While we’re not in the business of creating safe spaces or slapping trigger warnings on our recommendations, it’s necessary to recognise that there’s no easy way to make this feature a Trump-free zone. It’s just the brave new world we all live in. Let’s dive right in…

The last few weeks have thrown up some notable examples of the different standards Trump and Clinton are held to, and the different levels of attention paid to the nominee’s claims, scandals and lies (perceived or actual). To this end, the issue of Foundations has been interesting, with the Clinton organisation coming under warranted scrutiny and outsized criticism long before Trump’s was meaningfully examined—though there’s been some movement of late.

So, for our post-fact world, here’s a whip through some useful reads and resources. Paul Krugman (here and here) and Charles Blow (here and here) have recently being holding Trump’s statements up to the light, and David Remnick has even launched the fact-checking series Trump and The Truth, over at The New Yorker. On the media’s role, the absolutely essential read is from E.J. Dionne, with background from The Economist and a pledge from the exec editor of the NY Times to call a lie a lie. Mr Samantha Power, renowned scholar Cass Sunstein, did a great video with Vox on the role of conspiracy theories in US politics today. See also a cracking journal article Sunstein co-wrote years back on conspiracy theories, as well as Roger Cohen on conspiratorialists in the Middle East. For your bookmarks folder, Slate are keeping watch on the ‘Four Horsemen of the Trump Apocalypse’, and Politifact are keeping tabs on DJT and HRC. If you’re having trouble tracking Trump’s insults and braggadocio, his Twitter Archive is laid bare for the world. And finally, naturally, Fleetwood Mac. 45 days to go…

There’s plenty of research on offer this week, kicking off with a brand new blog from The Williams Foundation called The Central Blue. With an Australian defence capability focus, it’s definitely worth keeping an eye on—and perhaps even submitting a post to. From the Peterson Institute of International Economics comes an excellent report (and a fun infographic) on the economic and trade agendas of the two presidential candidates. The Atlantic Council put out a new research paper on the US Army’s future as its demand increases and size diminishes. A joint effort from the Perth USAsia Centre and China Matters (PDF) argues that fanning the flames over PRC influence in Australia isn’t wise. And lastly, the Parliamentary Library has published its Briefing Book for the 45th Parliament (PDF), which covers off everything from national economy to climate change to counterterrorism.

The US House Armed Services seapower and projection forces subcommittee met this week met to discuss recent developments in the South China Sea. Witnesses included bigwigs Andrew Erickson, Bonnie Glaser and James Kraska—check out footage of their testimonies here. All three called for the US to ratify UNCLOS and take a tougher stance on China’s ‘illegal’ actions. If you don’t have 2.5 hours spare to watch the hearing, this piece from USNI News goes over the key recommendations. Looking to the future, an excellent read from War on the Rocks looks at how Chinese A2/AD capabilities and island-building efforts will affect US diplomacy and preventative action.

Podcast

If you’re keen to learn a little more about one of the most contentious areas of US–China relations, be sure to check out the latest episode (25 mins) of CSIS’s China Power podcast series on China’s behaviour in cyberspace. Bonnie Glaser sits down with Samm Sacks from the Eurasia Group to map out the long road ahead for both countries as they push to establish cyber norms.

Videos

60 Minutes dropped in on STRATCOM earlier this week to take a look at what they’ve dubbed ‘a new Cold War’ and how the US military is preparing for it. Check out the short series of interviews here (13 mins).

Our ICPC colleagues have just wrapped the first ASPI–CSIS cyber dialogue over in DC, the outcomes of which will no doubt be appearing on The Strategist over the coming weeks. When the closed-door dialogue concluded in the early hours of this morning it was onto the public event at CSIS HQ, where Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull delivered a speech on ‘Deepening U.S.-Australia Cyber Security Cooperation’. The PM’s remarks were followed by a similar effort from US Homeland Security boss Jeh Johnson, and a Q&A facilitated by CSIS cyber tzar (and ICPC International Fellow) James Lewis. Take it all in here (1 hour).

Events

Canberra: Come along to ANU’s Crawford School on 10 October for a full day dialogue on the future of India and China’s strategic competition and cooperation in the Indo–Pacific. The all-star cast of panelists will offer perspectives from both states, and offer their thoughts on how tense ties between the two might upset the region’s balance of power.

Sydney: With the long-awaited first presidential debate to take place next Monday (Tuesday here in Australia), the USSC has thoughtfully planned ahead with a great free event on 28 September dissecting the candidates’ responses and what we’re likely to see in future debates leading up to 8 November. Register here. Also, for all the budding USyd diplomats out there, USSC is running a stellar competition that could see you acting as a US Foreign Service Officer at the US Embassy here in Canberra on election day. Get your thinking caps on and don’t miss out!

Last week news broke that an international alliance of business groups had penned a letter to Chinese Premier, Li Keqiang, imploring him to change China’s draft cybersecurity law, which many fear will significantly hamper free trade and commerce with the Asian giant.

This week China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs sought to dispel those concerns, claiming that the law wouldn’t ‘carry out differential treatment and will not create obstacles and barriers for international trade and foreign businesses investing in China.’ The Chinese MFA addressed several of the specific concerns raised by the businesses leaders, including fears relating  to mandated government access to data during ‘criminal investigations’ which Beijing claims is ‘necessary for safeguarding national security and investigating crime.’ The MFA also said companies would be permitted to send data offshore for business purposes, but with the caveat that this would be subject to a ‘security evaluation’. They explained that ‘these evaluations are for supervising and guaranteeing that the security of this data accords with China’s security standards,’ before adding that ‘the concerns of foreign investors and businesses invested in China are unnecessary.’

Thailand’s Defence Council has approved a new 2017–21 draft Master Plan for National Defence Against Cyber Threats. The new plan hopes to establish a ‘ministry-level’ cyber centre next year. The new centre will be established by the Office of the Defence Permanent Secretary, with the assistance of the Defence Information and Space Technology Department. The Masterplan includes six key areas of focus, which appear to take in a much wider remit than traditional Defence issues. In addition to work plans to protect critical infrastructure and prepare for ‘cyber operations’, additional pillars look to develop cyber skills, leverage national ‘cyber potential’, and boost cooperation on cyber issues.

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has put out a call for ideas, feedback, and big picture thinking on Current and Future States of Cybersecurity in the Digital Economy. Acting on behalf of the White House’s recently-announced Commission on Enhancing National Cybersecurity NIST placed a request for information in the US Federal Register seeking feedback on a wide range of potential cyber issues. Matters up for discussion range from CNI protection, Cybersecurity Insurance, R&D, IOT, international markets, public awareness and education, identity access and management and the cybersecurity workforce. The private sector has jumped at the chance to provide feedback, with best practices, the role of the government in regulation, privacy protection and the formation of international norms for appropriate state behaviour already on their agendas for discussion. Recommendations and comments will be accepted up until 9 September.

Malaysia has announced that it will create a special ‘cyber court’ in Kuala Lumpur to hear cybercrime cases. Prosecutors and judges will be required to have knowledge of information security issues to better enable them to understand the intricacies and nuances of the crimes they prosecute and hear. The court is intended to also take the strain off criminal and civil courts which are hearing an ever-increasing number of cybercrime cases. If the KL court is successful, the Prime Minister’s Department has plans to roll out new courts in Johor and Penang, followed by other states.

Wrapping up this week, techcrunch has a great list of ‘hacker movies’ for the cybersecurity practitioner that won’t have you cringing (or yelling) at the screen and Passcode has launched a ‘cybersecurity book club’ for the more literarily-inclined. First up is Thomas Rid’s Rise of the Machines. For the internationally minded, be sure to check out our friend Sico van der Meer’s latest piece on Foreign policy instruments to increase future cybersecurity.

The findings of the South China Sea Arbitration conducted at The Hague refutes China claim of indisputable sovereignty, and invalidates the ‘nine-dash line’ as a mechanism to delineate that claim—a heavy defeat for China. As expected, China has rejected the ruling. So what’s Beijing’s next likely move?

This dispute is one aspect of a broader Chinese ambition towards rejuvenation under a China Dream and restoration to ‘middle kingdom’ status that would see its neighbours in Southeast Asia relegated to tributary powers. That new Chinese hegemony would challenge US strategic primacy in Asia. The crisis feeds into a Chinese narrative of a ‘Century of Humiliation’ promoted by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to sustain its political legitimacy. So suddenly backing down on a critical Chinese interest would be an intolerable blow to CCP legitimacy, and in particular the reputation of Xi Jinping.

China will use soft power and diplomacy to counter global responses against Beijing’s repudiation of a rules-based international order, but its steady challenge to that order won’t waver, and Beijing won’t back down in the South China Sea.

From a military perspective, Chinese control of the South China Sea allows the extension of a PLA anti-access and area denial (A2AD) ‘bubble’ (here, here, and here) further to the south and east. That allows the PLA to fully employ more advanced submarine and naval surface combatants, longer-ranged strike warfare, and more sophisticated air power to delay or deter US military intervention in any future regional crisis, such as over Taiwan, and support People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) power projection into the Indian Ocean. The South China Sea is also a bastion for China’s Jin class SSBNs and the follow-on Type 096 Tang class SSBNs, particularly in the in the China Sea Basin south of China’s main SSBN base at Hainan Island, which has a maximum depth of 6,000 metres.

Beijing has already made it extremely difficult for ASEAN to reach a unified position on the rival claims to the South China Sea and is sure to continue to coerce the organisation, particularly at the ASEAN Foreign Minister’s meeting in Laos from the 21–26 July. It’ll try to do a deal with unpredictable Philippines’ President Rodrigo Duterte, who has suggested bilateral negotiations with Beijing. It may walk away from long-running negotiations over a multilateral ‘Code of Conduct’. It’ll continue to use both diplomatic pressure and bilateral economic inducements to buy off individual states.

China may also choose to go hard and press claims through military power. That would allow Beijing to demonstrate to the US, Japan and the region—as well as its domestic population—that it won’t be cowed. China has employed ‘grey zone’ actions that keep the use of coercive power below a level that would generate a retaliatory response from the US. Were China to shift above that level, the potential for miscalculation on either side could generate a rapid escalation of events, leading to a military conflict that China simply couldn’t afford to lose, but ultimately may not have the means to win.

There are some clear military steps (and here) that China could contemplate. It has already militarised disputed islands in the Paracels, so extending this to the Spratly Islands is a logical next step. That could include deploying combat aircraft, ground-based missile systems for air defence and anti-surface warfare, and naval forces to artificially created structures on Fiery Cross Reef, Mischief Reef, and Cuarteron Reef. China may contemplate fortifying Scarborough Shoal—a mere 150nm from Manila—or seizing Second Thomas Shoal and ejecting Philippines Marine forces there. Beijing could declare an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) over parts or all of the South China Sea—and rigorously enforce such an ADIZ using air capabilities deployed forward to artificial structures in the Spratly Islands. Finally, China could use its Coast Guard and ‘strategic fishing fleets’ even more assertively to challenge the interests of other claimants, and allow these ‘white hulls’ and ‘little blue men’ (and here) to be supported more directly by PLAN ‘grey hulls’ in a manner that forces China’s opponents to back down.

The Arbitral Tribunal ruling has thrown down a gauntlet to Beijing that it must respond to. At the moment, a strong US naval force in the South China Sea centred on the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan, constrains China’s freedom to act. Absent that forward US military presence, China could calculate a window of opportunity exists in the last months of an Obama Administration, which prefers leading from behind. That could prompt it to act while the US is distracted with a presidential election and seek to present a fait accompli to an incoming administration. Importantly, China probably calculates a tougher ride with a President Clinton, and an entirely unpredictable situation with a President Trump. So from Beijing’s vantage point it may be better to act now rather than risk being deterred in the near future.

Certainly military options carry the risk of miscalculation and escalation, and weaken China’s claim to a peaceful rise, but this cost must be balanced against risk in not acting. Failure to act decisively by Beijing could reinforce a domestic perception of a regime ‘all at sea’ with no clear idea how to proceed further, which would then have implications for regime legitimacy and domestic stability. Already Chinese censors are trying to keep a lid on nationalist anger. Fear of domestic unrest may prompt the Central Military Commission in Beijing to consider the military options more closely.

‘If you aren’t talking dollars, you aren’t talking strategy.’ While that well-known Arthur Tange saying is often used in the context of defence budgets, it can also be applied to alliance management.

One of the most interesting takeaways from Peter Chalk’s fine new ASPI report on the US ‘rebalance within the rebalance’ to Southeast Asia, was the increased size of US Foreign Military Financing. At the 2014 Shangri-La Dialogue, then-Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel announced the US would increase financing by 35%. As Chalk details, November 2015 saw the US announce a $140 million package for Southeast Asia, with allies such as the Philippines getting additional funds for maritime domain awareness and the construction of training and logistic bases.

Simply giving money to allies is never a popular strategy, and in an era of Donald Trump demanding that ‘the countries we defend must pay for the cost of this defence‘, it’s an even tougher sell. Still, the point at which the Obama Administration’s ‘Deep Engagement’ philosophy and counter ‘Offshore Balancing’ clearly converge is building up the capacity and strength of US allies and partners. The easiest and possibly most effective way to do that is simply to give them cash.

There are plenty of precedents for such a policy. Financing the weaker side was a fundamental part of England’s balance of power strategy over the 17th and 18th centuries—for instance, supporting the Grand Alliance against France in the 1680s. Likewise the US spent 17% of its total costs in World War Two helping Russia, the UK and other allies through the Lend Lease program.

In both cases that approach was partly taken because of the challenges of supplying forces to remote theatres. Yet it also stemmed from a recognition that sometimes those on the ground know their own needs better than outsiders do.

Indeed, many foreign aid and domestic welfare workers are increasingly coming to the same conclusion. At its heart, poverty stems from a lack of money. Though we all remember the ‘teach a man to fish’ parable, sometimes it’s better to just give others resources and let them decide how to use them. Inevitably that will lead to some moral hazard problems and waste or corruption. But what’s the point of spending decades trying to improve the quality of Asia’s militaries if their small size will be the central problem in a future conflict?

To do that properly, the US would have to substantially increase the Foreign Military Funding it makes available. But it wouldn’t need to be endless. Power is of course relative, and there’s no way the US can fund its own $600 billion defence budget, as well as bring the rest of the region up to anywhere near China’s $200 billion defence budget.

But the US doesn’t need to do that. Countries either can or can’t have strong surveillance of their territory and landmass. Countries either can or can’t provide ready response forces to immediate crisis situations. Countries either can or can’t resupply troops they’ve located on the remote edges of their territory—or in contested environments. As Israel’s experience shows, moderate consistent support from outsiders can help countries build viable defence industries and establish substantial military capacity.

While many have worried about crowded sea lanes in Asia, it’s still remarkable how few craft most nations have. When it comes to large combatants (frigate-sized or larger), Indonesia has nine large combatant ships. The Philippines has five, Malaysia four and Vietnam just two. For small, Corvette-sized combatants, Indonesia has 26, Vietnam 24, the Philippines nine and Malaysia seven. Compare that to China’s 79 large combatants and 107 small combatants. Or China’s 64 submarines, versus Vietnam’s three.

Building up those forces won’t solve everything. As Nick Bisley rightly points out, the US–China clash is ultimately a political dispute about rules, order and influence in Asia. Most of the day-to-day changes which obsess us are peripheral to solving those dilemmas.

But the stronger Asia is at managing its own affairs, the less politically sensitive the US and allies will be about China trying to create some elbow room. A region where countries have some comfort in their basic protection will be far less worried about slippery-slope arguments about territorial change. That still leaves perplexing identity, history and resource issues, but it does help allay some of the more fundamental concerns.

Perhaps the strongest reason why the US isn’t going to lose its global position in the hierarchy is because of the strength of its economy. It’s time to put that strength to greater work on behalf of US interests. The TPP is part of the story, but it won’t do it alone. The simplest answer may also be the most direct. If the US wants to help Asia get stronger, if it wants allies who can do more on their own, then maybe the simplest answer is to show them the money.

China came to the Shangri-La Dialogue to both romance and rumble.

The language of regional romance jars mightily with the grouchy belligerence over the South China Sea.

The rich suitor came wooing with honey words, then broke the spell by banging on the table.

The China duality was on display in the presentation by Admiral Sun Jianguo, deputy chief of the People’s Liberation Army.

In its 15th year, the Asia Security Summit has some theatrical traditions. The call and response—attack and counter-attack—between the US and China is kabuki-like ritual.

The script repeats each year. The US Secretary of Defense goes on stage in the first plenary and sets up the drama. Ashton Carter performed to order with his attack on China’s ‘expansive and unprecedented actions’ in the South China Sea: ‘Unfortunately, if these actions continue, China could end up erecting a Great Wall of self-isolation.’

Then on Sunday, the head of the China delegation gets to do a plenary push-back. Carter’s speech was all about China all the way through. Admiral Sun’s was a fine expression of the China duality.

The first half was sunshine and romance. The second half was all rumble (rumble definition: a fight between thugs).

China does the romance language so constantly, the words take on ritual quality. Yet the words do matter; more than statement of good intent, they can be measured against performance.

Asia–Pacific countries, the Admiral said, constitute a community of shared destiny, interdependent and inseparable: ‘The bright future for the Asia–Pacific region has to be facilitated by common development and common security of all regional countries’.

China advocates a new outlook which is ‘inclusive, shared and win-win security cooperation by all’.

The jab from Carter that hurt was the line about erecting a Great Wall of self-isolation.

Sun rumbled back: ‘In fact China is open, inclusive and a responsible country. It is a participator and constructor and contributor to the current international system. We were not isolated in the past, we are not isolated now. We will not be isolated in the future.’

The standard Chinese line is that the US is a captive of Cold War zero-sum thinking while China is the champion of a new future—Asia run for and by Asians.

In that view of the world, the US does zero while China does win-win; the sardonic translation of win-win is that China wins all the time.

The Admiral’s version of the zero sum charge: ‘Actually I am worried that some people and countries are still looking at China with the Cold War mentality and prejudice. They may build a wall in their minds and end up isolating themselves.’

With the international tribunal in The Hague about to announce its decision on Manila’s case against China in the South China Sea, Beijing keeps digging in deeper with every statement. The Great Wall of denial builds.

Sun repeated that the tribunal has no jurisdiction over China and the judgement will be ignored. So when the tribunal makes a binding decision (under the UNCLOS that China has ratified) China will announce it doesn’t matter and won’t be accepted.

For China, a reputational disaster looms. China, the law-abiding citizen, will flout the court.

Sun ran the standard line that everybody else caused the problem—the Philippines is berated for daring to go to court and the US is provocative for sailing and flying through the South China Sea.

The issue, he said, had ‘become overheated because of provocations of certain countries for their own selfish interests.’

Admiral Sun said the South China Sea remained stable and freedom of navigation hadn’t been affected.

China always insisted on peaceful settlement of disputes through negotiations and consultations. Those negotiations, of course, should be bilateral and win-win (refer to the sardonic interpretation).

The PLA deputy chief’s best line in the romance vein was this: ‘I always believe that shaking hands is better than clenching fists, opening hearts is better than opening fire. The two world wars gave nothing other than miserable lessons to mankind. We must take history as a mirror, cherish the peace of the world today, and preserve the hard-won situation of peace and security in the Asia–Pacific region.’

Nicely put. Pity about that hand banging the table.