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Chinese Communist Party leaders use ‘collective study sessions’ to identify emerging technologies that they can harness politically. Given the merging of civil and military industrial goals in China, the international community needs to recognise the challenges this strategy poses.

Huawei, one of tech war’s main supporting actors, recently completed the rollout in China of its new operating system, HarmonyOS 2.0, which aims to reduce China’s dependence on US technology. During his presidency, Donald Trump had turned that dependency into an existential threat.

While HarmonyOS is a success story in terms of Chinese innovation and scientific and technological progress, it also gives the party-state significantly more power in cyberspace.

Unlike its US rivals, iOS and Android, HarmonyOS requires third-party developers to go through an extensive identification process involving identity cards, passports and bank credentials. These developers, the growth drivers of such platforms, will be rendered, at least to some extent, subject to Chinese law regardless of where they live. That will enable Chinese authorities to bring previously unassailable individuals within the range of Chinese law by threatening them with sanctions, fines or bans. It will also give China increased leverage over newly developing cyber territories.

HarmonyOS’s strict developer identification process can be seen as part of the general regulatory wave targeting big tech in China. But it’s also a reflection of China’s successful transition towards a ‘government-steered market economy’. Over the past decade, the CCP has gained the ability to formulate, implement and evaluate government interventions. This ‘industrial policy’ is now managed through new institutions, interlocking policies and the strong integration of China’s tech companies. The policy has been tailored to reinforce the CCP’s legitimacy and power by developing emerging technologies and appropriating science and technology.

The CCP’s Politburo Standing Committee has long staged ‘collective study sessions’ (集体学习) to introduce the leadership to new ideas while establishing geopolitical contexts, new vocabulary and rhetorical frameworks. For two decades, these visions have been implemented throughout the party and across provinces through policies and laws, institutionalising party doctrine in emerging technology.

The cornerstone for HarmonyOS to expand the party’s sovereignty over cyberspace was set during the 38th collective study session on the development of internet technology in January 2007. Then president Hu Jintao called for the ‘construction and management of cyber culture’ to ‘spread [Chinese] advanced culture’ and ‘the advanced culture of socialism’. He discussed a ‘purified network environment’ (净化网络环境) and a new ‘order for the dissemination of online information’. That study session was followed by the banning of Google and Facebook within China, the expansion of China’s ‘Great Firewall’ and tighter online censorship.

Under Xi Jinping, government interventions have become more potent and Chinese cyber sovereignty has accelerated. China’s national security interests were extended to cyberspace in 2017.

The independent innovation capabilities of Chinese tech giants are suffering as military and civil industries are drawn much closer together and as accountability to the state for search engines, instant messaging services, websites, online payments, e-commerce and software increases.

Xi has also strengthened the signalling power of CCP study sessions to reach those developing new technologies. He has put more such technologies—big data, artificial intelligence and blockchain—on the study agenda than his predecessors and has made sure that the meetings are managed by his close allies, such as Ding Xuexiang, director of the General Office of the CCP, and Jiang Jinquan, director of the Central Policy Research Office.

Once portrayed as proof of the party’s learning capacity, study sessions are now a feature of a personality cult used by Xi to signal his technological vision to reinforce the party’s hold on power. His interest in ‘studying’ emerging technologies shouldn’t be taken simply as an acknowledgement of their economic gravity; it’s also a recognition of their central function in China’s strategic development.

The CCP holds between one (2002) and 10 (2006, 2015) ‘collective study sessions’ for its top ranks every year. In 2017, the head of the party ordered that a new emerging technology must be studied by the leadership every year. In contrast, Xi only put the overall development of science and technology on the agenda once between 2012 and 2016.

CCP collective study sessions by topic, 2002 to 2021

Source: CCP database of collective study sessions.

Xi declared in 2019 that blockchain would not only reduce cross-departmental and cross-sectoral data islands, but also help China exert ‘normative, discursive and rulemaking power’ through the application of the ‘rule of law’. His words caused a redirection of Chinese blockchain projects towards government services.

Similarly, in 2020 Xi identified quantum technology as an ‘emerging sector of strategic importance’ for ensuring ‘national security’ in which China needed to ‘seize commanding heights of international competition’. Two years before that, he declared AI important to China winning the global science and technology race by ‘becoming the pack leader’ (头雁).

China’s increased governmental steering of the economy has to be seen as inseparable from Xi’s vision for emerging technologies and will continue to have global implications. HarmonyOS’s strict registration requirements could soon include every user of the operating system, not just developers. Given Huawei’s strong and briefly world-leading share in the mobile phone market and China’s integral role in 5G mobile technology and the development of the internet of things, this could soon have an impact on a significant part of the global digital economy.

Accordingly, China’s efforts to standardise emerging technologies should be eyed with caution. That includes Beijing’s growing influence over the governance structures themselves (at Europe’s expense) and over efforts towards regional cooperation on standardisation, including the standardisation of technologies such as 5G and autonomous vehicles. Otherwise, tech standards will be developed rather disharmoniously to meet the primary political interests of the Chinese party-state.

‘Serving as minister of foreign affairs is not an easy task,’ said Joseph Wu, Taiwan’s foreign minister, in conversation with ASPI Executive Director Peter Jennings. ‘Somebody joked that the president must dislike me very much to put me in this position.’

Wu expects his job to get even more difficult over the next year as China continues to intensify pressure against Taiwan on a range of military, economic and diplomatic fronts.

The military pressure is certainly growing more palpable. ‘If you look at the types of military exercises they’ve been conducting, it’s becoming more complex, more suited for modern warfare, and more threatening than ever,’ said Wu. ‘Chinese air exercises around Taiwan increased to almost 1,000 sorties in the last year.’

China has also chalked up some wins in its ongoing efforts to isolate Taiwan diplomatically, with Kiribati, Solomon Islands, Panama and Honduras recently switching their diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing.

And, like Australia, Taiwan has been on the receiving end of Chinese embargoes on its agricultural products.

But a new phase in Beijing’s Taiwan campaign has recently seen it moving to sanction countries that support Taiwan.

‘I’m sure Australian friends have noticed the case of Lithuania. The Lithuanian government decided to have some relations with Taiwan by allowing Taiwan to open up a representative office in Vilnius. The way the Chinese are putting pressure on that small country in the Baltic—it’s unbelievable’.

But that’s not the end point, said Wu. ‘China is targeting European corporations doing business in Lithuania. This is a secondary sanction. Now, the European countries realise that it is a very hostile act against the EU, not just against Lithuania.’

Given the hostility that such moves are generating against China, Wu said that he remained confused about Beijing’s end game. ‘Sometimes I wish that I worked in Zhongnanhai in order to understand why they would do all this, because it’s not in line with their interests in the long run’.

But for Taiwan, China’s actions only make sense in the broader context of its ambitions.

‘If you look at their international operations, we come to a very sober conclusion, that authoritarianism is trying to expand its influence globally, beyond Taiwan. What they have done to Hong Kong, it’s very obvious. Hong Kong is a symbol of freedom and liberalism, politically and economically, but they have put it to an end by imposing the national security law.’

Here Wu points out the mixture of coercive military and economic diplomacy employed by China across the globe. For example, according to the Japanese government, China has dramatically increased its incursions into disputed territories in the East and South China Seas. It also has ramped up tensions in its border dispute with India, has deepened its political and military influence in Africa, and is actively trying to neutralise the EU in any disputes through the economic promise of its Belt and Road Initiative.

Therefore, Wu says Taiwan very much welcomes not just stronger bilateral relationships with his country, but also Australia’s closer relationship with Japan and the AUKUS agreement. All these developments are important in signalling to China that democracies are coming together to push back against the expansion of authoritarianism.

So, what is Taiwan’s plan of action over the next year to counter China’s campaigns of influence and intimidation?

Any strategy will succeed or fail on Taiwan’s diplomatic capacities. Wu explained that, in the first instance, Taiwan wants to impress upon the international community that it is not a troublemaker, that it wants to be a ‘force for good in the world’. He’s been heartened that US decision-makers have supported this view.

But in more than words, Taiwan has been trying to make contributions to the international community wherever possible.

‘We want to be a positive force in making contributions to the fight against terrorism, to preserve religious freedom, to extend democracy and human rights to the areas beyond Taiwan, and to fight against those authoritarian forces like North Korea by joining international sanctions.’

Working with partners to provide international assistance to developing countries is necessary to keep building Taiwan’s reputation. ‘It is very important for Taiwan to shine internationally, to have that Taiwan model of international assistance to other countries,’ said Wu.

Taiwan is especially interested in working with Australia on capacity-building in the South Pacific.

But especially critical is securing Taiwan’s supply of the weapons it needs for self-defence. So securing US support into the long term is Wu’s key priority.

‘We have been working very closely with the United States, as you can imagine. The US has been providing Taiwan not only with defensive weapons, but also with maintenance capabilities, services and training. That has substantially strengthened our defence capabilities.’

But Taiwan has also been collaborating with the US on asymmetric defensive options against increasing Chinese military pressure, said Wu.

In addition, Taiwan is trying to strengthen its reserve forces so that ‘we not only have the first layer of defence, but also the second layer and the third layer of defence’.

Wu also underlined the value of the strengthened relationship with Australia.

But if there was one thing that Australia could do for Taiwan in the next year, it would be to help it join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, known as the CPTPP.

‘Of course, Taiwan is trying to participate in the CPTPP. We have a strategic objective in this, and we are very glad to hear that the Australian decision-makers are very supportive. If Taiwan can join the CPTPP, I’m sure Taiwan–Australia relations would even be closer.’

Remarks by Australia’s prime minister and defence minister and discussions in Washington about the future of US security policy in the Taiwan Strait highlight a growing consensus among like-minded partners about the need to respond to any Taiwan contingency. Unfortunately, these conversations often only explore the contours of a future conflict and too rarely discuss what the US, Australia and others can do to support Taiwan pre-bellum.

Washington and Canberra have a variety of diplomatic and economic tools they can use now to mitigate Chinese coercion and build a coalition for a Taiwan contingency. US and Australian leaders can use these tools to create a broader global consensus that supports Taiwan’s defence, favours closer ties with Taipei, protects the international status quo, and clearly communicates the costs to China of military action against Taiwan.

This should start with the members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—Australia, India, Japan and the US—better articulating the group’s military commitments in the region. While the Quad partners have so far opted not to focus on the security dimensions of their partnership in public, they should cooperate, to the extent possible, across the intelligence, information and cyber domains to deter malign behaviour.

Similarly, the Australia, the UK and the US can use the AUKUS deal to highlight the benefits of closer hard security cooperation and discuss how each country can support Taiwan’s defence in any future conflict scenario. This will help the Quad partners understand how they can field forces necessary to deter China and/or help defend Taiwan, and will signal to smaller countries in the region the Quad’s ability to meet their security needs.

The US and Australia can use the promise of a more engaged Quad to foster closer ties between Taiwan and the international community. China has successfully pressured many countries to abandon their recognition of Taiwan’s government in favour of full relations with Beijing. Several countries have ended their official relationships with Taipei since 2016. Isolation makes Taiwan more vulnerable to Chinese coercion and reduces the international community’s ability to mobilise against Beijing should conflict unfold.

Despite steps taken by some in the US Congress to address this issue, more can be done. A broader coalition would signal to China that Taiwan’s future isn’t just of interest to a few concerned stakeholders; Beijing’s relationship with the international community is at risk. That may not lead China to reconsider military action against Taiwan, but it could help like-minded countries organise an appropriate response to any unilateral action taken by Beijing in the Taiwan Strait.

Deeper ties between Taiwan and the international community would also provide space for countries with historically close ties to the US and Australia to reconsider their engagement on this issue. Freedom-of-navigation operations in the Taiwan Strait by the United Kingdom and France represent welcome action by capable partners, but more is needed. A growing pro-Taiwan international consensus may finally prompt capitals around the world to consider wielding the more serious economic tools in their policy toolboxes.

These options, however, would need to be more than sanctions. Beijing would likely be willing to weather the effects of sanctions (no matter how costly) if it thought they would eventually end. Washington and Canberra would need countries to fundamentally rethink their economic and financial relationships with China. The European Union, for example, imports more goods from China than from any other country. If the EU were to reconsider its trade relationship with China in a Taiwan contingency, it might give Beijing pause.

The US and Australia would need to reassess how they engage with Russia vis-à-vis China as well. Russia and China enjoy a warm relationship and share a similar distaste for America’s view of the international order. Yet Moscow may find reason to cooperate with Washington, Canberra and others on this specific issue. Leaders in Moscow wouldn’t want to trade the current international system for a new order that continues to leave Russia as a ‘junior partner’. Russia will likely never trust any effort led by the US, but anything that would give Moscow an incentive not to support Beijing in a Taiwan contingency should be considered.

None of these diplomatic initiatives on its own would cause Beijing to abandon any plans it might have to attack Taiwan. However, they all capitalise on America’s and Australia’s comparative advantage relative to China in a Taiwan conflict scenario—their extensive network of allies and partners. The US, Australia and like-minded states have the means to impose a variety of costs on China.

However, given the asymmetry of interests involved in a military confrontation, it’s very likely Beijing would tolerate a higher level of losses than would Washington and Canberra. This means that those interested in helping to defend Taiwan and the status quo would need to impose costs beyond those on the battlefield. Washington and Canberra must begin to mobilise support for this course of action now.

Originally published 3 November 2021.

September was a dizzying month in Australian foreign policy, especially in the Australian–American relationship. In quick succession were the 70th anniversary of ANZUS, the announcement of the new AUKUS defence partnership, the annual AUSMIN consultations and the Quad’s first in-person leaders’ meeting. The pace was relentless and the consequences breathtaking, with AUKUS the most notable development.

Much Australian commentary has focused on what drove Canberra to join this partnership—the potential risks and benefits, the political dimensions and the challenges. Less discussed are the multiple factors that drove Washington to this decision. None relate to over-the-top claims that it was motivated by a desperate and provocative grasp at preserving its primacy. Understanding the multiple rationales at work is key to determining how important AUKUS is to America, the strength and durability of its commitment, and the likely evolution of this rapidly changing partnership.

AUKUS represents a sea change in US strategic thinking towards empowering its allies, redistributing its forces around the Indo-Pacific, and better integrating its allies into its supply chains and industrial planning to deal with an increasingly aggressive China. This requires sharing sensitive technologies, deepening intelligence cooperation, pooling resources and changing domestic legislation around export controls. It could fundamentally change America’s engagement with the region, its approach to technological acquisition, and its relationship with Australia and other allies.

Given the strategic, bureaucratic and legislative hurdles, this will be no mean feat. So, what explains this shift in Washington’s attitude? Several factors, as it turns out.

President Joe Biden has repeatedly asserted that alliances are America’s greatest asset and pledged that his administration will repair and reinvest in them. This isn’t simply a desire to apply rhetorical balm after four years of disruptions, although that’s undoubtedly at work too. For Biden, as with nearly all his predecessors, this is a matter of security.

‘When we strengthen our alliances,’ Biden told America’s diplomats shortly after becoming president, ‘we amplify our power as well as our ability to disrupt threats before they can reach our shores.’ This straightforward logic has guided American policymakers for decades: there’s safety, and power, in numbers and threats are best confronted as far from the American homeland as possible.

For Washington, AUKUS is a tangible demonstration of its commitment to allies under duress. More significantly, it is a recognition that in a deteriorating security environment with a shifting balance of power, America is prepared to significantly augment close allies’ capabilities and enable them to do more.

Similarly, America needs to address persistent questions about its commitment to, and staying power in, the Indo-Pacific. Foreign observers have obsessed over how inwardly focused America is, where its actual, as opposed to stated, priorities lie, and its ability to defend itself and others from emerging threats.

America’s allies and partners have asked these questions out of a sense of concern; its adversaries out of a sense of opportunity. In recent months, such concerns were heightened in the aftermath of America’s chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan and growing alarm over Taiwan’s vulnerability. AUKUS will not put an end to those debates, but willingly sharing the crown jewels of America’s technological and military prowess is a big step forward.

Just as significant, AUKUS will help shift America’s strategic focus and lay the foundation for a significantly expanded regional presence. Related to this is the message intended simultaneously for external audiences and domestic ones that the needs of the Indo-Pacific will take priority over other interests and drive bureaucratic choice and resource allocation.

The special regard that Australia is held in, by both American policymakers and the American public, combined with Washington’s desire to do more to help Australia respond to China’s bullying, also helps account for Washington’s willingness to pursue this deal. Australia and America have had a close relationship for decades but, over the past several years, a special interest in, and respect for, Australia’s own policies has grown in the US.

Australia is seen a canary in the coalmine, often the first to experience and be forced to respond to various forms of Chinese coercion and political interference. In Washington, politicians and policymakers now cite Australia as an example of both what Chinese coercion looks like and how to respond. This, and not paeans to the countries’ shared history on battlegrounds, is what is driving Washington’s desire to work more closely with Australia. That sentiment is true at both the elite and popular levels.

Polling reveals that Americans are willing to take significant risks to defend Australia. Biden’s statement that the ‘US has no closer or more reliable ally than Australia’ should be seen as a reflection of these views, and a desire to help turbocharge Australia’s efforts.

Of course, America’s desire to shore up its alliances and display its Indo-Pacific focus goes far beyond its relationship with Australia. But given the amount of trust required to share nuclear secrets and collaborate on cutting-edge technology, AUKUS could only have been undertaken with the closest of allies. As US Secretary of State Antony Blinken declared in May, ‘The US will not leave Australia alone on the field.’ AUKUS should be seen as a significant attempt to make good on that statement.

In strategic terms, AUKUS is largely driven by Washington’s recognition that it needs more capable players in the field (or, rather, in and under the sea) to help correct a shifting balance of power. China’s decades-long economic expansion has allowed its rulers to rapidly modernise its military. Beijing now possesses the world’s second largest defence budget, fields the largest conventional missile force, and controls the biggest navy and coastguard.

While China has poured resources into defence and rapidly grown its forces, the US and its allies and partners have not kept pace. The US still has a military advantage over China, but the gap has been rapidly closing in Asia, and in certain domains it may already have been erased. Without an urgent drive to address such trends, the regional balance of power may soon tip in China’s favour.

Responding to such imbalances requires greater numbers and more advanced capabilities. AUKUS holds out the possibility of fielding more forces and upgrading their capabilities. As China has not yet developed robust anti-submarine capabilities, nuclear-powered submarines can offset Beijing’s advantages—if more Australian, British and American submarines can be put in the water on an accelerated timeline.

A final American motivation is the hope that AUKUS will galvanise greater investments, efforts and collaborations by other nations concerned by the rapid growth of China’s military and its increasingly assertive use. While the sensitivity of the technology being shared and the complexity of the logistical requirements mean AUKUS will remain limited, the idea of nations working together to balance China’s rise is by no means exclusionary. This can already be seen with Japan’s and India’s contributions to the Quad.

Southeast Asia’s initial response to AUKUS has been more varied, but Taiwan, Vietnam, Singapore and the Philippines have all shown a willingness to enhance their defence capacities and augment their security partnerships, even if defence spending across the region remains low.

Europe too has shown interest in increasing its military presence, which makes it even more important to encourage greater regional involvement by France, despite its loss of Australia’s submarine contract. Some of these efforts are more aspirational than others, but the more coordinated efforts take place, the more convincing becomes the argument that Beijing is no longer operating in a permissive security environment.

The desire to empower America’s closest allies; the need to demonstrate the US commitment to, and prioritisation of, the Indo-Pacific region; the respect for and trust of Australia; the drive to balance Beijing with more robust defence capabilities for its allies; and the hope that bold actions will galvanise more nations to act all played a part in Washington’s decision to support AUKUS. Canberra may have initiated this deal with London, but Washington rightly saw the opportunity to advance its own strategic goals.

Australia’s 2020 defence strategic update concluded that the regional security environment was deteriorating more rapidly than earlier assessments indicated, requiring new thinking and new action.

Recognition of an altered landscape and the need to mobilise greater collective efforts can produce radical shifts in what is necessary, and what is possible.

During America’s Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln declared, ‘The dogmas of the quiet past, are inadequate to the stormy present.’ Thus he laid the political, moral and strategic groundwork for the Emancipation Proclamation to formally abolish slavery in America. ‘As our case is new, so we must think anew, and act anew.’ Attempting to motivate his fellow Americans, Lincoln concluded that his nation could succeed only by concert, not with, ‘Can any of us imagine better?’ but with, ‘Can we all do better?’ That simple statement preceded one of the boldest acts of statecraft in American history.

Many questions about AUKUS remain unanswered, and critical ones may not yet have been asked. But Washington and Canberra seem to have made the same bet, that only collective effort, and not individual actions, will produce lasting security and stability.

Originally published 28 April 2021.

There’s a greater likelihood of major conflict in the Indo-Pacific region now than at any time since the end of the Vietnam War.

That’s why the Australian government’s 2020 defence strategic update ended the longstanding planning assumption for the Australian Defence Force that we would have 10 years of strategic warning time to prepare for military conflict.

The Chinese government under Xi Jinping is the major driver of this stark assessment because of its creation of a People’s Liberation Army that is able to project power—and in particular because of its use of the PLA to take over disputed areas in the South China Sea and build military bases there, its use of the PLA on the India–China border, and the high tempo of its aggression in the East China Sea and in the airspace and sea around Taiwan.

These actions have been in direct contradiction with Beijing’s assurances of peaceful intent, which makes it hard to trust the words of Chinese leaders and diplomats when it comes to security.

Most infamously, in 2015 Xi assured US President Barack Obama that China would not militarise the South China Sea—and then went home and accelerated the PLA’s efforts to do just that. More recently, we’ve seen the Chinese government simply abandon its international commitment to maintaining Hong Kong’s open system of free speech and independent courts. Beijing broke its treaty with the UK, introduced a draconian national security law and followed up with arrests, prosecution and long jail terms for Hongkongers who practised political freedoms denied to China’s mainland citizens.

Xi has spoken of using force against Taiwan to unify it with mainland China. He and other senior government figures also speak about defending China’s growing ‘core interests’ by force. Related actions include authorising not just its military, but its coastguard to use lethal force wherever China claims jurisdiction.

None of the above is anything other than simple factual description of what Chinese armed forces have done and what Xi as the commander-in-chief of the PLA has said about using the military.

Reporting what Xi says and what the PLA and other Chinese armed forces do is not ‘stoking the drums of war’; it’s noticing what is happening in our region that affects our security. It is a matter of empirical fact that Chinese military incursions into Taiwanese airspace in 2021 are at record levels, multiple times the average over the previous four years. And Chinese naval activity around Taiwan has also intensified.

This military pressure is being felt in Taiwan and is the reason for various international leaders’ meetings mentioning Taiwan in their public statements.

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken did so in Alaska, at the first senior-level US–China meeting following US President Joe Biden’s first phone call with Xi.

Taiwan was discussed at the March virtual meeting of the Quad leaders, and also featured in the statement of the US–Japan summit between Biden and Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga last week.

Discussion of the potential for conflict without naming the source of this conflict naturally leads to anxieties and also to claims that people are stoking war by talking.

The source of instability and tension in our region is the Chinese state under Xi and its use of the PLA. Saying this is being open about why there is tension in the Indo-Pacific.

Being able to say what the source of the problem is useful if you then want to do things to resolve the problem. A ‘country agnostic’ approach to the causes of regional insecurity is simply not credible—and distorts public debate.

Australia contributes to a powerful combination of allies and partners that can provide credible deterrence and raise the costs of military adventurism for China. But this does require unity of effort and clear-minded analysis of the issues at hand.

The government’s plan for developing Australia’s military capabilities is designed around shaping the strategic environment in ways that make military conflict less likely, and having the military power and partnerships to deter conflict.

That plan includes giving the ADF more offensive power to raise the costs of conflict for others. And it’s based on strong alliance and security partnerships, with the US, Japan, India and Australia’s other security partners in the Five Eyes, the wider Indo-Pacific region and Europe.

This isn’t about Australia acting alone.

No one power needs to face the challenge of deterring Beijing from use of military force alone; it is best done multilaterally. And before anyone contemplates the use of military force, the costs of conflict can be raised by other activities. In Taiwan’s case, that includes reintegrating it into international forums and organisations like the World Health Organization and UN bodies, reversing Beijing’s long-term political isolation of the island.

But the idea that quiet behind-the-scenes diplomacy will raise the costs of conflict in Xi’s eyes and act as a deterrent seems to have no supporting evidence from recent history. Instead, the evidence suggests that the Chinese government’s confidence that its actions won’t have consequences is increased by international silence on regional security and is reduced by international discussion and cooperation.

Xi has no doubt been encouraged by the limited international response to his takeover of Hong Kong institutions and repression of freedoms China guaranteed to retain for decades. His military activities in the South China Sea have also proceeded without tangible opposition.

But he will have noticed that Taiwan is featuring at international meetings in discussions about finding ways to support Taiwanese security and reintegrate it into the international community. These efforts are all about reducing the prospects of China using force against Taiwan’s 23 million people.

The Chinese government’s judgements about being able to use force against Taiwan with impunity are affected by this, which is why Chinese government officials react so stridently to any moves to support Taiwan. Changing those calculations is the goal of credible deterrence.