Tag Archive for: China

Countering China’s coercive diplomacy

Countering China’s coercive diplomacy: prioritising economic security, sovereignty and the rules-based order

What’s the problem?

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is increasingly using a range of economic and non-economic tools to punish, influence and deter foreign governments in its foreign relations. Coercive actions have become a key part of the PRC’s toolkit as it takes a more assertive position in international disputes and seeks to reshape the global order in its favour.

This research finds that the PRC’s use of coercive tactics is now sitting at levels well above those seen a decade ago, or even five years ago. The year 2020 marked a peak, and the use of trade restrictions and state-issued threats have become favoured methods. The tactics have been used in disputes over governments’ decisions on human rights, national security and diplomatic relations.

The PRC’s tactics have had mixed success in affecting the policies of target governments; most governments have stood firm, but some have acquiesced. Undeniably, the tactics are harming certain businesses, challenging sovereign decision-making and weakening economic security. The tactics also undermine the rules-based international order and probably serve as a deterrent to governments, businesses and civil-society groups that have witnessed the PRC’s coercion of others and don’t want to become future targets. This can mean that decision-makers, fearing that punishment, are failing to protect key interests, to stand up for human rights or to align with other states on important regional and international issues.

What’s the solution?

Governments must pursue a deterrence strategy that seeks to change the PRC’s thinking on coercive tactics by reducing the perceived benefits and increasing the costs. The strategy should be based on policies that build deterrence in three forms: resilience, denial and punishment. This strategy should be pursued through national, minilateral and multilateral channels.

Building resilience is essential to counter coercion, but it isn’t a complete solution, so we must look at interventions that enhance deterrence by denial and punishment. States must engage in national efforts to build deterrence but, alone, it’s unlikely that they’ll prevail against more powerful aggressors, so working collectively with like-minded partners and in multilateral institutions is necessary.

It’s essential that effective strategic communications accompany all of these efforts.

This report makes 24 policy recommendations. It recommends, for example, better cooperation between government and business and efforts to improve the World Trade Organization (WTO).

The report argues that a crucial—and currently missing—component of the response is for a coalition of like-minded states to establish an international taskforce on countering coercion. The taskforce members should agree on the nature of the problem, commit to assisting each other, share information and map out potential countermeasures to deploy in response to coercion.

Solidarity between like-minded partners is critical for states to overcome the power differential and divide-and-conquer tactics that the PRC exploits in disputes. Japan’s presidency of the G7 presents an important opportunity to advance this kind of cooperation in 2023.
 

Introduction

We treat our friends with fine wine, but for our enemies we have shotguns.
—Gui Congyou (桂从友), former PRC Ambassador to Sweden, 20191

The PRC’s use of economic and non-economic coercive statecraft has surged to previously unseen levels,2 as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) more aggressively pursues its ‘core interests’, or bottom-line issues on which it isn’t willing to compromise.3 Those tactics have increasingly been deployed in reaction to other states—especially developed democracies—when they make foreign and security policy decisions that displease the CCP.

Coercive diplomacy encompasses a range of ‘grey zone’ or hybrid activity beyond conventional diplomacy and short of military action. It’s ‘the use of threats or negative actions to force the target state to change behaviour’.4 Much of this is economic coercion—the weaponisation of interdependence in goods and services trade and investment. The use of punitive actions to coerce sits alongside the positive inducements also used to influence as part of a carrot-and-stick approach to foreign relations. The exploitation of economic leverage is often accompanied by other coercive tools as part of a multidomain effort to influence a target. This includes cyberattacks, arbitrary detentions and sanctions on individuals.

The PRC’s use of coercive statecraft presents a particular challenge, as its authoritarian governance allows it to harness a range of malign tactics as part of its broader strategic efforts to reshape the existing global order in its favour. As a hybrid threat, this coercive conduct is often used in a way that exploits plausible deniability and a lack of democratic and market-based restraints. The PRC’s coercive behaviour is rarely formally or clearly declared; nor does it necessarily rely on legitimate legal authority.

While other states, including developed democracies, have and use coercive powers, the nature, scale and intent of the PRC’s conduct pose a distinct threat to the rules-based international order.

The PRC’s use of these tactics is weakening the rules-based, liberal international order. While the methods don’t always cause significant economic harm or succeed in immediately changing a target state’s policy, they have done so and have caused other harms, for example by encouraging an environment of self-censorship and promoting a culture in which policymakers avoid public discussions or advancing policy development in certain areas. Another harm is the disruptive nature of the information environment surrounding the PRC’s coercive actions, which places enormous pressure on politicians and decision-makers (including because some commentators question what ‘concessions’ a government will make to potentially unwind the PRC’s punitive measures).

Some states are nonetheless making difficult decisions in defiance of the PRC’s tactics, which alienate policymakers and populations. However, the PRC’s tactics are probably also functioning as a highly successful signal for many countries, especially developing states, deterring them from making decisions that could provoke PRC aggression. This means that states are compromising important decisions with implications for the international order, human rights and national security.

The main analysis in this report is based on an open-source dataset of examples of coercive diplomacy. The dataset draws on information from news articles, policy papers, academic research, company websites, social media, official government documents and statements made by politicians and business officials. The research team gathered as many examples of coercive diplomacy as could be identified publicly from 2020 to 2022. This carries forward the methodology used for ASPI’s 2020 report, The Chinese Communist Party’s coercive diplomacy.5

In relying on open-source research and mostly English-language sources, this approach does carry limitations. This isn’t intended to be an exhaustive or comprehensive documentation of coercive diplomacy across the world. There will be cases of coercion that have remained private,66 and there may be publicly known cases not captured, especially in countries where English-language reporting is unavailable. This dataset has been compiled to identify trends in the PRC’s use of coercive diplomacy and insights into how and where it operates and how it can be better countered.

In addition to this dataset, the report overviews the PRC’s strategic outlook and analyses a series of in-depth case studies of PRC coercion: Australia, Lithuania and the Republic of Korea. We also conducted modelling of the economic impact of simulated coercive restrictions against those states and analysed the information environment surrounding the actual cases of coercion that they have experienced. The report then concludes with our policy recommendations.

  1. ‘How Sweden copes with Chinese bullying’, The Economist, 20 February 2020, online. This is a reference to ‘My motherland’, the theme song of a Chinese movie about the Korean War. See Fan Anqi, ‘China warns “irretrievable consequences”, “unbearable price” amid US’ Taiwan remarks swings’, Global Times, 24 May 2022, ↩︎
  2. Fergus Hanson, Emilia Currey, Tracy Beattie, The Chinese Communist Party’s coercive diplomacy, ASPI, Canberra, 1 September 2020. ↩︎
  3. For more on China’s core interests, see Appendix 2. ↩︎
  4. See Ketian Zhang, ‘Chinese non-military coercion—tactics and rationale’, Brookings, 22 January 2019. ↩︎
  5. Hanson et al., The Chinese Communist Party’s coercive diplomacy. ↩︎
  6. For example: Primrose Riordan, ‘China’s veiled threat to Bill Shorten on extradition treaty’, The Australian, 5 December 2017, online; Fergus Hunter, ‘Australia abandoned plans for Taiwanese free trade agreement after warning from China’, Sydney Morning Herald, 24 October 2018. ↩︎

The latest flashpoint on the India-China border: Zooming into the Tawang border skirmishes

The latest flashpoint on the India-China border: Zooming into the Tawang border skirmishes

Overview

On 9 December 2022, Indian and Chinese troops clashed at the Yangtse Plateau along the India-China border. The confrontation was the most serious skirmish between Indian and Chinese troops since Galwan in 2020.

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s latest visual project provides satellite imagery analysis of the key areas (including 3D models) and geolocates military, infrastructure and transport positions to show new developments over the last 12 months.

Tawang is strategically valuable Indian territory wedged between China and Bhutan. The Yangtse Plateau is an important location in Tawang because it enables visibility over key Indian supply routes to the region.

Our analysis reveals that rapid infrastructure development along the border in this region means the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) can now access key locations on the Yangtse Plateau more easily than it could have just one year ago. While India maintains control of the commanding position on the plateau’s high ground, China has compensated for this disadvantage by building new military and transport infrastructure that allows it to get troops quickly into the area. 

This new ASPI work builds on satellite analysis that ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre carried out in September 2021, focused on the Doklam region (‘A 3D deep dive into the India-China border’). 

The latest analysis aims to contextualise India-China border tensions by examining the terrain in which this clash took place, and provides analysis of developments that threaten the status quo along the border – a major flashpoint in the region.

The India-China border continues to become more crowded as infrastructure is built and large numbers of Indian and Chinese outposts compete for strategic, operational and tactical advantage. This increases the risk of escalation and potential military conflict stemming from incidental or deliberate encounters between Indian and Chinese troops. These ongoing tensions, and clashes, deserve more attention from regional governments, global policymakers and international organisations.

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State-sponsored economic cyber-espionage for commercial purposes: tackling an invisible but persistent risk to prosperity

As part of a multi-year capacity building project supporting governments in the Indo-Pacific with defending their economic against the risk of cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, ASPI analysed public records to determine the effects, the actual scale, severity and spread of current incidents of cyberespionage affecting and targeting commercial entities.

In 2015, the leaders agreed that ‘no country should conduct or support ICT-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business information, with the intent of providing competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors.’

Our analyses suggests that the threat of state-sponsored economic cyberespionage is more significant than ever, with countries industrialising their cyberespionage efforts to target commercial firms and universities at a grander scale; and more of these targeted industries and universities are based in emerging economies.

“Strategic competition has spilled into the economic and technological domains and states have become more comfortable and capable using offensive cyber capabilities. Our analysis shows that the state practice of economic cyber-espionage appears to have resurged to pre-2015 levels and tripled in raw numbers.”

In this light, we issued a Briefing Note on 15 November 2022 recommending that the G20 members recognise that state-sponsored ICT-enabled theft of IP remains a key concern for international cooperation and encouraging them to reaffirm their commitment made in 2015 to refrain from economic cyber-espionage for commercial purposes. 

This latest Policy Brief, State-sponsored economic cyber-espionage for commercial purposes: tackling an invisible but persistent risk to prosperity, further suggests that governments should raise awareness by better assessing and sharing information about the impact of IP theft on their nations’ economies in terms of financial costs, jobs and competitiveness. Cybersecurity and intelligence authorities should invest in better understanding the extent of state sponsored economic cyber-espionage on their territories.

On the international front, the G20 and relevant UN committees should continue addressing the issue and emphasising countries’ responsibilities not to allow the attacks to be launched from their territories. 

The G20 should encourage members to reaffirm their 2015 commitments and consider establishing a cross-sectoral working group to develop concrete guidance for the operationalisation and implementation of the 2015 agreement while assessing the scale and impact of cyber-enabled IP theft.

‘Impactful projection’: long-range strike options for Australia

Executive Summary

The Australian Government has stated that the ADF requires greater long-range strike capability. This was first stated by the previous government in its 2020 Defence Strategic Update (DSU), which emphasised the need for ‘self-reliant deterrent effects’. The present government has endorsed that assessment: Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles has stated that ‘the ADF must augment its self-reliance to deploy and deliver combat power through impactful materiel and enhanced strike capability—including over longer distances.’ He’s coined the term ‘impactful projection’ to describe the intended effect of this capability, which is to place ‘a very large question mark in the adversary’s mind.’

The term may be new, but the concept is not. To us, it’s a restating of the concept of deterrence by denial; that is, having sufficiently robust capabilities to convince an adversary that the cost of acting militarily against us isn’t worth any gains that might be made.

But the need for the ADF to have those kinds of capabilities has become much more urgent. As the 2020 DSU noted, we no longer have 10 years of warning time of conventional conflict involving Australia. Moreover, this is not just the prospect of conflict far from Australia’s shores. People’s Liberation Army (PLA) force-projection capabilities have grown dramatically in the past two decades and include long-range conventional ballistic missiles, bombers and advanced surface combatants that have already transited through Australian waters.

The ‘worst case’ scenario for Australia’s military strategy has always been the prospect of an adversary establishing a presence in our near region from which it can target Australia or isolate us from our partners and allies. PLA strike capabilities in the archipelago to our north or the Southwest Pacific, whether on ships and submarines or land-based missiles and aircraft, would be that worst case. That could occur as China sought to ‘horizontally escalate’ a conflict with the US to stretch its military resources. So, an enhanced ADF long-range strike capability is not primarily about a conflict off Taiwan or in the South China Sea.

Unfortunately, the ADF’s strike cupboard is rather bare. Defence is acquiring more modern maritime strike and land-attack missiles for its existing platforms. But, even if equipped with better weapons, strike systems built around fighter planes or surface combatants are unlikely to have the ‘affordable mass’ or range needed to deter or defeat a major power’s attempts to project force against Australia.

There’s no doubt that the Defence Strategic Review (DSR) commissioned by the Albanese government is considering new strike options. According to the review’s terms of reference, those capabilities need to be delivered by 2032–33. In this report, we consider options to increase the ADF’s strike power in that time frame.

We start with the US Air Force’s B-21 Raider bomber, which was recently rolled out in California. The B-21 has become a topical issue here but so far there’s been little reliable information to inform the public discussion. This report is a first step in investigating the public data that is currently available on the B-21, while also analysing the B-21’s suitability for Australia’s needs.

As an extremely stealthy bomber that can deliver large amounts of ordnance across our near region, the B-21 is the ‘gold standard’ in strike capability. It could potentially be delivered by 2032–33. But that capability comes at great cost. We estimate the total acquisition cost for a squadron of 12 aircraft to be in the order of $25–28 billion and have a sustainment cost that would put it among the ADF’s most expensive current capabilities (but be significantly less than nuclear-powered submarines).

But that cost is potentially offset by a number of factors. A single B-21 can deliver the same effect as many F-35As. Moreover, B-21s would not require the ‘overhead’ of supporting capabilities such as air-to-air refuellers when operating in our region. Moreover, the B-21 can prosecute targets from secure air bases in Australia’s south, where it has access to workforce, fuel and munitions.

Of course, there are other options for long-range strike. These have their own constellations of cost, capability and risk. Long-range missiles, including hypersonics, have also received much recent attention. But they may be deceptively expensive; the further we want a missile to fly, the more expensive it is, and none of its exquisite components are reusable. Moreover, history suggests that very large numbers of missiles will be needed to defeat an adversary—more than we’re ever likely to be able to afford or stockpile.

Any assessment of capability options needs to be informed by robust cost–benefit analysis. The B-21 certainly has a high sticker price, but if, by virtue of its stealth, it can employ cheaper, short-range weapons, then in the long run it may be more affordable and deliver greater effects than long-range missiles alone. It was analysis of this kind that persuaded the USAF to go down the path of a new bomber. Of course, such exercises are assumption-rich activities, and all assumptions need to be rigorously tested; what’s valid for the US might not be for Australia.

Then there are several options that fall under the heading of the ‘Goldilocks’ bomber: a strike system that doesn’t have the eye-watering cost of the B-21 but still delivers a meaningful capability enhancement. One option is provided by ‘palletised munitions’ dropped from military cargo aircraft. There are two attributes of this approach that have appeal in Australia’s circumstances. The first is that many of the components, such as the missiles and aircraft, are already in ADF inventory or are being acquired. The second is that airlifters can operate from the short and unprepared airfields found in our region. More strike aircraft operating from more locations enhances the survivability of our strike system and complicates the adversary’s operating picture.

Another Goldilocks approach is potentially provided by autonomous, uncrewed systems. They will still need to be large to provide the range needed for impactful projection. However, it’s possible to discern what the solution could look like; for example, a larger version of the Ghost Bat that can deliver ordnance across our near region. At some point, the future of strike will involve larger crewed and uncrewed systems supported by large numbers of ‘the small, the smart and the many’—cheap, disposable systems that Australian industry can responsively produce in mass. The key question is: can that be done within the DSR’s 2032–33 target time frame?

There is potentially a way for Australia to have its cake and eat it too: by hosting USAF B-21s. Under the Enhanced Air Cooperation stream of the US Force Posture Initiative, USAF B-1, B-2 and B-52 aircraft visit northern Australia. In future, having our major ally rotate B-21s through northern Australia could obviate the requirement for Australia to have this kind of long-range strike capability in its own order of battle. Ultimately, the issue comes down to how much independent, sovereign strike capability the Australian Government requires. And any sovereign Australian capability adds to the overall alliance pool, which is the core concept underpinning AUKUS.

This report also examines some of the main arguments against the B-21. While all of them need to be considered seriously, we would also note that the world has changed. The September 2021 AUKUS announcement under which Australia will acquire a nuclear-powered submarine capability demonstrates that. Things that were previously inconceivable are now happening, so we shouldn’t dismiss the B-21 out of hand. Our recommendation is that the Australian Government should engage with the US Government to gain access to the information on the B-21 program so they can make an informed decision on its viability for Australia.

This analysis will form part of wider ASPI program of work looking at the strategic and capability questions that Australia is grappling with, including deterrence and long-range strike.

Frontier influencers: the new face of China’s propaganda

Executive summary

This report explores how the Chinese party-state’s globally focused propaganda and disinformation capabilities are evolving and increasing in sophistication. Concerningly, this emerging approach by the Chinese party-state to influence international discourse on China, including obfuscating its record of human rights violations, is largely flying under the radar of US social media platforms and western policymakers.

In the broader context of attempts by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to censor speech, promote disinformation and seed the internet with its preferred narratives, we focus on a small but increasingly popular set of YouTube accounts that feature mainly female China-based ethnic-minority influencers from the troubled frontier regions of Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia, hereafter referred to as ‘frontier influencers’ or ‘frontier accounts’.

Despite being blocked in China, YouTube is seen by the CCP as a key battlefield in its ideological contestation with the outside world, and YouTube’s use in foreign-facing propaganda efforts has intensified in recent years. Originally deployed on domestic video-sharing platforms to meet an internal propaganda need, frontier-influencer content has since been redirected towards global audiences on YouTube as part of the CCP’s evolving efforts to counter criticisms of China’s human rights problems and burnish the country’s image.

Alongside party-state media and foreign vloggers, these carefully vetted domestic vloggers are increasingly seen as another key part of Beijing’s external propaganda arsenal. Their use of a more personal style of communication and softer presentation is expected to be more convincing than traditional party-state media content, which is often inclined towards the more rigid and didactic. For the CCP, frontier influencers represent, in the words of one Chinese propaganda expert, ‘guerrillas or militia’ fighting on the flanks in ‘the international arena of public opinion’, while party-state media or the ‘regular army’ ‘charge, kill and advance on the frontlines’.

The frontier accounts we examine in this report were predominantly created in 2020–21 and feature content that closely hews to CCP narratives, but their less polished presentation has a more authentic feel that conveys a false sense of legitimacy and transparency about China’s frontier regions that party-state media struggle to achieve. For viewers, the video content appears to be the creation of the individual influencers, but is in fact what’s referred to in China as ‘professional user generated content’, or content that’s produced with the help of special influencer-management agencies known as multi-channel networks (MCNs).

For the mostly young and female Uyghur, Tibetan and other ethnic-minority influencers we examine in this report, having such an active presence on a Western social media platform is highly unusual, and ordinarily would be fraught with danger. But, as we reveal, frontier influencers are carefully vetted and considered politically reliable. The content they create is tightly circumscribed via self-censorship and oversight from their MCNs and domestic video platforms before being published on YouTube. In one key case study, we show how frontier influencers’ content was directly commissioned by the Chinese party-state.

Because YouTube is blocked in China, individual influencers based in the country aren’t able to receive advertising revenue through the platform’s Partner Program, which isn’t available there. But, through their arrangements with YouTube, MCNs have been able to monetise content for frontier influencers, as well as for hundreds of other China-based influencers on the platform. Given that many of the MCNs have publicly committed to promote CCP propaganda, this arrangement results in a troubling situation in which MCNs are able to monetise their activities, including the promotion of disinformation, via their access to YouTube’s platform.

The use of professionally supported frontier influencers also appears to be aimed at ensuring that state-backed content ranks well in search results because search-engine algorithms tend to prioritise fresh content and channels that post regularly. From the CCP’s perspective, the continuous flooding of content by party-state media, foreign influencers and professionally supported frontier influencers onto YouTube is aimed at outperforming other more critical but stale content.

This new phenomenon reflects a continued willingness, identified in previous ASPI ICPC reports,11 by the Chinese party-state to experiment in its approach to shaping online political discourse, particularly on those topics that have the potential to disrupt its strategic objectives. By targeting online audiences on YouTube through intermediary accounts managed by MCNs, the CCP can hide its affiliation with those influencers and create the appearance of ‘independent’ and ‘authoritative’ voices supporting its narratives, including disinformation that it’s seeking to propagate globally.

This report (on page 42) makes a series of policy recommendations, including that social media platforms shouldn’t allow MCNs who are conducting propaganda and disinformation work on behalf of the Chinese party-state to monetise their activities or be recognised by the platforms as, for example, official partners or award winners. This report also recommends that social media platforms broaden their practice of labelling the accounts of state media, agencies and officials to include state-linked influencers from the People’s Republic of China.

  1. Fergus Ryan, Ariel Bogle, Nathan Ruser, Albert Zhang, Daria Impiombato, Borrowing mouths to speak on Xinjiang, ASPI, Canberra, 7 December 2021. Fergus Ryan, Ariel Bogle, Albert Zhang, Jacob Wallis, #StopXinjiang Rumors: the CCP’s decentralised disinformation campaign, ASPI, Canberra, 2 December 2021,https://www.aspi.org.au/report/stop-xinjiang-rumors. ↩︎

Suppressing the truth and spreading lies

How the CCP is influencing Solomon Islands’ information environment

What’s the problem?

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is attempting to influence public discourse in Solomon Islands through coordinated information operations that seek to spread false narratives and suppress information on a range of topics. Following the November 2021 Honiara riots and the March 2022 leaking of the China – Solomon Islands security agreement, the CCP has used its propaganda and disinformation capabilities to push false narratives in an effort to shape the Solomon Islands public’s perception of security issues and foreign partners. In alignment with the CCP’s regional security objectives, those messages have a strong focus on undermining Solomon Islands’ existing partnerships with Australia and the US.

Although some of the CCP’s messaging occurs through routine diplomatic engagement, there’s a coordinated effort to influence the population across a broad spectrum of information channels. That spectrum includes Chinese party-state media, CCP official-led statements and publications in local and social media, and the amplification of particular individual and pro-CCP content via targeted Facebook groups.

There’s now growing evidence to suggest that CCP officials are also seeking to suppress information that doesn’t align with the party-state’s narratives across the Pacific islands through the coercion of local journalists and media institutions.

What’s the solution?

The Australian Government should coordinate with other foreign partners of Solomon Islands, including the US, New Zealand, Japan and the EU, to further assist local Pacific media outlets in hiring, training and retaining high-quality professional journalists. A stronger, more resilient media industry in Solomon Islands will be less vulnerable to disinformation and the pressures exerted by local CCP officials.

Social media companies need to provide, in national Pacific languages, contextual information on misinformation and label state affiliations on messages from state-controlled entities. Social media companies could encourage civil society to report state affiliations and provide evidence to help companies enforce their policies.

Further government funding should be used to support public research into actors and activities affecting the Pacific islands’ information environment, including foreign influence, the proliferation of disinformation on topics such as climate change, and election misinformation. That research should be used to assist in building media resiliency in Pacific island countries by providing information and targeted training to media professionals to assist in identifying disinformation and aspects of coordinated information operations. Sharing that information with civil-society groups and institutions across the region, such as the Pacific Fusion Centre, can also help to improve regional media literacy and understanding of information operations as a cybersecurity issue.

Pacific island countries will need support as great-power competition intensifies in the region. The US, for example, can do more to demonstrate that the CCP’s narratives are false, such as proving Washington’s genuine interest in supporting the region by answering the call of the local Solomon Islands population to do more to clean up remaining unexploded World War II ordnance on Guadalcanal. ASPI has also previously proposed that an Indo-Pacific hybrid threats centre would help regional governments, business and civil society to understand the threat landscape, develop resilience against online harms and counter malign activity.1 It would contribute to regional stability by promoting confidence-building measures, including information-sharing and capacity-building mechanisms.

Introduction

This report explores how the CCP is using a range of influence channels to shape, promote and suppress messages in the Solomon Islands information environment. Through an examination of CCP online influence in the aftermath of the Honiara riots in late 2021 and in response to the leaked security agreement in March 2022, this report demonstrates a previously undocumented level of coordination across a range of state activities. As part of a wider shift in ASPI’s research on foreign interference and disinformation, this report also seeks to measure the impact of those efforts in shaping public sentiment and opinion, and we welcome feedback on those methods. The data collected in this project doesn’t provide an exhaustive record of all CCP influence tactics and channels in Solomon Islands but provides a snapshot of activity in relation to the two key case studies.

In this paper, we use the term ‘China’ to refer to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as an international actor, ‘Chinese Government’ or ‘Chinese state’ to refer to the bureaucracy of the government of the PRC, and ‘Chinese Communist Party’ or ‘party-state’ to refer to the regime that monopolises state power in the PRC.

Methodology

Data collection for this case study covered two discrete periods. The first collection period was for 12 weeks from the beginning of the riots on 24 November (referred to in tables and charts as the Honiara riots case study), and the second period was for six weeks from the leaking of the China – Solomon Islands security agreement on 24 March (referred to as the security agreement case study).2 The analytical methods used included quantitative analysis of publicly available data from a range of sources, including articles from Solomon Islands media outlets, articles from party-state media and Facebook posts in public groups and local media pages based in Solomon Islands. For the purpose of the analysis, any article with more than 80% of its content derived from local or foreign government official sources (direct quotes or statements from diplomatic officials, ministers or embassies, for example) was categorised as an ‘official-led’ article. Examples of such content included editorials, media releases and articles that prominently relied on direct quotes. This data was collected systematically for quantitative and qualitative analysis and was strengthened by deeper investigation into some public Facebook groups and activity. This approach drew upon a previously published framework, titled ‘information influence and interference’, used to understand strategy-driven, state-sponsored information activities.33

We conducted a simple categorical sentiment analysis of social media posts as a measure of the effectiveness of CCP influence efforts. We analysed comments from Facebook posts published by three leading media outlets in Solomon Islands (The Solomon StarThe Island Sun and the Solomon Times) for the two events investigated for this research report. We also analysed comments from posts by the Chinese Embassy in Solomon Islands’ Facebook page, as well as posts in public Pacific island Facebook pages and groups that shared links to party-state media. Relevant comments were categorised as being positive (pro) or negative (anti) towards a particular country or group, such as ‘the West’, which had to be explicitly stated in the comment. Comments that referred to more than one grouping (China, the West, or the Solomon Islands Government) were categorised for analytical purposes based on the dominant subject of the comment. Our initial data collection also sought to analyse information relating to New Zealand, the UK and Japan, but that was prevented by the lack of reporting and online discussion focused on those countries (in this data-collection period, only one article each from New Zealand and Japan were identified).

  1. Lesley Seebeck, Emily Williams, Jacob Wallis, Countering the Hydra: a proposal for an Indo-Pacific hybrid threat centre, ASPI, Canberra, 7 June 2022. ↩︎
  2. Anna Powles, ‘Photos of draft security agreement between Solomon Islands and China’, Twitter, 24 March 2022. ↩︎
  3. Miah Hammond-Errey, ‘Understanding and assessing information influence and foreign interference’, Journal of
    Information Warfare, Winter 2019, 18:1–22. ↩︎

Assessing the groundwork: Surveying the impacts of climate change in China

The immediate and unprecedented impacts of climate change are becoming increasingly apparent across China, as they are for many parts of the world. Since June 2022, China has been battered by record-breaking heatwaves, torrential downpours, flooding disasters, severe drought and intense forest fires.

In isolation, each of those climate hazards is a reminder of the vulnerability of human systems to environmental changes, but together they are a stark reminder that climate change presents a real and existential threat to prosperity and well-being of billions of people. 

Sea-level rise will undermine access to freshwater for China’s coastal cities and increase the likelihood of flooding in China’s highly urbanised delta regions. Droughts are projected to become more frequent, more extreme and longer lasting, juxtaposed with growingly intense downpours that will inundate non-coastal regions. Wildfires are also projected to increase in frequency and severity, especially in eastern China. China’s rivers, which have historically been critical to the county’s economic and political development, will experience multiple, overlapping climate (and non-climate) impacts.

In addition to these direct climate hazards, there will also be major disruptions to the various human systems that underpin China, such as China’s food and energy systems as are discussed in this report. These impacts deserve greater attention from policy analysts, particularly given that they’ll increasingly shape China’s economic, foreign and security policy choices in coming decades.

This report is an initial attempt to survey the literature on the impact that climate change will have on China. It concludes that relatively little attention has been paid to this important topic. This is a worrying conclusion, given China’s key role in international climate-change debates, immense importance in the global economy and major geostrategic relevance. As the severity of climate change impacts continue to amplify over the coming decades, the significance of this gap will only grow more concerning.

Assessing the impact of CCP information operations related to Xinjiang

What’s the problem?

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is using technology to enforce transnational digital repression and influence unwitting audiences beyond China’s territory. This includes using increasingly sophisticated online tactics to deny, distract from and deter revelations or claims of human rights abuses, including the arbitrary detention, mass sterilisation and cultural degradation of minorities in Xinjiang. Instead of improving its treatment of Uyghurs and other Turkic minorities, the CCP is responding to critiques of its current actions against human rights by coordinating its state propaganda apparatus, security agencies and public relations industry to silence and shape Xinjiang narratives at home and abroad.

Central to the CCP’s efforts is the exploitation of US-based social media and content platforms. CCP online public diplomacy is bolstered by covert and coercive campaigns that impose costs and seek to constrain international entities—be they states, corporations or individuals—from offering evidence-based critiques of the party-state’s record on human rights in Xinjiang and Hong Kong and other sensitive issues. This asymmetric access to US-based social media platforms allows the CCP to continue testing online tactics, measuring responses and improving its influence and interference capabilities, in both overt and covert ways, across a spectrum of topics.

The impact of these operations isn’t widely understood, and the international community has failed to adequately respond to the global challenges posed by the CCP’s rapidly evolving propaganda and disinformation operations. This report seeks to increase awareness about this problem based on publicly available information.

What’s the solution?

The exploitation of information operations and propaganda by Russia and China during Putin’s war on Ukraine demonstrates the importance of taking measures to reduce the power and impact of such activities before a crisis or military conflict is underway.1 This is a viable option, given both the success of the West in countering Russia’s false pretexts for instigating an invasion of Ukraine by revealing Russian plans,2 and the outstanding success of the Ukrainian Government’s communication efforts globally. This has undercut attempts by Putin to establish legitimacy in the conflict and has also pressured Beijing into moderating its international and material support for Moscow during the conflict. However, collective action was largely taken only after Russia’s invasion. The CCP has a different modus operandi and seeks to achieve its objectives without military force. It relies on other countries having high tolerance levels before those countries take action, which often means that the harmful impacts of information operations are occurring before any countermeasures are taken.

CCP information operations targeting Xinjiang narratives and human rights abuses should be countered now to mitigate the party’s global campaign of transnational repression and information warfare. Achieving that requires governments and civil society to work more closely with social media platforms and broadcasters to deter and expose propaganda organisations and operatives.

Governments must lead this policymaking process in coordination with allies and partners with shared interests. Economic sanctions regimes that target the perpetrators of serious human rights violations and abuses should be expanded to include the distributors of disinformation and foreign propaganda who silence, intimidate and continue the abuse of survivors and victims of human rights violations. Sanctions targeting propagandists and state media have already been used as an effective tool of statecraft. For example, the Australian Government,3 in coordination with other governments in the US, UK and Europe,4 has sanctioned Russian propagandists and state media for spreading disinformation and propaganda during Putin’s war. Sanctioning Chinese propagandists and state media for their repression of global free speech will curb the CCP’s disinformation and foreign propaganda prior to a conflict, undermine its capabilities during conflicts and deter future information campaigns.

CCP information operations are also evolving and changing. Governments should disrupt Chinese propaganda assets and identify strategic data sources—such as public opinion mining of US-based social media—that are being exploited to improve the party’s influence and interference capabilities. In addition, governments, civil society actors, think tanks and social media operators should create countermeasures and responses to CCP information operations and propaganda activities focusing on the discourse on human rights to blunt and deter malign CCP activity. This should include funding research exposing the Chinese foreign propaganda system, including public relations firms, cultural corporations and public opinion monitoring companies based inside and outside China.

Full Report

You can download the full report here.

  1. See Samantha Hoffman, Matthew Knight, China’s messaging on the Ukraine conflict, ASPI, Canberra, 23 May 2022. ↩︎
  2. Julian E Barnes, Helene Cooper, ‘US battles Putin by disclosing his next possible moves’, New York Times, 12 February 2022. ↩︎
  3. Marise Payne, ‘Further sanctions on Russia’, media statement, 8 March 2022. ↩︎
  4. Treasury sanctions Russians bankrolling Putin and Russia-backed influence actors’, media release, US department of the Treasury, 3 March 2022. ↩︎

China’s messaging on the Ukraine conflict

In the early days of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, social media posts by Chinese diplomats on US platforms almost exclusively blamed the US, NATO and the West for the conflict. Chinese diplomats amplified Russian disinformation about US biological weapon labs in Ukraine, linking this narrative with conspiracy theories about the origins of COVID-19. Chinese state media mirrored these narratives, as well as replicating the Kremlin’s language describing the invasion as a ‘special military operation’.

ASPI found that China’s diplomatic messaging was distributed in multiple languages, with its framing tailored to different regions. In the early stage of the conflict, tweets about Ukraine by Chinese diplomats performed better than unrelated content, particularly when the content attacked or blamed the West. ASPI’s research suggests that, in terms of its international facing propaganda, the Russia–Ukraine conflict initially offered the party-state’s international-facing propaganda system an opportunity to reassert enduring preoccupations that the Chinese Communist Party perceives as fundamental to its political security.

VAMPIRE VAMPIRE VAMPIRE: The PLA’s anti-ship cruise missile threat to Australian and allied naval operations

This report examines anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) possessed by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which is China’s armed forces, and the serious threat posed to Australian and allied naval forces operating in the Indo-Pacific region.

The PLA has spent over 20 years preparing to fight and win wars against technologically advanced adversaries, such as the United States and its allies. PLA preparations have included long-term investments in various capabilities that would be needed to facilitate and sustain ASCM strike operations, even whilst under heavy attack from technologically advanced powers.

This report has recommended a series of upgrades to Australian Navy capability. In the short term, military-off-the-shelf upgrades might significantly enhance the survivability of existing surface ships. In the medium term, a mix of crewed and uncrewed assets could not only deepen fleet magazines but also underpin offensive naval and air defence operations. In the longer-term, a range of options could be acquired to help break the PLA’s kill-chain – this refers to disrupting the PLA’s ability to find, track and engage naval assets with ASCMs.

Tag Archive for: China

Australia’s defences must be ready in two years. Here’s what to do

Beijing deployed a naval task group to the waters around Australia for three related reasons. First, to demonstrate the reach and potency of Chinese sea power and to put Australia on notice that it is vulnerable to the application of that power. Second, to test our political and military responses. Third, to rehearse for wartime operations against Australia.

Regarding the last, the deployment was most likely a rehearsal run for the conduct of a seaborne missile strike on Australia, with China testing how it might most effectively launch missile strikes on Australian military facilities and critical national infrastructure.

The task group was led by a powerful cruiser that was equipped with 112 missile cells from which long-range land attack cruise missiles could be launched at targets across Australia.

In wartime, such an operation would be conducted by an even larger and better protected surface action task group, most probably consisting of the same type of cruiser, one or two escorting destroyers, one or two submarines and a replenishment tanker. The mission of the task group would be to fight through any opposing, mainly Australian, forces to get into optimal firing positions in the waters around Australia.

China would assume that in any plausible scenario where it might need to launch such an attack against Australia—as part of a broader US-China war—scarce US naval and air units almost certainly would be heavily engaged elsewhere in the broader Indo-Pacific region and therefore its attacking force would be able to fight through light, mainly Australian, defending forces.

This is not to say that our treaty ally, the United States, would not willingly come to our aid in such a scenario. The reality, however, is that in any such war the US would have very little spare capacity to do so.

It is not that we would be abandoned. Rather, the defence of Australia would be prioritised by the US according to the imperatives of the broader fight and we would be expected to do more for ourselves.

China also most likely would undertake air-launched long-range missile strikes against Australia. These would involve long-range missiles being launched by H-6 bombers, which most likely would fire them from the north of Indonesia, beyond the perceived range of Australia’s air defences. Submarines also probably would be sent to attack shipping around Australia, mine our ports and sea lanes and destroy undersea cables.

China’s relatively small number of aircraft carriers means it is unlikely that Australia would be subjected to carrier-borne air raids, but the possibility should not be discounted, especially as the Chinese aircraft carrier fleet grows in strength.

We should not delude ourselves that the deployment was a benign exercise, conducted ‘lawfully’ in international waters—with the underlying imputation being that is simply what great powers do.

Regrettably, this was the theme of the Australian government’s initial response, which could not have been better scripted in Beijing itself.

The deployment was a rehearsal and, at the same time, a menacing attempt at strategic intimidation, designed to increase anxiety in the Australian population about China’s growing military power and fuel domestic doubts about the wisdom of potentially risking conflict with China—for instance, over Taiwan.

This day of reckoning was long coming. Once China decided in the early 2000s to develop a blue-water navy, it was always going to focus some of its attention on our sea-air approaches and our nearby waters. This is because Beijing understands that, as a matter of geostrategic logic, Australia’s size and geographical location would be a valuable wartime asset for the US.

Neutralising that advantage is a key consideration for People’s Liberation Army war planners.

The PLA could not afford to yield to the US uncontested access to such a significant and secure bastion and staging area, where US forces could be concentrated in protected locations out of the reach of most of China’s conventional arsenal and from where devastating US strikes could be mounted on Chinese forces and bases in the littoral areas of East Asia, the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean.

While it has not taken a definitive decision to go to war, China has moved into a rehearsal phase for such a conflict. It is determined to give itself the option of fighting and winning a war against the US and its allies. It therefore has to test all of its operational plans, including the neutralisation of Australia’s wartime utility.

We are not special in this regard. China is rehearsing its war plans across the entire Pacific—including in relation to establishing sea control in the littoral rim of East Asia, from Japan to Indonesia, denying US sea and air access to that littoral rim, holding at risk US carrier strike groups and bases, such as Guam, and striking at more distant US staging areas, such as Alaska, Hawaii and Australia.

PLA war planning calculations have nothing to do with the tone or the content of the bilateral Australia-China relationship. They are a function of the hard-headed judgments that PLA war planners need to make. We could have a perfectly ‘stabilised’ relationship, with copious quantities of Australian wine and lobster flowing into Chinese ports, and still be on the PLA’s strike list.

Unfortunately, our response to the deployment was shaped principally by those whose focus is obsessively fixed on the state of the bilateral relationship rather than by those who are paid to think and advise in geostrategic terms.

We should expect more such demonstrations of power projection by China, using not only surface vessels but also submarines, carrier strike groups and H-6 bombers. Such power projection is commonplace around the rimlands and littoral regions of Eurasia, where Chinese, Russian and, increasingly, combined Chinese-Russian operations are mounted frequently against the US (including around Alaska and off Hawaii), Canada, Britain, Japan, Taiwan, The Philippines and others. We have much to learn from these allies and partners in terms of how they deal with such frequent and persistent Chinese and Russian visitors.

Until now Australia has been located safely away from this contact zone of Eurasia, with only Imperial Germany before WWI and Imperial Japan in the early years of the Pacific war of 1941-45 darkening our frontiers.

Today we are no longer protected by distance. Thankfully, there is a ready-made solution to this geostrategic problem. Ever since Kim Beazley commissioned Paul Dibb in February 1985 to conduct a review of Australia’s defence capabilities, the cardinal importance of defending Australia’s sea-air approaches has been at the core of defence planning, even if the requisite capabilities and level of funding required to carry out the resultant military strategy have never fully materialised.

For 40 years, Australian defence planning has been founded on the idea of defending our area of direct military interest, which extends well beyond the continent and the immediate waters around Australia. This means seeking to deny to an adversary the ability to successfully move into and through the sea-air approaches to Australia.

It also means achieving and maintaining sea control in key areas in the waters around Australia. Our strategy is to turn the vast archipelagic arc that extends from the waters to the west of Sumatra to those around Fiji into a great strategic barrier through which any adversary would have to move to attack Australia.

Once this geostrategic logic is understood, much else falls into place—for instance, why it is that Australia could not allow itself to be outflanked to the northeast by the establishment of Chinese bases in the South Pacific, which would represent a catastrophic penetration of the barrier.

In the same way that US president John Kennedy could not tolerate Soviet missiles in Cuba in 1962, we could not tolerate Chinese missile units or bombers having access to bases in the South Pacific.

The geography of this barrier is such that the sea-air approaches to Australia naturally funnel ships and submarines into a small number of chokepoints. When exploited well, chokepoints favour the defender. They create killing zones where attacking forces can be destroyed before they can do harm.

Australian defence planning also has to contemplate more distant operations, forward of the barrier, including in the South China Sea and in the southern portions of the Central Pacific (for instance, in the Guam-Bismarck Sea corridor) to attrite advancing adversary forces even before they reach the chokepoints.

While we have the strategy, which was given its clearest expression in the 1987 and 2009 defence white papers and has been honed across 40 years since Dibb’s landmark report, we do not have the full suite of capabilities or the mindset to execute the strategy in the face of the gathering storm.

We need to be ready by early 2027—which appears to be the earliest time that China will be ready to launch a military operation against Taiwan, which in turn may trigger a wider war.

Of course, assumptions about whether and when China would do such a thing need to be kept under constant review. In strategy, everything is contingent and nothing is inevitable. If it is to come, war will break out whether we are ready or not. Having missed our chance more than 15 years ago to properly start to prepare—when dark prophesies of a possible war first emerged—we now have to do what we can in the time we have. We should urgently do the following things, which are over and above what has been decided by successive Australian governments, most recently in response to the 2023 Defence Strategic Review.

1. Enhance surveillance

First, we must enhance the continuous wide-area surveillance of our area of direct military interest. We must be able to pinpoint the precise locations and track the movement of Chinese (and Russian) ships, submarines and aircraft of interest as far from Australia as possible. This will require the more intensive use and meshing together of the sensor feeds from national intelligence systems, space-based sensors, the Jindalee radar network, P-8 Poseidon maritime surveillance aircraft, MQ-4C Triton surveillance drones, E-7 Wedgetail airborne early warning and control aircraft, undersea sensors and other assets.
A fused situational picture of key Chinese and Russian movements in our area of direct military interest should be developed and shared in real time with US Indo-Pacific Command in Hawaii in exchange for its fused picture of the same. This will require more resources to support 24/7 operations in the Australian Defence Force and the relevant intelligence agencies. Wide-area surveillance of our area of direct military interest cannot be a business-hours activity.

2. Lift operational readiness

Second, we must enhance ADF operational readiness, which means having more forces standing ready to undertake quick alert missions, such as air interceptions and maritime surveillance flights.

This will cost money and drain crews as they will fatigue more rapidly when kept at higher states of readiness. More assertive rules of engagement should be authorised by the defence minister to allow for the close shadowing of Chinese and Russian units in our area of direct military interest. This would be done in a safe and professional manner, as it is being done nearly every other day by our allies and partners who are being probed regularly at sea and in the air.

The ADF’s Joint Operations Command should be reconfigured along the lines of the original vision of defence force chief General John Baker, who in 1996 established the Australian Theatre Command, or COMAUST. Baker’s logic was that the ADF should be postured, and commanded, principally to conduct operations in Australia’s area of direct military interest. While operations farther afield would be undertaken from time to time, they should not be the main focus of the ADF. After 9/11, the ADF adopted a globalist orientation. Mastery of the area of direct military interest started to fall away.

It is time for the ADF to focus zealously once again on the defence of Australia’s area of direct military interest, and our national military command arrangements and systems should reflect this.

3. Acquire longer-range anti-surface warfare capabilities

Third, we must urgently acquire longer-range anti-surface warfare capabilities. A radical suggestion would be to acquire rapidly six to 10 B-1B Lancer bombers from the US Air Force’s inventory. B-1Bs have been configured in recent years for anti-ship strike missions. Each is now able to carry 36 Long Range Anti-Ship Missiles (24 internally in bomb bays and 12 externally), which is a fearsome anti-surface capability. While the RAAF already is acquiring the LRASM weapon for use by its F/A-18F Super Hornets, having a platform in the order of battle with the range and payload capacity of the B-1B Lancer would severely impair PLA options for mounting surface action missions against Australia.

4. Acquire longer-range air superiority capability

Fourth, we must urgently acquire a longer-range air superiority capability to deal with the threat of stand-off attacks by PLA Air Force H-6 bombers operating north of Indonesia. Again, a radical suggestion would be to acquire rapidly the air-to-air version of the SM-6 missile to equip the RAAF’s F/A-18F Super Hornet fighters. Facing such fighters, especially if they were operating forward of the barrier, would make PLA planners think twice about mounting long-range bomber missions against Australia.

5. Remediate naval warfare capability

Fifth, we urgently need to remediate our naval warfare capability, to ensure that our battle fleet of six Collins-class submarines and 10 major surface combatants (the Hobart and Anzac classes) are fully crewed and ready for action.

This will require crewing, training, inventory and maintenance issues to be addressed. The RAN’s replenishment tankers need to be fixed and returned to the fleet as soon as possible. Across time, the RAN battle fleet will need to grow in size, given the rapid growth in the PLA Navy’s battle fleet.

Ideally, we should be aiming across the longer term for a battle fleet of 12 submarines, 20 major surface combatants and 20 smaller offshore combatants, the last of which could be used as missile corvettes and naval mine warfare vessels. To further enhance the RAN’s battle fleet, our large landing helicopter dock vessels should be re-purposed as sea control carriers, with embarked anti-submarine and airborne early warning helicopters and long-range naval drones.

6. Ensure RAAF is battle ready

Sixth, we need to ensure that the RAAF is battle ready, with its squadrons fully crewed and its air bases well protected and fully functional. It is relatively easier to expand an air force, as compared with a navy, given the vagaries of naval shipbuilding. The RAAF is therefore the better bet in terms of a rapid expansion that could be achieved soonest.

More F-35 Lightning II fighters should be acquired, along with the B-1B Lancers mentioned already. The latter could serve as an interim bomber, pending reconsideration of the acquisition of the B-21 Raider strategic bomber. Crewing ratios should be increased quickly, such that the RAAF has more crews than aircraft, which could then be flown more intensively. The extraordinarily rapid expansion of the RAAF’s aircrew training pipeline in World War II should be its guiding vision.

7. Push forward army’s maritime capability

Seventh, the army should continue to develop its increasingly impressive maritime warfare capabilities and readiness. Consideration should be given to the rapid acquisition of the ground-based Typhon missile system, which would give the army a long-range anti-ship and land strike capability. As we barricade the sea-air approaches to Australia, we will have to be vigilant in relation to stealthy commando raids and sabotage operations. The army will need to be postured to deal with such attacks.

8. Address capability gaps

Eighth, we need to remediate a number of other capability gaps where we have no or virtually no capability. Of particular concern is integrated air and missile defence. We will need to acquire some combination of Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) and Patriot interceptors on land and SM-3 interceptors at sea. Naval mine warfare capability also needs to be addressed.

There are likely to be other gaps that would impair our ability to execute the strategy. Given the urgency of the situation, rapidly acquired interim solutions will have to suffice to fill many of these gaps. Such interim solutions can be refined and built on. That is the lesson of the Russo-Ukrainian war.

9. Negotiate PNG alliance

Ninth, a military alliance should be negotiated with Papua New Guinea to provide for the establishment of ADF bases in locations such as Manus, Rabaul and Lae to support the conduct of maritime surveillance, anti-surface, anti-submarine, and air superiority missions. For instance, a forward-deployed composite RAAF wing, consisting of F-35A Lightning fighters, B-1B Lancers armed with LRASM, F/A-18F Super Hornets armed with SM-6 missiles, and P-8 Poseidon maritime aircraft could operate from the Bismarck to the Celebes seas and beyond with the aim of denying access into our northern sea-air approaches. A similar alliance should be negotiated with The Philippines. This would extend our coverage north of the barrier into the South China Sea.

We need to better appreciate the significance of PNG and the Philippines as Pacific watchtowers of the sea-air approaches to Australia. Our Indian Ocean territories are our western watchtowers.

10. Develop a war book

Tenth, we should urgently reinstate the practice of developing a war book that would deal with civil defence, national cyber defence, the protection of critical infrastructure and the general protection, and sustainment of the population during times of war.

 

While the likelihood of war in the foreseeable future is low, perhaps 10 to 20 per cent, it is enough to warrant action. This will cost money and divert resources from more agreeable activities. That is the nature of war, which drains societies even when it does not occur. Against this must be weighed the costs of being unprepared.

While this worsening strategic environment is very confronting, there is an even darker scenario. Imagine if we had to face a coercive, belligerent, and unchecked China on our own. That would require a very different military strategy and a significantly larger ADF.

That is a grim story for another day—and one that may require us to pursue our own Manhattan Project. In that world, we would look fondly on this relatively benign age.

A loss in Europe is a loss in the Indo-Pacific

The United States shocked the world last week with President Donald Trump’s very public rift with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. This was followed by a US pause on military aid and some intelligence sharing with Ukraine, all intended to push Ukraine to agree to a ceasefire on terms favourable to Russia. But Russia’s interests are also China’s. A bad peace in Europe may mean more bad behaviour in the Indo-Pacific.

Trump campaigned for the presidency in part on a commitment to end Russia’s war on Ukraine, without regard for who is the aggressor and who is the victim. He seems to want a legacy as the president who ended wars, contrasting with his predecessors, both Republican and Democrat. The overall direction of US foreign policy is now being shaped to fit within these constraints.

This has empowered voices within the Republican Party who see China, not Russia, as the pacing threat of our time. Key figures in the administration, such as nominee for Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby, have for several years pushed the idea that to meet the threat posed by China, the US must direct resources away from Europe and the Middle East and towards the Indo-Pacific. That position has been widely, though not universally, adopted within the Republican Party.

There is certainly bipartisan agreement in the US that East Asia is now the key theatre for US grand strategy, and that China’s global ambitions and growing military prowess pose a pacing threat to the US and its democratic allies and partners.

In his Senate confirmation hearing this week, Colby said the US must focus on ‘denying China regional hegemony’ and that it ‘would be a disaster for American interests’ if Taiwan were to fall to China. But US aid to Ukraine and Israel has delayed arms shipments to Taiwan, and Colby has said the US simply doesn’t have the capacity to support conflicts in three regions. By his logic, and perhaps now that of the White House, the US must remove its support for Ukraine so it can concentrate its resources against China and in support of Taiwan.

But the reality is that the European and Indo-Pacific fronts are intricately linked as long as Russia and China support each other and their interests are aligned. Countering one adversary will require addressing the influence of the other.

The two countries declared a no-limits partnership just days before Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. Chinese President Xi Jinping reaffirmed that partnership last month on the three-year anniversary of the war. The partnership has been material and substantial: China has provided assistance to Russia’s war machine, geospatial intelligence for its military, markets for its natural resources and sanctioned companies, and backing at the United Nations.

Russia, meanwhile, is strengthening military cooperation with China, including in the Indo-Pacific. In 2024, the US intercepted Chinese and Russian bombers flying for the first time together near Alaska, and Russia joined China in military exercises in the Sea of Japan.

Both countries echo each other’s propaganda, and their massive media and covert disinformation apparatuses amplify each other’s messaging.

Why would China dedicate its resources and risk its reputation in Europe to support Russia in Ukraine if leaders in Beijing did not believe that a Russian win in Ukraine was vital to Chinese interests? Indeed, a Russian victory would be an immense victory for China as well. It would shatter the image of a strong and unified west, show NATO to be a paper tiger and sow doubt throughout the world about the value of US security guarantees. These are all goals that Beijing has pursued for decades, and that are key to the revisionist world order Beijing hopes to craft.

A Russian win in Ukraine, moreover, would create a clear precedent for one of Xi’s most important goals—taking Taiwan. That’s why the Taiwanese government, which has more to lose than anyone else in the Indo-Pacific region, has for three years loudly cheered US support for Ukraine. If Colby’s argument were correct—that is, if US military support for Ukraine ran counter to Taiwan’s interests—Taiwan would now be rejoicing. Instead, Taipei is filled with trepidation.

If the war in Ukraine ends on terms favourable to Russia, both China and Russia will be free to concentrate more of their joint efforts in the Indo-Pacific. Instead of a cautious China and a distracted Russia in the eastern theatre, the US will have to deal with an emboldened China and a vindicated Russia—even as US allies and partners in the region view the US with newfound skepticism. If the US at some point calls on Europe for assistance in East Asia, few would expect them to heed that call.

Defence, not more assertive cyber activity, is the right response to Salt Typhoon

The ongoing Salt Typhoon cyberattack, affecting some of the United States’ largest telecoms companies, has galvanised a trend toward more assertive US engagement in the cyber domain.

This is the wrong lesson to take.

Instead, the US should prioritise investments in cyber defence and reconsider its commitment to persistent engagement, a strategic move away from earlier US approaches based on restraint and deterrence. The attack underscores the risks of an increasingly permissive cyber environment: one in which large-scale cyber operations are normalised, restraint is eroded and investments in cyber defence are insufficient.

In November 2024, reports began spreading that the Salt Typhoon group had penetrated several major US telecommunications networks. These operations compromised sensitive data, including call metadata of US citizens and communications vital to national security agencies. The US government says the Chinese government is behind the attack.

What makes it so concerning is that it exploited long-standing vulnerabilities in obsolete and unpatched network infrastructures. Telecommunications companies, including Verizon, AT&T and T-Mobile, failed to secure network devices, with some systems still operating without multi-factor authentication. Active for more than a year before its detection, the breach highlights the need for additional investments in cyber defence, while also demonstrating the potential consequences of underestimating evolving digital espionage.

While public analyses of the incident are correct in pointing out its significance, they risk missing broader context. The attack is part of a pattern of cyber operations between the US and China.

The US has adopted a cyber persistence strategy, increasing the scale and frequency of operations against adversaries. National Security Agency and Cyber Command activities have expanded, with the US aiming to demonstrate its ability to persistently counter Chinese cyber campaigns while continuing its own efforts to compromise similar systems in China and other countries. The theory underlying this approach is that over time, US adversaries will learn norms of appropriate behaviour in the cyber domain as a result of the US imposing costs through its extensive cyber capabilities. This approach, however, can have unintended risks.

Specifically, it may help to create a permissive environment, where large-scale cyber intrusions are not only expected, but accepted as part of international competition. As the US intensifies its cyber responses, the boundaries of acceptable state behaviour in cyberspace erode, making it harder to establish norms that could minimise future conflicts. China and other countries could view these persistent operations as a justification for their own cyber campaigns, entrenching norms that explicitly authorise large-scale cyber operations.

This does not mean that greater US restraint would fundamentally change China’s or other adversaries’ cyber behaviour, at least in the short term. It is unlikely that most active states in the cyber domain could be quickly induced to curtail operations.

Rather, the continued expansion of US offensive cyber operations, whether in response to the Salt Typhoon attack or more generally, will probably provide opposite lessons to what the proponents of the policy intend.

Cyber operations are unlikely to lead to military escalation. But it does not follow that increased offensive cyber operations will lead to the diffusion of norms of restraint. Rather than sparking tit-for-tat escalation dynamics, the danger is that adversaries and third-party states may conclude that these sorts of attacks are fair on the international stage. This would make the cyber domain a more dangerous place even without escalation to full military conflict. Even if this particular horse is already halfway out of the barn, states should resist the urge to chase it over the horizon.

As the cyber domain becomes increasingly permissive, states are continuing to underinvest in cyber defence. This leaves critical infrastructure vulnerable to prolonged breaches like Salt Typhoon and heightens the probability of those breaches occurring. Despite the US having one of the most advanced cybersecurity systems in the world, the attack remained undetected for more than a year. This prolonged response time underscores a failure: a reactive, rather than preventative, approach to cybersecurity.

The US and its allies should prioritise cyber defence. This would certainly involve technical research and development, which should be supported by increased public research spending. But it would also go beyond that. To respond to the Salt Typhoon attack, the US should develop legal and policy frameworks to channel public and private investment toward cyber defence.

Stricter regulations and cybersecurity standards for telecom providers are also essential, as voluntary measures are failing to counter persistent threats. Revisiting broad liability shields for software firms, at least in some critical infrastructure sectors, could help to ensure better overall levels of security by providing incentives to bring more secure software to market and maintain its security over time. Additionally, states should continue enhancing global cooperation on cyber threat intelligence-sharing and collective defence initiatives.

The Salt Typhoon attack reminds us of vulnerabilities inherent in global telecommunications and cybersecurity frameworks. As state-sponsored cyber activities increase, states should resist the urge to respond by normalising and legitimising large-scale cyber operations. They should instead prioritise defence mechanisms, resilience and the establishment of norms that discourage offensive operations.

When dealing with China, Australia must prioritise security over economics

China’s economic importance cannot be allowed to supersede all other Australian interests.

For the past couple of decades, trade has dominated Australia’s relations with China. This cannot continue. Australia needs to prioritise its security interests when dealing with Beijing, and it shouldn’t overestimate or overstate its vulnerability to China’s coercive trade practices.

Prioritising security is particularly important as we confront escalating global competition and China’s increasingly assertive behaviour. China’s live-fire exercises in the Tasman Sea have once again brought attention to the growing threat of aggressive Chinese military actions in the Indo-Pacific.

The exercises were conducted in international waters and violated no international law. But the behaviour broke norms and was less than ideal: usually, such exercises are preceded by adequate early warning to affected countries. In this case, neither Australia nor New Zealand was informed, and early reports suggest that passenger aircraft that were already enroute were forced to reroute because of the exercises. This is unacceptable international behaviour, and the Australian government should not be shy in saying so.

Australia has been more than accommodating of China. In response to press questions on live-fire exercises, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese said China ‘could have given notice but Australia has a presence from time to time in the South China Sea’. This framing was unwise, to say the least. Albanese no doubt wishes to avoid escalation, but it is unnecessary to provide such false equivalence, which Beijing could exploit. The comment offers China a free pass.

Economic issues are important for political leaders, especially in democracies, where everyday issues take precedence even over discussions about national security. This is probably why Albanese highlighted the government’s success in boosting trade and addressing disputes with Beijing—even though many of these disputes were of China’s doing, rather than Australia’s.

But Australian leaders should also recognise that China is not simply doing us a favour by trading with us. It benefits from the goods and services that Australia offers and the revenue from what it sells. This is a mutually beneficial relationship, and disruptions will affect China too.

While China may be able to source its mineral and other resources from other parts of the world, Australia can similarly find other markets for its resources, as it has in response to previous Chinese trade obstruction. China buys from Australia for a variety of reasons, including price, quality and the predictability of supply. These are not values it can get from anywhere. In many countries, resources are in conflict zones that are difficult to access.

Any trade disruption would likely hurt Australia more than it would hurt China, but it would still damage China’s economy. There is a reason why previous trade punishments have targeted a few niche products, such as wine. China has not targeted critical items, such as mineral resources, precisely because it knows that its own economy would face difficulties if it did so. As China’s economy slows, the cost of transitioning away from Australian goods and services rises.

China has repeatedly used trade sanctions against smaller economies—such as Norway, Canada, Sweden and Mongolia—for perceived slights and other political reasons. But it has never really benefited from doing so, instead gaining a reputation as a bad and unreliable actor. Its trade threats in the past few years have been more bark than bite, with most targeted countries, including Australia, standing their ground and China eventually backing off.

While Australia should not pursue trade confrontation, it may be similarly unwise to emphasise or exaggerate its vulnerability, as this will only invite pressure. Rather, Australia should initiate talks with its European and Indo-Pacific partners, as well as the US, to present a united front against such threats.

China can make threats and apply sanctions only against countries with smaller economies, and only because it thinks they will have to face such sanctions alone. Even if sanctions are ineffective—as indeed they have been—we cannot let China assume that it can get away with such behaviour without consequences. A united response to China’s trade bullying is needed to deter and, if deterrence fails, punish China for such aggressive actions.

Political leaders in democracies no doubt have a hard time balancing economic and security requirements in foreign policy. But they should avoid over-emphasising trade and economic factors—Beijing will assume these are pressure points when leaders talk as if they are. Australia must instead emphasise that it will not bend to such tactics.

In case we forgot, Typhoon attacks remind us of China’s cyber capability—and intent

Australians need to understand the cyber threat from China.

US President Donald Trump described the launch of Chinese artificial intelligence chatbot, DeepSeek, as a wake-up call for the US tech industry. The Australian government moved quickly to ban DeepSeek from government devices.

This came just weeks after the Biden administration stunningly admitted on its way out of office that Chinese Communist Party hackers were targeting not just political and military systems but also civilian networks such as water and health. The hackers could shut down US ports, power grids and other critical infrastructure.

These incidents remind us that China has the intent, and increasingly the capability, to seriously challenge US and Western technology advantage. Australia will be an obvious target if regional tensions continue to rise. It must be well-prepared.

As ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker highlights, China’s advances in critical technologies have been foreseeable for some time. US and Western confidence is manifesting as complacency.

DeepSeek has emerged as a cheap, open-source AI rival to the seemingly indomitable US models. It could enable Chinese technology to become enmeshed in global systems, perhaps even in critical infrastructure.

Meanwhile, Chinese hackers have stealthily embedded themselves in US critical infrastructure, potentially enabling sabotage, or the coercive threat of sabotage, to extract something Beijing wants. The two main perpetrators of these operations are Salt Typhoon and Volt Typhoon. The Chinese government backs both.

Salt Typhoon’s infiltration of at least nine US telecom networks has enabled CCP-sponsored hackers to geolocate individuals and record phone calls, directly threatening personal privacy and national security. This devastating counterintelligence failure includes the identification of individuals that US agencies suspect are agents working for China. It also enables CCP surveillance and coercion of US nationals and Chinese dissidents.

If anything, Volt Typhoon poses a greater threat, with covert access to critical infrastructure networks. Each reinforces the dangers of the other.

Some US officials involved in the investigation have said the hack is so severe, and the networks so compromised, that the United States may never be sure the intruders have been fully rooted out.

Both operations demonstrate sophisticated stealth. In particular, Volt Typhoon’s technique of living off the land—in which they sit at length in the systems, using its own resources—made detection harder. It could gain outwardly legitimate access without the requirement for malware. This reveals an intent to map and maintain access to critical systems, not for immediate destruction, but for whenever best serves Beijing’s interests. In this sense, it can be seen as a precursor to war.

The focus on critical infrastructure underscores how malicious cyber operations can undermine national resilience during peacetime and crises and sow doubt on a government’s ability to safeguard the people. Through these operations, adversaries could influence a target country’s decisions as leaders avoid taking any action that might provoke a disruption or sabotage.

Australia’s intelligence agencies are aware of these risks. Australia’s director-general of security, Mike Burgess, warned in his 2024 annual threat assessment that ‘the most immediate, low cost and potentially high-impact vector for sabotage [by foreign adversaries] is cyber’. This was reinforced in his 2025 assessment when he declared that ‘foreign regimes are expected to become more determined to, and more capable of, pre-positioning cyber access vectors they can exploit in the future.’ He warned that we’re getting closer to the threshold for ‘high-impact sabotage’.

The Australian Signals Directorate has been improving preparedness and resilience. It has helped Australian organisations to defend themselves and mitigate prepositioning and living-off-the-land techniques. ASD has also been building offensive capabilities needed to impose costs on attackers.

We must avoid the traps China sets as it seeks global information dominance. First, we can’t be complacent. It’s unsafe to assume that the US and its allies will remain decisively better than China, and that we can counter whatever Beijing can do. Second, we must reject the viewpoint that ‘everyone spies so it would be hypocritical to condemn China’, as it is a false moral equivalence. Third, we must avoid arguing that there isn’t present threat just because Beijing doesn’t have the intent to go to war today. This wishful thinking is a dangerous mistake. If we fall into these traps, we present Beijing with more time and render ourselves incapable of advancing our interests.

Chinese capabilities are strong and growing, and the way they are being used by the CCP demonstrates clear malign intent. This should be pushing elected governments to take the protective action and prepare for future cyber operations.

The reluctance to see the threats in the information domain as equal to traditional threats is a decades-old mistake that must be corrected. We need to minimise our dependence on China for technology.

China’s naval deployment should invigorate Australia’s election debate

The Australian government’s underreaction to China’s ongoing naval circumnavigation of Australia is a bigger problem than any perceived overreaction in public commentary. Some politicisation of the issue before a general election is natural in a democracy—and welcome if it means Canberra’s defence and China policy settings feature more prominently in debates ahead of the election due by May.

How times have changed. Fifteen years ago, Australia was worried that the quadrilateral partnership with India, Japan and the US would spook China, making it worry that it was being strategically encircled by the US and its regional allies and partners. Wind the clock forward to 2025 and China’s navy is off Perth, circumnavigating Australia with a potent surface action group.

This is the furthest south that a Chinese naval flotilla has ventured. This one is composed of a cruiser, a frigate and a replenishment ship—above the surface, at least.

Naval analysts have urged Australia to temper its reaction to the deployment because Canberra has a reciprocal interest in freedom of navigation in China’s maritime periphery. This is certainly a factor, and to some extent puts the government in a bind. The Chinese navy has a clear legal right to operate in waters close to Australia, even if it is going very far out of its way to make a point. That includes the right to conduct live-fire exercises.

But what point is Beijing making? Even while noting legal reciprocity in freedom of navigation, ordinary Australians are quite entitled to read hostility in China’s intentions. The flotilla was not invited here, and China didn’t notify us it was coming. Carrying out live fire exercises in the Tasman Sea with little or no notice, as the flotilla did on 21 February, wasn’t just unprofessional; it sent an unmistakably coercive signal to Australia and New Zealand.

By sending its navy all the way around Australia, the Chinese Communist Party is signalling that all of Australia lies within reach and is part of its area of direct military interest. It is showing it can project combat power and potentially hold Australia’s maritime communications at risk even though it lacks a base close to the continent. (And we should not think that Beijing has given up on getting one.)

The initial response from Australia’s government was muted and, on the issue of whether China had given warning of its live fire drills, muddled. This, and Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s evident desire to downplay the significance of the deployment will have been noted by Beijing, which with the deployment is testing and comparing reactions in Canberra, Wellington and Washington.

The United States, under new political management, has so far stayed silent on the deployment, despite the concurrent presence in Australia of the chief of its Indo-Pacific Command and a US nuclear submarine at HMAS Stirling, near Perth. There is still time for the US to show its support this week, before the task group completes its tour of Australia and returns to the South China Sea through the Indonesian archipelago, as it can be expected to do.

New Zealand’s initial response was conspicuously better than Australia’s. Defence Minister Judith Collins linked China’s motivations to its strategic quest for greater influence and access to marine resources in the South Pacific, uncomfortably underscored by a recent deal between Beijing and the Cook Islands that blindsided Wellington.

A firmer Australian government reaction could have set the tone for a less divisive political debate. Canberra’s contention that it has stabilised bilateral relations with China looks increasingly questionable in light of the unsubtle ‘or else’ message trailing in the Chinese navy’s wake as it sails around Australia. China’s coercion of Canberra since 2020 has never stopped; it has simply taken different forms.

Australians and New Zealanders should not fall into the trap of viewing China’s naval deployment to their neighbourhood in isolation and adopting a defensive mindset. In fact, the Chinese military is mounting concurrent drills at several locations, including near Japan, Taiwan and the Gulf of Tonkin, close to Vietnam. Beijing is ramping up its military presence across the Western Pacific to calibrate regional reactions, most likely with an interest in probing the strength of US alliances and security partnerships early on in the second Trump administration.

The more Australia and other countries speak with one voice on China, the harder it will be for Beijing to exploit potential wedges.

This will not be the last time a Chinese surface action group undertakes a three-ocean deployment around Australia. But the current deployment may turn political debate to defence spending increases, the hollowed-out state of the Royal Australian Navy’s surface capabilities and the government’s supposed stabilisation policy settings. If it does, we may owe a debt of gratitude to the Chinese navy.

China is on course for a prolonged recession

The risk of China spiralling into an unprecedentedly prolonged recession is increasing.

Its economy is experiencing deflation, with the price level falling for a second consecutive year in 2024, according to recent data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China. It’s on track for the longest period of economy-wide price declines since the 1960s.

Coupled with the collapse of the property sector, a looming trade war with the United States and demographic and debt overhang challenges, much of the Chinese public has lost confidence in the economy and its leadership.

The country has the ingredients for a recession, and not a short one. It has spent too much on investment and needs to turn to consumption as a source of demand, but people are unwilling to spend. They have long had high savings rates, and now deflation is further discouraging spending. So do falling property values, ageing of the population and excessive corporate and government debt.

Getting out of such a recession will be hard, because of the challenge of restoring confidence and getting households and businesses to spend more. Since local government debt is high, expanding public expenditure to stoke demand would worsen economic imbalances.

Current deflation is a result of the Chinese government’s long-standing adherence to the China model, which consists of extensive state control and ownership of resources, limited free-market activity, and authoritarian CCP leadership. The model fuelled both the country’s economic miracle and its most intractable problem: a structural imbalance between investment and domestic consumption.

To sustain fast growth and cushion economic downturns, China has long relied mainly on investment in infrastructure, property and manufacturing. Household consumption is seriously constrained through unfair policies and a discriminatory social security system. These include strictly limited rights to move for work, weak human rights protections and relatively low benefits for migrant workers.

In the 30 years to 2012, investment gradually rose from 32 percent to 46 percent of GDP, while the share of final consumption declined from 66.6 percent to 51.1 percent. The high rate of investment financed necessary infrastructure upgrades and modernised China’s production technology, helping the country become a global manufacturing powerhouse. However, over time, high rates of investment led to severe overcapacity in key industrial sectors, particularly after the 2008 financial crisis.

Under Xi Jinping’s leadership since 2012, the government has persisted with an export-oriented policy. In 2023, investment accounted for 41.1 percent of nominal GDP (versus a global average of 24 percent), with consumption representing 56 percent (versus a global average of 76 percent). China’s trade surplus in 2024 reached a record US$992 billion. This may displease Donald Trump who may choose to implement trade barriers that could further destabilise the Chinese economy.

Xi has failed to progressively institute a welfare state to create the confidence needed for boosting household consumption. He believes welfarism encourages laziness. So, amid ongoing economic and political uncertainty, families have long prioritised cutting expenses and increasing savings, which has further depressed domestic consumption.

In the second quarter of 2024, the central bank’s income confidence index registered 45.6 percent, down 4.4 percentage points from the first quarter of 2022, when the government imposed strict controls against Covid-19. China’s household savings rate surged to 55 percent in 2024, up 11.2 percentage points from 2023 and the highest level since 1952.

Xi has made it clear that he intends to stay the course, and is doubling down on state economic control. China has shifted away from market liberalisation, reverting to state-led development and industrial policy. The private sector has lost out. The share of private enterprises among China’s largest listed companies declined sharply over three years, from 55 percent in mid-2021 to 33 percent in mid-2024. China’s foreign direct investment dropped 27.1 percent in 2024, following an 8.0 percent decline in 2023.

The rapid ageing of China’s population will make it difficult to boost domestic consumption and rein in ballooning debt over the next decade.  The pension system is at risk of running dry by 2035, further exacerbating structural imbalances that policymakers have vowed to address.

With never-ending anti-corruption and ‘strictly governing the Party’ campaigns, Xi has taken China back to a personal dictatorship after decades of institutionalised collective leadership. Under the centralised one-man rule, any efforts by local governments and officials to break the rigid political system risk severe punishment.

More and more laws and regulations have been enacted to surveil the population, driving up social costs. Reformers and advocates of greater freedom of thought and expression have been silenced under Xi’s crackdown on human rights. The political reforms in the Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao eras, which unleashed economic dynamism and spurred innovation, have come to a halt or even regressed.

The government’s stimulus measures have failed to boost economic recovery. Since July 2024, the youth unemployment rate has remained above 17 percent.

The economy might not yet be in recession—meaning contraction in GDP—but it is now growing very slowly by its standards of the past four decades. The government estimates GDP was 5.0 percent higher last year than in 2023, but researchers at Rhodium Group estimate growth was in fact only 2.4 to 2.8 percent.

With Chinese warships nearby, Australia needs to step up as a maritime power

China now fields the world’s largest navy, and last week’s rare foray into our exclusive economic zone should be a wake-up call for Australians. Our most critical economic and security interests travel by sea, and in a rapidly deteriorating strategic environment, we can’t afford complacency. It’s time for Australia to step up as a genuine maritime power.

Over the last decade, China has morphed from a modest coastal navy into a true blue-water force. In 2015, its navy’s battle force—submarines, surface combatants and aircraft carriers—stood at 255 vessels, according to the US Congressional Research Office. That figure has soared to 400 in 2025, with further growth on the horizon. The fleet’s quality has also jumped, with around 70 per cent of China’s current battle force built since 2010.

The Royal Australian Navy fields just 16 battle-force vessels—its smallest and oldest in decades. That includes six submarines aged 22 to 29 years, seven Anzac-class frigates (19 years to 27 years old), and three much newer Hobart-class destroyers that lack the firepower of true destroyers. While the government plans to grow the fleet by the 2030s and 2040s to levels not seen in decades, the current shortfall is compounded by dwindling support capabilities—such as replenishment, hydrography and mine warfare—after decades of underinvestment by successive governments.

Comparing ship counts alone may be crude, but it highlights China’s drive to become a true blue-water maritime power. Its rapid fleet expansion goes hand in hand with sweeping structural reforms, including the creation of a coast guard in 2013—now the world’s largest maritime law enforcement outfit, boasting more than 142 vessels.

Among them is the so-called monster ship 5901 Nansha—nearly four times the size of an Anzac-class frigate, which form the backbone of our surface combatant fleet.

The growth and modernisation of China’s navy has gone hand-in-hand with an increasingly expeditionary strategy. Chinese naval deployments to the Indian and Pacific oceans are on the rise, marked by the establishment of a naval base in Djibouti in 2017 and increasingly common Pacific port visits, including stops in Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea as well as hospital ship deployments to the South Pacific. Against this backdrop, Australia shouldn’t be shocked to see a Chinese navy task group off our east coast.

It’s rightly considered an uncommon occurrence, particularly since Australia’s east coast isn’t exactly on the way to anywhere—making it clear this was a deliberate show of capability. But we should expect it to become increasingly common.

Why should Australia care about China’s growing naval and maritime power? Because our core vulnerabilities lie at sea. Some 99 per cent of our trade travels by ship, and 99 per cent of our data travelling to the rest of the world passes through undersea cables. But it’s not just about data and trade generally; it’s particularly the critical goods that keep our economy running and ensure our security, from fuel and ammunition to pharmaceuticals and fertiliser. Cut off those supplies, and we cripple our economy and security: no fuel means grounded F-35s and idle trucks nationwide.

In a crisis or conflict, an adversary wouldn’t need to invade our shores to bring Australia’s economy—and by extension, our defence—to its knees. All it would have to do would be to cut off our critical seaborne supplies: fuel, fertiliser, ammunition, pharmaceuticals, and more. In a rapidly deteriorating strategic environment, Australia must be able to defend its maritime domain.

Recognising this vulnerability means Australia must develop the capacity to protect critical seaborne supplies in a crisis. It demands focus, structural reform, speed and investment. The 2021 announcement of AUKUS (our nuclear-powered submarine pathway), the planned surface combatant fleet expansion and the army’s move to adopt maritime strike are all crucial steps, but they aren’t enough. We must address the wider gaps in the fleet, and do it at speed.

We must recognise that maritime capability isn’t just hardware; it’s also structure and mindset. We need to reform our civil maritime security, establish a coastguard to free the Royal Australian Navy from border policing and adjust our legislative architecture to build a genuinely capable maritime strategic fleet.

Australia shouldn’t, and can’t, hope to match China’s naval might. Our maritime strategy hinges on alliances and partnerships across the region, including deeper co-operation with partners like the United States, Japan, and India. Yet to safeguard our vital interests at sea, we must demonstrate self-reliance within our alliances – we must develop a comprehensive maritime strategy and resource it.

China’s naval demonstration on Australia’s east coast should serve a reminder of our vulnerability, and a warning that addressing this vulnerability requires Australia to truly recognise its place as a maritime power. Our future prosperity and security depend on it.

China’s ships near Australia. Challenges in the South China Sea. Get used to it

Australia can take three lessons from Chinese military behaviour in the past two weeks.

China will keep conducting dangerous military manoeuvres against us and other countries in the South China Sea; its actions will continue to differ from its words; and it is likely to send advanced Chinese warships to our region more often and for longer.

It has been an eventful fortnight in the China-Australia military relationship. First, on 11 February the Department of Defence reported the fifth known incident of unsafe behavior by China’s military towards the Australian Defence Force. On the same day the department reported that a powerful Chinese naval task group was operating in Australia’s northeastern maritime approaches.

On 17 February, Defence reported that it had restarted senior military talks with China. Talks were held at the level of vice chief of defence and this marked the first time that senior-level dialogue had been held between militaries since 2019 (Previous talks had occurred at the level of chief of defence, and working level talks have been held twice since 2019.

Finally, on 21 February and the following two days, the Chinese task group conducted not one but two live-fire exercises in the Tasman Sea, between Australia’s most populous region and New Zealand. These unprecedented exercises, while consistent with international law, came with limited notice, meaning commercial aircraft had to quickly change flight paths to avoid potential danger. Foreign Minister Wong challenged her Chinese counterpart over the incident on the margins of a G20 meeting in South Africa.

Expect China’s military to keep targeting Australia, as well as other US allies and partners that uphold freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea. In the coming month, ASPI will release a live tracker of military incidents to outline frightening trends of unsafe behavior by China’s military towards Australia, the US, Canada, the Netherlands, the Philippines and any other country that challenges Beijing’s excessive maritime claims.

Second, this fortnight reminds us of the vast gulf between China’s words and actions. China’s readout of the 17 February defence talks noted that both sides had ‘agreed to continue strengthening strategic communication … properly handle disputes and differences, and carry out exchanges and cooperation.’ Its South China Sea challenges are the cause of dispute, while its far seas deployments lack transparency and communication.

This lesson also reminds us that while China’s tactics may change, its strategy does not. We may have ups and downs in our diplomatic, economic and military relations with China, but long-term trends reflect a deteriorating relationship with a global power set on expanding its influence. The past fortnight has provided a snapshot of China’s ability to deploy a variety of tactics, which in this case were designed to signal its military reach and test Australia’s military and diplomatic responses.

The third lesson is that we should expect more Chinese naval deployments in and around Australia’s exclusive economic zone. This trend has been evident since 2022, but there are broader developments underway in China’s military that indicate Beijing’s ambition to develop a global navy that will be able to project power into our region more frequently and for longer periods at a time.

China’s naval strategy for most of the 20th century was focused on coastal defence. However, since 2008, it has deployed naval task groups to the Gulf of Aden for counter-piracy operations. These have typically been made up of two combatant ships and an oiler for logistical support. Each task group can stay in the gulf for about four months.

Due to a lack of support ships or a network of overseas support bases, we haven’t seen regular and sustained deployments by China’s navy to other areas of the globe. But this trend is changing.

In December 2024, the US Department of Defense reported that ‘China is expected to build additional fleet replenishment oilers soon to support its expanding long-duration combatant ship deployments.’ China has 12 replenishment oilers that support long-distance, long-duration deployments. (The US Navy operates 15 replenishment oilers and and can also use the allies’ ports ). Construction of new oilers has become a priority for China, especially given its lack of overseas logistics facilities.

China had initial success in establishing an overseas base at Djibouti, which now provides some logistical support to China’s naval deployments. China also maintains a regular military presence at the Ream naval base in Cambodia. However, despite efforts to persuade other countries, including Pacific Islands countries, China has yet to establish military bases or logistical facilities elsewhere.

As China’s navy improves its logistics and defensive capabilities, a lack of overseas bases will only slow, not stop, China’s ambition to project naval forces into global environs (including Australia’s) more often and for longer durations. This will have implications for Australia’s own limited naval capabilities, which will come under pressure to monitor more Chinese ships in our region, while continuing operations that support freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea.

DeepSeek is in the driver’s seat. That’s a big security problem

Democratic states have a smart-car problem. For those that don’t act quickly and decisively, it’s about to become a severe national security headache.

Over the past few weeks, about 20 of China’s largest car manufacturers have rushed to sign new strategic partnerships with DeepSeek to integrate its AI technology into their vehicles. This poses immediate security, data and privacy challenges for governments.  While international relations would be easier if it weren’t the case, China’s suite of national security and intelligence laws makes it impossible for Chinese companies to truly protect the data they collect.

China is the world’s largest producer of cars, and is now making good quality, low-cost and tech-heavy vehicles at a pace no country can match. It has also bought European industry stalwarts, including Volvo, MG and Lotus. Through joint ventures, it builds and exports a range of US and European car models back into global markets.

DeepSeek has struck partnerships with many large companies, such as BYD, Great Wall Motor, Chery, SAIC (owner of MG and LDV) and Geely (owner of Volvo and Lotus). In addition, major US, European and Japanese brands, including General Motors, Volkswagen and Nissan, have signed on to integrate DeepSeek via their joint ventures.

Australia is one of the many international markets where Chinese cars have gained enormous traction. More than 210,000 new cars were sold into Australia in 2024, and Chinese brands are set to take almost 20 percent of the market in 2025, up from 1.7 percent in 2019. Part of this new success is due to the government’s financial incentives encouraging Australians to purchase electric vehicles. China now builds about 80 percent of all electric vehicles sold in Australia.

Then, there are global markets where Chinese car brands are not gaining the market share they have in Australia (or in Russia, the Middle East and South America), but where Chinese-made cars are. This is the case in the United States and in Europe, for example. This is because many foreign companies use their joint ventures in China to sell China-made, foreign-branded cars into global markets. Such companies include Volkswagen, Volvo, BMW, Lincoln, Polestar, Hyundai and Kia.

Through its Chinese joint venture, Volkswagen will reportedly partner with DeepSeek. General Motors has also said it will integrate DeepSeek into its next-generation vehicles, including Cadillacs and Buicks. It’s unclear how many such cars may end up in overseas markets this year; that will likely depend on each country’s regulations.

It is not surprising that DeepSeek is a sought-after partner, with companies scrambling to integrate and build off its technology. It also shouldn’t have been a shock to see this AI breakthrough coming out of China—and we should expect a lot more. Chinese companies, universities and scientific institutions made impressive gains over the past two decades across most critical technology areas. Other factors, such as industrial espionage, have also helped.

But widespread integration of Chinese AI systems into products and services carries serious data, privacy, governance, censorship, interference and espionage risks. These risks are unlikely ever to go away, and few government strategies will be able to keep up.

For some nations, especially developing countries, this global integration will be a bit of a non-event. It won’t be seen as a security issue that deserves urgent policy attention above other pressing climate, human security, development and economic challenges.

But for others, it will quickly become a problem—a severe one, given the speed at which this integration could unfold.

Knowing the risks, governments (federal and state), militaries, university groups and companies (such as industrial behemoth Toyota) have moved quickly to ban or limit the use of DeepSeek during work time and via work devices. Regulators, particularly across Europe, are launching official investigations. South Korea has gone further than most and taken it off local app stores after authorities reportedly discovered that DeepSeek was sending South Korean user data to Chinese company ByteDance, whose subsidiaries include including TikTok.

But outside of banning employee use of DeepSeek, the integration of Chinese AI systems and models into data-hungry smart cars has not received due public attention. This quick development will test many governments globally.

Smart cars are packed full of the latest technology and are built to integrate into our personal lives. As users move between work, family and social commitments, they travel with a combination of microphones, cameras, voice recognition technology, radars, GPS trackers and increasingly biometric devices—such as those for fingerprint scanning and facial recognition to track driver behaviour and approve vehicle access. It’s also safe to assume that multiple mobile phones and other smart devices, such as smart watches, are present, some connecting to the car daily.

Then there is the information aspect—a potential influx of new AI assistants who will not always provide drivers with accurate and reliable information. At times, they may censor the truth or provide Chinese Communist Party talking points on major political, economic, security and human rights issues. If such AI models remain unregulated and continue to gain popularity internationally, they will expose future generations to systems that lack information integrity. As China’s internal politics and strategic outlook evolve, the amount of censored and false information provided to users of these systems will likely increase, as it does domestically for Chinese citizens.

Chinese built and maintained AI assistants may soon sit at the heart of a growing number of vehicles driven by politicians, military officers, policymakers, intelligence officials, defence scientists and others who work on sensitive issues. Democratic governments need a realistic and actionable plan to deal with this.

It may be possible to ensure that government-issued devices never connect to Chinese AI systems (although slip-ups can happen when people are busy and rushing), but it’s hard to imagine how users could keep most of their personal data from interacting with such systems. Putting all security obligations on the individual will not be enough.

Australia has been here before. Australia banned ‘high-risk vendors’ in from its 5G telecommunications network in 2018, and the debates leading up to and surrounding that decision taught us how valuable it was for the business community to be given an early and clear decision—something some other countries struggled with. Geostrategic circumstances haven’t improved since Australia banned high-risk vendors from 5G; unfortunately, they’ve worsened.

Australia’s domestic policy settings are also driving consumers towards the very brands that will soon integrate DeepSeek’s technology, which politicians and policymakers have been told not to use. Politicians from all parties test-driving BYD and LDV vehicles highlights that parliamentarians may need greater access to more regular security briefings to ensure they are fully across the risks, with updates provided to them in a timely fashion as and when those risks evolve.

Tackling this latest challenge head-on is a first-order priority that can’t wait until after the 2025 federal election.

Governments must ensure this issue is given immediate attention from their security agencies. This needs to include an in-depth assessment of the risks, as well as a consideration of future challenges. Partners and allies should share their findings with each other. An example of the type of activity that should be incorporated into such an assessment is Australia’s experience in 2017 and 2018 leading up to its 5G decision, when the Australian Signals Directorate conducted technical evaluation and scenario-planning.

There is also a question of choice, or rather lack of it, that needs deeper reflection from governments when it comes to high-risk vendors. Democratic governments should not allow the commercial sector to offer only one product if that product originates from a high-risk vendor. Yet there are major internet providers in Australia which provide only Chinese TP-Link modems for some internet services, and businesses which only sell Hikvision or Dahua surveillance systems (both Chinese companies were added to the US Entity List in 2019 because of their association with human rights abuses and violations).

Not only do the digital rights of consumers have to be better protected; consumers must also be given genuine choices, including the right to not choose high-risk vendors. This is especially important in selecting vendors that will have access to personal data of citizens or connect to national critical infrastructure. Currently, across many countries, those rights are not being adequately protected.

As smart cars integrate AI systems, consumers deserve a choice on the origin of such systems, especially as censorship and information manipulation will be a feature of some products. Governments must also provide a commitment to their citizens that they are only greenlighting AI systems that have met a high standard of data protection, information integrity and privacy safeguards.

Which brings us back to DeepSeek and other AI models that will soon come out of China. If politicians, government officials, companies and universities around the world are being told they cannot use DeepSeek because such use is too high-risk, governments need to ensure they aren’t then forcing their citizens to take on those same risks, simply because they’ve given consumers no other choice.