February that it’ll establish an air service team for Antarctic exploration. The SOA didn’t provide details, other than stating that seeks to support China’s scientific operations in Antarctica. A Chinese firm also started constructing Brazil’s replacement base in Antarctica, at a cost of US$99.6 million.

Turkey’s now cooperating with another established Antarctic Treaty Consultative Party at an existing station. Turkey and Ukraine are embracing each other as good friends that share a tense relationship with Russia, and now Turkey has sent its first expedition to Antarctica, using Ukraine’s Antarctic base. Turkey plans to build its own permanent station later this year.

Russia has showed an increased interest in Antarctica. In December, for example, Russia’s first meteorite expedition left for Antarctica to search for traces of meteorite substances. More interesting was The Washington Post report that observed that ‘even the penguins were curious’ when the leader of the Russian Orthodox Church visited Russia’s Bellingshausen Base wearing a parka and rubber boots, along with his traditional black robes. Kirill’s sojourn in the Antarctic was splashed across Russian media at a time when Russia’s been expanding its presence in Antarctica. In January the Russian navy was back in Antarctica after 33 years, undertaking hydrographic survey work.

Russia has been improving its Antarctic research stations and constructing new research vessels for both Arctic and Antarctic operations. ‘Seeing that in the last few years there have been many new developments with regard to Antarctica, this has become a very important region for Russia,’ Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin said last July in the context of Russia’s new maritime doctrine.

In a forthcoming book, Antarctica: The Battle for the Seventh Continent, Doaa Abdel-Motaal, argues that that the Antarctic treaty is unlikely to be adequate in the face of competition for resources and that it has been Antarctica’s harsh climate and isolation that’s protected the continent so far, not the treaty. She argues that revisiting the treaty in favor of an orderly division of the continent is the best plan for avoiding conflict.

Whether one agrees with this judgement or not, it’s certainly the case that Antarctica is likely to become more geopolitically contested in the future. (Also see this article for some excellent photos of life on base in Antarctica).

That’s why it’d be useful for the Turnbull government to formally respond to the recommendations of the 20 Year Australian Antarctic Strategic Plan, handed to the government a year ago by Tony Press, a former Director of the Australian Antarctic Division.

Cyber wrap

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The US Department of Justice (DoJ) continues to dominate headlines this week, as the Apple v FBI case ends, a Chinese national admits to stealing US military secrets and seven Iranian hackers are indicted. As foreshadowed last week, the DoJ announced on Tuesday that it had found a way to unlock San Bernadino gunman Sayed Farook’s iPhone without Apple’s assistance, and subsequently dropped its case against Apple. We don’t know anything about the company that assisted the FBI to unlock the iPhone or how they did it, and government officials won’t be drawn on whether they will share the information with Apple. Over at the Council on Foreign Relations, Robert Knake points out that since such vulnerabilities are worth big money, it’s possible the third party that unlocked the phone may not even tell the FBI how they did it, let alone Apple—unless some cash is coughed up.

Last Thursday, a Chinese national pled guilty in a US court to assisting cyber espionage efforts targeting US defence contractors including aviation giants Boeing and Lockheed Martin. Chinese aviation expert Su Bin was arrested in Canada in 2014 and, after making a deal with prosecutors, was extradited to the US earlier this year. Su admitted that since 2008 he had been working with two other people in China to steal US military secrets, by identifying key individuals for his co-conspirators to target, providing guidance on what information should be stolen and translating useful documents into Chinese. This included detailed information on the C17 transport aircraft currently operated by the RAAF, and the F‑35 fighter aircraft that will enter RAAF service in 2018. Su claimed he was motivated by money, but Chinese state-backed media has suggested that regardless of his motivation Su deserves respect and praise for his work to assist China.

And last Friday the DoJ indicted seven Iranian hackers for Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks on the US financial sector in 2011 as well as on the online controls of a New York dam in 2013. The indictment alleges that the seven men who work for two private Iranian IT firms performed the attacks on behalf of the Iranian government, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. It included DDoS attacks on 46 major financial institutions over 176 days, resulting in tens of millions of dollars’ worth of remediation costs. One of the indicted, Hamid Firoozi, also allegedly accessed the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system of a dam that controls water flows near Rye Brook in New York. No physical damage occurred, possibly because the sluice gate that controls water flow had been disconnected from the SCADA system for maintenance. Like the previous indictment of five PLA officers accused of hacking, this indictment is unlikely to see the accused men face court in the US, but rather is intended to ‘name and shame’ exercise to show that the US is believes it knows who conducted the attacks and to deter those responsible from travelling overseas.

Despite the continued tension between the US and China regarding cyber security, the Chinese government still needs to deal with major US firms like Microsoft to fulfil its IT needs. Microsoft China has reportedly worked with China’s Electronics Technology Group Corporation to modify Windows 10 for the Chinese government. The ‘specially provided edition’ of the popular operating system apparently removes many consumer focused apps but increases the amount of management and security features. China has also been working on a Linux -based operating system called NeoKylin, however Microsoft is unlikely to lose market share to its Chinese rival in the near future. Also from China this week comes news of the establishment of the Cyber Security Association of China. According to state media, the Association, which is made up of major Chinese tech firms such as Alibaba and major academic and research institutes, is intended to ‘organise and mobilise forces in all aspects of society to participate in building China’s cybersecurity’.

An underappreciated strategic option in North Asia

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F-16 Fighting Falcons from the 35th and 80th Fighter Squadrons of the 8th Fighter Wing, Kunsan Air Base, Republic of Korea

Continued Chinese maritime ‘gray zone’ aggression in the South China Sea (as well as further afield) requires that Australia make strategic choices now to avoid being militarily dominated or economically marginalised by Beijing in the future.

China is Australia’s largest trading partner, accounting for more than 25% of Australia’s total export market. The recently-concluded China–Australia Free Trade Agreement means that Australia has unprecedented access to Chinese markets for its agricultural produce, natural resource extraction industries and a range of service offerings. If Australia’s only concern was maintaining or expanding current levels of economic activity between the two countries, the question of whether or not to conduct a freedom of navigation operation in the South China Sea would be self-evident.

But Australia has much more at stake than balance sheets, and therefore a more problematic set of choices to confront. The greatest challenge for the Turnbull Government and its successors is how to create manoeuvre space between the two superpowers and thus avoid the fate of either tributary state or ‘expendable ally’.

Conducting ‘FONOPs with Australian characteristics’ risks alienating both China and the US—not the worst outcome but certainly not a desirable one. On the other hand, the choice to abandon ANZUS would almost certainly bring short-term economic benefits to Australia. As Chinese economic influence grew, however, it would bring with it unacceptably high levels of coercion against such core Australian values as freedom of expression, defence of human rights and the rule of law. Similarly, although a majority of Australians support the US alliance, only a minority advocate making Australia a wholly-owned subsidiary of US geostrategic policy.

There is a third path forwards. Australia can retain its freedom of action, maintain cordial relations with both China and the US, and enhance its influence in the region by deepening its ties to South Korea in the same way it has already done so with Japan. The 2014 Korea–Australia Free Trade Agreement (KAFTA) is producing positive results for Australia, including an annual trade surplus in excess of $10 billion. Building on the foundation of the ‘2+2’ meetings of foreign and defence ministers of the two nations, Australia needs to market itself as a valuable and value-added partner. There are good reasons for doing so.

First, both Australia and South Korea are ‘middle’ powers whose economies play a significant role in in East Asia. China is South Korea’s largest overseas trade partner, a status that President Park Geun-hye seeks to protect despite a growing number of challenges to the overall relationship. She’s smart to do so; no matter how or when Korean reunification occurs, China’s support will be decisive to success. Although less dependent diplomatically on China than Korea, Australia is just as intertwined with China economically. Expanded commercial ties with Korea are desirable in and of themselves, and would mitigate the effects of potential Chinese retaliation in the future (e.g., when Australia affirms the anticipated Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling in favour of the Philippines and against China).

Second, Australia has a vested interest in regional stability. North Korea’s increasingly erratic bellicosity cannot be ignored. The 2015 Blueprint for Defence and Security Cooperation Between Australia and the Republic of Korea calls for increased ADF participation in both tactical training and operational exercises inside South Korea. It’s vital that the ADF embrace this. In particular, the ADF must follow the example of the US Army Pacific’s Pacific Pathways program and rehearse the entire deployment process from alert through integration and tactical employment. The requirements for placing forces in harm’s way while maintaining their fighting ability are seldom addressed adequately during routine bilateral exercises (which tend to focus on tactical interoperability), but military forces that neglect that aspect of readiness do so at their own peril.

Third, growing the defence relationship with South Korea demonstrates value to the US in a way that complements ANZUS while lowering the potential threat to Australia’s relationship with China. A sudden collapse of the North Korean regime isn’t out of the question. A new ‘K Force’ might be required—not for combat but to respond to a humanitarian assistance or area security requirement following the departure or destruction of the Kim regime. Should the DPRK actually initiate hostilities, both South Korea and Australia could leverage their mutual specialty in maritime security to guard against DPRK submarines (the ones that don’t sink themselves) and sea-borne infiltration of special operations forces. Given Australia’s current relationship with Beijing and a propensity to act independently when desired, an Australian Army presence north of the 38th Parallel in support of ROK forces might be more palatable to China than a cross-border operation by a reinforced Eighth US Army. Finally, the deployment of the ADF to a Korean contingency could satisfy US expectations vis-à-vis ANZUS. That would allow Australia to avoid an overt clash with Beijing should the US find itself embroiled in simultaneous military crises in Korea and the South China Sea.

An enhanced Australia–Republic of Korea relationship is neither a new suggestion nor limited to economics and defence. The Turnbull government should seize this opportunity now. Doing so allows the government to remain faithful to the spirit and letter of the Defence White Paper and the traditional close association with the US while navigating an independent course in regional affairs.

Australia and the South China Sea

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Exercise BERSAMA SHIELD 2014

Lately, we Australians have had plenty to say about the South China Sea.

The discussants fall into two broad groups. The first group subscribes closely to the perspectives of the United States Pacific Command and Washington. This group is hesitant to have Australian policy differ from that of the US.

The second group believes that while Chinese expansionist policies shouldn’t be condoned, the South China Sea isn’t primarily Australia’s problem and we should stick to diplomatic approaches to the issues—by which this group means we should talk, not act.

National policy should be selfish. We must decide what to do on the basis of Australian needs, not on what the Americans or Chinese would prefer.

First, we have to be clear in our own minds on whether—as adherents here of the American vernacular like to put it—we have skin in the game or a dog in the fight.

We do. Like most other regional countries, including China, we have an interest in the free flow of commerce—and freedom of navigation—in the area.

Second, stability in the South China Sea counts for everyone in the Asia–Pacific, not only those with territorial claims in, or those countries close to, the South China Sea itself. China has ground to make up and honour to uphold, but it is asserting its claims to regional maritime supremacy at the expense of everyone else.

So, what to do? We must first look in the mirror. If we subscribe to the rule of international law as we claim to, we have to support principles of legal redress with clean hands.

The Philippines has a border dispute with China before the International Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). We argue China should follow the determination of the Court.

But we have scant credibility. Australia is one of the relatively few countries which opted out of mandatory dispute settlement under the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. Given that position, which is at its most salient in our declining to accept PCA jurisdiction in our border dispute with Timor, we aren’t well placed to suggest China should cease bullying less powerful countries on border demarcation issues. To its credit, Labor has suggested it would accept PCA arbitration on our boundary dispute with East Timor if bilateral negotiations failed.

Third, whatever the scope of the Australian interest in the South China Sea, most ASEAN countries have a more direct stake. It’s therefore legitimate for Australia to argue that ASEAN should take a lead and provide a more united and determined front towards China.

But to argue that effectively—and to avoid the perception that we’re seeking to have the ASEANs gang up on China—requires skill. We’d do better to stick to an emphasis on regional transparency and agreed rules of conduct applicable to all rather than to mimic US rhetoric on China. While China is the main aggressor in the South China Sea, it’s not the only one.

Talk alone hasn’t thus far worked in deterring China. If Australia is to be taken seriously as an independent guardian of our own security, we need more than active diplomacy and a loud mouth. We must push back, and the most effective way to do that is through assertion of right of passage.

We should be exercising our right of passage, but subject to qualifications.

First, while commonsense requires prior advice to the Americans, we shouldn’t transit a contested area as part of an American flotilla or squadron, but alone. By doing so, we diminish the argument that we’re merely an American outrider.

Second, we should make these transits through contested areas by practicable routes consistent with meeting normal and lawful Australian security requirements. Examples would be passage via sea and air lanes between Kota Kinabalu and Ho Chi Minh City or a number of approaches to Manila. We shouldn’t portray the transit as a challenge to China.

Third, the foregoing should be done without braggadocio, testing for some in the Australian political class.

That would be an on balance—and hence difficult—decision. Those actions carry risk. It’s all very well for the chest thumpers to tell the government what to do, but imagine if a ship is rammed or an aircraft forced to land—let alone that a vessel is sunk or a plane shot down!

It’s cold comfort that China would probably bear the brunt of international criticism. Apart from a possible loss of Australian lives, we would have a crisis with China which would inevitably be difficult to manage.

And China might impose economic costs.

But we’re now in an era of regional change, uncertainty and risk. We need policies which are dictated by Australian interests and formulated on the basis of independent Australian thinking. Where necessary we have to assert ourselves and act with resolution. There’s a case to be made outside the realms of this note for less subservience to US security policy. This isn’t, however, an argument for blowing with the wind of Chinese ambition.