Welcome back; let’s roll.

World Press Freedom Day on Wednesday was marked by the release of the annual World Press Freedom Index, which shows a worsening global situation. (Here’s a run-down on the state-of-play in Asia.) Getting ahead of the curve, Sky’s David Speers last week delivered a keynote at the Press Freedom Australia dinner. His topic, naturally, was fake news. Speaking to the Australian context, Speer implored journos to go ‘back to basics’ and treasure the trust readers place in them. He also had a few choice words on transparency, singling out the oft camera-shy Defence establishment as the worst example in government. ‘When was the last time you saw the Chief of Defence do an interview?’, Speers asked. Well, we’ll have just that here on The Strategist next Wednesday!

An excellent longread from pollster extraordinaire Nate Silver encourages the media to come to grips with the extent to which Hillary Clinton’s race to the Oval Office was damaged by FBI Director James Comey’s October letter to Congress. The tenth article in a series that hopes to unpack the truth behind the biggest political upset of 2016, Silver says that while the letter wasn’t the be-all and end-all of the election results, that the press is still in denial about the fact that the move likely cost Clinton the presidency. Ouch. Comey, of course, this week said the thought of having affected the election outcome makes him ‘mildly nauseous’, testimony which was dissected in The New Yorker and demolished in The NYT.

Here’s China from a few different angles: first, a must-read riposte to a recent lecture delivered by Hugh White (who had a rejoinder of his own). Second, Foreign Policy’s just-released list of the 50 power players in the US and China who are driving the bilateral relationship. Third, a special report recently in The Economist on Beijing’s actions and ambitions in Asia is worth spending some time with. And finally, a corker from The New York Times: Is China the World’s New Colonial Power?

To mark their 20th anniversary, Asia Society Australia are unfolding a collection of 20 essays on Asia and Australia. While Disruptive Asia will receive an official launch in Sydney and Melbourne next month, David Epstein kicked things off in the Fin today by tracking the trend to find Australia’s place in Asia. (Check out his full chapter here.) Asia Society Australia are encouraging everyone play along at home by jumping onto Twitter to contribute under the #DisruptiveAsia hashtag and by subscribing to their newsletter. With 19 more analytical gems to come down the line, this series is one to watch.

And although we’re a day late—something something next year—May the Fourth be with you, dear readers. Take a second to look at this re-upped piece from FiveThirtyEight which charts the relative power of Imperial Forces from the beginning of Rogue One to the conclusion of Return of the Jedi—and shows the aspiring galactic war strategist why you shouldn’t start a ground war on Endor.

Podcast

With the big vote taking place this weekend France has been all over the airwaves. Two podcasts stand out this week, the first from ‘On Point’ (46 mins), featuring Sophie Pedder—The Economist’s Paris bureau chief—and New America CEO Anne-Marie Slaughter. The pair discuss the rise of nationalism and how it affects an increasingly interconnected world. Next up, on the CSIS Podcast (13 mins), Europe program director Heather Conley holds a magnifying glass to round one of the elections, and forecasts what’s next for the European nation.

Videos

Japanophiles can get their fix with a heft of events that have been happening stateside this week. Sasakawa USA pulled together a manel of heavyweights to dive into Asia policy in the time of Abe and Trump (72 mins). Another bunch of dudes had been out in force across town at CSIS the day before, where three esteemed Japanese lawmakers, ably aided by Mike Green, spoke of Japan’s strategy for the Trump administration (86 mins). CSIS also hosted a solid panel (and femme-tastic antidote) looking at US–Japan cyber cooperation and cybersecurity in advance of the Tokyo 2020 Olympics (90 mins).

Footage has emerged (2 mins) this week of the F-35A Lightning IIs taking on the famous Mach Loop Low Flying Area during their first overseas training deployment to Europe. The Mach Loop LFA is a series of valleys in western Wales, and is a go-to training spot for fast jets learning to manoeuvre at low altitudes. (If you’re interested, check out this footage of a A400M Atlas tactical airlifter and some American F-22s strutting their stuff in the Loop).

Events 

Canberra: The Annual Civil Society Report Card has played an integral role in grading the government’s progress in implementing the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security since its inception in 2012. The fourth Report Card will be launched here in the capital next Thursday, get along to make your voice heard. (For some background reading, don’t look past a recent ASPI Strategic Insights paper which examines the WPS agenda and Australia’s implementation role.)

Melbourne: Worried about the state of democracy around the world? Wondering what all the electoral acrobatics mean? Never fear, because Melbourne Uni VC Glyn Davis will soon moderate a panel that’ll canvass a whole range of crucial issues for the concerned citizen. Details here.

When considering Australia’s future in Asia, many of us have had difficulty looking beyond China—but we have many better options in Asia. At the core of our misperceptions are six myths about the potential for cooperation with Beijing.

The first myth is that China is driven by a political and business culture broadly compatible with ours where business and politics operate independently. In reality, Chinese business is inseparable from politics because of the omnipresence of the ruling party, to which all other concerns are subservient, even in private enterprises.

The Communist Party leadership sustains its legitimacy by striving to deliver economic progress and restoring the global preeminence the Chinese civilization once enjoyed. Many rules are tilted against foreigners. Corruption is common, intellectual property theft is rife, and there’s no recourse to an independent judiciary.

A second myth is that a substantial liberalisation and democratisation of China is likely. Since he came to power in 2012, Xi Jinping has taken personal control of the primary organs of the state; dissent has been quashed; the ‘Great Firewall’ has been strengthened, drastically curbing access to international information; religious and other organisations have been suppressed and state intervention in the economy has increased. China is a tightly-controlled authoritarian state which treats dissent harshly.

A third myth is that China is not expansionist. In a 2011 address in London, Malcolm Turnbull stated: ‘it is important to note that China’s growth in power, both economic and military, hasn’t been matched by any expansionist tendencies beyond reuniting Taiwan.’ That would come as a surprise to Tibet, Vietnam and the Philippines, let alone the 23 million in the vibrant democracy on Taiwan.

Then there is Beijing’s effective seizure of over 80 percent of the South China Sea, an area about the size of Western Europe from Poland’s eastern border to the English Channel. The Chinese have effectively occupied almost all of the waters from Hainan to Indonesia and Malaysia and they vigorously apply Chinese domestic law there.

A fourth myth is that China generally abides by international law. The Permanent Court of Arbitration on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea determined unanimously last July that there was no legal basis for China’s claim to historic rights over the resources and areas in the South China Sea. This judgement, carrying the full force of international law, was immediately dismissed by China as ‘null and void.’

In September 2015, when Xi Jinping met President Obama in Washington, he stated that: ‘relevant construction activities that China is undertaking in the Nansha (Spratly) Islands (in the centre of the South China Sea) do not target any country, and China does not intend to pursue militarisation.’

This statement was a falsehood. Finishing touches are now being made to three fighter bases on the islands, each with protected facilities for 24 fighter-bombers and at least four larger aircraft.  Missile installations to target ships and aircraft are also nearing completion.

A fifth myth is that Beijing would never interfere in Australian affairs. In reality, China is running substantial programs to influence Australian opinion with the acquisition of nearly all Chinese language publications; the courting of decision-makers, journalists, business executives and academics through fully paid visits to China; substantial contributions to political parties; the establishment of pro-Beijing associations, including 14 Confucius Institutes in Australian universities; the regular insertion of supplements in newspapers; and the organization of ‘patriotic’ demonstrations, concerts, and other events by its embassy, consulates and other pro-Beijing entities. Cyber and intelligence operations reinforce messages, recruit intelligence agents and ‘agents of influence,’ and intimidate, coerce, and deter counter-actions.

Beijing tolerates little foreign involvement in Chinese life but simultaneously conducts intrusive programs overseas.

A sixth myth is that Australia has no choice but to subsume its interests because China is its most important economic partner. China is Australia’s largest trading partner in terms of imports and exports but Australian firms operating in the US earn four times the value of our simple imports and exports across the Pacific and so America is clearly our most valuable economic partner. China is only the seventh largest source of foreign investment in Australia, far behind the US and Europe. In 2015 alone, the US invested more than the entire stock of Chinese investment here.

China isn’t Australia’s most important economic partner and, because of rising production costs, mounting debt and slowing growth, it may never achieve that. Even if it did, taking a ’value-free’ approach of absolute deference to China would be cynical because it would place Australia’s economic interests above all else and put a price tag on our sovereignty. It would also be naïve because China’s appetite for our compliance could never be satisfied.

In order to make the most of the Indo-Pacific century, Australia should certainly cooperate with China where we can and sell a wide range of goods and services there. However, if are to maximize our success and retain our independence, we need to recalibrate risks and turn increasingly to other parts of the region, especially to our ASEAN neighbours and India.

Malcolm Turnbull’s recent visit to Delhi and his enthusiasm for expanded links is an important advance. India and a number of other Asian countries offer more trustworthy governments, more compatible business and legal cultures, higher rates of economic growth and more sustainable political, economic and strategic partnerships.

Australia faces an increasingly crowded and complex geopolitical environment in the South Pacific. While the most important external powers in the region have traditionally been Australia, New Zealand, the US and France, which have long worked together as partners, a number of new powers are increasingly active, most notably China, Russia, Indonesia, Japan and India. South Pacific states, particularly Papua New Guinea and Fiji, are emerging as regional powers to constrain Australian influence. South Pacific states are also becoming more active on the international stage, further taking them outside Australia’s and their other traditional partners’ sphere of influence.

The complex geopolitics of the South Pacific have also generated shifts in the regional order. While the Pacific Islands Forum, of which Australia is a member, remains the pre-eminent regional political and security institution, South Pacific states have been empowered by their greater choice of non-traditional external partners, disenchanted with the Pacific Islands Forum and encouraged by an emboldened Fiji to create or strengthen alternative regional and subregional institutions and organisations that exclude Australia and their other traditional external partners.

Given the proximity and strategic import of the South Pacific, Australia can’t afford to be complacent about these geopolitical challenges and needs to be more aware of and focused on the region. The geopolitical environment in the South Pacific has important implications for us, particularly given our strategic interest in being the region’s ‘principal security partner’ in order to ensure that no power hostile to Western interests establishes a strategic foothold in the region from which it could launch attacks on Australia or threaten allied access or our maritime approaches.

There’s a risk that China’s growing regional activism could generate destabilising competition with the US in the South Pacific, which would have consequences for Australia, both as the region’s near neighbour and because of flow-on effects on its security relationship with the US and economic relationship with China. While that’s unlikely, the perception that external powers are competing for regional influence has opened up global opportunities for South Pacific states, as it has encouraged the belief that they can play competing great powers against each other. Consequently, South Pacific states appreciate that they have more choice as to which external power (or powers) they engage with. Some appear to be taking advantage of this in order to access aid, concessional loans, military support and international influence.

The geopolitical environment in the South Pacific also has implications for Australia’s strategic interest in ensuring stability, security and cohesion in the region. The influx of aid and investment from non-traditional external powers runs the risk of destabilising recipient states. This raises two main challenges for Australia. First, as the region’s principal security partner with a strong sense of responsibility for the region, we’re likely to feel obliged (and be expected by our partners, particularly the US) to respond to serious instability and conflict. Second, the increased presence and activism of non-traditional external powers, particularly China, raises questions about whether they would intervene to protect their interests and investments and, if so, how Australia would respond.

Australians, and particularly the Australian government, need to be more aware of and focused on the South Pacific. Our attention to the region has peaked at moments when the region was perceived to pose an imminent potential threat, such as during the ‘war on terror’, when ‘weak’ states were perceived to be vulnerable to penetration by terrorists or transnational criminals who might have threatened Australia. This motivated us to intervene to attempt to strengthen state institutions in Solomon Islands, PNG and Nauru. Beyond those moments, our foreign and strategic policy in the region has been characterised by unclear, inconsistent and competing interests and intentions, which has reduced its effectiveness and undermined Australia’s influence.

So what should Australia do to ensure that it remains able to pursue its strategic interests? In my report I outline three proposals. First, Australia’s best chance of ensuring that no power hostile to Western interests establishes a strategic foothold in the region, from which it could launch attacks on Australia or threaten allied access or our maritime approaches, is to do more to remain the region’s principal security partner. Second, to ensure that none of the non-traditional external powers active in the South Pacific becomes hostile to Australia’s interests, or more seriously, a source of threat, Australia should try to draw those powers into a more cooperative approach to development and security. Third, Australia should seek to better cooperate with new regional and subregional institutions to ensure that it isn’t marginalised in the changing regional order.

If Australia is going to ensure that it’s able to respond to the complex and crowded geopolitics of the South Pacific, it needs to prioritise the region in a clear, consistent and sustained way in its foreign and strategic policy planning.

Two visits to Australia by the Chinese leader Li Keqiang illustrate the China sweet-and-sour.

The just-completed trip by Premier Li for the annual leaders’ summit was all about the sweet. Just the fact of the annual talks (won by Julia Gillard) offers oodles of honey: the meeting is the message.

Contrast all the sugar with the sour sharpness when Li Keqiang came to Canberra as Vice Premier in 2009. China had been punishing Oz, kicking and gouging at Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, not least for speaking truth to China in Mandarin.

The tough Australia–China joint statement produced by Li’s 2009 visit is a significant point in the evolution of the state-to-state relationship. I called that document a diplomatic ceasefire, offering my translation of the diplomatese. So clause one, on the ‘great potential and prospects’ of the relationship, was rendered by me as Canberra telling Beijing: ‘We heard you yelling at us. You’ve had your say, now please consider your enduring interests—and show some respect.’

The sweet-and-sour reality is that Australia already has plenty of experience of arguing with China. And the big bets Australia will make on China in this year’s Foreign Policy White Paper call for deeper and broader engagement, based on a continuing readiness to argue.

Australia’s first ambassador to China, Stephen FitzGerald, gives an excellent view of the stakes in his Gough Whitlam Oration: ‘We are living in a Chinese world. But we don’t have a relationship to match it’.

Whitlam’s diplomatic recognition of China in December 1972 envisaged a relationship comparable to those Australia has with Washington or London, Tokyo or Jakarta. Australia would seek with China ‘a comparable familiarity, in government and society, and comparable closeness, access, and trust, and potential to influence,’ FitzGerald says.

Achieving such a broad embrace without being crushed, as FitzGerald notes, requires Australia to know its interests, and be able to say ‘no’. Whitlam set out that ‘no’ side in his letter of instruction to his Beijing ambassador:

‘We … need to measure our actions carefully so that we do not give the Chinese the impression that we are careless of our own interests. They are themselves hard-headed realists, and it would be unnatural of them not to take advantage of us or hold us in contempt for apparent weakness.’

The message is clear but complicated. Australia has to be as tough when it says ‘yes’ as when it says ‘no’.

The equation gets ever more complicated as the security and economic stakes keep growing. The Foreign Policy White Paper will judge and juggle:

1. the reality of the Asian Century, even if ‘Asian Century’ isn’t used; certainly the statement won’t stretch to FitzGerald’s Chinese world
2. the US alliance
3. Australian values and interests, and
4. the rules-based international order.

Australia is no bystander. We’re part of this Chinese world and the dollars and cents offer a sense of magnitude. Consider this primer from David Uren:

‘Australia has not had such an intense trading relationship as it has with China since the early 1950s, before its historic dependence on Britain faded. China takes a third of our exports of goods while its students and tourists provide a quarter of our services income. China also provides more than a fifth of our imports. The two-way trade is worth about $150 billion a year, which is more than next-ranked US ($69bn) and Japan ($60bn) combined.’

Quantity, indeed, has a quality all of its own. The quantity China offers gives a special quality to the questions asked of the Oz polity.

The Foreign Policy White Paper will have to crib the viewpoint, but not the title, of Julia Gillard’s Asian Century White Paper (no Coalition document could ever bear Julia’s moniker). The Asian Century White Paper failed as policy prescription but works well as description and prediction. Asia’s rise is changing the world and the Asian Century has profound implications for Oz:

‘Asia’s extraordinary ascent has already changed the Australian economy, society and strategic environment. The scale and pace of the change still to come mean Australia is entering a truly transformative period in our history.’

While discarding Julia’s Asian Century title, the Coalition can easily do the Asia-future language.

The former Liberal Trade Minister, Andrew Robb, speaks constantly from the Asian Century vision, arguing that ‘China and India will inexorably return to sharing the global economic and political centre of gravity.’ The shift in Oz understanding and actions is just beginning. Here’s Robb on the challenge of the vision: ‘Despite two million Australians speaking an Asian language in the home, our cultural awareness is meagre, our Asian language skills are still largely non-existent and our investment levels in the region embarrassing.’

In dealing with Xi Jinping, Australia engages the despot who went to Davos. Australia can say ‘yes’ to Xi’s Davos endorsement of inclusive, invigorated, economic globalisation. That is, we can embrace the words, while not submitting to the crush of the regime. It’s tough work, but that’s what a smart polity is for.

Part of the answer must be Peter Drysdale’s model for a grand bargain between Australia and China, enshrined in treaty and modelled on Australia’s Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Japan. As the Australia–China Joint Economic Report outlines, get it in writing and argue out the detail. That isn’t Australia bending the knee to China. Rather it’s an Australia confident of its own values and institutions, as tough in saying ‘yes’ as in saying ‘no’.

We were in Washington recently for the latest annual track-2 ‘Quad Plus’ dialogue. The meeting brings together participants from think tanks in Australia, India, Japan and the United States, as well as invited “plus” nations—this year we had representatives from Singapore. (Reflections on previous meetings are here and here.)

This round of talks comes at an important time, with the Quad democracies (and in fact many democracies around the world) facing a series of difficult challenges. In the 12 months since the previous meeting we’ve seen Russia consolidate its position in Crimea and eastern Ukraine through clever use of deniable ‘grey zone’ warfare. And China now has a series of fortified outposts in the South China Sea (SCS), having summarily dismissed the legitimacy of last year’s Arbitral Tribunal finding against it. As well, many democracies are facing internal electoral insurgencies that consume bandwidth and distract from global issues.

Because of our shared values and similar political institutions, it’s easy to find common ground with our colleagues from the other Quad countries—despite the fact that we all have our own parochial issues and security challenges. So the question becomes how to harmonise our efforts to address the common challenges.

One of the most intriguing ideas floated in this year’s meeting came from the US side in a fine paper on South China Sea issues by Professor James Kraska from the US Naval War College. He proposes a three-pronged response to China’s unilateral activities in the SCS. Two of the points are familiar to us: supporting and supplementing American Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) and leveraging the legal high ground provided by the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal ruling on China’s claims.

Consistent with those two approaches, Kraska argues that other countries (including the other Quad countries) should conduct FONOPS to reinforce the internationally established laws of the sea. The logic is that because FONOPS generate—or at least help sustain—public goods, the burden should be shared between the nations that benefit from those goods. And making sure that any FONOPS conform to the findings of the PCA ruling would help to underpin the rule of law that we collectively seek to preserve.

While there’s no doubt that the Tribunal ruling can and should feature prominently in our diplomatic representations on the SCS, FONOPS will likely remain a contentious option for Australia and others. But we were most intrigued by Kraska’s third idea: the use of lawful countermeasures. Countermeasures, in this sense, are actions to impose a cost on states that interfere with other’s rights under international law. In order to qualify as lawful, acts must be proportionate, not disadvantage innocent third parties, and conform with broader international norms, such as respect for human rights.

In the SCS, China is restricting the rights of other nations conferred by UNCLOS—specifically, the right to innocent passage in territorial seas and passage without restriction in an EEZ. At the moment, it does so without incurring any costs beyond diplomatic protests. A lawful response by other states could take the form of imposing similar restrictions on Chinese vessels and aircraft in their EEZ and territorial waters. In practice, that would mean physically shadowing Chinese platforms and asking them to leave. To be clear, we’re talking about searchlights and loudspeakers, not shots across the bow.

We like this idea for a number of reasons. First, it imposes a symmetry on the situation that’s lacking at the moment. Second, it doesn’t increase tensions in the vicinity of third party territories and claims. But the most compelling reason is that it reverses the asymmetry of interests that bedevils the cost–benefit calculus of FONOPS within Chinese-claimed waters.

Rightly or wrongly, China has convinced itself that the SCS is a core interest, and has been increasingly assertive in defence of that interest. The strength of feeling that has been engendered within Chinese society would make it very hard for its government to cede ground now. FONOPS help to delegitimise any legal claim that China has to the waters around occupied features, but since the Tribunal decision, we know that the legal niceties are of secondary importance to China. Deliberations about FONOPS have to factor in the potential of an aggressive Chinese response, and subsequent escalation risks. It’s possible that a FONOP would have to be abandoned for reasons of safety or prudence, but such a back down would seriously undermine the point trying to be made.

Many of those concerns don’t apply in the case of Chinese vessels being challenged in other nation’s waters. The asymmetry of territorial interest would be reversed, adding to the credibility of resistance. And the potential for escalation would be much more in the hands of the country employing the countermeasure. It would be a clear assertion of the rights that we value, but with considerably lower risk than FONOPS in Chinese-claimed waters.

There’s nothing about legal countermeasures that restricts their application to the Quad countries. In principle, it’s a strategy that any country could implement. But the Quad countries are well placed to pursue the strategy by virtue of their naval and maritime air capabilities. Individually it would be a useful form of signalling; collectively it could be very powerful indeed. It’s an idea worth thinking about—and worth recalling the next time the debate about FONOPS rears its head.